MSc (Zoology) / Department of Zoology

MER Mathivha Centre for African Languages, Arts and Culture / PhD (Tshivenda)

Doctor Legum - LLD / Traditional justice systems (TJS), which apply African customary law (ACL), play a significant role in the regulation of various cultural, social, and economic spheres of individual lives in society. It is estimated that 90% of African countries use TJS in dispute resolution. Succession matters form one of the areas in which TJS are applied. In Kenya, it is estimated that the majority of succession matters are addressed through TJS given that only 36% of cases are taken to the formal justice system (FJS) for determination. This indicates the presence of legal pluralism where formal law co-exists with African customary law. However, the application of customary succession laws and their enforcement by the FJS encounter impediments which curtail the integration of ACL within the FJS. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to determine the interface between African customary laws of succession in the TJS and the FJS. In order to achieve this objective the study applies the Historical School of Jurisprudence as its theoretical framework and applies document analysis as the research methodology. The major findings of the study indicated that though progressive recognition, application and enforcement of ACL in Kenya has been realised, there are several impediments to the integration and enforcement of customary succession decisions within the FJS. These include non-complimentary legal provisions, lack of in-depth knowledge on ACL by the FJS, and more importantly, lack of a policy guideline on the integration of ACL within the FJS. Based on these findings, this study finds it necessary to develop a guideline that will enhance the integration and enforcement of customary succession decisions by the FJS.

The Constitution stipulates that its value-commitments are to inform the interpretation of statutes and the development of the common law and customary law. Legislative construction and law-application generally are therefore to be perceived as involving an axiological dimension. Three hermeneutical traditions are dealt with to the end of clarifying the approaches to be adopted in everyday legal• argumentation. The study culminates in the adduction of leads for substantive !juridical argument in the process of statutory interpretation and in handling common-law and customary-law sources. These leads are shown to be functional byi way of a critical discussion of recent case law and a conspectus of contemporary t~ought bearing on the nature of customary law. The social dimension of the legal process is throughout underscored as a factor of significance. Concomitantly, it is rcigistered that the jurisprudence of formalism, so marked an attitude of a previous time, should be abjured to the extent that it is disdainful of value-commitment. Conformably, literalist and literalist-cumintentionalist perceptions as well as kindred stances are berated. The penultimate chapter of this thesis suggests an encompassing approach to the interpretation of statutes, comprised of a systematic tabulation of insights previously garnered. The fmal chapter postulates that common law and customary law are not to be dealt with upon an interchangeable basis, inasmuch as the sources go out from radically divergent premises. It then proceeds to elaborate a conceptual framework for dealing respectively with each of these sources. / Law / LL.D.

The Constitution stipulates that its value-commitments are to inform the interpretation of statutes and the development of the common law and customary law. Legislative construction and law-application generally are therefore to be perceived as involving an axiological dimension. Three hermeneutical traditions are dealt with to the end of clarifying the approaches to be adopted in everyday legal• argumentation. The study culminates in the adduction of leads for substantive !juridical argument in the process of statutory interpretation and in handling common-law and customary-law sources. These leads are shown to be functional byi way of a critical discussion of recent case law and a conspectus of contemporary t~ought bearing on the nature of customary law. The social dimension of the legal process is throughout underscored as a factor of significance. Concomitantly, it is rcigistered that the jurisprudence of formalism, so marked an attitude of a previous time, should be abjured to the extent that it is disdainful of value-commitment. Conformably, literalist and literalist-cumintentionalist perceptions as well as kindred stances are berated. The penultimate chapter of this thesis suggests an encompassing approach to the interpretation of statutes, comprised of a systematic tabulation of insights previously garnered. The fmal chapter postulates that common law and customary law are not to be dealt with upon an interchangeable basis, inasmuch as the sources go out from radically divergent premises. It then proceeds to elaborate a conceptual framework for dealing respectively with each of these sources. / Law / LL.D.

LLM / Department of Public Law

Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI) / This study examines the history of Indian-settler legal relations in Indiana, from the state’s pre-territorial period to the late-nineteenth century. Through a variety of interdisciplinary sources and methods, the author constructs a broad narrative on the evolution and co-existence of Native and non-Native customary legal systems in the region, focusing on matters related to marriage, property rights, and testimony. The primary thesis—which emphasizes reciprocally formative relations, rather than persistent conflict—suggests that Indiana’s pre-modern legal past involved an ad hoc yet highly effective process of cultural brokerage, reciprocity and inter-personal accommodation. That the American Indians lost much of their self-governing status following the period of contact is clear; however, a closer look at the ways in which nations historically defined, exercised, asserted, and shared jurisdiction, reveals a more intricate story of influence, authority, and concession. During the French and British colonial and American territorial periods, settler society adjusted to and often accommodated Native concepts of law and justice. Through a complex order of social obligations and community-based enforcement mechanisms, a shared set of rules and jurisdictional practices merged, forming a hybrid system of Indian-settler norms that bound these individuals across the cultural divide. When Indiana entered the Union in 1816, legal pluralism defined jurisdictional practice. However, with the nineteenth-century rise of legal positivism—the idea of law as the sole command of the nation-state, a sovereign entity vested with exclusive authority—territorial jurisdiction and legal uniformity became guiding principles. Many jurists viewed the informal, pre-existing custom-based regulatory structures with contempt. With the shift to a state-centered legal order, lawmakers established strict standards for recognizing the law of the “other,” ultimately rejecting the status of the tribes as equal sovereigns and forcing them to concede jurisdiction to the settler polity.

No abstract available / Thesis (DPHil)--PU vir CHO, 1982

No abstract available / Thesis (DPHil)--PU vir CHO, 1982

In Canada and New Zealand there are increasing calls for recognition of aboriginal rights which previously were ignored or denied because of the application of English law to concepts of property rights and ownership. English legal principles are vitally important in Canadian and New Zealand society, but there has always been room for local adaptations which could have recognised the existing practices and rights of the indigenous peoples. The English law makes various assumptions about ownership of rivers, dividing them into bed, banks and water, and applying various tests of adjoining occupation, tidalness and navigability to determine rights. Aboriginal property rights have been guaranteed and protected by various mechanisms such as government policy, treaty, and the courts, but there is uncertainty about the status of rivers. The form of the survey definition of reserves and rivers is also fundamental to how property rights may be determined. This thesis examines the situation of rivers in Canada and New Zealand through common law, treaty provisions and through what is now, a developing body of applicable and recognised customary/Aboriginal law. From these three legal foundations, a case study approach focuses on the practical situation of the Siksika people on the Bow River in southern Alberta, and the Kai Tahu on the Taieri River in Otago. This investigation concludes that there are various legal mechanisms by which indigenous people may claim rights to the rivers with which they have a relationship; by resorting to English common law principles; by applying new and developing conceptualisations of customary and aboriginal rights doctrines; by appealing to tribunals examining treaty agreements; or by direct negotiation with the Crown. All of these processes require evidence of past and current relationships, use and occupation of rivers by the indigenous claimants. Current undisputed possession and control may be a satisfactory outcome, but ultimately an acknowledgement of ownership may depend on politically negotiated settlements.