Il rating creditizio è un elemento molto importante per le imprese in quanto ha impatto, ad esempio, sul costo del capitale (Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003; Campbell and Taksler, 2003), sul prezzo delle azioni e dei titoli obbligazionari (Dichev and Piotroski, 2001; Hand et al., 1992). Anche le imprese che ottengono il rating per la prima volta, tipicamente soggetti di dimensioni più piccole e con una storia più recente, hanno molto interesse per il rating. Nel principale contributo della mia tesi (“Is Indebtedness always negative for Credit Ratings? Empirical evidence on Newly Rated Firms”), misuro empiricamente, per il periodo dal 1985 al 2013, se i soggetti che hanno ottenuto un rating per la prima volta ottengono una valutazione differente rispetto agli altri operatori. Dalle mie analisi emerge che i soggetti che hanno ottenuto un rating per la prima volta ottengono valutazioni lievemente più negative rispetto agli altri operatori ma, sorprendentemente, emerge che coloro che hanno un maggiore indebitamento hanno delle valutazioni migliori. Negli altri due articoli della mia tesi sviluppo ulteriori analisi sui rating. Nel primo articolo (“Credit Rating Agencies: a Review of Recent Academic Studies and Key Practical Implications”), presento una sistematizzazione della letteratura accademica sui rating e sulle agenzie di rating. Nel secondo articolo (“The Dynamics of Credit Rating Standards”), esamino se le agenzie di rating hanno modificato i propri standards nel corso del tempo. / Firms care deeply about their credit ratings, since ratings influence, for instance, firm’s cost of capital (Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003; Campbell and Taksler, 2003), bond and stock market prices (Dichev and Piotroski, 2001; Hand et al., 1992). This is also true for newly rated firms, typically smaller, in a younger stage of their life cycle and with a shorter track record compared with other issuers to show to the external financial stakeholders. In the main paper of my thesis (“Is Indebtedness always negative for Credit Ratings? Empirical evidence on Newly Rated Firms”), I test the impact of being newly rated firms on credit ratings over the period from 1985 to 2013. I report a negative but pretty low effect on rating outcome for the entire sample of newly rated firms but, surprisingly, I find a strong positive relation between highly levered firms and credit rating. I develop additional research on credit rating in the other two papers of my thesis. In the first paper (“Credit Rating Agencies: a Review of Recent Academic Studies and Key Practical Implications”), I present a systematization of the latest academic contributions on credit ratings and credit rating agencies. In the second paper (“The Dynamics of Credit Rating Standards”), I examine long-term issuer credit ratings and I focus on the time variable to study how credit rating agencies have modified their standards over years.

The thesis elaborates on the development of the rating at capital markets and its regulation in the context of the global financial crisis. The first part focuses on the definition of the rating, the kinds and types of grant, explanation of the symbols in the rating scale, the rating process and activities of credit ratings agencies. The second part compares the different development of credit rating industry in the United States of America and in the European Union. It also deals with the participation of credit rating agencies in the financial crisis. The last part is concerned with the Dodd -- Frank Act and Regulation 1060/2009 on credit rating agencies as two different measures granted after crises. The thesis analyzed also their impact on the credit rating industry.

Banks face market pressure when determining their capital structures because they are subject to strict regulations. CFOs are willing to adjust their company’s capital structures in order to obtain higher ratings. The credit ratings are highly valuable not only because they assess the creditworthiness of the borrowers but also because those agencies take advantage of the information asymmetry and have access to data that companies might not disclose publicly. Also, this industry gained much interest after the BIS proposals back in 1999 and 2001 that the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision should consider the borrower’s credit ratings when examining banks’ solvency and adequacy. Factors used to determine the credit ratings are banks’ asset quality which is fundamental measure for the creditworthiness, banks’ capital which is related to the asset quality in relation to the RWA, banks’ profitability, and liquidity measurements. The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether the banks that keep excess equity to balance sheet receive better credit ratings, given the predictors capital, banks size and defaulted to total exposures. The European Banking Authority (EBA) stress test results are used as a benchmark for determining banks’ capital adequacy and solvency, whereas the credit ratings are obtained shortly after the EBA’s reports publication. The sample size is 73 and 95 banks for the years 2011 and 2014, respectively. The results from the multivariate ordinal regression do not show significant correlation results between the excess equity to balance sheet and the credit ratings, even though the estimated coefficient is negative, namely excess equity is associated with lower credit ratings. An explanation to this one can find in the low-quality capital relative to the banks’ capital base. Also, banks which plan to implement risker projects or currently hold risker assets are subject to higher capital requirements. Moreover, banks currently being rated low but with the potential of being upgraded would be more willing to issue equity than debt in order to avoid the corresponding risk and achieve the higher rating. The equity ratio and the defaulted to total exposures ratio show significant correlation to the banks’ credit ratings. Overall, since the results of the regression are insignificant, we do not have reasons to believe that holding excess equity is not beneficial for banks. When banks make changes in their leverage ratios they would either carry the cost of being downgraded or the cost related to issuing more equity, therefore at the end they will balance the leverage ratio close to the optimal and keep as much capital as required by regulations.

