The study examines the link between the Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) performance of a company and its cost of debt, measured as credit spreads between corresponding corporate and risk-free government bonds, in Nordic countries between 2020 and 2022. No previous studies look at ESG effects on bond spreads in the Nordic markets, although their stakeholder-oriented nature could make them attentive to ESG issues. Additionally, public and regulatory attention to carbon dioxide suggest a value for companies in decreasing emissions. In line with previous studies on ESG top-level and individual pillar performance, Refinitiv ESG scores are used as proxies for ESG performance in the two initial regressions, and an additional regression is run where a measure of carbon intensity is substituted for environmental pillar performance. Although there is a risk of reverse causality inherent in this field, the findings in this study indicate that ESG top-level performance reduces cost of debt, while carbon intensity increases it. Notably, social pillar scores and carbon intensity, but not environmental pillar scores, have significant effects on spreads.

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Corporate insiders frequently borrow from lending institutions and pledge personal equity shares as collateral for the loan. Using manually collected pledge data for January 2007-December 2011, I examine how this phenomena affects firm investors and analyze agency conflicts between pledging managers and (a) outside shareholders, and (b) bondholders. Pledging potentially influences investor risk through changing managerial incentives and/or contingency risk from ill-timed margin calls. Findings suggest influential insiders extract private benefits of control at the expense of outside shareholders through pledging. Difference-in-differences regressions utilizing an exogenous shock to lending supply indicate pledging corresponds with a 9.9% relative increase in stock volatility – controlling for changes in fundamentals – and support a causal interpretation of the relation between pledging and equity risk. Despite apparently harming equity investors however, further analysis suggests pledging benefits bondholders, and corresponds with an economically and statistically significant reduction in yield spreads on corporate bonds. Robustness tests evidence reductions in risky financing when insiders pledge, corroborating the negative relation between pledging and cost of debt and consistent with mitigated agency conflicts between managers and bondholders. / Business Administration/Finance

In this dissertation, I investigate the economic consequences of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 158 (SFAS 158). SFAS 158 requires firms to move pension funding status from the footnotes to the balance sheet. Moving pension funding status from a footnote to the balance sheet improves the transparency and understandability of pension accounting, however it at the same time increases the pension liability recognized and decreases the shareholder's equity reported for firms with underfunded pension plans. I investigate whether firms take actions to mitigate the impact of SFAS 158. I also examine whether the market perceptions of the risk and cost of capital differ because of SFAS 158. I first find that while firms reduce the non-pension debt to equity ratio to minimize the cost of SFAS 158, they did not use discretionary accruals to offset the impact of SFAS 158. One interpretation of these findings is that firms' potential responses to the rule depend on the costs and benefits associated with that discretionary behavior. While accrual manipulations do not affect either real operations or cash flows, aggressive accrual manipulations can increase the probability of a qualified opinion from auditors, and financial penalties from regulators (SEC litigation). In contrast, real activity manipulation is more opaque than accounting earnings management, making it more difficult to detect by shareholders, SEC regulators, or auditors. I then find that the market perceived risk proxied by total equity risk increased after SFAS 158. However, I fail to find that the increased total equity risk is generally priced by the equity capital markets. Further analysis indicates that bond spread yield decreases after SFAS 158 for firms with underfunded pension plans, suggesting different behavior of debt investors and equity investors. This finding might be explained by the rich information environment specific to the debt market. Compared with the equity market, the debt market includes mainly sophisticated investors. Sophisticated investors have access to more firm-specific information than other investors. Given their access to potentially more informative data, the debt market response to SFAS 158 is different from the equity market. This dissertation contributes to the debate regarding the effectiveness of the pension accounting reforms incorporated in SFAS 158, and is useful to legislators, regulators, and researchers in assessing the anticipated costs and benefits of SFAS 158. In addition, this study lends support to the stream of research which documents that managers take actions to achieve certain financial reporting goals in response to new accounting rules. This study also provides insight into how firms take real actions to minimize the cost of having an under-funded defined benefit pension plan. Understanding these relationships have implications for interpreting pension numbers reported in the financial statements and designing pension accounting rules that prevent or minimize the possibility that managers take advantage of the complexity and subjectivity associated with pension accounting to influence reported earnings. Finally, this study contributes to the existing literature by highlighting the importance and necessity of considering investor sophistication in studies on recognition vs. disclosure. / Business Administration/Accounting

In this study I investigate the impact that operating in specific foreign countries has on the bank loan contracts of multinational companies. While previous research has shown that increased firm globalization leads to a lower cost of bank debt, I find that this relationship is attenuated when firms operate in countries with certain institutional attributes. Using income levels, creditor rights, and property rights as institutional indices, I test the association of country-level factors with the priced and non-priced components of bank loan contracts. I find that globalized firms operating in low income countries, countries with weak creditor rights, or countries with weak property rights do not receive the same positive debt contracting features as do firms operating in high income countries, countries with strong creditor rights, or countries with strong property rights. / Ph. D.

