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Uses and misuses of criminalisationEdwards, James Robert January 2011 (has links)
Which uses of the power to criminalise are misuses of that power? When, in other words, is an exercise of the power to create a criminal offence an exercise of that power which cannot be morally justified? This thesis seeks to provide one part of the answer, by addressing an aspect of the question little discussed by criminal law theorists. Thus it seeks not classes of conduct which it is impermissible to criminalise, nor classes of objective which offence-creators cannot permissibly pursue. Rather the thesis addresses the distinct issue of means – of how criminal offences (are set up to) bring about their creators’ objectives. It asks which means of achieving objectives it is impermissible to employ or make available, and how the power to criminalise must be used to avoid their employment or availability. In answering these questions the thesis distinguishes a number of types of criminal offence, by reference to the means by which the tokens of each (are set up to) achieve objectives. The argument is that to create tokens of these types is often to misuse power, because it is often to employ, or make available, impermissible means. This judgment of impermissibility is a function of a number of principles of political morality, some of which are developed at length in the course of the thesis. No single principle (or set of principles) is presented as an absolute limit on the power to criminalise; but each is part of a complete picture of how that power can permissibly be used, and contributes to vindicating the thesis defended within these pages. That thesis, to repeat, is that some uses of criminalisation are no better than misuses, on account of the means by which the resulting offences (are set up to) achieve their creators’ ends.
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Le corps en droit pénal / The body under criminal lawKurek, Camille 12 December 2017 (has links)
La seule évocation du corps humain éveille l’attention. Pourtant, le droit pénal ne s’en saisit qu’à travers la personne humaine et aux fins de protection de cette dernière. Le corps humain apparaît au travers des valeurs sociales protégées consubstantielles à la personne, ou plus généralement à l’humain, mais rarement en tant que tel. Dissimulé derrière ces valeurs, le corps interroge quant à la place que lui accorde le droit pénal. Cette étude se propose de renverser la perspective classique en appréhendant le corps non pas au travers des valeurs qu’il véhicule, mais pour ce qu’il est. L’analyse de la place du corps en droit pénal révèle sa dissimulation fréquente derrière la personne. Lorsqu’il est appréhendé comme un objet autonome, le législateur semble l’assimiler à une valeur sociale protégée. Or, cette première impression est trompeuse car il n’en constitue que le substrat. La vie, l’intégrité physique ou encore la dignité lui sont certes inhérentes, mais le corps n’est que le support concret qui véhicule ces notions abstraites. Il en découle un régime peu satisfaisant, d’une part parce que le traitement réservé aux valeurs sociales protégées ne lui est pas adapté et, d’autre part, car lorsqu’il est traité en dehors du prisme de la personne, il fait l’objet d’une appréhension lacunaire.Face à ces incohérences, cette étude se propose de renouveler le régime octroyé au corps humain en lui appliquant les règles relatives aux catégories juridiques préexistantes – les choses et les personnes. Tirant profit du droit pénal de la personne et du droit pénal des biens, une conception renouvelée du corps émerge en droit pénal. / The mere mention of the body captures the attention. However, criminal law considers it only through the human person and the protection purposes of the latter. The human body is reflected through protected social values which are part and parcel of the person, or more generally of the human being, but it is rarely considered as such. The body, being concealed behind these values, questions its position under criminal law. This study is intented to reverse the traditional approach by addressing the body for what it is and not through the values it conveys.The analysis of the position of the body under criminal law reveals its frequent concealment behind the person. When the body is tackled as an individual object, then the legislator seems to associate it with a protected social value. Yet, this first impression is misleading since it forms only the substratum. Life, physical integrity or dignity are certainly inherent to the body but the latter being only the solid support to convey those abstract notions. All this leads to an unsatisfactory legal regime, firstly because the treatment accorded to protected social values is not suitable to the body and secondly, because when treated outside the person lens, the body is the subject of a flawed apprehension. Faced with these inconsistencies, this study aims to renew the legal regime granted to the human body by applying the rules on the pre-existing legal categories- things and people. By taking advantage of the criminal law regarding people and of criminal law regarding property, a renewed understanding of the body emerges in criminal law.
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