Published Article / Freedom of religion is a constitutional right of every employee. It is the duty of the employer to respect and honour this freedom of religion of the employee. The question arises what the employer must do if there is conflict between the right to religion and the interests of the business. The current approach in the South African law is that the courts are of the opinion that employers are not very sensitive regarding the aspects of religion. Case law also favours the employee in case of judgements regarding the absence at the workplace due to religious reasons. The proposal is made that each case be investigated on its own merits. The approach should still be sensitive, but not so much that the legislation is boycotted. It is also recommended that no specific religion should get preference and that religion and science should work together. All religions must be given the same treatment, but the legislation should still be the determining factor.

Every theory of liberal multiculturalism is premised on some account of the nature of culture, cultural difference and social reality, or what I call “the conditions of multiculturality”. In this dissertation, I offer a revised account of the conditions and challenge of multiculturality. Beginning with the widely accepted idea that individuals depend on both culture and community as social preconditions for choice, freedom and autonomy, and informing this idea with collectivist and individualist lessons from Tyler Burge’s famous externalist thought-experiment, my analysis shows that social contexts are multicultural when they are characterized by a plurality of social communities offering distinct sets of cultural norms, and individuals are multicultural to the extent that they are capable of using cultural norms from various social communities. The depth, pervasiveness, and complexity of multiculturality raises important normative questions about fair and just terms for protecting and promoting social communities under conditions of internal and external cultural contestation, and these questions are not only restricted to cases involving internal minorities. As a theory of cultural justice, liberal multiculturalism must respond to the challenge of multiculturality generated by cultural difference per se, but it cannot do so adequately in all cases armed with only the traditional tools of toleration, freedom of association and exit, fundamental rights and freedoms, and internal political autonomy. My analysis demonstrates that, upon the revised conception of multiculturality, liberal theories of tolerationism, egalitarianism and nationalism leave significant cultural remainders, or unaccounted for cultural interests. What is needed is a different liberal multiculturalism, which respects the individual’s fundamental rights and freedoms, is committed to the equal and just treatment of individuals, tolerates voluntary cultural groups and practices in the social sphere, recognizes an individual right to culture, and provides some measure of state assistance to individuals seeking to protect and promote their cultural communities in the private sphere. This is a recipe for liberal cultural justice, and for a defensible liberal multiculturalism without nationalism. / Thesis (Ph.D, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2012-12-14 19:00:46.433

The United Nations Declaration of Human Rights establishes both the right to subsistence and the right to culture as rights that all humans should have. In practice, however, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) run into many moral implications when providing aid to the hungry, one of them being conflicts with local customs. In this essay, I will discuss a theoretical account of actions for providing some insight into the moral implications faced by NGOs in their work. First I discuss both one’s right to subsistence and one’s right to culture, and finally establish whether it’s possible to have one of these rights take precedence of the other.

This essay is an attempt to explain and assess the liberal nationalists’ view on the problems of the legitimacy of nationalism and cultural rights. I want to look at some theories over the past fifteen years that normatively evaluate ‘nationalism’ according to the liberal principles. The main focus of the first part will be on three questions, which are: the question of legitimacy (is nationalism permissible?), the question of justice (is nationalism required?), and the question of appropriate format (what forms of nationalism and nationalistic policies are considered as legitimate and just?). In the second part, by considering the alleged conflict between the ‘minority nation-building’ and the ‘majority nation-building’ in multination countries, I will examine two models for resolving this conflict: ‘Multinational Federalism’ and ‘Transnational Federalism’. I will argue that, though most liberal nationalists support the former model, they fail to provide a convincing normative ground for justifying Multinational Federalism and stopping national minorities from secession. The liberal nationalists’ arguments for necessity of nationalism, ironically, undermine their own claim about normative importance of Multinational Federalism in comparison to Transnational Federalism. This is what I call ‘the paradox of liberal nationalism’. / Thesis (Master, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2007-10-09 00:53:12.467

In this thesis I examine the status of the rights recognised in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in New Zealand‘s domestic law. I contrast that status with the constitutional guarantees that Brazil, South Africa and Finland provide for these rights, and critique the principal objections made in New Zealand and elsewhere against them. I argue that greater domestic legal protection of economic, social and cultural rights is necessary and propose that they be incorporated into the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990.

In this thesis I examine the status of the rights recognised in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in New Zealand‘s domestic law. I contrast that status with the constitutional guarantees that Brazil, South Africa and Finland provide for these rights, and critique the principal objections made in New Zealand and elsewhere against them. I argue that greater domestic legal protection of economic, social and cultural rights is necessary and propose that they be incorporated into the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990.

