This thesis is concerned with game-theoretic models of oligopoly resource markets. They revolve around an open market, on which a number of firms sell a common resource. The market price-demand relationship means that the price (demand) that results from the firm’s production (pricing) decisions is a function of the decisions of all firms selling to that market. This means that firms must generally anticipate the actions of competing firms when determining their own strategies, which means that these models often need to be analysed using game theory. We focus on games in which the resource is exhaustible, with the exception of Chapter 5, in which the majority of the analysis is carried out in an inexhaustible resources setting. Exhaustibility introduces an additional complication into these games; that of allocating the extraction and sale of a limited resource pool over time. We consider several separate areas of extension, which we outline below. In Chapter 2, we consider a dynamic Stackelberg game. Stackelberg competition is an asymmetric form of competition in which one player (the leader) has the ability to pre-commit to and announce a strategy in advance. The ability to pre-commit to a strategy is almost always highly valuable, and in this case allows the leader to drive down the follower’s production by pre-committing to drive up their own. We follow the framework used in [62] to analyse Cournot competition to derive our results. In Chapter 3, we compare the two settings in which resource extraction models are usually formulated: Open-Loop, in which the players determine their strategies as functions of time and the initial resource levels of the players only; and Feedback-Loop, in which the players determine their strategies at each point in time as a function of the current resource levels at that time. Our focus is on the investigation of the relationship between the difference in the production or value of a firm under these two models, and the distribution of resources across the firms. In Chapter 4, we consider a common property resource game. These involve multiple firms which can extract from a common resource pool. We study a widely-used Open- viii Loop model, as formulated in [79]. We examine the result that analysis of the problem by standard methods results in two candidate equilibria, and argue that one of these equilibria can be ruled out by construction of a superior response. In Chapter 5, we analyse joint constraints on production, namely constraints which are met when the total production is above or below a certain level. It is a well- established result that these constraints can result in multiple equilibria. We provide several brief extensions to existing uniqueness results. We also demonstrate methods by which these results can be utilised to analyse games with piecewise-linear windfall taxes or congestion charges. Finally, we discuss the problems of extending these results to games with resource exhaustibility.

液晶面板是跨世紀的新發明，這個產業更是百年產業，隨著技術的演進與產業的更替，這個產業最重要且關鍵殺手級的應用－平面電視機，終於在近些年逐漸引爆且蓬勃發展。本研究應用經濟學寡佔模型中的部分理論，分別就大尺寸電視液晶面板產業的競爭與合作關係依價格與產能兩大關鍵因素進行探討，並運用相關賽局理論探討各競爭廠商的策略思維，以期能對未來產業的競爭或相關類似產業架構的產業提供些許建議。 / The industry of TFT-LCD draws much attention for decades because of the world class business opportunities. The most important killer application, FPD（Flat-Panel Display）,starts booming these recent years. This study tries to apply some economy theories such as Oligopoly, Cournot Model and Bertrand Model to analyze the competition between prices and quantities. And we also analyzed the interaction of competition from the view of Game Theory and so on.

Chapter 1 of this study investigates the link between a firm’s capital structure and their industry competitive behavior. Given the competitive behavior in certain markets, Cournot or Bertrand, we investigate if there are any inborn characteristics of these markets’ competitive behavior that would create an incentive for Cournot firms to have a different strategic debt level than Bertrand firms. Related theories argue that any industry’s competitive behavior, whether it is Bertrand or Cournot would typically consist of a certain type of debt and pursue a certain type of competitive strategy, based on its classification. In this study, we investigate the debt level of a sample of firms classified into either Cournot or Bertrand competition, i.e. explore competitive behavior as a characteristic of firms that tend to be associated with different debt ratios and determine if the competitive market type does in fact lead to a varying debt ratio target. We used two different measures to categorize competition type, the CSM and the SI measure. Our findings indicate that there is no significant difference between differentiated debt levels between Bertrand and Cournot firms. Chapter 2 of the study examines various factors that may affect American Depository Receipts’ trading volume distribution between their home and US markets. These include factors not previously considered in the extant literature. One such factor is the trading motive (hedging or speculative) of investors. Other factors examined include price impact, relative volatility, market to book ratio, as well as a cultural dimension factor: individualism. Controlling for time-specific effects, we find that the relative motive measure of cross-listed firms has a positive relationship on the trading volume distribution. In addition, when looking at a small sample of firms with different motive factors, we find that hedging motive in the home country leads to an increased proportion of trading in the host country relative to the home country, while speculative motive leads to a decrease in the volume share of the host country relative to the home country. A positive and significant relationship is also observed between volatility and the log of trading volume share. The relationship is negative for liquidity and visibility in relation to the trading volume distribution of cross-listed firm’s stocks. Culture difference at home relative to host is found to positively impact trading volume distribution of cross-listed stocks.

