殷子俊. / "2004年7月". / 論文(哲學碩士)--香港中文大學, 2004. / 參考文獻(leaves 101-106). / "2004 nian 7 yue". / Abstracts in Chinese and English. / Yin Zijun. / Lun wen (zhe xue shuo shi)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue, 2004. / Can kao wen xian (leaves 101-106). / 摘要 --- p.i / 鳴謝 --- p.iii / Chapter 第一章 --- 引言 --- p.1 / Chapter 1.1 --- 本文主旨 --- p.1 / Chapter 1.2 --- 二十世紀語意整全論的先驅一奎因 --- p.2 / Chapter 1.3 --- 整全論的性質 --- p.6 / Chapter 1.3.1 --- 整全論與分子論 --- p.8 / Chapter 1.4 --- 整全論的分類 --- p.12 / Chapter 第二章 --- 真理與意義 --- p.14 / Chapter 2.1 --- 戴維森的語意理論 --- p.14 / Chapter 2.1.1 --- 戴維森的約定T理論 --- p.15 / Chapter 2.1.2 --- 外延滿足性及組合性 --- p.17 / Chapter 2.1.3 --- 約定T理論的技術問題 --- p.22 / Chapter 2.2 --- 戴維森的真理理論 --- p.24 / Chapter 2.2.1 --- 爲真理的槪念辯護 --- p.24 / Chapter 2.2.2 --- 兩種錯誤的真理觀 --- p.29 / Chapter 2.3 --- 意義、信念與真理 --- p.34 / Chapter 第三章 --- 徹底的詮釋 --- p.37 / Chapter 3.1 --- 翻譯與詮釋 --- p.37 / Chapter 3.2 --- 徹底的詮釋 --- p.40 / Chapter 3.2.1 --- 寬容原則 --- p.42 / Chapter 3.2.2 --- 三角測量 --- p.48 / Chapter 3.3 --- 戴維森的整全論 --- p.51 / Chapter 3.3.1 --- 從徹底的詮釋到整全論 --- p.52 / Chapter 3.3.2 --- 戴維森整全論的歸類 --- p.56 / Chapter 3.3.3 --- 整全論與組合性 --- p.59 / Chapter 3.3.4 --- 整全論與理解 --- p.62 / Chapter 第四章 --- 溝通的整全性一論弗達與拿玻的反整全論 --- p.65 / Chapter 4.1 --- 弗達與拿玻的立場與前設 --- p.65 / Chapter 4.2 --- 弗達與拿玻的論證 --- p.67 / Chapter 4.2.1 --- 組合性論證 --- p.69 / Chapter 4.2.2 --- 規範性論證 --- p.80 / Chapter 4.2.3 --- 寬容原則論證 --- p.84 / Chapter 4.2.4 --- 信念的基本性論證 --- p.89 / Chapter 4.3 --- 總結：徹底詮釋論與語意整全論 --- p.94 / 詞彙翻譯對照表 --- p.98 / 哲學家譯名對照表 --- p.100 / 參考書目 --- p.101

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Mémoire numérisé par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal.

Comment rendre compte du fait que le mental est efficace causalement, si les relations causales impliquent des relations nomologiques (lois), et que le monde mental est exempt d’une telle caractéristique? Dans un article intitulé «Mental Events», Donald Davidson tente de résoudre ce problème en soutenant l’idée que les occurrences d’événements mentaux sont identiques à des occurrences d’événements physiques. Toutefois, cette thèse de l’identité des occurrences, le Monisme Anomal, est problématique dans la mesure où si c’est en tant qu’événements physiques que les événement mentaux sont efficaces causalement, alors le mental en tant que mental n’a aucune efficacité causale : les événements mentaux ne sont que des épiphénomènes. Pour résoudre cette difficulté, Davidson soutient d’abord que ce n’est pas en tant que physiques ou mentaux que les événements sont des causes, mais en tant que particuliers, quoi qu’il en soit des propriétés qu’ils exemplifient. Il introduit aussi une version de la notion de survenance pour rendre compte du rapport entre les propriétés mentales et physiques, notion dont je me sers finalement pour formuler une deuxième réponse possible à l’objection épiphénoméniste.

What is an event? What sort of object are they? How is a given event distinguished from other events and other objects? This thesis on science oriented metaphysics will take Davidson's account of events as its starting point to answer the above questions. It will develop this conception of events into one that is consistent with the special theory of relativity by updating its notions of change, cause and property. The new concept of a proper property, a generalization of the notion of an invariant, is introduced to solve some of these metascientific problems. Other features of the work include an analysis of the Lorentz force equation as it applies to one family of cases of causation, showing that a use of cause and effect to help individuate events cannot be complete until relativistic features are built into it. I propose that the conception of a proper property will also solve this worry over the nature of causation as it affects the issues of events above. In particular, it will attempt to solve a charge of circularity which has been leveled at Davidson's account. This property analysis also has the feature that it makes the account of events which started with Davidsonian inspiration (i.e. causes and effects are intimately connected to events) more like Kim's. Kim's account of events is modified on the grounds it does not do justice to our intuitions about changes and events.

In this thesis I give a response to external world scepticism. I first argue that scepticism arises when we accept that it is an empirical question whether I am in a sceptical scenario, that is, a scenario in which my beliefs are coherent, and yet my empirical beliefs are false. The idea that it is an empirical question whether I am in a sceptical scenario gets its plausibility from the realist claim that our empirical beliefs have an objective subject matter. I then attempt to give a response to scepticism that is compatible with this realist claim. Three promising responses to scepticism are considered, but are found to be inadequate. Seeing why these responses are inadequate helps us to appreciate some of the conditions on an adequate response to scepticism. By drawing on the work of Donald Davidson I develop a response to scepticism that is compatible with the realist claim, and that meets these conditions. According to this response, when we get clear about the concept of belief we see that sceptical scenarios are a conceptual impossibility. Thus, just as it is not an empirical question whether I am a married bachelor, it is not an empirical question whether I am in a sceptical scenario, and the argument for scepticism breaks down.

