Thesis (Ph. D.)--Florida State University, 2006. / Advisor: Dale L. Smith, Florida State University, College of Social Sciences, Dept. of Political Science. Title and description from dissertation home page (viewed Sept. 13, 2006). Document formatted into pages; contains ix, 242 pages. Includes bibliographical references.

LL.M. (International Law) / This thesis is based on the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice viz a viz the South African law and practices as it relates to diplomatic protection of nationals or corporate entities who encounter problem with the law in a foreign country. How the concept of diplomatic protection has assisted individuals and corporate entities who wish to go to a foreign country for whatever reason to feel free and relaxed knowing that their lives and property are protected. The expose examines the rights of individuals to diplomatic protection in international law in comparison with the rights of nationals to request for diplomatic protection in South Africa. The questions posed are; what is the liability of the state to its nationals, what level of responsibility is to be exhibited by the state when providing diplomatic protection and do such nationals have a right to demand to be protected in international law and or municipal law. Chapter one will examine the growth and historical development of diplomatic protection and the position as it is today. Chapter two will deal with nationality issues, this is because to determine who will be the beneficiary of diplomatic protection nationality must first be determined. The issues to be discussed in this chapter are: acquisition of nationality, double or multiple nationalities, continuity of nationality, loss of nationality, nationality of a Corporation and its shareholders, stateless persons and refugees, and the right to diplomatic protection. In answering the question of state responsibility, chapter three will examine the local remedy rules. This is because local remedies will have to be exhausted before the state can intervene. Chapter four will examine the treatment of alien which include expulsion of alien, expropriation of foreign property, and consular protection. Various attempts have been made to define Diplomatic protection, but there has not been a generally accepted definition. Some of these definitions are highlighted below. A description is also provided below to help with the understanding and scope of diplomatic protection.

On December 16, 1963, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted Resolution 1967 (XVIII) recording its belief that provision for impartial fact finding within the framework of international organizations, and in bilateral and multilateral conventions, could make an important contribution to the peaceful settlement of disputes, and to their prevention. The Resolution noted a considerable body of practice in the use of fact finding methods in international relations, which is available to be studied "for the progressive development of such methods" (6th perambular paragraph). In the light of this Resolution, the object of this study was to ascertain the nature and the scope of the fact finding powers possessed by the principal judicial organ of the community of nations, the World Court and their applicability in the various types of proceedings which may be instituted before it. As a background the major problems inherent in, and the nature and function of, the law of evidence in international judicial proceedings are sketched. An attempt is also made to determine the respective rights and duties of the litigants and the World Court in the matter of the adduction of evidence. The provisions of the Statute and Rules of the World Court which expressly confer upon it fact finding powers are then examined. A broad competence is seen to be granted the Court to request the production of evidence, and to undertake investigations and enquiries of various kinds into the facts of the issues submitted to it. The only condition precedent to the exercise of these powers being that the litigant states must have agreed to submit their dispute to the Court for adjudication. Notwithstanding a paucity of authority, it is also found that the world Court also possesses certain implied fact finding powers stemming not from the instruments of its creation, but from its inherent nature as a judicial tribunal. This implied competence to undertake researches, of its own motion, into the facts of an issue submitted to it supplements the Court's express competence, although a duplication of the power to appoint independent experts is evident. It is then ascertained whether the World Court can have recourse to all the fact finding powers conferred upon it in the two categories of proceedings, contentious and advisory proceedings, which may be instituted before it. Some limitations on the Court's powers are found to exist in the case of advisory proceedings, these limitations deriving from the nature of the proceedings. With respect to contentious proceedings no limitations were found. From the preceding examination of the fact finding powers of the World Court it was concluded that it had the potential to discover the absolute truth of any issue submitted to it for decision, with the co-operation of the parties. While some amendments to the Statute and Rules of the Court were suggested, it was felt that any major revisions of the Court's powers would have no substantial effect until the jurisdiction of the Court became compulsory. / Law, Peter A. Allard School of / Graduate

The Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) was inaugurated in 2005. It is a regional court that serves Member States of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), an international organization that promotes regional integration in the Caribbean. In this dissertation, I conduct a doctrinal examination and analysis of the human rights jurisprudence of the CCJ, to determine the nature and extent of the Court’s use of International Human Rights Laws and Norms (IHRLN) in its adjudication. Although my main focus is the Court’s human rights decision-making, I also conduct an analysis of some of its wider work, to the extent that this wider work, coupled with the Court’s human rights decision-making, builds an understanding of the Court’s definition of itself and explains the trajectories of the Court as a regional judicial institution. I conduct my doctrinal examination and analysis against the backdrop of three theoretical underpinnings, namely - human rights universalism; transformative justice; and Caribbean political economy and human rights cultural relativism. The goal is to understand how the CCJ, as a young regional Caribbean court, has navigated the region’s historical, socio-cultural, and political contexts, in its use of what are regarded as universalist human rights norms in the law, as it adjudicates domestic human rights and constitutional law issues. I also evaluate where the Court ends up when it navigates these issues, in order to determine impact, and to assess whether the Court’s outcomes can be rationalized or justified. The study demonstrates that this new court has adopted and adapted existing international human rights norms and ideas, notwithstanding some socio-cultural and political challenges in the Caribbean to some of these norms and ideas. My major finding is that the CCJ is inclined towards a strongly universalistic perception and application of IHRLN, and relies quite heavily on these laws and norms to guide its human rights and constitutional law adjudication, although it does this sometimes in a way that indigenizes the application of these IHRLN. In some of the Court’s human rights-related decisions, it has also acted in quite transformative ways, sometimes arriving at outcomes that challenge some Caribbean’s socio-cultural and political norms or expectations, particularly on subjects such as LGBTQ+ rights, the death penalty, political corruption, and the strengthening of aspects of Caribbean Community Law. Through these transformative decisions, the CCJ has disturbed some of the expectations about the contours and boundaries of Caribbean constitutional law, and in places, has formulated new principles and doctrines which signal a clear yearning to use IHRLN to take Caribbean law to new frontiers. It does this without completely disregarding Caribbean socio-cultural and political realities, but by sometimes mediating them. This approach by the Court demonstrates independence and reflects an absence of the suspicions of some IHRL norms and ideas that are oftentimes reflected in the political economy dynamics of the wider Caribbean region. It likewise does not signify an embrace of some of the more well-known cultural reticence and relativist attitudes to some aspects of international human rights norms found in some quarters of the Caribbean. Instead, the study reveals a more nuanced positioning by the Court, in its human rights jurisprudence. The result, this dissertation has found, is a Court that has (a) accomplished critical legal reform in important areas of the law, (b) empowered CARICOM citizens in a number of ways, and (c) strengthened respect for indigenous regional institutions in the wider politique of Caribbean regional identity and integration. The Court has accomplished these goals through calculated persuasion, rationality, and normative reasoning. The contribution of this dissertation is three-fold. Firstly, it formulates and presents a rigorous analysis of how the CCJ operationalizes IHRLN in its work. This is done, drawing on the literature on human rights universalism, cultural relativism, and transformative justice, and against the backdrop of regional human rights reticences that I explore, and which are premised on certain perceptions of the hegemonic and neo-colonial tendencies and potential of some IHRLN. Secondly, the thesis offers an in-depth and critical assessment and evaluation of the CCJ’s impact on the human rights jurisprudence of the region as a whole. Finally, it offers an in-depth analysis of how the Court’s work has so far contributed to the development of Caribbean law.

This thesis is designed to explore the complex question of compliance within the European Union. The European Union relies on the voluntary submission of it members to rules that the organization sets up. Other international organizations operate through this dynamic as well. As such, it is highly important to shed light, through research, on why states comply with the rules set forth by the organizations they belong to. Why do states comply in the European Union? There are many channels of research currently looking at this question. This thesis seeks to examine the European Commission's role in ensuring compliance in the European Union. The Commission is the chief enforcer and monitor within the European Union; as such, it is a critical component in the examination of state's compliance behavior. In order to examine the question of compliance within the European Union a researcher is forced to look at an alternative variable. Compliance is not measurable in a direct fashion and thus some proxy measure must be constructed in order to research it. The conduct of the Commission with regards to suspected and actual Member State violations of treaty obligations offers such a variable. Using data drawn from a variety of sources including the European Commission itself and a framework of research drawn from Mbaye's Why National States Comply with Supranational Law (2001) this thesis finds that no single explanatory variable is responsible for Member State compliance with the rules and laws of the European Union. Rather several factors are at work and must be looked at. This thesis finds moderate support for several hypotheses sourced from the extant literature on the subject of compliance through the models proposed herein. Other hypotheses do not hold up as well under scrutiny.

No description available.

