This study analyses democratic governance, focusing on the processes leading to decentralising governance in Kenya. It examines issues of decentralisation as applied to the recent decentralisation of governance in Kenya. In Kenya, centralisation has been associated with the monopolisation and abuse of power, political patronage, and the marginalisation of certain groups and communities. There is a belief among the majority of Kenyans therefore, that dispersing political, administrative, and fiscal powers and responsibilities to regional governments, will deepen democracy, maximise opportunities for all Kenyans to participate in the process of decision-making, and consequently improve regional social and economic development. The new Kenyan Constitution 2010 is the result of many years of deliberation among Kenyans who, together with the international community, called the government to open up to more participation and shared power across the country. This pressure heightened with the re-introduction of multiparty politics in Kenya since 1992. The study has taken the form of a selective and critical literature analysis of decentralisation, and particularly the rationale and process of decentralisation in Kenya. It has introduced decentralisation in Kenya from a historical and political perspective. It also analyses the process of constitutional reform, from Moi’s regime to the inauguration of the new constitution in 2010. The Constitution has significantly restructured the governing system in Kenya, as well as defined new power relationships for the benefits of many Kenyans. This has been determined in the study by assessing the extent to which previous powers that were exercised by the executive, particularly the presidency, have been restructured and redesigned, curtailing its powers. This study argues that the reforms introduced and formalised by the 2010 Constitution have introduced decentralisation as the official form of governance in Kenya. / Thesis (M.Soc.Sci.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 2012.

This dissertation comprises two essays. While the topics of both essays are different both are interrelated on the base of economic development. The first essay examines ethnic wage gaps on segmented labor markets with evidence from Latin American countries. The second essay revisits the determinants of fiscal decentralization with an emphasis on the role that geography plays in determining fiscal decentralization. The first essay contributes to limited literature on ethnic wage gaps in Latin America. It examines ethnic wage gaps for workers in formal and informal labor markets. Using data from Latin American countries we estimate and examine across-ethnic wage gaps for informal and formal markets, their changes over time, factors that explain their differences, and the wage gap distribution. More specifically, we verify that different ethnic wage gaps do exist across formal and informal markets; they behave differently not only at their means but also along the wage distribution. The results indicate that higher ethnic wage gaps in informal sectors exist not only on average but also throughout the distribution. In addition, we find that wage gaps have declined significantly over the last 10 years. we explain this by examining changes in the prices of institutional factors and changes in human capital endowments. The distributional analysis shows a decrease in the unexplained component, especially in the top part of the distribution. The second essay contributes to the existing literature on the determinants of fiscal decentralization by motivating theoretically and exploiting in depth the empirical relevance that geography has as a determinant of fiscal decentralization. The relationship between decentralization and geography is based on the logic that more geographically diverse countries show greater heterogeneity among their citizens, including their preferences and needs for public goods and services provisions. Communications and physical distance are also a very important issue and play a key role on the effect of geography over time. (Lora et. al., 2003) argue geography plays a key role in economic and social development, as well as in the institutional design of the countries; yet, this effect could be enhanced (or diminished) in the presence of better physical infrastructure or communications. The theoretical model in this paper builds on the work by Arzaghi and Henderson (2002) and Panizza (1999). For the empirical estimation, we use a panel data set for approximately 91 countries for the period 1960-2005. Physical geography is measured along several dimensions, including elevation, land area and climate. We construct a geographical fragmentation index and test its effect on fiscal decentralization. In addition, we interact the geographical fragmentation index with time-variant infrastructure variables in order to test the effect that infrastructure and communications have on the relationship between geography and fiscal decentralization. For robustness, we construct Gini coefficients for in-country elevation and climate. We find a positive and strong correlation between geographical factors and fiscal decentralization. We also find that while the development of infrastructure (in transportation, communications, etc.) tends to reduce the effect of geography on decentralization, this effect is rather small and mostly statistically insignificant, meaning that the impact of geography survives over time. The strategy has additional value because geography may be used as an instrument for decentralization in future econometric estimations where decentralization is used as an explanatory variable, but may be suspected to be endogenous to the economic process being studied (economic growth, political instability, macroeconomic stability, income distribution, etc.).

This research measured the impact of decentralisation on the promotion of good local governance in the Lilongwe District Assembly. The study explored the condition of local governance by examining the status of the facets that underpin local governance namely participation, transparency and accountability, gender equity and efficiency. It highlighted dilemmas associated with implementing decentralisation in areas where there are no functioning local institutions and where tendencies of centralisation still loom large.

Thesis (M.A.)--Duquesne University, 2007. / Title from document title page. Abstract included in electronic submission form. Includes bibliographical references (p. 75-88).

Thesis (Ph.D.) -- University of Adelaide, School of Economics, 2005? / Includes bibliographical references. Also available in print.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Columbia University, 1969. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 358-371).

Legal history of government decentralization in Indonesia. / Revision of the author's thesis (S2)--Universitas Padjadjaran, Bandung. Includes bibliographical references (p. 117-119).

Thesis (doctoral)--Stockholms universitet, 1994. / Extra t.p. with thesis statement and English abstract inserted. Summary in English. Includes bibliographical references (p. 291-298).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2002. / Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 256-265). Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2002. / Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 256-265). Also available on the Internet.