I re-examine “rating shopping” and “rating catering” in the market for AAA rated collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) by replicating the study of Griffin and Tang (2013) using post-crisis data. I find a sharp increase in the amount of CDOs that received a single rating, suggesting that CDO underwriters were more cautious about formally soliciting multiple ratings. However, I also find a decrease in AAA rating disagreements between S&P and Moody’s, implying that issuers shopped their CDOs through informal conversations with agencies. Finally, I find investors correctly accepted tighter credit spreads for dual-rated CDOs because dual-rated CDOs experienced fewer rating downgrades than single rated deals. These results differ from the pre-crisis findings of Griffin and Tang (2013) and are consistent with the existence of rating shopping and disappearance of rating catering during the post-crisis period.

The Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies The thesis is concentrated on the regulation of credit rating agencies and aims to contribute to a current discussion regarding the future of credit rating agencies. A primary focus of the work was to explore whether a negative role of credit rating agencies in current crisis was caused by their insufficient, unnecessary or unsuitable regulation. An evaluation of sufficiency of newly adopted regulation with respect to the effective functioning of the rating market was chosen as an additional purpose of research. For the fulfillment of the stated aim analytical and comparative methods and synthesis were used. The style of the thesis falls within the Law and Economics approach. The research is based on EU and US legal norms, legislative documents of the European Commission and legal jurisprudence. Part I describes the emergence, development and the functioning of credit rating agencies, structure of rating market and legal meaning of the rating. Part II analyzes the ratio for regulation of credit rating agencies from the perspective of economic analysis of law. Mainly, whether agencies fulfill their function, what could potentially restrain them and how can be regulation helpful in this field. Part III compares and examines current regulatory reform of credit...

<p>This paper explores the effect of credit rating agency’s (CRA) reputation on the discretionary disclosures of corporate bond issuers. Academics, practitioners, and regulators disagree on the informational role played by major CRAs and the usefulness of credit ratings in influencing investors’ perception of the credit risk of bond issuers. Using management earnings forecasts as a measure of discretionary disclosure, I find that investors demand more (less) disclosure from bond issuers when the ratings become less (more) credible. In addition, using content analytics, I find that bond issuers disclose more qualitative information during periods of low CRA reputation to aid investors better assess credit risk. That the corporate managers alter their voluntary disclosure in response to CRA reputation shocks is consistent with credit ratings providing incremental information to investors and reducing adverse selection in lending markets. Overall, my findings suggest that managers rely on voluntary disclosure as a credible mechanism to reduce information asymmetry in bond markets.</p> / Dissertation

Credit rating agencies (CRAs) play an integral part in today's financial markets. Through ratings they express considered opinion about future creditworthiness of an obligor and thus lower information asymmetry in the capital markets. Recently, CRAs have been brought in the spotlight as they are often blamed for being the triggers of the recent market turmoil. Critics often argue that ratings of tranches of structured finance instruments, backed by subprime mortgages, were unjustifiably high, downgrades were too late and the overall integrity of the rating process was compromised through numerous conflicts of interests CRAs face. However, in this thesis I argue that CRAs were put in this position rather through external factors than their own actions. Massive regulation usage of ratings, rapid growth of structured securities market, overdependence on the rating and the overall ignorance of the meaning of rating itself are the actual causes to blame.