Yes / The European Court of Justice has played a pivotal role in the transformation of international law obligations between Member States into an integrated legal order with direct applicability and effect in those Member States. This article explores whether or not the ECJ continues to be relevant to EU governance and integration and whether it continues to transform the legal orders of the member states. It briefly outlines the early case law which transformed the legal order and the preliminary reference procedure as an important element of that transformation and then considers the extent to which the ECJ continues to act in ways which are transformational even though the legal order itself has remained relatively static. The EU citizenship jurisprudence serves as a useful example of how integration is driven forward by the Court. This paper argues that the Court’s decisions do continue to have significant impact on areas of law and policy and EU governance generally. It illustrates this argument using gender equality law and the Human Rights as pertinent examples and concludes that the ECJ remains relevant in governance terms as it continues to drive forward EU integration in many areas and influence the development of law and policy across the member states.

Yes / Le Brexit représente le changement le plus important dans les relations que le Royaume-Uni a entretenu avec l’Europe et le monde depuis la fin de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. La décision britannique de mettre fin à plus de quatre décennies de participation au projet européen, la détermination du gouvernement de Theresa May à extraire son pays de l’Union Européenne (UE), mais aussi de l’Union douanière, du Marché intérieur, de la juridiction de la Cour Européenne de Justice, de l’ensemble des règlementations européennes, et même de la Convention Européenne des Droits de l’Homme, ont des implications multiples et lourdes de conséquences dans de vastes domaines. Le Royaume-Uni est certes le premier pays affecté, et ce sur tous les plans. Toutefois, la France et l’Allemagne, ainsi que le projet européen, sont aussi directement concernés par ce divorce qui laisse présager d’importantes répercussions économiques et politiques, mais aussi un déclin progressif de leur voisin d’outre-Manche, avec les conséquences qui pourront en découler.

This study is an attempt at determining the normative legitimacy of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). At its core, it scrutinizes the current mandate of the organization following the layering of economic integration objectives with human rights protection, sustenance of democracy, and the rule of law. The study discusses the elements of legitimacy across disciplines mainly, international law, international relations and political science. Legitimacy is eventually split along two divides, the normative and descriptive/sociological aspects. The study traces the normative content (shared/common values) underlying integration in Africa, concluding that integration has been born on new ideals such as human rights, democracy and the rule of law. Expectedly, Regional Economic Communities (RECs) as building blocks of the prospective African Economic Community (AEC) under the African Union (AU) regime are mandated to play a vital role in moving the continent forward upon these values. The inquiry is extended to the institutions of ECOWAS to determine their capacity to effectively implement the new mandate of the organization and operate supranationally. In the process, key legal and institutional shortcomings are discussed, particularly in relation to national institutions. It is argued that while human rights protection enhances the normative legitimacy of ECOWAS, it must not be pursued in isolation. Economic integration and protection of citizens’ rights are co-terminus and mutually reinforcing. Hence, community institutions must reflect this link if they are to be effective. The study concludes on the note that, while ECOWAS possesses layers of legitimacy, and have carried out legitimation steps, it cannot be considered a legitimate organization if Member States continue to be non-compliant with community objectives and if key legal questions remain unaddressed. It is submitted that ECOWAS is merely undergoing legitimation, whether it can eventually be considered a legitimate organization is dependent on addressing the identified challenges.

<p> </p><p>Upon a closer examination of the role and performance of the International Court of Justice, we find that it does primarily fulfil its role and obligation as far as the UN charter and the Courts stature are concerned. It is upon the application of Kjell Goldmann’s <em>Internationalists Programme </em>that we find ourselves wanting more from the Court.</p><p>If we assume the development of international institutions, exchange, communication and the like to be desirable and necessary for the continued development of international peace and security, the ICJ can be shown to have had historical opportunities to affect the development to such an effect, but lacks the formal means to do so.</p><p>With the subscription to the internationalists programme, we find that there are plenty of potential improvements that could reasonably be made. These are primarily about the official influence of the Court, with regards to cases relevant to it and its jurisdiction, which is severely crippled by current regulatory framework. This is a condition shared with plenty of other international courts in their various forms.</p><p>Essentially, the current state of the ICJ lacks the desirable attributes and possibilities to influence the development of international law to any meaningful extent. If we indeed were to look for an international court with the means to build international legal institutions and seek to further enforce international peace and security, the ICJ is not what we are looking for.</p><p> </p>