Made available in DSpace on 2015-05-14T12:11:54Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivototal.pdf: 1177964 bytes, checksum: 5a7bb36b7ee8d091a460d8cba06bdb25 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-02-28 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / This dissertation has the aim of accomplishing a study of the relation between thought and language, including arguments for o agains the possibility of thought in the absence of language. In order to achieve this, a review of the philosophical literature on the subject from the second half of the twentieth century until recently has been performed. The first chapter focuses on Donald Davidson‟s influential argument, particularly as established in Thought and Talk, of great importance to the field. Contrary arguments have been studied in the second chapter, Searle‟s proposal on Consciousness and Language as well as Bermúdez‟s thesis on Thinking Without Words are the main highlights. From bibliographical analysis, the third chapter is construed more argumentatively, with the objective of evaluating the theses which have been presented in an informed manner. / Esta dissertação de mestrado tem por objetivo realizar um estudo sobre a relação entre pensamento e linguagem, englobando argumentos acerca da possibilidade ou não de pensamento sem linguagem. Para isso, empreende-se uma revisão de alguns elementos da literatura filosófica produzida sobre o assunto na segunda metade do século XX e começo do século atual. O primeiro capítulo é dedicado à análise do influente argumento de Donald Davidson, com ênfase particular ao seu artigo Thought and Talk, de grande importância para o tema. Argumentos contrários também são contemplados no segundo capítulo, a proposta de Searle, presente em Consciousness and Language, e a tese de Bermúdez, em Thinking Without Words são os principais destaques. A partir da análise bibliográfica, o terceiro capítulo é construído com teor mais argumentativo, com o objetivo de avaliar as teses apresentadas de maneira informada.

The Normativity of the Mental and the Role of the Second Person’s Standpoint. On Davidson’s Footsteps”. I offer in this paper an elucidation of the normativity of the mental in terms of the second person’s standpoint, with the hope of opening a conceptual horizon that will allow us to go beyond Donald Davidson. Aiming at this, the paper is structured as follows. In the first part I present Davidson’s original response to the mind/body problem and reconstruct his argument in favour of the irreducibility of mental concepts thesis. In the second part I deal with the feature that the peculiarity of the mental bears in his system, that is, normativity. In the third section I explore and assess the davidsonian treatment of the first, second and third person standpoints with the aim of finally narrowing down my proposal. / En este trabajo ofrezco una elucidación de la normatividad de lo mental en términos de la perspectiva de segunda persona, con la esperanza de abrir un horizonte conceptual que nos permita ir más allá de Donald Davidson. A tal efecto, el artículo tiene la siguiente estructura. En la primera parte presento su original respuesta al problema mente/cuerpo y reconstruyo su argumentación a favor de la tesis de la irreducibilidad de los conceptos mentales. En la segunda parte me ocupo del rasgo que, en su sistema, porta la peculiaridad de lo mental, a saber: la normatividad. En la tercera sección exploro y evalúo el tratamiento davidsoniano de las perspectivas de primera, segunda y tercera persona con vistas a precisar, finalmente, mi propuesta.

Truth and Justification in Donald Davidson’s Philosophy”. In this paper, I attempt to discuss the tensions that exist in Davidson’s work between hisconception of beliefs as veridical by nature and its radical opposition to epistemictheories of truth. With this purpose, I introduce two modalities of philosophicalelucidation: analytic non-reductive elucidation and connective elucidation. I alsoclaim that these two modalities are characteristic of two periods of Davidson’sway of dealing with the concept of truth. I attempt to show that the considerationof these two types of elucidation allows shedding light on the way in whichDavidson’s work deals with the problem of truth and on the particular abovementionedtension. / En este artículo me propongo tratar la tensión existente en la obra deDavidson entre su concepción de las creencias como verídicas por naturaleza ysu radical oposición a las teorías epistémicas de la verdad. Para ello introduzcodos modalidades de elucidación filosófica, elucidación analítica no reductiva yelucidación conectiva y sostengo que caracterizan dos periodos en el tratamientode Davidson del concepto de verdad. Me propongo mostrar que la consideraciónde estos dos tipos de elucidación permite echar luz sobre el tratamientodel problema de la verdad en la obra de Davidson y sobre la particular tensiónanteriormente mencionada.