What is an event? What sort of object are they? How is a given event distinguished from other events and other objects? This thesis on science oriented metaphysics will take Davidson's account of events as its starting point to answer the above questions. It will develop this conception of events into one that is consistent with the special theory of relativity by updating its notions of change, cause and property. The new concept of a proper property, a generalization of the notion of an invariant, is introduced to solve some of these metascientific problems. Other features of the work include an analysis of the Lorentz force equation as it applies to one family of cases of causation, showing that a use of cause and effect to help individuate events cannot be complete until relativistic features are built into it. I propose that the conception of a proper property will also solve this worry over the nature of causation as it affects the issues of events above. In particular, it will attempt to solve a charge of circularity which has been leveled at Davidson's account. This property analysis also has the feature that it makes the account of events which started with Davidsonian inspiration (i.e. causes and effects are intimately connected to events) more like Kim's. Kim's account of events is modified on the grounds it does not do justice to our intuitions about changes and events. / Arts, Faculty of / Philosophy, Department of / Graduate

Donald Davidson cherche à montrer comment le langage est produit et compris. Parti de la conviction que l'on ne peut parler de langage que dans le contexte social d'une « triangulation » qui marque l'interaction mutuelle entre les interlocuteurs et leur interaction avec un environnement qu'ils partagent, il appréhende la signification au sein de la communication. Pour l'expliquer et élaborer une théorie qui en rend compte, il replace le langage dans le contexte global de ce qu'on a pris l'habitude de qualifier de « programme sémantique de Davidson », qui soulève plusieurs questions eu égard essentiellement à la vérité, à l'interprétation et à la nature de la relation qui relie le langage à la pensée et à la réalité. Ce mémoire présente alors le fruit d'un travail tout au long duquel on a retracé élément par élément les composantes de l'environnement philosophique dans lequel Davidson insère son programme sémantique. C'est ainsi qu'on a pu le reconstituer et en donner un aperçu assez complet, à partir duquel l'originalité et l'unité du projet de ce philosophe peuvent être mises en évidence. Ce faisant, on a pu montrer que Davidson offre à la philosophie du langage une nouvelle perspective dans laquelle il conçoit le langage dans l'unité organique qui le rattache, par une relation de survenance mutuelle, autant à la pensée qu'à la réalité, formant ainsi la triade Langage-Pensée-Réalité. Désormais, il est possible de voir comment le fonctionnement du langage, de la signification, de la vérité et de l'interprétation culmine dans et est porté par la structure, le contenu et la dynamique que représente cette Triade. ______________________________________________________________________________ MOTS-CLÉS DE L’AUTEUR : langage, signification, vérité, interprétation, interprétation radicale, réalité, pensée, sémantique, triade, ontologie, métaphysique, épistémologie.

BONFIM, Jonatan Henrique Pinho. A semântica de Davidson: verdade, referência e mundo. 2015. 100f. – Dissertação (Mestrado) – Universidade Federal do Ceará, Programa de Pós-graduação em Filosofia, Fortaleza (CE), 2015. / Submitted by Márcia Araújo (marcia_m_bezerra@yahoo.com.br) on 2015-12-14T15:25:22Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2015_dis_jhpbonfim.pdf: 570430 bytes, checksum: dd1853860ade8efbe993a541f0e4a9fc (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Márcia Araújo(marcia_m_bezerra@yahoo.com.br) on 2015-12-14T16:53:22Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2015_dis_jhpbonfim.pdf: 570430 bytes, checksum: dd1853860ade8efbe993a541f0e4a9fc (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-12-14T16:53:22Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2015_dis_jhpbonfim.pdf: 570430 bytes, checksum: dd1853860ade8efbe993a541f0e4a9fc (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015 / É possível elaborar uma teoria do significado sem levar em conta o mundo como referência? Por meio dessa inquietação propormos analisar as críticas de Donald Davidson a teoria da verdade como correspondência e a semântica clássica, cujas entidades extralinguísticas e o mundo “desnudo” são determinantes para compor a significação. Por meio da investigação do seu programa – Programa de Davidson – indicaremos a) as possíveis soluções e dissoluções de problemas gerados por tais teorias, muitas vezes, provenientes da concepção de linguagem subjacente a elas e b) a construção de uma teoria adequada do significado que tem como ponto nevrálgico mostrar que na comunicação entre falantes competentes há uma construção de uma teoria da verdade para a linguagem do outro. Davidson convida-nos a trilhar outro percurso teórico que pensam os conteúdos, dentre eles a referência, sendo construído dentro da linguagem e não mais fora dela, sem, contudo, cair no problema da vacuidade da linguagem, portanto, de uma explicação da significação completamente desconectada do mundo.

Dissertação (mestrado) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Paraná, Curitiba, 2011 / Bibliografia: f. 108-110 / As abordagens da metáfora de Donald Davidson e John Searle são consistentes com as respectivas teorias do significado nas quais estão baseadas. Enquanto ambos os filósofos concordam que a falsidade patente geralmente se evidencia nos casos em que a metáf / Donald Davidson's and John Searle's approach to metaphor is consistent with their respective theory of meaning on which it is based. While both philosophers agree that patent falsity is the usual case with metaphor in their literal interpretation, they di