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According to economic rational choice theory greater choice will deliver well-being by increasing the likelihood that individuals satisfy personal preferences (Mas-Colell, Whinston, & Green, 1995). Consequently, extensive choice has become a fundamental aspect of both consumer markets and public policy (Schwartz, 2000; 2004; Botti & Iyengar, 2006). Crucially however, recent psychological research has begun to challenge the assumption that more choice leads to greater well-being. In several instances evidence has been found that whilst some choice is good, more choice can lead to reduced post-decisional satisfaction (e.g. Iyengar & Lepper, 2000; Shar & Wolford, 2007; Reutskaja & Hogarth, 2009). This is referred to as the Excess Choice Effect (ECE). If widespread, this ECE may mean that policies aimed at increasing well-being via choice actually deliver the opposite of their objectives. Although subject to much theoretical speculation, surprisingly little is known about the underlying cause of this effect. In light of this lacuna, the main aim of the current thesis was to investigate an alternative explanation for the ECE – namely, increased counterfactual thought. Across 7 experiments various factors known to influence the availability of counterfactual thoughts were manipulated, and the impact upon the prevalence of the ECE was explored, whilst another experiment (Experiment 7) aimed to determine individuals’ predicted affective responses to extensive choice. Overall, evidence was found that counterfactual thinking appears to play an important role in driving the dissatisfaction often associated with extensive choice. Specifically, the ECE was found to be most prevalent where counterfactual alternatives were made readily available, for example when under low cognitive load, when reflecting upon a recent, real-life decision, and when choice outcomes were negative. Further, in Experiment’s 1, 5, 6, and 8 these ECE’s were found to be significantly mediated by increased counterfactual thought, or the heightened experience of counterfactual emotion, following extensive choice. No evidence for any impact of choice level upon (psychological) satisfaction levels was found when the capacity to think counterfactually was reduced, i.e. via high cognitive load, over time, when reflecting upon a hypothetical scenario, or following a positive choice outcome. Ideas for future research are considered, and the potential implications of these findings for our theoretical understanding of the ECE, for the psychology of choice, for consumer well-being, retailers and the construction of public policy are discussed.

Människor upplever ånger dagligen, och beroende på vilka beslut som fattas kan vissa beslut ångras mer än andra. Därför undersöktes skillnader i typer av ånger med hjälp av webbenkäter som delades via Facebooks PM funktion. 80 deltagare ingick där de fick beskriva två saker som de ångrade mest att de hade gjort samt två saker som de ångrade mest att de inte hade gjort. Dessa skattades sedan på hur mycket de ångrade det samt hur pass viktigt/allvarligt de upplevde det. En signifikant skillnad upptäcktes där saker som de ångrade att de inte hade gjort skattades som viktigare/allvarligare än det som de ångrade att de hade gjort. Inom kategorierna kärlek/sex/äktenskap och familj/vänskap ångrade deltagarna mest saker som de hade gjort respektive inte hade gjort. De omkringliggande faktorerna kan vara det som påverkar upplevelsen av ånger oavsett om det är pågrund av en handling eller icke-handling.

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This thesis explores the proposal that there is a close link between counterfactual thinking and lying. Although both require the imagination of alternatives to reality, research has yet to establish a direct link. In the first seven studies the relationship between counterfactuals and lies is directly investigated using novel scenario-based and behavioural tasks. In a further four studies we also investigate the role of affect and executive functions as explanatory mechanisms. Results show that individuals with a tendency to think counterfactually are more likely to generate potential lies and to be more successful when lying in front of others (Study 1 and 6). Furthermore, we also show that counterfactual availability influences people’s tendency to come up with lies (Studies 2, and 3) and the extent to which they expect others to lie (Studies 4, and 5). We also find that the saliency of counterfactual alternatives can affect people’s moral standards by motivating them to lie (Study 7). Based on these results we argue that counterfactuals motivate lying by providing information about how things could have been different. We however also investigate alternative explanations. In Studies 8, 9 and 10 we seek to understand whether counterfactually derived affect might also underlie the relationship, but find no such link. Additionally, in Study 11 we investigate the relationship in Parkinson’s disease participants in order to understand if executive function might be an underlying mechanism. We do not find this to be the case and we show that PD patients are able to engage in counterfactual thinking and also lie. The findings in this thesis are the first to provide a direct link between counterfactual thoughts and lies. Overall, we show how counterfactuals can help us mislead others and we reveal that counterfactual thinking is an important cognitive process in deception.

