The Companies Act of 71 of 2008 makes a number of important changes to the rules relating to capital maintenance. In line with the objectives of the Companies Act of 71 of 2008, section 44 of the Act has removed the prohibition on the provision of financial assistance by a company which was contained under the previous section 38 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973. Despite the repeal of the prohibition, a transaction which involves the provision of financial assistance by a company for the acquisition of or subscription of its own securities still needs to be effected in accordance with the requirements and conditions that are provided under the Act and Memorandum of Incorporation. To explore the new developments, within this study, the provision of financial assistance in terms of section 44 of the Companies Act of 2008 is, therefore, analysed in detail. On the other hand, the UK Companies Act of 2006 repealed the prohibition on the giving of financial assistance by private companies in most circumstances. It, however, retained the prohibition to public companies only because of the requirements of the Second Company Law Directive (77/91/EEC). This study also explores the rules of financial assistance by a company under the UK Companies Acts in detail. Though the source of financial assistance by a company both in South Africa and in English Company laws is rooted in the English decision of the Trevor v Whitworth case, currently these countries have adopted what is deemed appropriate and significant in their own countries. This study, therefore, examines and compares the rules governing the provision of financial assistance by a company in the company laws of these two countries. / Mercantile Law / LL.M. (Commercial law)

Good corporate governance should be the cornerstone of all company management. Directors ought to know in whose interests the company should be managed. This thesis attempts to answer the following question: whose interests must be granted primacy in the management of a company? In chapter 1 it is stated that shareholders' interests are traditionally granted primacy in the management of a company. There has, however, been a shift in public opinion towards recognition of a wider variety of interests that should be considered than only those of the shareholders. These interests include, inter alia, environmental interests and those of the investors, employees and consumers. This thesis thus focuses on the primary stakeholders, namely individual shareholders, creditors, employees, consumers and suppliers. In chapter 2 a theoretical foundation is provided on the nature of a company. The different theories on the nature of a company, emphasising either shareholder primacy or stakeholder protection, are discussed. A combined new theory is proposed. It is suggested that the confusion relating to the meaning of "the company" needs to be eliminated. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 provide an international comparison of the company law in Botswana, Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. The focus falls, firstly, on directors' duties, secondly, on the question in whose interests directors should manage a company and, thirdly, on the codification of their duties. In chapter 6 the South African position is evaluated. First, the possible stakeholders are identified and the protection currently afforded them is explained. The reports of the King Committee on Corporate Governance, the Policy Document on company law reform as well as the Companies Bill of 2007 are discussed. Draft clauses are recommended to be incorporated in new company legislation to provide directors with clarity on what is expected of them. It is the aim of this thesis to provide clarity on whose interests should receive primacy when directors manage a company. The outcome of this research should provide a clear indication to South African directors of what is expected of them and who the beneficiaries of their fiduciary duties are. / Law / LL.D.

Company directors, being human, may be tempted to promote their own interests rather than those of the companies on whose boards they serve. Directors are subject to a number of legal duties. A director has a fiduciary duty to act in good faith and in the best interests of the company. A number of other duties flow from this duty such as the duty to avoid a conflict of interests. The duty of a director not to appropriate a corporate opportunity belonging to the company of which he or she is a director, also flows from the duty to avoid a conflict of interests. The common-law duties of directors which have their origins in English law, have developed over a number of years. Because of the difficulty that directors had in establishing what their duties were, a number of jurisdictions embarked on a process of codifying or partially codifying these duties. South Africa, Australia and England are three countries that have promulgated legislation which has resulted in the codification or partial codification of directors’ duties. The purpose of the codification or partial codification of directors’ duties was firstly to clarify the duties of directors, and secondly to make the duties more accessible to those affected by them – the directors of companies. In South Africa the Companies Act 71 of 2008 has partially codified the duties of directors. Because directors’ duties have only been partially codified there is uncertainty regarding their scope. This dissertation will focus on the possible effect of the 2008 Companies Act on the duty of a director not to take a corporate opportunity falling to the company. In this dissertation I address two issues involving the effect of the 2008 Companies Act on the duty of a director not to appropriate a corporate opportunity belonging to the company. Firstly, I consider whether the partially codified directors’ duties are wide enough to cover issues involving the appropriation of corporate opportunities. Secondly, I consider the appropriate common-law test or tests to be applied in determining whether, in the specific circumstances, an opportunity should be classified as a corporate opportunity. In considering whether the partially codified duties of directors are wide enough to include the corporate-opportunity rule, I compare the approach to corporate opportunities and the corporate-opportunity rule in South Africa, Australia and England. / Mercantile Law / LL.M. (Corporation Law)