Prior research on intra-firm pay disparity suggests intra-firm pay disparity at various hierarchy levels affects firm performance and executive-level pay disparity is related to investment risk in the credit and the equity market. However, none of the studies examine the relationship between CEO-to-worker pay disparity and credit investment risk. The purpose of this study is to investigate the association between CEO-to-worker pay disparity on credit investors' risk assessments. Large CEO-to-worker pay disparity could suggest CEO rent extraction which increases credit risk or effective labor cost management that decreases credit risk. Overall results of this study indicate increased CEO-to-worker pay disparity is associated with a lower cost of debt (a higher probability of credit rating upgrades). This association weakens as the growth rate of average employee pay increases and is more pronounced for labor-intensive firms than for capital-intensive firms, suggesting credit investors incorporate the information about the effectiveness of labor cost management in CEO-to-worker pay disparity in their risk assessments. In addition, the negative relationship between the change in CEO-to-worker pay disparity and the change in the cost of debt is less salient when CEO compensation increases rapidly. Further analysis shows the association is attenuated by increased excessive CEO compensation. The findings indicate credit investors also consider the risk arising from CEO rent extraction when they evaluate CEO-to-worker pay disparity. / Ph. D.

O objetivo deste trabalho é identificar os principais demandantes pela auditoria independente em empresas desobrigadas legalmente a serem auditadas e se há valor para elas em se submeterem a esse processo de verificação. A base de dados utilizada foi a da FIPECAFI, que utiliza esses dados para classificar anualmente as 1.000 Melhores e Maiores empresas localizadas no Brasil. Optou-se por essa base por ela possuir informações econômico-financeiras e de auditoria não só de empresas abertas, mas também de fechadas de pequeno e de médio porte. Estas estão isentas pela Lei 6.404/76 e alterações posteriores de contratarem auditores externos para a verificação das suas demonstrações contábeis. Contudo, diversos órgãos reguladores, como ANEEL, ANTT, CVM, BACEN, SUSEP, entre outros, impõem que as empresas sob as suas supervisões sejam auditadas, independentemente do porte. Assim, após a análise da Lei societária e dos princípios normativos emitidos por esses órgãos, restaram 998 empresas desobrigadas legalmente a serem auditadas entre 2005 e 2015, gerando 4.531 observações. Destas observações, 56% compõe o grupo de interesse, ou seja, as que optam por serem auditadas, e 44% o grupo de controle. O tratamento estatístico dos dados contou com técnicas exploratórias descritivas, de correlações, bem como inferenciais através de regressões logísticas binomiais robustas para dados em painel. Os resultados indicam que empresas desobrigadas legalmente a serem auditadas apresentam maiores probabilidades de contratarem os serviços de auditoria externa por influência dos credores, não por intervenção dos seus controladores estrangeiros ou nacionais de grande porte. Adicionalmente, essas empresas, que optam voluntariamente por terem suas demonstrações financeiras verificadas sob a ótica legal, estão associadas a maiores oportunidades de investimento, a uma menor fragilidade financeira e menores custos de captação de terceiros em relação às não auditadas. / The purpose of this paper is to identify the main claimants by independent auditors in legally released companies to be audited and if there is value to them in submitting to this process. The database used is property of FIPECAFI, which uses this data to annually classify the 1,000 Best and Biggest Companies located in Brazil. This basis was chosen because it possesses economic, financial and audit information not only of open companies, but also of small and medium-sized private companies. These are exempt by Law 6.404/76 and subsequent amendments to contract external auditors to verify their financial statements. However, several regulatory agencies such as ANEEL, ANTT, CVM, BACEN, SUSEP and others require that companies under their supervisions be audited, regardless of size. Thus, after analyzing the Corporate Law and the main regulations issued by these agencies, left 998 private companies exempt from being audited between 2005 and 2015, generating 4,531 observations. Of these observations, 56% make up the interest group, that is, those who choose to be audited and 44%, the control group. The statistical treatment of the data counted on descriptive exploratory techniques, correlations, and also with inferential ones through robust binomial logistic regressions for panel data. The results show that companies legally released to be audited are more likely to contract the external audit services by influence of the creditors and not by intervention of their foreign or national large controllers. In addition, these companies, that voluntarily opt to have their financial statements verified from a legal standpoint, are associated with larger investment opportunities, lower financial weakness and lower cost of debt.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-25T18:39:58Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Ezio Vicario Junior.pdf: 948958 bytes, checksum: e9ac55507de2054715ad8e135c6917c2 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-12-16 / The main objective of this study is evaluate the differences between two methodologies used to calculate the cost of third part capital, especially after Brazilian Law 11.638/2007 and 11.941/2009 and guidelines issued by Accounting Pronouncements Committee that brought significant changes in the financial statements. The first calculation method uses the information available in the year's Balance Sheet and Income Statement and, the methodology, the data contained in the Financial Statements notes. The study scope selected 38 companies listed on the "Novo Mercado" of Bovespa's Corporate Governance, from 2008 to 2013, companies that use to provide to the market and stakeholders transparency, high quality information and the necessary level of disclosure required for a business decision. Considering this universe of 38 analyzed companies, it is possible to note that there are significant differences between the two methodologies, s howing conflict of information and, therefore do not meet the expectations of stakeholders. The analyze also showed that the data included in the Financial Statement Explanation also need a standardization, which would make the analysis and comparisons between companies easier / O principal objetivo deste estudo é avaliar as diferenças entre as duas metodologias de cálculo do custo de capital de terceiro, especialmente após a Lei n º 11.638/2007 e 11.941/2009 e orientações emitidas pelo Comitê de Pronunciamentos Contábeis, que trouxeram mudanças significativas nas demonstrações financeiras. A primeira forma de cálculo utiliza as informações disponibilizadas no Balanço Patrimonial e o Demonstrativo de Resultado do Exercício e a segunda forma, os dados contidos nas Notas Explicativas. Foram selecionadas as empresas inscritas no Novo Mercado de Governança Corporativa da Bovespa, no período de 2008 a 2013, por possuírem exigências de fornecerem ao mercado e as partes interessadas, transparência, qualidade na informação e o nível de disclosure necessários à tomada de decisão. Considerando o universo de 38 empresas analisadas, foi possível comprovar que existem diferenças significativas entre as duas formas de cálculo, evidenciando que essas informações conflitam em suas apresentações e, portanto, não atendem às expectativas dos Stakeholders. As análises demonstraram ainda que os dados das Notas Explicativas carecem de padronização em suas apresentações, o que facilitaria as análises e comparações entre as empresas