O presente estudo objetiva investigar a materialidade do rating de crédito sobre as decisões de estrutura de capital, uma vez que diferentes níveis de rating podem representar melhores ou piores condições para a captação dos recursos externos necessários ao financiamento empresarial. A hipótese rating de crédito-estrutura de capital sugere que, após um rebaixamento no rating, as empresas adotem um perfil mais conservador nas decisões de estrutura de capital visando restabelecer as condições que possibilitem a recuperação do rating anterior. Essa relação foi estudada por meio da análise do impacto das reclassificações do rating sobre o balanceamento da estrutura de capital ao nível-alvo de endividamento de empresas latino americanas não-financeiras com algum rating designado no período 2000- 2014. Os resultados evidenciam que muitos dos preceitos da hipótese teórica também prevalecem para as empresas latinas, principalmente quando avaliados sob a perspectiva das características institucionais da região. / This study investigates credit rating relevance on firm\'s capital structure decision-making once different rating levels may imply better or worse funding conditions. The credit ratingcapital structure hypothesis suggests that firms adopt conservative capital structure decisions after rating downgrades aiming to retrieve necessary conditions to restore a better rating. This relationship was studied by analyzing the impact of credit rating changes on target leverage balance of the capital structure of non-financial Latin American firms with a credit rating designated during the period of 2000-2014. Results show that many of the theoretical assumptions prevail for Latin American firms, especially if evaluated from a perspective of the region institutional characteristics.

O risco é um aspecto importante a ser considerado nas avaliações empresariais e, diante das crises financeiras globais, os ratings divulgados pelas agências de classificação de riscos são fundamentais para o gerenciamento de riscos nas empresas, bem como para a tomada de decisão dos investidores ao escolher em qual empresa investir. Diante do exposto, o presente trabalho se propôs a identificar os fatores que podem explicar as atribuições dos ratings com especial atenção ao impacto do uso de derivativos. A partir disso, a principal novidade apresentada nesta pesquisa foi a de averiguar o reflexo do uso de derivativos juntamente com as posições de proteções assumidas pelas empresas nas classificações de créditos - ajudando a suprir, assim, essa lacuna na literatura da área. Para isso, foram utilizados 2.090 ratings e analisadas as empresas não financeiras da B3 entre os anos de 2010 e 2016 por meio de análise dos dados em painel, conferindo maior robustez às análises e aos achados. Os resultados indicaram que as empresas que utilizam instrumentos financeiros derivativos não recebem os melhores ratings. Esses resultados contestam a teoria de que o uso de derivativos é visto positivamente pelos investidores. No entanto, apesar de nenhum impacto significativamente estatístico ter sido encontrado nos ratings das empresas que utilizam derivativos, observou-se que as empresas que usam derivativos e possuem os maiores valores nocionais foram as que receberam as melhores notas da agência Moody\'s. / Risk assessment is an important aspect concerning business valuation and, considering the global economic crisis, the information disclosed by rating agencies is essential to developing a risk management plan and making investment decisions. The purpose of the present study is therefore to identify the factors that may explain the attribution of risk ratings, focusing on the impact of derivatives. Thereafter, ascertaining the effects of derivatives combined with protective business behaviors regarding credit ratings is innovative and assists in filling knowledge gaps in research and literature. In this study, 2.090 ratings were considered and B3\'s non-financial companies were examined between 2010 and 2016 by using panel data analysis, which lends robustness to the analysis and the findings. Results indicate that companies that use derivative instruments are not attributed the best ratings, thus opposing the theory that the use of derivatives attracts investors. Although ratings showed no significant statistical impact on companies that use derivatives, companies with the highest notional values, which also use derivatives, were attributed the best ratings by Moody\'s.