Davidson and classical pragmatism”. In this paper I wish to trace some connections between Donald Davidson´s work (1917-2003) and two major representatives of the classical pragmatist movement: Charles S. Peirce (1839­1914) and William James (1842-1910). I will start with a basic characterization of classical pragmatism; then, I shall examine certain conceptions in Peirce’s and James’ pragmatism, in order to establish affinities with Davidsons’ thought. Finally, and bearing in mind the previous connections, I will reflect briefly on the relevance –often unrecognized– of classical pragmatist ideas in the context of contemporary philosophical discussions. / En el presente trabajo me propongo rastrear algunos nexos existentes entre la obra de Donald Davidson (1917-2003) y dos de los mayores exponentes del movimiento pragmatista clásico: Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914) y William James (1842-1910). Con dicho objetivo, partiré de una caracterización básica del pragmatismo clásico; luego, examinaré ciertas concepciones propias del pragmatismo de Peirce y de James con el propósito de establecer afinidades con el pensamiento davidsoniano. Finalmente, y teniendo en cuenta la vinculación anterior, reflexionaré brevemente sobre la vigencia –muchas veces poco reconocida– de las ideas pragmatistas clásicas en el contexto de las discusiones de la filosofía contemporánea.

Nesta tese realizo uma exposição e exame sistemáticos do projeto semântico do filósofo estadunidense Donald Davidson de construir uma teoria composicional do significado para as línguas naturais explorando a estrutura recursiva de uma teoria interpretativa da verdade de tipo tarskiana. Nesta estratégia, uma teoria do significado deve ser capaz de capturar a capacidade linguística geral que qualquer falante de uma língua possui de produzir e interpretar novas sentenças. O requerimento de que a teoria seja composicional constitui o critério fundamental que orienta o empreendimento de Davidson e está na base do projeto de elucidar o aspecto composicional do significado via o emprego de uma teoria da verdade do tipo tarskiana. Defendo que o projeto de Davidson intenta lançar as bases de um programa de pesquisa em semântica das línguas naturais que, embora não hegemônico no campo e visto com ceticismo por alguns, é o único exemplo até o momento de uma tentativa de iluminar de forma sistemática o aspecto composicional do significado de amplos fragmentos das línguas naturais sem um apelo direto a entidades abstratas associadas às expressões de uma linguagem, como propriedades, proposições sentidos, intensões etc. Dois tópicos acerca do projeto recebem uma investigação detalhada. Em primeiro lugar, questões filosóficas fundacionais que a proposta suscita. Abordamos as objeções de Davidson a teorias que quantificam sobre significados, discutindo os problemas que ele identifica em análises que reificam a camada intensional dos significados das expressões de uma língua, em especial sistemas neo-fregeanos, tais como os propostos por Rudolf Carnap e Alonzo Church. Baseado em parte nesta crítica de Davidson, pouco examinada na literatura, e sem a qual se corre o risco de uma interpretação equivocada das ambições do projeto, sustento, em consonância com os semanticistas neo-davidsonianos Ernie Lepore & Kirk Ludwig (2005; 2007), que Davidson não intenta fornecer uma semântica que se caracteriza por substituir ou reduzir uma teoria do significado a uma teoria da verdade. A ideia é que uma teoria composicional do significado pode ser apresentada como um corpo de conhecimento sobre uma teoria interpretativa da verdade. Davidson tampouco intenta eliminar a camada intensional do significado; o que se busca é evitar a sua reificação. Uma outra parte da tese se debruça sobre o esforço de acomodar na teoria um conjunto de fenômenos linguísticos próprios das línguas naturais: expressões sensíveis ao contexto, como pronomes pessoais e demonstrativos, que forçam a relativização do predicado de verdade às situações de uso das sentenças; quantificação restrita; sentenças com verbos de ação e que descrevem relações causais entre eventos; contextos opacos criados por sentenças com verbos de atitude proposicional, e a dificuldade de tratar esses contextos sem introduzir entidades intensionais. Examino também aspectos fundacionais da semântica de Lepore & Ludwig, que, sem dúvida, amplia significativamente o escopo de fenômenos linguísticos que podem ser explicados por uma teoria motivada pelo projeto de Davidson. No método dos autores, é estabelecida, entre outras condições, seguindo Davidson, que não basta saber o conteúdo informacional expresso pelos axiomas de uma teoria da verdade. É preciso saber também quais conteúdos os axiomas veiculam. Isto é, tem-se que saber os sentidos dos axiomas. Ao sistematizarem na forma de uma teoria esse conhecimento, eles associam, por meio de uma lista, um sentido/intensão a cada axioma. Para cada expressão da linguagem objeto deve haver um axioma na teoria, e o sentido desse axioma deve ser conteúdo de conhecimento do semanticista/intérprete para que ele seja capaz de empregar a teoria-T para interpretar as expressões subsentenciais e as sentenças da linguagem objeto. Se minha observação