Thesis (M.B.A.)--University of Hong Kong, 1993.

Zugl.: Leipzig, Universiẗat, Diss., 2008. / Includes bibliographical references (p. [502]-534) and index.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1975. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 497-516).

Universiẗat, Diss., 2004--Köln. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 269-284).

Thesis (doctoral)--Universiẗat Kiel, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 285-309).

Business opportunities are a chance for a company to grow its activity and to further the aggregate welfare of the society as a whole. Corporate opportunities rules and their functional equivalents should enable companies to develop their business activities when directors discover those business opportunities. Companies need to be certain that they can legally appropriate those business opportunities. A company should have this ability when it is the best potential exploiter of the opportunity at issue, which is likely when the opportunity is a chance to expand the company's line of business or to pursue vertical integration. In fact, a company's appropriation of new business opportunities justifies a company's sunk costs that stem from its specific investments. Hence, the tests adopted for identifying corporate opportunities in US (Delaware), German (line of business test), UK, French, Spanish and Italian corporate laws (interest test) reflect the need to further efficiency by way of diminishing hold-up costs. Remedies against misappropriations of corporate opportunities by directors should both pursue maximum disclosure of new corporate opportunities by directors and preserve the possibility of alternative allocations of a corporate opportunity, when a company's director can exploit the opportunity more efficiently than the company. Such an alternative allocation may occur through negotiation or through efficient breach of duty. It is suggested that a differential remedial system (higher sanctions for breach of duty following non-disclosure) would maximize both disclosure and efficient allocation. This approach is closer to the one that exists in Anglo-American law than to the one adopted in most civil law jurisdictions. The present differences in various corporate laws may be connected to the existence of institutional complementarities, which should be taken into account in future reforms.

Text in Afrikaans / The Companies Act, 1973 ("the Act") contains no specific provision dealing with the relationship between a nominee shareholder and its principal, the beneficial shareholder. The Act merely contains a variety of references to this unique relationship without specifying the content thereof or elaborating on the rights of the beneficial shareholder. It is clear from the Act that no legal connection exists between the company and the beneficial shareholder and a company is only obliged to recognise its registered members. It has become apparent that beneficial shareholders need more protection than is currently afforded to them in terms of our common law. Currently beneficial shareholders have a common law right to claim return of their shares from any person (even bona fide third parties) in the event of the misappropriation of such shares by their nominee shareholders. Beneficial shareholders are unprotected if their nominee shareholders were to act contrary to their instructions, for example by not voting at the general meeting in accordance with the instructions of the beneficial shareholders. Having regard to the fact that the relationship between the beneficial shareholder and the nominee shareholder is based on agency or trusteeship, the beneficial shareholder will be entitle to compel its nominee to transfer the shares to another person. This may, however, have stamp duty implications and if the nominee refuses to give its cooperation in respect of such transfer, costly legal action may be the only solution for the beneficial shareholder. In deciding which section of the Act should be adapted to include the rights of beneficial shareholders, the following sections have been considered: Section 266 (statutory derivative action), section 252 (statutory remedy in the event of prejudice), section 440K (compulsory acquisition of securities of minorities) and section 344(h) (liquidation on grounds of equity). The only one of these sections which provides the court with a wide enough discretion to afford the required protection is section 252. An important point in this regard is that section 252 cannot effectively be extended to beneficial shareholders unless they also acquire the right to have access to the same company information as the members of the company would receive. In an attempt to create a balance between the needs to greater protection of beneficial shareholders and the avoidance of unnecessary cumbersome administrative obligations on companies, it is suggested that a register of beneficial shareholders be created and that companies be obliged to inform all beneficial shareholders appearing on such register of the same company information as is provided to registered members. The Act must make it clear that : • a beneficial shareholder can only be recorded in the register with the assistance of its nominee shareholder; • the relevant nominee shareholder must satisfy the company secretary that the person which is recorded in the register is in fact its principal; • the only two instances where the company secretary will be entitled to remove the beneficial shareholder is in the first instance where the beneficia] shareholder consents to such removal and secondly where the shares held by the registered member is transferred. The latter ground will avoid continued provision of company information to persons not involved with the company. No duty will be placed on companies to ensure that the names and addresses of beneficial shareholders are correct. This will be the responsibility of beneficial shareholders. The improved flow of company information will facilitate the improved awareness by beneficial shareholders of relevant events and together with the appropriate extension of section 252, will go a long way in improving the much needed protection of beneficial shareholders. / Mercantile Law / LL.M. (Handelsreg)

