Thesis (M.A.)--West Virginia University, 1999. / Title from document title page. Document formatted into pages; contains vi, 45 p. : ill. (some col.), maps (some col.). Includes abstract. Includes bibliographical references (p. 30).

Peirce, Wittgenstein and Davidson: Anti-skeptic Coincidences”. This paper shows some similarities among Peirce’s, Wittgenstein’s and Davidson’s answers to skepticism. In each case, the response to Cartesian skepticism consist in pointing out the contradictory character of the skeptical doubt in itself.More specifically, those philosophers agree on the following points: (i) in order to face the challenge of skepticism we have to examine its bases without conceding the terms of the challenge; (ii) the skeptic cannot doubt without assuming some propositional contents as true. In this sense, the skeptic commits performative contradiction; (iii) in his challenge, the skeptic omits the practical dimension of language and knowledge. That is the source of his difficulties. / Este artículo pone de manifiesto algunos puntos comunes en lasrespuestas al escepticismo de Peirce, Wittgenstein y Davidson. En cada caso, la respuesta al escepticismo cartesiano consiste en señalar el carácter contradictorio de la misma duda escéptica. Más específicamente, los tres filósofos están de acuerdo en los siguientes puntos: (i) a fin de hacer frente al desafío escéptico,debemos examinar sus bases sin conceder los términos en los que se plantea el desafío; (ii) el escéptico no puede dudar sin asumir algunos contenidos proposicionales como verdaderos. En este sentido, el escéptico incurre en contradicción performativa; (iii) en su desafío, el escéptico omite la dimensión práctica del lenguaje y del conocimiento. Ese es el origen de sus dificultades.

No description available.

In his influential essay “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme”, Donald Davidson argues that we cannot make sense of conceptual relativism, the doctrine that there could be incommensurably different systems of concepts applicable to a single world. According to Davidson, there is no criterion of identity for language that does not imply or presuppose the possibility that we interpret that language by means of our own language. Given some plausible assumptions, this implies that there is at most one conceptual scheme, one way of interpreting or representing the world. But then the very idea of a conceptual scheme is empty. The dissertation is an examination of Davidson’s reasoning, and a defence of a different position regarding conceptual relativism. I reject much of Davidson’s argumentation, and his radical (subordinate) conclusion that we would be able, at least in principle, to make sense of any language. Languages that we would be unable to translate or interpret, even in principle, are at least logically possible, in my view. However, this possibility should not be thought to imply or encourage conceptual relativism. In this respect, I think that Davidson and many of his critics have conflated the notion of a difference in conceptual scheme, which requires incommensurability between languages or systems of concepts, and mere conceptual difference. I argue that a genuinely alternative conceptual scheme would be associated with language unintelligible to us because of its relation to our language. For what is at issue, supposedly, is a conceptual relation: a relation between languages, not a relation between speakers, or their capacities, on the one hand, and languages, on the other. I try to show how some of Davidson’s arguments, suitably modified, can be deployed against the possibility of an alternative scheme, so understood, and provide some additional arguments of my own. My position is thus significantly weaker than Davidson’s: there could not be languages that we would be unable to interpret because they are incommensurable with our own.

No description available.