This note analyzes a simple Cournot model where firms choose outputs and capacities facing varying demand and price-cap regulation. We find that binding price caps set above long-run marginal cost increase (rather than decrease) aggregate capacity investment. (author's abstract) / Series: Working Papers / Research Institute for Regulatory Economics

In this thesis, a market is assumed with n competing buyers where price is an inverse linear function of the quantity supplied to the market. The buyers get engaged in Cournot competition, but may also collaborate on purchasing decisions from a supplier. The supplier offers a quantity discount, as the quantity purchased increases unit price decreases. Furthermore, the demand base in the market is uncertain, but the buyers may get a signal of the demand. In this setting, the value of collaboration, information sharing and non-linear pricing is analyzed.

No description available.

Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Centro Tecnológico. Programa de Pós-Graduação em Engenharia de Produção / Made available in DSpace on 2013-07-16T01:20:28Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 212393.pdf: 766033 bytes, checksum: 1c59a79ac03824f0bee609b8ab58e436 (MD5) / Em 1990, na Inglaterra, teve início a reforma do Setor Elétrico com a reestruturação e privatização do setor. Desde então, outros países, dentre eles EUA, Nova Zelândia e Brasil, iniciaram o processo de reforma e desregulamentação do setor elétrico, objetivando a introdução da competição no setor e o direcionamento de investimentos para a expansão da oferta de energia, de modo a assegurar a eficiência econômica do setor, bem como reduzir os preços. Em geral, tais reformas introduziram a competição nos setores de geração e comercialização para consumidores livres e mantiveram os monopólios regulados nas atividades de transmissão e distribuição. Esses princípios também foram adotados na reforma do Setor Elétrico Brasileiro. Além de ser um insumo básico de produção, a energia elétrica possui também caráter social, por ser considerada um serviço de utilidade pública. Por outro lado, não havendo possibilidade de armazenar energia economicamente, sua produção é simultânea ao consumo, acarretando que sua produção seja equivalente à demanda e que a competição entre as empresas geradoras ocorra na quantidade de produção. Com a introdução de um modelo de competição no setor elétrico, uma das preocupações dos países que fizeram a reforma foi a possibilidade das empresas ou grupos de empresas exercerem poder de mercado por meio de práticas anticompetitivas. Isto posto, o tema de pesquisa escolhido para este trabalho foi "a análise das práticas anticompetitivas visando a estabelecer práticas competitivas na geração da energia elétrica, utilizando o modelo de Cournot-Nash". O objetivo geral desta tese é: "identificar quais medidas sugeridas pela literatura especializada para evitar a adoção de práticas anticompetitivas e reduzir o poder de mercado estão sendo consideradas na implementação do novo modelo para o setor elétrico brasileiro, tendo como referência teórica o modelo de Cournot-Nash". A motivação para escolha desse tema está no fato de que, se a variável estratégica escolhida para a competição for a quantidade de energia gerada, o modelo de Cournot é o mais adequado para analisar o setor; sendo a eletricidade um produto homogêneo, podem-se obter preços significativamente acima do custo marginal, desde que a oferta desse produto seja administrada explorando a capacidade de usina geradora. Assim, o setor deve ser regulado para restringir as possibilidades de adoção de práticas anticompetitivas pelos geradores ou grupo de geradores. A técnica de coleta de dados utilizada para a efetivação deste trabalho consistiu na comparação e análise de documentos publicados pelos órgãos que atuam no Setor Elétrico Brasileiro, em especial o MME, a ANEEL, o MAE e o ONS, e da pesquisa bibliográfica associada ao tema. A comparação permitiu avaliar se as medidas adotadas para o modelo brasileiro contemplam as recomendações sugeridas na literatura pertinente e, conseqüentemente, verificar se o modelo implementado no Setor Elétrico Brasileiro restringe a possibilidade das empresas geradoras de energia exercer poder de mercado por meio da adoção de práticas anticompetitivas, como a manipulação da quantidade de energia ofertada.