It is in the area of the regulation of a company's share capital and distributions to shareholders that the inherent conflict between creditors and shareholders, and the fragile balance among shareholders internally, intersect. The share capital of a company underlies its corporate structure and represents not only its initial own funds from which creditors can be paid, but also the relative equity interests of the shareholders. The balance between shareholders can be disturbed by capital reorganisations through increase, reduction or variation of share capital or through disproportionate contributions by, or distributions to, shareholders. Share repurchases are particularly risky in this regard. Creditor interests are affected when their prior right to payment is endangered by distributions to shareholders. This study analyses the South African Law relating to share capital and distributions against the background of a comparative study of the laws of England, New Zealand, Delaware and California, as well as the provisions of the American Model Business Corporations Act. Two main approaches to creditor protection are evident. The capital maintenance doctrine, which is followed in England and Delaware, protects creditors by emphasising the notional share capital of the company as a limit on distributions. In contrast, the solvency and liquidity approach focuses on the net assets of the company and on its ability to pay its debts. New Zealand, California and the Model Business Corporations Act represent this approach. Regulatory responses to shareholder protection range from insistence on compliance with procedural requirements to minimal statutory intervention in the internal affairs of companies, instead relying on general principles of fairness and good faith. There is little correlation between a particular system's approach to creditor protection on the one hand, and to shareholder protection on the other. England, New Zealand and South Africa prescribe specific formalities, while the American approach is more relaxed. South Africa is a hybrid system. Its transition from capital maintenance to solvency and liquidity has been incomplete and its protection of equity interests is relatively unsophisticated. A number of recommendations are made for an effective and coherent approach that will safeguard the interests of creditors and shareholders alike. / School: Law / LL.D.

Thesis / The Companies Bill B61-2008 proposes to introduce appraisal rights into South African law. Appraisal entitles a shareholder to demand payment from the corporate issuer of his shares at a fair cash value in certain instances where major transactions which would change the company's direction have been proposed. It allows a cash exit rather than being coerced into supporting the majority's decision. Arriving at a fair share value is a challenge to appraisal. Presently, under the Personal action, a shareholder who opines that the company's act or omission is unfairly prejudicial or that its affairs are conducted in an unfairly prejudicial manner, may apply to court for an appropriate order. It enables the minority to challenge the majority's decision. Both remedies will be available to dissenting shareholders under the new dispensation and a shareholder must decide which remedy best suits his purposes. Appraisal should be seen as a last resort. / Law / LL.M. (Corporate Law)

The Companies Act 71 of 2008 (“2008 Companies Act”) will have far reaching effects on the manner in which a company is formed and operated under South African company law and in particular entrenches the procedure that must be followed by a company when acquiring its own shares. The radical amendment of the capital maintenance rules by the introduction of the solvency and liquidity tests to the Companies Act 61 of 1973 has been carried forward under the 2008 Companies Act. These tests impose an obligation on a company to ensure that the company is both solvent and liquid at the time of the acquisition of its own shares and for a stated period thereafter. The 2008 Companies Act further brings the duties and liabilities of the directors in line with their current fiduciary duties in terms of common law. / Mercantile Law / LLM

The Companies Act of 71 of 2008 makes a number of important changes to the rules relating to capital maintenance. In line with the objectives of the Companies Act of 71 of 2008, section 44 of the Act has removed the prohibition on the provision of financial assistance by a company which was contained under the previous section 38 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973. Despite the repeal of the prohibition, a transaction which involves the provision of financial assistance by a company for the acquisition of or subscription of its own securities still needs to be effected in accordance with the requirements and conditions that are provided under the Act and Memorandum of Incorporation. To explore the new developments, within this study, the provision of financial assistance in terms of section 44 of the Companies Act of 2008 is, therefore, analysed in detail. On the other hand, the UK Companies Act of 2006 repealed the prohibition on the giving of financial assistance by private companies in most circumstances. It, however, retained the prohibition to public companies only because of the requirements of the Second Company Law Directive (77/91/EEC). This study also explores the rules of financial assistance by a company under the UK Companies Acts in detail. Though the source of financial assistance by a company both in South Africa and in English Company laws is rooted in the English decision of the Trevor v Whitworth case, currently these countries have adopted what is deemed appropriate and significant in their own countries. This study, therefore, examines and compares the rules governing the provision of financial assistance by a company in the company laws of these two countries. / Mercantile Law / LL.M. (Commercial law)