estiver correta, na estrutura da teoria dos autores acaba por ocorrer a reificação dos sentidos dos axiomas, o que seria forte indicação de que a semântica que constroem não cumpre o propósito de ser uma teoria imune à introdução de entidades intensionais. Além disso, esta associação de um conteúdo semântico a cada axioma via quantificação, parece implicar uma questão mais grave: o assinalamento de objetos intensionais às expressões da linguagem objeto. Desse modo, se minhas ponderações estiverem corretas, a semântica dos autores parece não se configurar como uma alternativa às teorias neo-fregeanas, no sentido de cumprir o que estas fazem, sem que, na sua estrutura, tenha que postular entidades intensionais. / In this dissertation I carry out a sistematic exposition and examination of Donald Davidsons semantic project to construct a compositional theory of meaning for natural languages by exploring the recursive structure of an interpretative truth theory à lá Tarski. In this strategy, a theory of meaning must be able to capture the general linguistic ability of any speaker of a language to produce and interpret new sentences. The requirement that the theory be compositional is the fundamental criterion that guides Davidson\'s enterprise and ii is at the basis of the project of elucidating the compositional aspect of meaning via the use of a theory of truth of the Tarskian type. I argue that Davidson\'s project attempts to lay the groundwork for a research program on natural language semantics which, while not hegemonic in the field and viewed with skepticism by some, is the only example so far of an attempt to systematically illuminate the compositional aspect of the meanings of broad fragments of natural languages without a direct appeal to abstract entities associated with the expressions of a language, such as properties, senses, propositions, intensions, etc. Two topics about the project received detailed attention. Firstly, I focus on issues of philosophical foundations raised by the proposal. I approach Davidson\'s objections to theories that quantify over meanings by discussing the problems he identifies in analyzes that reify the intensional layer of the meanings of the expressions of a language, especially neo-Fregean systems, such as those proposed by Rudolf Carnap and Alonzo Church. Based partly on Davidson\'s criticism, which is scarcely examined in the literature, and without which there is a risk of a misinterpretation of the ambitions of the project, I maintain, along with the neo-Davidsonian semanticists Ernie Lepore & Kirk Ludwig (2005; 2007), that Davidson does not attempt to provide a semantics which is characterized by substituting or reducing a theory of meaning to a truth theory. The idea is that a compositional theory of meaning can be presented as a body of knowledge about an interpretive truth theory. Davidson does not seek to eliminate the intensional layer of the expressions. What is sought is to avoid its reification. Another part of the thesis focuses on the effort to accommodate in the theory a set of linguistic phenomena proper to natural languages: context-sensitive expressions such as personal and demonstrative pronouns, which force the relativization of the truth predicate of to the contexts of use; Restricted quantification; Sentences with action verbs that describe causal relationships between events; Opaque contexts created by sentences with propositional attitude verbs, and the difficulty of dealing with these contexts without introducing intensional entities. I also examine the foundational aspects of Lepore & Ludwig\'s semantics, which undoubtedly widens the scope of linguistic phenomena that can be explained by a theory motivated by Davidson\'s project. In the authors\' method, it is established, among other conditions - following Davidsons approach - that it is not enough to know the informational content expressed by the axioms of a theory of truth. It is also necessary to know what content the axioms convey. That is, one has to know the meanings of the axioms. By systematizing this knowledge in the form of a theory, they associate, through a list, a sense/intension to each axiom. For each expression of the object language there must be an axiom in the theory, and the meaning of this axiom must be the content of the semanticist / interpreter\'s knowledge so that he is able to employ a truth theory to interpret the subsentential expressions and the sentences of the object language. If my observation is correct, in the structure of the authors theory the reification of the meanings of the axioms occurs, which would be a strong indication that the semantics they construct does not fulfill the purpose of being a theory immune to the introduction of intensional entities. Moreover, this association of a semantic content to each axiom via quantification seems to imply a more serious question: the signaling of intensional objects to the expressions of the object language. Thus, if my considerations are correct, the semantics of the authors seems not to be configured as an alternative to neo-Fregean theories, in the sense of fulfilling what they do, without in the structure of the theory having to postulate intensional entities.