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A utilização do valor justo, na avaliação de ativos biológicos, decorrentes da adoção de padrões internacionais de contabilidade, tem provocado efeitos econômicos significativos sobre o valor das empresas e, consequentemente, nos seus resultados correntes e futuros. Dessa maneira, este trabalho tem como objetivo analisar se os usuários da informação contábil reconhecem a relevância do uso do valor justo na mensuração de ativos biológicos. Por meio de experimentos com alunos de MBA, sob a perspectiva da Teoria do Pensamento Contrafactual, foram considerados os seguintes estímulos sobre o julgamento da relevância do uso do valor justo para ativos biológicos: (i) se o resultado (perdas ou ganhos) decorrentes da avaliação a valor justo, (ii) se o tipo de ativo biológico (com ou sem liquidez) e (iii) se a decisão gerencial (manter o ativo até o vencimento ou disponibilizar para a venda) interferem no julgamento da relevância do uso do valor justo. Os resultados apontam que, mesmo com a presença dessas variáveis, o uso do valor justo é relevante para mensuração dos ativos biológicos. / The use of fair value in the measurement of biological assets resulting from the adoption of international accounting standards, has caused significant economic effect on the value of firms and hence on their current and future results. Thus, this study aims to examine whether users of accounting information recognize the relevance of the use of fair value measurement of biological assets. Through experiments with MBA students from the perspective of the Theory of Counterfactual Thinking, we considered the following stimuli on the trial of the relevance of the use of the fair value of biological assets: (i) if the result (gain or loss) arising from measurement at fair value, (ii) the type of biological assets (with or without liquid) and (iii) if the decision management (maintaining the asset to maturity or available for sale) interfere with the judgment of the relevance of the use of value fair. The results show that, even with the presence of these variables, the use of fair value is relevant for measurement of biological assets.

Goal-directed episodic simulation, the imaginative construction of a hypothetical personal event or series of events focused on a specific goal, is essential to our everyday lives. We often imagine how we could solve a problem or achieve a goal in the future, or how we could have avoided a misstep in the past, but many of the behavioral and neural mechanisms underlying such goal-directed simulations have yet to be explored. The three papers of this dissertation investigated the neural correlates of three types of future episodic simulations in Papers 1 and 2 and examined a fourth such simulation directed at past events as an adaptive, constructive process in Paper 3. Some research has associated default network activity with internally-focused, but not with goal-directed cognition. Papers 1 and 2 of this dissertation showed that regions of the default network could form functional networks with regions of the frontoparietal control network while participants imagined solving specific problems or going through a sequence of steps necessary to achieve a personal goal. When participants imagined events they associated with actually attaining a goal, default network regions flexibly coupled with reward-processing regions, providing evidence that the default network can join forces with other networks or components thereof to support goal-directed episodic simulations. Using two distinct paradigms with both young and older adults, Paper 3 focused on episodic counterfactual simulations of how past events could have turned out differently and tested whether counterfactual simulations could affect participants' memory of the original events. Our results revealed that episodic counterfactual simulations can act as a type of internally generated misinformation by causing source confusion between the original event and the imagined counterfactual outcome, especially in older adults. The findings of the three papers in this dissertation lay the groundwork for further research on the behavioral and neural mechanisms of goal-directed episodic simulations, as well as their adaptive functions and possible downsides. / Psychology