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Chapter One describes Britain's nuclear and conventional defence policy towards the United States during 1957-1959. Britain's nuclear policy during these years was based on reconciling British independence with Anglo-American cooperation and cost effectiveness. The British government reduced Britain's conventional forces, but Britain's force strength In Europe had to be adjusted as the Americans began to support calls for a build-up of conventional forces in Europe. Chapter Two deals with Macmillan's policies on SKYBOLT, POLARIS and the NATO MRBM force during 1960. The British government was keen on getting both missiles from the Americans, aiming at a deal that would leave Britain with a maximum degree of independence for her deterrent. The Eisenhower Administration's support for SACEUR's NATO MRBM force proposals thwarted British attempts to get POLARIS. Chapter Three describes Macmillan's attempt at reconciling Britain's nuclear cooperation with the United States with British offers of military cooperation with France during 1961-1962. Such options were considered in order to prevent Britain's deterrent from being subsumed within a multilateral force. An Anglo-French nuclear alignment was one possible alternative to a more obvious example of alliance interdependence, a NATO nuclear force backed by the United States. In Chapter Four Britain's efforts to reduce her conventional forces during the years 1960-1962 are discussed. These efforts coincide with American pressure to build up conventional forces in Europe in the wake of the Berlin crisis. Anglo-American discussions over the conventional force strength issue culminated in the Nassau meeting of December 1962. The general British debate on future commitments and deployments overshadowed the coordination of efforts with the Americans on conventional forces overseas. Chapter Five describes Britain's nuclear relationship with the United States in the aftermath of Nassau. This centred on the drafting of a POLARIS Sales agreement and finding some common ground on the NATO multilateral force issue. On the former, the British position was challenged by American efforts at renegotiating the Nassau agreement. On the latter, the British government was divided over if and to what extent it should cooperate with the Americans on the MLF. The US Administrations under Kennedy and Johnson were only half-hearted in their support for the mixed manned multilateral force. Macmillan meanwhile remained hesitant about suggestions to embark upon a nuclear rapprochement with France. Chapter Six follows Britain's attempt to reach a decision on commitments and conventional force deployments during the years 1963-1 964. Members of the British government were inclined to look at the division of defence tasks between Brita n and the United States in areas outside NATO as another form of Anglo-American interdependence at work. During Douglas-Home's premiership, Britain's role in out-of-NATO areas assumed greater significance.

This thesis critically examines the career and significance of America’s first Secretary of Defence James V. Forrestal from a post-Cold War perspective. Within traditional Cold War scholarship, Forrestal’s legacy is problematic. The nature of his role as a defence administrator, combined with his suicide in 1949, has led scholars to underestimate his significance and relegate his legacy to the occasional biography. The few studies that examine his contribution utilise conventional analytical approaches that fail to fully assess his policymaking impact. The end of the Cold War, however, has brought additional insight into the policy concerns that dominated the conflict, new analytical approaches to its scholarship and fresh material on which to base a re-assessment. As this thesis demonstrates, the employment of new methodologies to study Forrestal’s impact is long overdue. By drawing on theories specifically related to leadership and decision-making behaviour, this thesis brings a deeper, fuller understanding of Forrestal’s policy-making impact as a Cold War official through an examination of his professional conduct. Despite Forrestal’s many successes, political controversies surrounding his defence career overshadowed his many achievements. This thesis argues that such controversies were the result of Forrestal’s dedication as a public official, his policy-making and management styles, and the structure of his authority as defence secretary. They were not, as some have argued, the result of his ineffectiveness as a policy-maker, “hawkish” attitudes or declining mental health. His collapse, furthermore, was not the natural conclusion of any paranoid delusions or obsessive nature, but rather a result of Forrestal’s dedication to his work at the expense of his own health. This thesis undertakes a content analysis of Forrestal’s writings and an examination of his policy-making approach, concentrating on the evolution and execution of his policy advice and initiatives, as well as the structure of his authority as secretary of defence. It begins with a biographical overview of his life and public service career, as well as an assessment of existing Cold War scholarship and its general tendency to underestimate Forrestal’s significance. The components of his legacy are then analysed thematically, with chapters devoted to his foreign policy influence, his role in the unification controversy and his administrative efforts as defence secretary. Throughout, Forrestal’s career and significance is reassessed both in the application of new theoretical and methodological insights, and the analysis of recently declassified and reorganised documents, particularly the complete and unexpurgated version of Forrestal’s official diaries.