Le droit des sociétés prévoit un régime de nullité dérogatoire du droit commun, applicable aux actes et délibérations de la société. Cependant, l’accroissement du contentieux, encouragé par des textes particulièrement sibyllins, et l’important travail d’interprétation fourni par la jurisprudence révèlent manifestement l’insuffisance des dispositions actuelles. C’est ce que nous nous proposons de constater dans une première partie. L’imperfection des textes apparait dès l’étude du domaine du droit spécial, les notions d’acte et de délibération ne permettant pas d’en tracer correctement les contours. L’analyse des causes de nullité confirme les lacunes du droit positif. Le système des nullités, reposant sur une distinction infondée entre violation d’une disposition expresse et violation d’une disposition impérative, soulève d’inextricables difficultés. L’imprévisibilité des solutions est du reste renforcée par une politique jurisprudentielle instable, tantôt audacieuse, tantôt rigoureuse. Dans le même sens, l’étude des règles processuelles, gouvernant l’action en nullité et le prononcé de la sanction, met en évidence la confusion entourant le régime des nullités sociales. Tous ces maux nous conduisent à une même conclusion : la nécessité d’une réforme. Fort de ce constat, nous proposons dans une seconde partie les moyens d’une éventuelle réforme. Pour rendre la matière plus lisible et plus prévisible, il nous faut redéfinir le domaine des nullités sociales mais aussi simplifier et moderniser les règles de nullité, au regard des mutations ayant marqué le droit des sociétés ces dernières années. Au demeurant, l’équilibre du système de nullités des décisions sociales suppose de repenser les règles processuelles, dans l’optique de juguler le contentieux et d’inhiber les effets perturbateurs de la sanction sur le fonctionnement de la société. / The company law provides for a special nullity system, applicable to acts and décisions of the company. However, the increase of litigation, reinforced by abstruse rules, and the different jurisprudential interpretations, highlights the inadequacy of the current rules. This is what we propose to demonstrate in the first part. The imperfection of the rules appears as soon as the field of the special law is studied. The analysis of grounds of nullity confirms the shortcomings of the positive law. The system of nullity, based on the distinction between violation of an express provision and violation of an imperative provision, causes inextricable difficulties. The unpredictability of solutions is strengthened by an unstable caselaw. Moreover, the study of the process by means of a court declaring the nullity of an defective act or decision leads to the same negative comments. Taking the imperfection of positive law into account, we conclude the need for legal reform. Accordingly, we propose in the second part the means of a possible reform. To make the rules easier to understand, we have to redefine the field of the nullity system but also to simplify and modernize the rules, according to transformations which have marked the company law in recent years. Finally, a comprehensive reform of the nullity system implies the rebuilding of the procedural rules, in order to decrease litigation and to reduce the disruptive effects of the sanction on the company.

No abstract available. / Dissertation (LLM (Mercantile Law))--University of Pretoria, 2006. / Mercantile Law / unrestricted

China permits foreign investors to establish foreign investment companies limited by shares (FICLBS) together with Chinese domestic investors after 1995. FICLBS are a new form of foreign investment in addition to Sino-foreign Equity Joint Ventures, Sino-foreign Contractual Joint Ventures and Wholly Foreign Owned Enterprises. In the meantime, FICLBS have close relations with and are strictly governed by PRC Company Law. The double nature of FICLBS accounts for many characteristics of FICLBS. As a form of foreign investment, FICLBS are based on the foreign investment regime. FICLBS are governed by the legal provisions relating to foreign investment regime. At the same time, various State and Party policies give various characteristics to FICLBS and make them different from other foreign investment enterprises. As a form of modern company, FICLBS are greatly influenced by both civil law and common law as a result of the policy of joining the world economy. This thesis focuses on the common law influences. The influences of common law on FICLBS are manifest in various respects. On the other hand, various Chinese characteristics are intentionally remained. These Chinese characteristics can be found in many important phases and aspects of FICLBS such as corporate capacity, corporate governance, shares and dividends. The contradicting characteristics of FICLBS are a product of the contradicting State and Party policies underlying them. On one hand, China adopts the opening-up policy and has been making constant efforts to join the world economy. On the other hand, China has always been trying to maintain the so-called Chinese characteristics despite the fact that there is no generally accepted definition of Chinese characteristics. Although China has always been committed to keeping its policies consistent, the unstable nature of the policy basis of FICLBS will inevitably affect the future of FICLBS. However, since the opening-up policy of China will not possibly be reversed in the future, FICLBS will remain available for foreign investors no matter how the specific policies are changed. / Law, Peter A. Allard School of / Graduate