One of the objectives of the Securities Regulation Code on Takeovers and Mergers ("the Code") was to achieve neutrality of treatment of minority shareholders in takeover situations irrespective of the method employed to effect the takeover. This objective has not yet been achieved despite the inclusion of Rule 29 in the Code. Different levels of minority protection apply depending on the method used to effect a takeover. Asset takeovers are also excluded from the ambit of the Code. It is suggested that capital reductions and security conversions be prohibited to effect a takeover unless the Code is applicable to the transaction. The scheme of arrangement procedure, with certain suggested amendments, should be retained as a takeover method. It is further suggested that section 228 of the Companies Act be amended to ensure greater minority shareholder protection but that asset takeovers not be included within the ambit of the Code at this stage. / Private Law / LL.M.

This research looks at the need and enforceability of legal warranties that companies include in contracts and/or public displays/notices to limit the company’s liability exposure to third parties. It also discusses the liability incurred by a company and that of its directors in their personal capacities (if any) should the legal warranty implemented be found to be unenforceable. The liability that may be incurred by the company and/or its director/s is dependent on whether the legal warranty which it implemented is enforceable or not and therefore it is important to establish what would constitute an enforceable legal warranty. In order to determine what is likely to constitute an enforceable legal warranty the study looks back at what has previously been deemed to constitute an unenforceable legal warranty. This is done by analysing the common law principles of contract, being the freedom to contract and the sanctity of contract, and its development in accordance with our constitutional dispensation through case law precedents. The provisions of the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 that apply to legal warranties are also analysed in order to determine the anticipated outcome of future case law where the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 may be applicable to a dispute involving legal warranties. Once what constitutes an unenforceable legal warranty is established, the study will discuss the legal position of a third party, and that of the company, where a third party has suffered damages as a result of the company’s acts or omissions and the company is unable to raise a legal warranty as a defence against such liability, as the legal warranty is found to be unenforceable. Thereafter the study will discuss the measures available to the company where the company is found liable to the third party for the aforementioned damages and the company wishes to mitigate its losses in this regard. Such measures shall include director insurance as well as the recovery of such liability against a director, in the director’s personal capacity, where the company either does not have director insurance or is unable to enforce the director insurance due to the actions of a director. In order to determine the director’s accountability to the company in this regard an assessment is made of the duties imposed on a director in terms of the common law and Companies Act 71 of 2008 to establish whether such duties are wide enough to include a duty on the director to ensure legal warranties he/she plays a part in implementing are enforceable. / Mercantile Law / LL. M. (Corporate Law)