Este estudo visa a investigar sobre se o direito tem sido adequadamente utilizado para instrumentalizar a política pública de cultura no Brasil. Partimos do arcabouço jurídico nacional e internacional sobre os direitos culturais e de conceitos importantes para o tema, passamos pela parte histórica e contextual da política cultural no Brasil, com as modificações havidas desde a redemocratização e seus reflexos no setor produtivo e no consumo cultural, para, então, analisar a proposta de reforma da Lei Rouanet feita pelo Governo Lula, com o objetivo de extrair os pontos que realmente só poderiam ser modificados por lei e identificar o que poderia ser alterado por meio de instrumentos jurídicos infralegais. O passo seguinte foi trabalhar as razões pelas quais houve proposta de reforma legal tão abrangente, e discorrer sobre a relação entre o direito e a política pública de cultura no Brasil, especificamente da possibilidade de reinterpretar o texto e construir um novo conteúdo normativo com base em nova política, sem alteração formal na lei. Concluímos que a interpretação construtiva da Lei Rouanet, agora aliada ao Plano Nacional de Cultura, formando os pilares sobre os quais se deve construir a legislação infralegal da cultura, seria capaz de responder de forma contundente à maior parte dos anseios sociais e governamentais de reforma do sistema de financiamento da cultura no Brasil. / This study aims to investigate whether the law has been properly used to equip the public policy on culture in Brazil. Firstly, it discuss the national and international legal framework on cultural rights and key concepts, contextualizes the public policy on culture in Brazil, with the changes taking place since the return to democracy and their reflections in the productive sector and the cultural consumption, then analyzes the proposed reform of the Rouanet Law taken by Lula government, with the purpose of extracting the points that really could only be modified by law and identify what could be changed through regulation. Finally, it looks for the reasons why the proposal for Rouanet Law reform was so comprehensive, and examines the relationship between law and public policy on culture in Brazil, specifically the possibility to reinterpret the text and build a new normative content based on new policy without formally amending the law. It concludes that the constructive interpretation of the Rouanet Law would be able to answer forcefully to most social and governmental desire for reform financing of culture system in Brazil.

There is little work done in the area of indigenous disability identity issues and how they are recognised in domestic and international human rights laws. The discourse of disability has always been based on social constructionism and without it, there is no identity. I discuss its relevance to indigenous (Māori) with disabilities and how the multiplicitous nature of the identity of other has a particular impact when indigenous, gender and disability are all identified from marginalised groups. I also explore the impact of westernised thinking around impairment, in particular the models of disabilities on indigenous well-being. The issues of family (whānau), whakawhanaungatanga (family relationships), interdependence (community) and collectivity identities central to indigenous thinking are largely ignored by law and policy, yet central to indigenous identity. This ignorance in policy has led to the disparities that continue to remain for indigenous persons with disabilities, particularly those from within thematic identity groups.

<p>The Norwegian Rom community (Gypsies) leads a life outside large society. Most of the members are illiterate and poor and they are dependent on social security. Moreover, the Rom children are not going to school because education is not a part of the Rom culture. This situation raises various ethical dilemmas regarding cultural rights and obligations. In this thesis the author asks which of the conflicting rights should weigh most: The parent’s right to bring up their children in accordance with their own culture and beliefs, or the child’s right to education? The author’s argument is structured around two main problem areas. First, what is it with education that is good for all people? The short answer to this question is that education is important for functioning in society. Knowledge provides for a wider range of opportunities, and how to use this knowledge is up to each person. The other problem area is the limits of cultural toleration in liberal societies. Here, the author argues that although the right to culture is important, liberalism cannot accommodate illiberal practices. Childrearing that restricts the child’s access to the world outside its original community is one example of intolerable practices. In order to get the Rom children in to school, dialogue is the preferable way to go. However, if the establishment of dialogue is impossible because of fundamentalist or non-dialogical attitudes, an alternative argument is provided: Discursive paternalism is a compulsion to argue on contested norms. This compulsion reconciles individual freedom (autonomy) and paternalism, and can therefore be justified by liberals. Main references are Will Kymlicka, Martha Nussbaum, Chandran Kukathas, Adeno Addis and May Thorseth.</p>

The Norwegian Rom community (Gypsies) leads a life outside large society. Most of the members are illiterate and poor and they are dependent on social security. Moreover, the Rom children are not going to school because education is not a part of the Rom culture. This situation raises various ethical dilemmas regarding cultural rights and obligations. In this thesis the author asks which of the conflicting rights should weigh most: The parent’s right to bring up their children in accordance with their own culture and beliefs, or the child’s right to education? The author’s argument is structured around two main problem areas. First, what is it with education that is good for all people? The short answer to this question is that education is important for functioning in society. Knowledge provides for a wider range of opportunities, and how to use this knowledge is up to each person. The other problem area is the limits of cultural toleration in liberal societies. Here, the author argues that although the right to culture is important, liberalism cannot accommodate illiberal practices. Childrearing that restricts the child’s access to the world outside its original community is one example of intolerable practices. In order to get the Rom children in to school, dialogue is the preferable way to go. However, if the establishment of dialogue is impossible because of fundamentalist or non-dialogical attitudes, an alternative argument is provided: Discursive paternalism is a compulsion to argue on contested norms. This compulsion reconciles individual freedom (autonomy) and paternalism, and can therefore be justified by liberals. Main references are Will Kymlicka, Martha Nussbaum, Chandran Kukathas, Adeno Addis and May Thorseth.