A tese investiga três dimensões dos efeitos da adoção mandatória do IFRS para os mercados de crédito no Brasil: 1) para a relevância da informação contábil na perspectiva dos credores; 2) para os termos contratuais de crédito bancário e títulos de dívida; e 3) para a propensão das empresas locais captarem recursos nos mercados de crédito internacionais. As análises contemplam amostras de aproximadamente 6.500 ratings atribuídos por instituições financeiras e agências de risco (Fitch, Standard & Poors e Moody\'s) e 137.000 contratos de crédito bancário e títulos de dívida (debêntures) detidos por 122 grupos econômicos durante o período de 2005 a 2014. A abordagem empírica é construída a partir de um modelo de interação, comparando-se os períodos pré e pós-IFRS e confrontando grupos de adotantes mandatórios e voluntários. Utilizando-se controles relacionados às características do contrato (loan-specific), da empresa (firm-specific) e da instituição financeira concedente do crédito (lender-specific) e a partir de estimações por MQO, MQ2E e regressão logística, os resultados sugerem que os impactos da adoção do IFRS para a relação contratual de crédito exibem considerável heterogeneidade entre as empresas, dependem do tipo de mercado avaliado (crédito bancário x títulos de dívida) e são condicionais aos incentivos das empresas promoverem efetiva melhora na qualidade da informação contábil. Especificamente, a tese encontra que a adoção mandatória do IFRS contribuiu para: (i) aumentar a habilidade dos números contábeis explicarem o rating de crédito das empresas; (ii) reduzir a dispersão das notas de crédito atribuídas por diferentes instituições financeiras; (iii) reduzir o custo do crédito, alongar os prazos de vencimento, aumentar os montantes concedidos e reduzir a probabilidade de exigência de garantia; e (iv) aumentar a propensão das empresas locais captarem recursos nos mercados internacionais. Entretanto, as evidências sugerem que tais efeitos são exclusivos para entidades que possuem incentivos para prover informação contábil de qualidade, suportando que a existência de benefícios econômicos não depende meramente da publicação dos demonstrativos no padrão global, mas sim está condicionada à maneira como as empresas efetivamente adotam os pronunciamentos. Análises adicionais indicam que as consequências econômicas para o mercado de crédito tendem a ser maiores para os títulos de dívida em relação ao crédito bancário e para empresas com piores notas de crédito e maiores reconciliações iniciais entre o GAAP doméstico e o IFRS. Testes de robustez relacionados a variações na especificação da amostra e reduções nas janelas de evento reforçam a validade dos modelos e ajudam a suprimir potenciais preocupações de que os resultados tenham sido provocados por efeitos concorrentes. O estudo reforça a importância do papel informacional das demonstrações financeiras para os contratos de crédito e contrapõe evidências na literatura de que consequências positivas associadas ao IFRS são exclusivas para países que apresentam determinadas características institucionais / The thesis investigates three dimensions of the effects of mandatory IFRS adoption for credit markets in Brazil: 1) to the credit relevance of accounting information; 2) to the contractual terms of bank loans and debt securities; and 3) to the propensity of local firms to raise funds in international credit markets. The analyzes include samples of approximately 6,500 ratings assigned by financial institutions and rating agencies (Fitch, Standard & Poor\'s and Moody\'s) and 137,000 bank loans and debt securities (debentures) contracts held by 122 conglomerates during the 2005-2014 period. The empirical approach is built on an interaction model, comparing the pre- and post-IFRS adopters and confronting mandatory and voluntary groups. After controlling for loan-, firm- and lender-specific determinants of loan terms and using OLS, 2SLS and logistic regression estimates, the results suggest the impact of IFRS adoption for credit markets exhibit considerable heterogeneity between companies, depend on the assessed market (bank loans x debt securities) and are conditional to the companies incentives to effectively improve accounting quality. Specifically, the study finds that the mandatory IFRS adoption has contributed to: (i) increase the ability of accounting numbers to explain credit ratings; (ii) reduce the dispersion of credit scores attributed by different financial institutions; (iii) reduce the cost of credit, lengthen maturities, increase the amounts raised and reduce the likelihood of collateral requirement; and (iv) increase the propensity of local firms to raise funds in international credit markets. However, evidence suggests that these effects are unique to firms that have incentives to increase the quality of accounting information, supporting the existence of economic benefits does not merely depend on the publication of financial statements in the global accounting standard, but is conditional on how companies effectively adopt the pronouncements. Further analyzes indicate that the economic consequences for the credit market tend to be higher for debt securities relative to bank loans and for companies with poorer credit ratings and larger fist-time IFRS reconciliations. Robustness tests related to variations in the specification of the sample and reductions in the event of windows reinforce the validity of the models and help mitigate potential concerns that the results were caused by competing effects. The study reinforces the importance of the informational role of financial statements for lending agreements and contrasts evidence in the literature that positive consequences associated with IFRS are unique to countries with certain institutional features.