This paper examines the impact of credit rating migration in determining optimal capital structure. The models we propose capture empirical behavior in two ways; the behavior of linking firm¡¦s rating to the promised coupons and the behavior of targeting minimum rating. We find that as long as the rating at issuing time is not too low, tax shields of the rating-linked coupon debt are larger than those of standard debt with the same par, and hence, optimal leverage usage of the firm with the rating- linked coupon scheme is greater. Further, we also show that the behavior of targeting a minimum rating causes mean-reverting leverage dynamics. Managers are appeared to make over-repurchase choices for adjusting the current rating back to the initial target following a downgrade from target minimum rating.

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This thesis presents three essays on credit ratings of regulated utilities, dividend signaling, and asymmetric information and security issuances and repurchases. Chapter 2 investigates the practices of credit rating agencies by using the regulated utility industry as a natural testing ground. Following deregulation and the Enron scandal, the general opinion among industry professionals is that utilities are being punished by rating agencies. Contrary to this popular belief, we find that the utility credit ratings are significantly higher compared to those of other firms, and this significance is more pronounced in the post-deregulation period. Although rating agencies often cite regulatory reasons for placing utilities on negative credit watches, these firms ratings are rarely downgraded after being placed on negative watches. Chapter 3 provides a rational explanation for the disappearing dividend trend. Dividends serve as signaling device and, under models of dividend signaling under information asymmetry, cost of signaling increases with volatility of firms cash flows. Declining propensities to pay dividends imply that (1) information asymmetries have become lower and/or (2) cost of signaling has increased. We find evidence consistent with both. In particular, firms with higher information asymmetries and lower stock price informativeness are more likely to pay dividends: the increasing stock price informativeness has made dividend signaling less valuable, and a significant portion of disappearing dividend trend could be explained by rising risk and increasing stock price informativeness. Chapter 4 investigates the motivations for debt and equity issuances and repurchases in hot and cold markets. I find that firms issue equity in hot markets to reduce adverse selection costs associated with asymmetric information. In particular, firms issuing equity in hot markets possess high asymmetric information while firms issuing equity in cold markets possess less severe asymmetric information. I also find that credit ratings and market-to-book ratios could explain why firms might repurchase equity or issue debt in hot markets rather than issue equity: firms with high credit ratings and low market-to-book ratios are more likely to issue debt even in hot equity markets, and firms with low market-to-book ratios are more likely to repurchase equity in any market. / Finance

The three big credit rating agencies released their unsolicited ratings since 1996 and all of these unsolicited ratings are given to banks in Asia, especially in the emerging markets. This study aims to test whether there are differences between solicited and unsolicited bank ratings. We compare the financial profiles of solicited and unsolicited banks and investigate the factors that influence banks’ credit ratings. The empirical results show that unsolicited bank ratings are significantly lower than solicited ratings. It is seen that the financial variables of banks with solicited ratings are also better than those with unsolicited ratings. However, the profitability of banks with solicited ratings is significantly lower than those with unsolicited ratings. We see that listed and commercial banks tend to have lower credit ratings and it could be due to the fact that listed banks may face the volatility of their short-term stock prices, so their operating strategies are influenced by market noise, which leads to inferior performance. The reason why commercial banks tend to have lower credit ratings is that commercial banks face so fierce competition that their profitability is compressed. In the last section, we use an ordered probit model to examine the determinants of Fitch’s rating. We find that sovereign credit risk, solicited status, listed status, bank specialization, profitability and asset quality are the major factors influencing Fitch’s bank credit ratings.

