Internet technology (IT) has changed the way information is disseminated, which has led to changes in transaction-making and the creation of new electronic markets. This has also led to the emer-gence of new types of online intermediaries, and new selling mechanisms. Since most online selling involves commodity goods and the discovery of low prices, the design of selling mechanism primarily focuses on the disclosure of price information. Low-price discovery selling mechanisms, however, have caused buyers to shift from one mechanism to another to get the best deals. Online sellers are facing profit pressures as a result. Price information only addresses a portion of consumer needs though. They need information to identify uncertainties that may harm them during transactions. Consumers also search for products and services that fit their individual preferences and are willing to pay a price premium for such offerings. Sellers have to offer additional information and to do decommoditization, or consumers will abandon selling mechanisms that do not match their needs. This dissertation examines these issues in three essays. It explores two online selling mechanisms: online group-buying auctions and a la carte pricing schemes in airline industry. The a la carte pricing is to offer flexible pricing to consumers. The research employs an Internet-based experimental test bed, a single-firm empirical case study, and an econometric model to test the relevant theories. I evaluate the design of online group-buying auctions, where consumers are more uncertain about group-buying as a mechanism for organizing economic exchange. I also evaluate the design of online selling mechanisms in the air travel services industry, where digitally-intermediation has created problems with suppliers¡¦ ownership of their customers and increasing channel conflicts. The results indicate that the dominance of price in consumer purchase decisions can be mitigated by complementary information, as well as value-added product and service information that an online selling mechanism provides. Consumer information requirements are dynamic and inconsistent though. So an effective selling mechanism must identify how to disclose an adequate amount of information to consumer. Some of the new mechanism designs that have emerged have produced a means for sellers to be more effective. My findings suggest that, in addition to price transparency, online selling mechanisms also affect transaction completion uncertainty, and support the expression of personal preferences.

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