<p>I examine how employing workers with specific human capital affects capital structure decisions by employers. Based on plant-level data from the U.S. Census Bureau, I use the opening of new plants as an exogenous reduction in human capital specificity-- the inability to transfer specific skill sets across employers--for incumbent workers in a local labor market. My results indicate that the opening of a new manufacturing plant in a given county leads to a 2.6-3.9% increase in the leverage of existing manufacturing firms in the county, relative to the leverage of manufacturing firms in an otherwise comparable county. Moreover, plant openings have a larger impact on firms that are more likely to share labor with the new plant, that have high labor intensity, and that have high marginal tax benefits of debt. Alternative explanations concerning productivity spillovers, product market competition, and county-wide shocks do not appear to account for the results. I find consistent evidence in a separate sample that contains a broad panel of firms. Overall, these results suggest that human capital specificity raises the cost of debt and thus decreases optimal leverage.</p> / Dissertation

本研究利用2000年至2004年的資料，分析獨立董事與監察人的設置 (以下簡稱為獨立董監) 與公司債務資金成本的關聯性。在以利息費用除以付息負債做為代理變數的前提之下，本研究的實證結果顯示，無論以當期利率水準、次期利率水準或者利率水準的變化做為被解釋變數，均顯示聘任獨立董監的企業會享有較低的債務資金成本。此外，進一步的分析也發現，無論以簡單的單變量模型、普通最小平方法或者利用縱橫面資料 (panel data) 模型，都得一致性地得到獨立董監得以有助於減緩公司與債權人間代理成本的實證結果。就控制變數而言，與預期相同，較完備的公司治理、較高的企業規模以及較佳的營運績效均與債務資金成本具有負向的關聯性。 / Corporate governance has become an imperative issue recently, especially the focus on the independent director system. Securities and Futures Commission has requested that those applying to be listed companies should set up the independent director systems for the purpose of building better corporate governance systems. In the framework of corporate governance formulated by the World Bank, as an essential capital provider or financial statement user, creditor plays an indispensable role. But few literatures has conducted to evaluate the relationship between the cost of debt financing and corporate governance, much less with the independent directors. Therefore, this study based on a sample of listed companies data in Taiwan Economic Journal over the period of 2000 to 2004 is to explore the relationship between independent directors and cost of debt and expected to provide the financial institutions determining the borrowing rate with some empirical results. The results indicate the cost of debt, whether based on the level analysis or change analysis of ordinary least square model or panel data analysis, is inversely related to the independent directors with significance at 1% level, suggesting that the enterprise with independent directors having the lower cost of debt in favor of the hypothesis. The analysis also indicates the relationship of the control variables of board characteristics, such as the ratio of the stock held by the board and supervisors is inversely with cost of debt、the higher ratio of the pledged shares held by the board and supervisors with the higher cost of debt and the enterprise with the combined titles of the chairman and CEO has higher cost of debt, follow our expectation again.