<p>Today all private corporations are obligated by statutory audit. The government of Sweden appointed an investigation to conclude if the audit should be statutory or not. The investigator presented on the third of April 2008 a report (SOU 2008:32) that suggests abolishment of the statutory audit for approximately 97 % of all private corporations in Sweden. This will result in certain effects on the banks credit rating because of the fact that the banks trust the audited accounts to have been audited by an independent audit.</p><p>The most important in the banks credit rating are: personal judgement, business concept, business plan and repayment ability. The banks also use the private corporations audited accounts in its credit rating.</p><p>We conducted a case study by interviewing four bank officials in different banks in Skövde and Tibro. The purpose of the study was to investigate the banks credit rating and the audits importance in the credit rating.</p><p>The conclusion deducted from our case study it that the confidence between the bank and the company is very high valued and that the audit is a sign of quality.</p>

The credit rating industry is characterised by the high concentration of a small number of firms and, allegedly, this concentration stems from certain anticompetitive behaviours made manifest by the dominant firms in the industry. Therefore, as has yet to be done in empirical research, the purpose of this study is to carry out an exploration of the antitrust behaviours supposedly perpetuated by agents in the credit rating process for debt finance. The aim is to determine what influences, if any, the interactions and relationships in the rating process have on the sustenance of the oligopoly in the rating industry and on impeding new rating agencies trying to enter the market. Through the application of thematic analysis, this study aims to gather evidence on the behavioural motivations of rating analysts and underwriters in the rating process. Furthermore, the theoretical framework suggests notching and tying to be the anticompetitive behaviours that strengthen the oligopoly. Hence, the study finds that the drivers of anticompetitive notching in the rating process are the taking of haircuts and mapping, the guise of protecting investors’ interests, punitive ratings and a quid pro quo rating norm. Similarly, it finds that the enablers of anticompetitive tying are continuous dealing in the rating process, covert negotiation, repeat rating requests, ancillary services and the regulatory overdependence on credit ratings. In addition, this thesis explores the impediments of new rating agencies trying to enter the credit rating industry and finds that new rating agencies face peculiar market, regulatory and organisational barriers. Firstly, the market barriers comprise arbitrage, economic rents, investor preference and the issuer-pay model. Secondly, the regulatory barriers are discretionary regulation, new regulations and the designation of nationally recognised statistical rating organisation status. Lastly, the organisational barriers include down-trading, inadequate funding, the lack of geographic spread, low added intellectual value and a narrow product and service scope. Finally, this research recommends for regulatory authorities to agree to a harmonised convention on the recognition of credit rating agencies that may lead to the emergence of new robust agencies. It also proposes the standardisation of mapping practices in the notching process to reduce rating variance among credit rating agencies. Lastly, the research offers evidence of notching for competition and tying through informal services that may substantiate antitrust liability for possible antitrust intervention.

O presente estudo objetiva investigar a materialidade do rating de crédito sobre as decisões de estrutura de capital, uma vez que diferentes níveis de rating podem representar melhores ou piores condições para a captação dos recursos externos necessários ao financiamento empresarial. A hipótese rating de crédito-estrutura de capital sugere que, após um rebaixamento no rating, as empresas adotem um perfil mais conservador nas decisões de estrutura de capital visando restabelecer as condições que possibilitem a recuperação do rating anterior. Essa relação foi estudada por meio da análise do impacto das reclassificações do rating sobre o balanceamento da estrutura de capital ao nível-alvo de endividamento de empresas latino americanas não-financeiras com algum rating designado no período 2000- 2014. Os resultados evidenciam que muitos dos preceitos da hipótese teórica também prevalecem para as empresas latinas, principalmente quando avaliados sob a perspectiva das características institucionais da região. / This study investigates credit rating relevance on firm\'s capital structure decision-making once different rating levels may imply better or worse funding conditions. The credit ratingcapital structure hypothesis suggests that firms adopt conservative capital structure decisions after rating downgrades aiming to retrieve necessary conditions to restore a better rating. This relationship was studied by analyzing the impact of credit rating changes on target leverage balance of the capital structure of non-financial Latin American firms with a credit rating designated during the period of 2000-2014. Results show that many of the theoretical assumptions prevail for Latin American firms, especially if evaluated from a perspective of the region institutional characteristics.