Section 71(3) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 has introduced into South African company law a provision which for the first time permits the board of directors to remove another director from office in certain specific instances. A further significant innovation in the Companies Act 71 of 2008 is contained in section 162, which empowers a court to make an order declaring a director delinquent or placing him under probation in specific instances. The effect of section 162 is that a court is empowered to remove a director from the board of directors. The focus of this thesis is the removal of directors from office by the board of directors and by the judiciary. The thesis explores the underpinning philosophy of the statutory provisions relating to the removal of directors from office. It also examines the impact of the power given to the board of directors and to the courts to remove a director from office. The grounds and the procedures for the removal of directors by the board of directors and the judiciary are examined. The fiduciary duties applicable to directors in removing a director from the board of directors are also explored. In addition, this thesis examines the removal of directors holding multiple positions or capacities in relation to a company, such as an employee or a shareholder with loaded voting rights. The remedies which may be relied on by a director who has been removed from office by the board of directors are examined. Recommendations are made to strengthen and improve the provisions in the Companies Act 71 of 2008 relating to the removal of directors from office by the board of directors and the judiciary. Amendments to the Companies Act 71 of 2008 are suggested to remove ambiguities; to guard against the abuse of sections 71(3) and 162; to improve the grounds and procedures for the removal of directors by the board of directors and the judiciary, and to enhance the remedies that may be relied on by a director who has been removed from office by the board of directors. / Artikel 71(3) van die Maatskappywet 71 van 2008 het ’n bepaling tot Suid-Afrikaanse maatskappyreg toegevoeg wat die direksie vir die eerste keer in staat stel om ’n ander direkteur in sekere spesifieke gevalle uit sy of haar amp te verwyder. ’n Verdere belangrike vernuwing in die Maatskappywet 71 van 2008 word in artikel 162 vervat, wat ’n hof magtig om ’n bevel uit te vaardig wat ’n direkteur misdadig verklaar of hom of haar in spesifieke gevalle aan ’n proeftydperk onderwerp. Die effek van artikel 162 is dat ’n hof by magte is om ’n direkteur uit die direksie te verwyder. Die fokus van hierdie tesis is die verwydering van direkteure uit hul ampte deur die direksie en die regbank. Die tesis verken die onderliggende filosofie van die statutêre bepalings wat met die verwydering van direkteure uit hul ampte verband hou. Dit ondersoek ook die impak van die bevoegdheid wat aan die direksie en die howe verleen word om ’n direkteur uit sy of haar amp te verwyder. Die gronde en prosedures vir die verwydering van direkteure deur die direksie en die regbank word ondersoek. Die fidusiêre pligte van toepassing op direkteure by die verwydering van ’n direkteur uit die direksie word ook verken. Daarbenewens ondersoek hierdie tesis die verwydering van direkteure wat veelvuldige posisies of hoedanighede met betrekking tot ’n maatskappy beklee, soos ʼn werknemer of aandeelhouer met gelaaide stemregte. Die regsmiddele waarop ’n direkteur, wat deur die direksie uit sy of haar amp verwyder is, kan steun, word ondersoek. Aanbevelings word gemaak om die bepalings in die Maatskappywet 71 van 2008, wat met die verwydering van direkteure uit hul ampte deur die direksie en regbank verband hou, te versterk en te verbeter. Wysigings aan die Maatskappywet 71 van 2008 word voorgestel om dubbelsinnighede uit te skakel; om teen die misbruik van artikels 71(3) en 162 te waak; om die gronde en prosedures vir die verwydering van direkteure deur die direksie en die regbank te verbeter, en om die regsmiddele waarop ’n direkteur wat deur die direksie uit sy of haar amp verwyder is kan steun, te versterk. / ISigaba 71(3) Somthetho weZinkampani 71 ka 2008 sewuze wangenisa emithethweni yezinkampani zaseNingizimu Afrika, umthetho ongowokuqala ovumela ibhodi labaqondisi ukuthi libe namandla wokugudluza omunye umqondisi esikhundleni sakhe ngaphansi kwezimo ezithile. Olunye ushintsho olusha kuMthetho wama-71 weZinkampani ka 2008 uqukethwe yiSigaba 162, wona ugunyaza inkantolo ukuthi ikhiphe umyalelo owazisa umqondisi ngokuthi unecala noma obeka umqondisi ngaphansi kophenyo, phecelezi “probation” ngesinye isikhathi. Inhloso yeSigaba 162 wukunikeza inkantolo igunya lokugudluza umqondisi kwibhodi labaqondisi. Impokophelo yale thisisi wukugudluzwa kwabaqondisi, bagudluzwe yibhodi labaqondisi kanye nomthetho/nobulungisa. Ithisisi ihlola ifilosofi yemithetho ekhishiwe emayelana nokugudluzwa kwabaqondisi ezikhundleni zabo, Kanti futhi ihlola umthelela wamandla anikezwe ibhodi labaqondisi kanye nezinkantolo ukuthi zigudluze umqondisi esikhundleni. Izizathu kanye nengqubo elandelwayo mayelana nokugudluzwa kwabaqondisi yibhodi labaqondisi kanye nomthetho nazo ziyahlolwa. Imisebenzi emayelana nokuthembeka eyenziwa ngabaqondisi ukugudluza umqondisi kwibhodi labaqondisi nayo iyacwaningwa Ngaphezu kwalokhu, le thisisi .iphenya ukugudluzwa kwabaqondisi abaqokwe ezikhundleni eziningi noma abanegunya elithize ngokwengqubo yenkampani, enjengesisebenzi, phecelezi “employee” noma umabelwa-mashezi onamalungelo amaningi okuvota, phecelezi, “loaded with voting rights”. Izeluleko ezingasetshenziswa wumqondisi ogudluzwe esikhundleni sakhe yibhodi labaqondisi nazo ziyahlolwa. Izincomo nazo ziyenziwa ngenhloso yokuqinisa kanye nokuthuthukiswa kwamandla oMthetho we-71 weZinkampani ka 2008, mayelana nokugudluzwa kwabaqondisi ezikhundleni yibhodi labaqondisi kanye nomthetho. Izinguquko zoMthetho wama-71 weZinkampani ka 2008 ziqonde ukususa izixakaxaka, ukulwa nokudlelezelwa kweSigaba 71(3) kanye no 162, ukuthuthukisa izizathu kanye nezingqubo zokugudluzwa kwabaqondisi yibhodi labaqondisi kanye nomthetho, ukuqinisa izindlela zokulungisa ezingasetshenziswa wumqondisi osegudluziwe esikhundleni yibhodi labaqondisi. / Mercantile Law / LL. D.