Este trabalho é uma etnografia das práticas sociais que tornam visíveis os processos de criação de sentidos e vínculos com a marca Harley-Davidson pelos pilotos que frequentaram os encontros do H.O.G. Harley Owners Group na cidade de São Paulo, entre maio de 2009 a fevereiro de 2011. Por meio da combinação das técnicas de observação participante, entrevistas e análise de imagens, busco entender quais as dimensões do envolvimento com a marca. A tese apresenta uma análise da organização do H.O.G. na capital paulista e acompanha o movimento dos pilotos para identificar as relações que se formam entre eles, e entre eles e a marca. A partir de imagens cinematográficas é possível identificar a constituição de um quadro de referências que inspiram a performance dos pilotos que participam das viagens semanais. A importância das imagens neste universo é reforçada pela fotografia, prática comum nos encontros e que auxiliou na identificação do que é entendido por Estilo Harley e a categoria daí decorrente o harleiro. O pertencimento ao grupo é resultado da articulação de vários elementos que envolvem a estetização da motocicleta e do piloto. Alguns aspectos escolhidos e compartilhados pelo grupo caracterizam uma masculinidade hegemônica que orienta comportamento, discurso e a experiência de consumo da marca. Finalizo o trabalho fazendo uma reflexão sobre o conceito de marca e os vínculos criados com ela. / This paper is an ethnographic study of the social practices that make the creation processes of meanings and links with the Harley-Davidson brand visible by the riders that attended the rides of the H.O.G - Harley Owners Group - in São Paulo city between May 2009 and February 2011. I try to understand the dimensions of brand involvement by combining the participant observation techniques, interviews and image analysis. This thesis presents an analysis of the H.O.G. organization in São Paulo city and follows the movement of the riders in order to identify the relations that are formed among them and between the riders and the brand. Through the use of film images it is possible to identify the constitution of a frame of reference which inspires the performance of the riders who participate in weekly rides. In this universe the importance of the images is reinforced by the photographs, a common practice in the events and that helped to identify what is understood as Harley Style and the deriving category the harleyro. Belonging to the group is the result of the articulation of several elements that involve the aestheticization of the motorcycle and the rider. Some aspects chosen and shared by the group characterize a hegemonic masculinity that guides the behavior, discourse and the brand consumption experience. I finish this paper reflecting on the concept of brand and the links created with it.

The present paper proposes a critical revision of the massive truth notion, in the context of Donald Davidson’s criticism to skepticism. It´s distinguished in Davidson’s work a cuantitative sense and a cualitative sense of the massive truth, asserting that the first one has been more frequently used and has had just an intuitive level of elucidation. The main problems associated to the cuantitative notion of massive truth are revised in relation to the quantification of beliefs, the detection of error on a background of truth and the application of the Davidsonian methodology to non perceptual beliefs. Over this revision it is proposed the substitution of the cuantitative notion of massive truth for a cualitative notion, and are analized its advantages over eventual skeptical objections. / El presente trabajo propone una revisión crítica de la noción de verdad masiva, en el contexto de la crítica de Donald Davidson al escepticismo. Se distingue en la obra de Davidson un sentido cuantitativo y uno cualitativo de verdad masiva, afirmando que el primero ha sido de uso más frecuente y ha contado con un nivel de elucidación solamente intuitivo. Se revisan los principales problemas asociados a la noción cuantitativa de verdad masiva, en relación con la cuantificación de las creencias, la detección del error sobre un trasfondo de verdad y la aplicación de la metodología davidsoniana a creencias no perceptuales. Sobre esta revisión se propone la sustitución de la noción cuantitativa de verdad masiva por una noción cualitativa, y se analizan sus ventajas frentea eventuales objeciones escépticas.

Comment rendre compte du fait que le mental est efficace causalement, si les relations causales impliquent des relations nomologiques (lois), et que le monde mental est exempt d’une telle caractéristique? Dans un article intitulé «Mental Events», Donald Davidson tente de résoudre ce problème en soutenant l’idée que les occurrences d’événements mentaux sont identiques à des occurrences d’événements physiques. Toutefois, cette thèse de l’identité des occurrences, le Monisme Anomal, est problématique dans la mesure où si c’est en tant qu’événements physiques que les événement mentaux sont efficaces causalement, alors le mental en tant que mental n’a aucune efficacité causale : les événements mentaux ne sont que des épiphénomènes. Pour résoudre cette difficulté, Davidson soutient d’abord que ce n’est pas en tant que physiques ou mentaux que les événements sont des causes, mais en tant que particuliers, quoi qu’il en soit des propriétés qu’ils exemplifient. Il introduit aussi une version de la notion de survenance pour rendre compte du rapport entre les propriétés mentales et physiques, notion dont je me sers finalement pour formuler une deuxième réponse possible à l’objection épiphénoméniste.