A tese investiga três dimensões dos efeitos da adoção mandatória do IFRS para os mercados de crédito no Brasil: 1) para a relevância da informação contábil na perspectiva dos credores; 2) para os termos contratuais de crédito bancário e títulos de dívida; e 3) para a propensão das empresas locais captarem recursos nos mercados de crédito internacionais. As análises contemplam amostras de aproximadamente 6.500 ratings atribuídos por instituições financeiras e agências de risco (Fitch, Standard & Poors e Moody\'s) e 137.000 contratos de crédito bancário e títulos de dívida (debêntures) detidos por 122 grupos econômicos durante o período de 2005 a 2014. A abordagem empírica é construída a partir de um modelo de interação, comparando-se os períodos pré e pós-IFRS e confrontando grupos de adotantes mandatórios e voluntários. Utilizando-se controles relacionados às características do contrato (loan-specific), da empresa (firm-specific) e da instituição financeira concedente do crédito (lender-specific) e a partir de estimações por MQO, MQ2E e regressão logística, os resultados sugerem que os impactos da adoção do IFRS para a relação contratual de crédito exibem considerável heterogeneidade entre as empresas, dependem do tipo de mercado avaliado (crédito bancário x títulos de dívida) e são condicionais aos incentivos das empresas promoverem efetiva melhora na qualidade da informação contábil. Especificamente, a tese encontra que a adoção mandatória do IFRS contribuiu para: (i) aumentar a habilidade dos números contábeis explicarem o rating de crédito das empresas; (ii) reduzir a dispersão das notas de crédito atribuídas por diferentes instituições financeiras; (iii) reduzir o custo do crédito, alongar os prazos de vencimento, aumentar os montantes concedidos e reduzir a probabilidade de exigência de garantia; e (iv) aumentar a propensão das empresas locais captarem recursos nos mercados internacionais. Entretanto, as evidências sugerem que tais efeitos são exclusivos para entidades que possuem incentivos para prover informação contábil de qualidade, suportando que a existência de benefícios econômicos não depende meramente da publicação dos demonstrativos no padrão global, mas sim está condicionada à maneira como as empresas efetivamente adotam os pronunciamentos. Análises adicionais indicam que as consequências econômicas para o mercado de crédito tendem a ser maiores para os títulos de dívida em relação ao crédito bancário e para empresas com piores notas de crédito e maiores reconciliações iniciais entre o GAAP doméstico e o IFRS. Testes de robustez relacionados a variações na especificação da amostra e reduções nas janelas de evento reforçam a validade dos modelos e ajudam a suprimir potenciais preocupações de que os resultados tenham sido provocados por efeitos concorrentes. O estudo reforça a importância do papel informacional das demonstrações financeiras para os contratos de crédito e contrapõe evidências na literatura de que consequências positivas associadas ao IFRS são exclusivas para países que apresentam determinadas características institucionais / The thesis investigates three dimensions of the effects of mandatory IFRS adoption for credit markets in Brazil: 1) to the credit relevance of accounting information; 2) to the contractual terms of bank loans and debt securities; and 3) to the propensity of local firms to raise funds in international credit markets. The analyzes include samples of approximately 6,500 ratings assigned by financial institutions and rating agencies (Fitch, Standard & Poor\'s and Moody\'s) and 137,000 bank loans and debt securities (debentures) contracts held by 122 conglomerates during the 2005-2014 period. The empirical approach is built on an interaction model, comparing the pre- and post-IFRS adopters and confronting mandatory and voluntary groups. After controlling for loan-, firm- and lender-specific determinants of loan terms and using OLS, 2SLS and logistic regression estimates, the results suggest the impact of IFRS adoption for credit markets exhibit considerable heterogeneity between companies, depend on the assessed market (bank loans x debt securities) and are conditional to the companies incentives to effectively improve accounting quality. Specifically, the study finds that the mandatory IFRS adoption has contributed to: (i) increase the ability of accounting numbers to explain credit ratings; (ii) reduce the dispersion of credit scores attributed by different financial institutions; (iii) reduce the cost of credit, lengthen maturities, increase the amounts raised and reduce the likelihood of collateral requirement; and (iv) increase the propensity of local firms to raise funds in international credit markets. However, evidence suggests that these effects are unique to firms that have incentives to increase the quality of accounting information, supporting the existence of economic benefits does not merely depend on the publication of financial statements in the global accounting standard, but is conditional on how companies effectively adopt the pronouncements. Further analyzes indicate that the economic consequences for the credit market tend to be higher for debt securities relative to bank loans and for companies with poorer credit ratings and larger fist-time IFRS reconciliations. Robustness tests related to variations in the specification of the sample and reductions in the event of windows reinforce the validity of the models and help mitigate potential concerns that the results were caused by competing effects. The study reinforces the importance of the informational role of financial statements for lending agreements and contrasts evidence in the literature that positive consequences associated with IFRS are unique to countries with certain institutional features.