殷子俊. / "2004年7月". / 論文(哲學碩士)--香港中文大學, 2004. / 參考文獻(leaves 101-106). / "2004 nian 7 yue". / Abstracts in Chinese and English. / Yin Zijun. / Lun wen (zhe xue shuo shi)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue, 2004. / Can kao wen xian (leaves 101-106). / 摘要 --- p.i / 鳴謝 --- p.iii / Chapter 第一章 --- 引言 --- p.1 / Chapter 1.1 --- 本文主旨 --- p.1 / Chapter 1.2 --- 二十世紀語意整全論的先驅一奎因 --- p.2 / Chapter 1.3 --- 整全論的性質 --- p.6 / Chapter 1.3.1 --- 整全論與分子論 --- p.8 / Chapter 1.4 --- 整全論的分類 --- p.12 / Chapter 第二章 --- 真理與意義 --- p.14 / Chapter 2.1 --- 戴維森的語意理論 --- p.14 / Chapter 2.1.1 --- 戴維森的約定T理論 --- p.15 / Chapter 2.1.2 --- 外延滿足性及組合性 --- p.17 / Chapter 2.1.3 --- 約定T理論的技術問題 --- p.22 / Chapter 2.2 --- 戴維森的真理理論 --- p.24 / Chapter 2.2.1 --- 爲真理的槪念辯護 --- p.24 / Chapter 2.2.2 --- 兩種錯誤的真理觀 --- p.29 / Chapter 2.3 --- 意義、信念與真理 --- p.34 / Chapter 第三章 --- 徹底的詮釋 --- p.37 / Chapter 3.1 --- 翻譯與詮釋 --- p.37 / Chapter 3.2 --- 徹底的詮釋 --- p.40 / Chapter 3.2.1 --- 寬容原則 --- p.42 / Chapter 3.2.2 --- 三角測量 --- p.48 / Chapter 3.3 --- 戴維森的整全論 --- p.51 / Chapter 3.3.1 --- 從徹底的詮釋到整全論 --- p.52 / Chapter 3.3.2 --- 戴維森整全論的歸類 --- p.56 / Chapter 3.3.3 --- 整全論與組合性 --- p.59 / Chapter 3.3.4 --- 整全論與理解 --- p.62 / Chapter 第四章 --- 溝通的整全性一論弗達與拿玻的反整全論 --- p.65 / Chapter 4.1 --- 弗達與拿玻的立場與前設 --- p.65 / Chapter 4.2 --- 弗達與拿玻的論證 --- p.67 / Chapter 4.2.1 --- 組合性論證 --- p.69 / Chapter 4.2.2 --- 規範性論證 --- p.80 / Chapter 4.2.3 --- 寬容原則論證 --- p.84 / Chapter 4.2.4 --- 信念的基本性論證 --- p.89 / Chapter 4.3 --- 總結：徹底詮釋論與語意整全論 --- p.94 / 詞彙翻譯對照表 --- p.98 / 哲學家譯名對照表 --- p.100 / 參考書目 --- p.101

Not available

In his influential essay “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme”, Donald Davidson argues that we cannot make sense of conceptual relativism, the doctrine that there could be incommensurably different systems of concepts applicable to a single world. According to Davidson, there is no criterion of identity for language that does not imply or presuppose the possibility that we interpret that language by means of our own language. Given some plausible assumptions, this implies that there is at most one conceptual scheme, one way of interpreting or representing the world. But then the very idea of a conceptual scheme is empty. The dissertation is an examination of Davidson’s reasoning, and a defence of a different position regarding conceptual relativism. I reject much of Davidson’s argumentation, and his radical (subordinate) conclusion that we would be able, at least in principle, to make sense of any language. Languages that we would be unable to translate or interpret, even in principle, are at least logically possible, in my view. However, this possibility should not be thought to imply or encourage conceptual relativism. In this respect, I think that Davidson and many of his critics have conflated the notion of a difference in conceptual scheme, which requires incommensurability between languages or systems of concepts, and mere conceptual difference. I argue that a genuinely alternative conceptual scheme would be associated with language unintelligible to us because of its relation to our language. For what is at issue, supposedly, is a conceptual relation: a relation between languages, not a relation between speakers, or their capacities, on the one hand, and languages, on the other. I try to show how some of Davidson’s arguments, suitably modified, can be deployed against the possibility of an alternative scheme, so understood, and provide some additional arguments of my own. My position is thus significantly weaker than Davidson’s: there could not be languages that we would be unable to interpret because they are incommensurable with our own.

Thesis (D.Phil.)--University of Oxford, 2008. / Supervisors: Professor D.M. Edgington, Professor John Hawthorne. Bibliography: leaves 222-226.

Thèse (M.A.)--Université Laval, 2004. / Bibliogr.: f. 123-127. Publ. aussi en version électronique.