When a multicultural team is formed of say six individuals of different cultural backgrounds, there will be potential conflicts and greater varieties. However, there will be a ¡§normal¡¨ curve forms the range and permissible boundaries of a team. In concept, this normal distribution is the ¡§calm¡¨ state when the team is not active (norms). The potential is the range of team members¡¦ abilities/differences (divergences). To be able to reach the potential and perform is part of the team¡¦s goal (convergences & attributions). But to expect something more than expected is cultural synergy (break the original boundaries). The factors that will be considered as diverging forces are the differences that are born (already exists) when the team is formed. In order to model these cultural factors and estimate these cultural differences, Hofstede cultural dimensions are used. The factors that will be considered as converging forces are what each individual believe in such as perspective taking and self-leadership. These values are projected from the assessments of team individuals. The factors that will be considered as supporting forces (attribution factors) are how each member interacts with one another during the process. These are each individual behavior and personality. Therefore, from the perspective of divergence and convergence to see how cultural differences influence the teams and talk about their possible behaviors and reasons behind them is a conceptual way to look at the team. Based on the concept described above, the analysis of these different forces on multicultural teams is conducted. Using these factors, the paper explains/examines: l Cultural and individual values differences l Wish to base on the findings from the research to make helpful inferences on the learning and performance of multicultural teams. l Cultural divergent factors l Individual convergent factors l Individual attribution factors l Cultural synergy

Reproduction de : Thèse de doctorat : Sciences économiques : Lyon 2 : 2006. / Titre provenant de l'écran-titre. Bibliogr.

Adults and young children have been found to distinguish between moral and social conventional acts, which are considered to entail distinct domains of reasoning (e.g., Turiel 1983). Recently, research has begun to examine the neural basis of moral judgments (e.g., Greene et al., 2001), but these studies did not examine the development of neurocognitive processing of judgments in these two domains. The present study focused on detection of cognitive conflict as a neurocognitive process that distinguished judgments of moral and conventional violations. The N2 component of the ERP was examined in order to determine whether the two types of violation are associated with different neurophysiological correlates and whether they change with development. In a series of five experiments, reaction times and ERPs were recorded from 12- to 14-year-old children and undergraduates who read scenarios that had one of three possible endings: (1) moral violations, (2) conventional violations, (3) no violation (neutral acts). Participants judged whether the act was acceptable or unacceptable when a rule was assumed or removed. Results indicate that reaction times were faster for moral than conventional violations when a rule was assumed for both undergraduates and children, as well as when a rule was removed for children but not for undergraduates. ERP data indicated that adults’, but not children’s, N2 amplitudes were larger (i.e., more negative) for conventional than iii moral violations when a rule was assumed. Furthermore, source analysis indicated generators for the N2 in dorsomedial and ventromedial prefrontal cortices. The results suggest that judgments of conventional violations involve increased conflict detection as compared to moral violations, and these two domains are processed differently across development. The findings were explained by the idea that judgments of conventional violations are more explicitly dependant on rules, whereas judgments of moral violations are based more directly on the intrinsic negative consequences of the act.

Adults and young children have been found to distinguish between moral and social conventional acts, which are considered to entail distinct domains of reasoning (e.g., Turiel 1983). Recently, research has begun to examine the neural basis of moral judgments (e.g., Greene et al., 2001), but these studies did not examine the development of neurocognitive processing of judgments in these two domains. The present study focused on detection of cognitive conflict as a neurocognitive process that distinguished judgments of moral and conventional violations. The N2 component of the ERP was examined in order to determine whether the two types of violation are associated with different neurophysiological correlates and whether they change with development. In a series of five experiments, reaction times and ERPs were recorded from 12- to 14-year-old children and undergraduates who read scenarios that had one of three possible endings: (1) moral violations, (2) conventional violations, (3) no violation (neutral acts). Participants judged whether the act was acceptable or unacceptable when a rule was assumed or removed. Results indicate that reaction times were faster for moral than conventional violations when a rule was assumed for both undergraduates and children, as well as when a rule was removed for children but not for undergraduates. ERP data indicated that adults’, but not children’s, N2 amplitudes were larger (i.e., more negative) for conventional than iii moral violations when a rule was assumed. Furthermore, source analysis indicated generators for the N2 in dorsomedial and ventromedial prefrontal cortices. The results suggest that judgments of conventional violations involve increased conflict detection as compared to moral violations, and these two domains are processed differently across development. The findings were explained by the idea that judgments of conventional violations are more explicitly dependant on rules, whereas judgments of moral violations are based more directly on the intrinsic negative consequences of the act.

Aristophanes to Fo is a study of the principal comedic conventions of Aristophanes' political satire and their relationship to contemporary political satire. A template of these principal conventions is tabulated. This is then compared to, and contrasted with, conventions used in subsequent plays in the genre of political satire, including one written as the practice component of this exegesis. This process determines the influence of Aristophanic conventions on political satire from 4th century BCE Greece to the modern era. There is an analytical emphasis on three 20th century plays as case studies and on my play, Soft Murder, which is case study number four. At the core of the research is the hypothesis that Aristophanic comedic conventions are still relevant to the genre of political satire in contemporary theatre. To retain relevance the genre should be a discourse on a situation or event that has social as well as political meaning to its audience and its presentation should have entertainment value for the culture of the time. Soft Murder is a fundamental part of this process and is written concurrently with the research component.

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Columbia University, 1934. / Vita. Published also without thesis note. Bibliography: p. 367-386.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--New York University, 1930. / Published also without thesis note. Cover title: The technique of international conferences. Bibliography: p. 106-116.