Esse estudo avalia a adequação dos requerimentos absolutos de capital no Brasil para bancos pequenos e grandes separadamente e investiga os requerimentos de capital mínimo para risco de crédito nas diferentes abordagens de Basiléia, em especial o impacto da adoção dos modelos dos ratings internos (IRB) conforme o Edital BCB n. 37/11. Além disso, propõe e avalia a abordagem padronizada dos ratings centralizados, CRBA, para cálculo do Capital Mínimo Exigido (CME) em bancos pequenos e que é baseada na abordagem padronizada em vigor na Europa, mas voltada para dados disponíveis nas Centrais de Risco. A CRBA pertence à família dos modelos internos e busca contribuir com as recentes discussões sobre a reforma regulatória bancária na Europa e nos Estados Unidos. Para os três objetivos mencionados, as metodologias adotadas foram: 1) o Valuet-at-Risk (VaR) não paramétrico de Crédito (CVaR) de Carey (2002) e o paramétrico Creditrisk+ para estimar o capital econômico do Sistema Bancário; seguido da 2) estimação amostral e avaliação do capital regulatório para bancos pequenos e grandes nas abordagens IRB, Basileia 1, abordagem padrão simplificada (SSA); além da 3) avaliação da abordagem proposta nesse estudo, a CRBA. A performance de todas essas abordagens é avaliada frente a cenários de stress ad hoc e durante a Crise de 2008-2009. Os dados utilizados foram exposições de crédito aleatórias colhidas da Nova Central de Risco do Banco Central do Brasil (SCR). Os principais resultados desse estudo são: 1) sugerir um capital regulatório total (Patrimônio de Referência mais provisão) para bancos grandes de 17,5% baseado no CVaR paramétrico de 99,9% e, para pequenos, de 15,31% baseado no CVaR de 99%; 2) sugerir que, de todas as abordagens de Basileia II, o IRB estimado conforme o Edital BCB n. 37/2011 e para as Probabilidade de Default (PDs) calculadas por matrizes de migração do SCR, é o mais conservador; 3) sugerir que a abordagem proposta seja mais sensível ao risco de crédito do que atual brasileira, especialmente no varejo, além de oferecer um nível proteção maior contra choques aleatórios de crédito. Na Crise de 2008-2009, os bancos pequenos e grandes apresentaram respostas muito distintas a choques diversos ou quando os \"estados da economia\" se deterioravam. Os bancos pequenos não atingem o grau de diversificação necessário para minimizar perdas extremas. Por outro lado, do ponto de vista do risco sistêmico, a falência dessas entidades tem impactos muito menores que a de conglomerados bancários de porte. Finalmente, a abordagem proposta CRBA é apresentada como uma alternativa à abordagem atual no Brasil e à abordagem padronizada (SA) nos demais países, em especial na Europa. No Brasil, a CRBA cumpriria o papel de aumentar a sensibilidade a risco de crédito do CME nos bancos pequenos criando incentivos para uma gestão de risco de crédito mais cautelosa e alinhando o nível de capital dos bancos pequenos ao seu risco efetivo. Nos demais países, a CRBA é uma alternativa à abordagem padronizada, que independe da opinião das Agências de Classificação de Risco (ACRs). A CRBA traz dois benefícios: o primeiro de ampliar o escopo dos modelos internos e eliminar a dependência regulatória na opinião das ACRs, diminuindo a oportunidade de arbitragem regulatória com ratings inflacionados e corrigindo incentivos para que as ACRs sejam apenas provedoras de opiniões isentas; e o segundo, de prover os organismos supervisores com um mecanismo de controle (tracking error) sobre a qualidade de gestão de risco dos bancos pequenos por meio das Centrais de Risco. / This