abstract: This dissertation discusses the Cournot competition and competitions in the exploitation of common pool resources and its extension to the tragedy of the commons. I address these models by using potential games and inquire how these models reflect the real competitions for provisions of environmental resources. The Cournot models are dependent upon how many firms there are so that the resultant Cournot-Nash equilibrium is dependent upon the number of firms in oligopoly. But many studies do not take into account how the resultant Cournot-Nash equilibrium is sensitive to the change of the number of firms. Potential games can find out the outcome when the number of firms changes in addition to providing the "traditional" Cournot-Nash equilibrium when the number of firms is fixed. Hence, I use potential games to fill the gaps that exist in the studies of competitions in oligopoly and common pool resources and extend our knowledge in these topics. In specific, one of the rational conclusions from the Cournot model is that a firm's best policy is to split into separate firms. In real life, we usually witness the other way around; i.e., several firms attempt to merge and enjoy the monopoly profit by restricting the amount of output and raising the price. I aim to solve this conundrum by using potential games. I also clarify, within the Cournot competition model, how regulatory intervention in the management of environmental pollution externalities affects the equilibrium number of polluters. In addition, the tragedy of the commons is the term widely used to describe the overexploitation of open-access common-pool resources. Open-access encourages potential resource users to continue to enter the resource up to the point where rents are exhausted. The resulting level of resource use is higher than is socially optimal, and in extreme cases can lead to the collapse of the resource and the communities that may depend on it. In this paper I use the concept of potential games to evaluate the relation between the cost of resource use and the equilibrium number of resource users in open access regimes. I find that costs of access and costs of production are sufficient to determine the equilibrium number of resource users, and that there is in fact a continuum between Cournot competition and the tragedy of the commons. I note that the various common pool resource management regimes identified in the empirical literature are associated with particular cost structures, and hence that this may be the mechanism that determines the number of resource users accessing the resource. / Dissertation/Thesis / Doctoral Dissertation Applied Mathematics for the Life and Social Sciences 2017

In duopoly Cournot competition with sequential moves, it is well known that each player prefers Stackelberg leadership without demand uncertainty. We study the same game when the demand is uncertain, and firms possess some private information about the uncertain demand. There are two effects of private information in this game. First, when the Stackelberg leader moves first, its private information is leaked to, or inferred by the Stackelberg follower via the output quantity. Hence, the Stackelberg follower makes decision based on more accurate information than the leader. Second, the leader incurs a cost to signal its information to the follower, which hurts the leader. Both effects hurt the Stackelberg leader, then the follower may earn more ex ante profit than the leader. When the demand is continuous, Gal-or (1987) assumes that firms follow linear decision rules and reports that the follower always sets a higher output quantity than the leader and earns more profit than the leader. However, our study finds that it is true if and only if the demand is unboundedly distributed. Otherwise, the Stackelberg leader's Pareto-optimal output quantity is not linear in its private information unless it observes the highest signal, and the follower does not always earn more ex ante profit than the leader. When the demand is discretely distributed, we study how the number of demand states influences the effect of cost of signaling. With more demand states, the effect of cost of signaling on the leader becomes more significant, and the follower may earn more ex ante profit than the leader.

There are three main chapters in the dissertation which fall in the areas of industrial organization and international economics. After the introduction and the literature review, I present two different models that highlight how the degree of substitutability between differentiated products on a market affects a new entrant's entry decisions. I further extend the benchmark model to discuss the implications of the government trade policy on the competition strategies. The last chapter investigates how the bilateral trade flows in various industries between the United States and China respond to Yuan/Dollar exchange rate fluctuations and a few other key variables. In the second chapter, I extend the Singh and Vivies (1984) model and the Hackner (2000) model by allowing for a multi-product duopoly, a domestic incumbent and a foreign entrant, with asymmetric costs in producing two differentiated products: high- and low-quality. If they engage in Cournot competition, in the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, the foreign entrant will choose to supply both products when two varieties are more heterogeneous. If two varieties are more homogeneous, the foreign entrant tends to supply only one product. After extending the model to consider the tariff imposed on foreign imports, the simulation results suggest that, to increase domestic welfare, the government should allow cost-effective foreign entrants to enter, but keep cost-ineffective ones out of the domestic market. In the third chapter, I provide a thorough analysis of the Bertrand model with a setup that is similar to the Cournot model. When firms compete on prices, the SPNE differs significantly from that of the Cournot model. Depending on the relative marginal cost between two firms, there are circumstances under which the foreign entrant would choose to only enter into the low- or the high-quality market regardless of the degree of substitutability between two varieties. Furthermore, when the domestic government imposes a tariff on the foreign imports, the foreign entrant's entry decision changes with the tariff level. In the last chapter, unlike the existing literature which mainly look at the relationship between the exchange rate and the trade balance at the aggregate level, I attempt to investigate the short-run and the long-run impact of the Yuan/Dollar exchange rate on the US trade balance at the commodity level using a new methodology, the Autoregressive Distributed Lag Bounds Testing approach. As most articles found no short-run and long-run relationship between the exchange rate and the trade balance at the aggregate level ("aggregation bias"), I argue that different commodities may respond to the exchange rate fluctuations differently. Therefore, this study would offer us a better understanding on which US industries are more vulnerable to the Yuan/Dollar exchange rate fluctuations and which ones are strong players against Chinese competitors. In addition, I further explore other possible contributors to the US trade deficit such as income levels, China FDI inflow, and the US FDI outflow. / Economics