This study examined the talent development of five Davidson Fellowship science winners using the Differentiated Model of Giftedness and Talent. The Davidson Fellowship program recognizes students under the age of 18 who have completed a significant piece of original work in one of six fields: science, technology, mathematics, music, literature, or philosophy. Parents of four of the Fellows also participated in the multiple-case study, which used semi-structured phone interviews to gather data. The cross-case analysis of this multiple-case study revealed that the Fellows traveled multiple pathways to success. Each Fellow and his family took advantage of different educational options, formal and informal. No consistent educational programming existed across participants from different schools in different areas of the country, except AP® courses and science fairs. The Fellows encountered a number of different negative catalysts in the environment, including a lack of challenge in the public schools, inconsistent treatment by teachers and administrators, variable availability of challenging school and extracurricular opportunities, difficulties with peers, and challenging logistical arrangements necessary for participation in extracurricular opportunities. The strength of these negative catalysts was offset by a number of protective factors, or positive catalysts. The positive catalysts were both strong and numerous in each of the Fellows. Each Fellow presented evidence of very high ability. They were healthy. They were raised in supportive learning environments that encouraged taking risks, striving for excellence, and improvement over earning good grades. They had multiple supportive adults in their lives: parents, teachers, and mentors who created a layered support system. When one adult was not available, there were others on whom the student could depend in a crisis. The parent relationship was particularly strong. Each Fellow reported, and each of the parents confirmed, a uniquely supportive relationship with their parents marked by mutual respect and admiration. Each Fellow presented strong motivation for his work. Each displayed a candid awareness of his own strengths and weaknesses, and a willingness to confront and apply himself to remedy weaknesses. They all presented compelling evidence of a tenacious perseverance. Stronger than the negative catalysts, these positive catalysts worked in concert to protect the individual against failure or resignation.

One of the most interesting developments in recent psychological theorising has been a growing appreciation of the need for a viable theory of mental causation. Hitherto, the prospects for reconciling what seems to be the uniquely rational character of human thought and action with the non-rational mechanistic workings of the natural world have appeared to be limited or even illusory, and the pursuit of reconciliation of this sort has therefore formerly been dismissed as being either impossible of completion or inappropriate for contemplation. Much of the scepticism concerning the role of causal processes in human thought and action was dispelled, however, by the philosopher Donald Davidson, who argues that not only is human action capable of being caused by the actor�s thoughts and desires, but that only when such action is so caused, can it be rational. Davidson�s proposal for the reconciliation of human rationality with causal necessitation is articulated in his theory of Anomalous Monism. According to this theory, there exists what may be termed an ontological-conceptual distinction between events themselves and the characters or properties that are attributed to events by human observers, and it is through recognition of this distinction that one discovers how mental events, that is, events that are amenable to description in the psychological vocabulary, are causally efficacious yet free from the constraints typically associated with the necessity and sufficiency of causal laws. Anomalous Monism, if it were workable, would therefore resolve the paradox according to which human mentality is at once integrated in, and yet unconstrained by, the mechanistic natural world, by demonstrating the compatibility of the facts of causation with the intuitions of folk psychology. However, close examination of Anomalous Monism reveals it to rely on logically flawed anti-realist principles concerning the characters of events, properties and causation. It follows from this that the theory itself must be rejected, but the task that it was devised to undertake, the formulation of a viable theory of mental causation, need not be similarly discarded. Rather, what remains is the challenge of delineating an alternative theory, one that withstands logical scrutiny whilst addressing what is characteristic of human mental processes, and thereby what is characteristic of mental causation. The theory of Direct Realism that is derived from the broader philosophical realism of John Anderson provides the materials for meeting this challenge. According to Direct Realism, mental phenomena are relational situations obtaining between certain organisms (including humans) and their environments. As such, mental phenomena are included in the range of phenomena occurring in the natural world and they are therefore subject to all of its ways of working, including its deterministic mechanisms. The particular challenge that a Direct Realist theory of mental causation faces, that of demonstrating that relational situations can be causal, is revealed upon examination of the character of causation to be unproblematic. Furthermore, the seeming incompatibility between human rationality and natural necessitation is resolved when it is acknowledged that, rather than be an inherent feature of thought and action, logical structure is a characteristic of the natural environment that organisms are at times sensitive to, as revealed by its effects on the characters of their thoughts and actions. Far from being remote or illusory, the prospects for reconciling human mentality with the causal mechanisms of the natural world are discovered in the present thesis to be favourable when a realist approach to the characters of both mental events and causation is adopted.