work analyses capital requirements adequacy in Brazil both for small and big banks individually and evaluates the minimum capital requirements for credit risk in the different Basel II approaches, especially, the impacts of IRB adoption as stated on Edital BCB n.37/11. Besides, it proposes and evaluates the Centralized Standard Ratings Based Approach (CRBA) to calculate Minimum Capital Requirements (MCR) in small banks. It is inspired in the Basel II Standard Approach (SA) disseminated in Europe, but based on information from the Credit Registers. The CRBA is an internal model approach in line with recent discussions on regulatory reform in Europe and in the US. The methodology to address these three research goals is: the non-parametric credit Value-at-Risk (VaR) or CVaR of Carey(2002) and the parametric Creditrisk+ to estimate the economic capital for the banking system; to evaluate regulatory capital in small and big banks in the IRB, Basel 1 and the Simplified Standard Approach (SSA) on the sample; and to evaluate the CRBA, proposed in this study. The performance of these approaches is confronted with ad hoc stress scenarios and within the Credit Crisis of 2008-2009. The data is comprised of credit exposures available in the Brazilian Credit Register (SCR). This work main results are: 1) to suggest a total regulatory capital (capital and provision) of 17.5% to big banks based on a parametric CVaR (99.9%) and of 15.31% to small banks based on a CVaR (99%); 2) to suggest, based on all Basel II approaches, that the IRB, as stated on Edital BCB n.31/11 and calibrated with the probabilities of default (PD) estimated with transition matrixes from the SCR, is the most conservative approach; 3) to suggest that the proposed approach is more sensitive to credit risk especially in retail and is more effective against stress chocks. Small and big banks behave differently to adverse shocks. The small banks, for instance, have problems diversifying out extreme losses when the \"states of the economy\" deteriorate. On the other hand, considering systemic risk, the bankruptcies of these institutions are much less of a problem than the ones of a big bank. Finally, the CRBA is presented as an alternative to the current approach (SSA) in Brazil and to the Standard Approach (SA) in other countries, specifically in Europe. In Brazil, the CRBA would increase the risk sensitivity of MCR on smaller banks creating incentives to more careful risk management practices and aligning their capital and risk levels. On the other countries, the CRBA is an alternative to the Standard Approach (SA) that is not dependent on Credit Rating Agencies - CRAs\' opinions and brings two additional benefits. First, it is an internal model based approach eliminating regulatory dependence on CRAs\' opinions, minimizing opportunities to regulatory arbitrage with inflated ratings and allowing CRAs to be more of a trustworthy opinion provider. Second, it provides supervisors a tracking error mechanism to evaluate risk management in small banks using Credit Registers.

In this research, I present the analysis of the relationship between credit rating and tax avoidance. I found out that the lower the cash effective tax rate the stronger the association with credit rating. Sensitivity analysis showed that the probability of falling into more favorable credit rating category is increases and the probability of falling into less favorable category decreases if cash effective tax rate increases at least by 1%. Also, the negative association between book-tax differences and credit rating found.