This thesis critically examines the career and significance of America’s first Secretary of Defence James V. Forrestal from a post-Cold War perspective. Within traditional Cold War scholarship, Forrestal’s legacy is problematic. The nature of his role as a defence administrator, combined with his suicide in 1949, has led scholars to underestimate his significance and relegate his legacy to the occasional biography. The few studies that examine his contribution utilise conventional analytical approaches that fail to fully assess his policymaking impact. The end of the Cold War, however, has brought additional insight into the policy concerns that dominated the conflict, new analytical approaches to its scholarship and fresh material on which to base a re-assessment. As this thesis demonstrates, the employment of new methodologies to study Forrestal’s impact is long overdue. By drawing on theories specifically related to leadership and decision-making behaviour, this thesis brings a deeper, fuller understanding of Forrestal’s policy-making impact as a Cold War official through an examination of his professional conduct. Despite Forrestal’s many successes, political controversies surrounding his defence career overshadowed his many achievements. This thesis argues that such controversies were the result of Forrestal’s dedication as a public official, his policy-making and management styles, and the structure of his authority as defence secretary. They were not, as some have argued, the result of his ineffectiveness as a policy-maker, “hawkish” attitudes or declining mental health. His collapse, furthermore, was not the natural conclusion of any paranoid delusions or obsessive nature, but rather a result of Forrestal’s dedication to his work at the expense of his own health. This thesis undertakes a content analysis of Forrestal’s writings and an examination of his policy-making approach, concentrating on the evolution and execution of his policy advice and initiatives, as well as the structure of his authority as secretary of defence. It begins with a biographical overview of his life and public service career, as well as an assessment of existing Cold War scholarship and its general tendency to underestimate Forrestal’s significance. The components of his legacy are then analysed thematically, with chapters devoted to his foreign policy influence, his role in the unification controversy and his administrative efforts as defence secretary. Throughout, Forrestal’s career and significance is reassessed both in the application of new theoretical and methodological insights, and the analysis of recently declassified and reorganised documents, particularly the complete and unexpurgated version of Forrestal’s official diaries.

This thesis critically examines the career and significance of America’s first Secretary of Defence James V. Forrestal from a post-Cold War perspective. Within traditional Cold War scholarship, Forrestal’s legacy is problematic. The nature of his role as a defence administrator, combined with his suicide in 1949, has led scholars to underestimate his significance and relegate his legacy to the occasional biography. The few studies that examine his contribution utilise conventional analytical approaches that fail to fully assess his policymaking impact. The end of the Cold War, however, has brought additional insight into the policy concerns that dominated the conflict, new analytical approaches to its scholarship and fresh material on which to base a re-assessment. As this thesis demonstrates, the employment of new methodologies to study Forrestal’s impact is long overdue. By drawing on theories specifically related to leadership and decision-making behaviour, this thesis brings a deeper, fuller understanding of Forrestal’s policy-making impact as a Cold War official through an examination of his professional conduct. Despite Forrestal’s many successes, political controversies surrounding his defence career overshadowed his many achievements. This thesis argues that such controversies were the result of Forrestal’s dedication as a public official, his policy-making and management styles, and the structure of his authority as defence secretary. They were not, as some have argued, the result of his ineffectiveness as a policy-maker, “hawkish” attitudes or declining mental health. His collapse, furthermore, was not the natural conclusion of any paranoid delusions or obsessive nature, but rather a result of Forrestal’s dedication to his work at the expense of his own health. This thesis undertakes a content analysis of Forrestal’s writings and an examination of his policy-making approach, concentrating on the evolution and execution of his policy advice and initiatives, as well as the structure of his authority as secretary of defence. It begins with a biographical overview of his life and public service career, as well as an assessment of existing Cold War scholarship and its general tendency to underestimate Forrestal’s significance. The components of his legacy are then analysed thematically, with chapters devoted to his foreign policy influence, his role in the unification controversy and his administrative efforts as defence secretary. Throughout, Forrestal’s career and significance is reassessed both in the application of new theoretical and methodological insights, and the analysis of recently declassified and reorganised documents, particularly the complete and unexpurgated version of Forrestal’s official diaries.

This thesis critically examines the career and significance of America’s first Secretary of Defence James V. Forrestal from a post-Cold War perspective. Within traditional Cold War scholarship, Forrestal’s legacy is problematic. The nature of his role as a defence administrator, combined with his suicide in 1949, has led scholars to underestimate his significance and relegate his legacy to the occasional biography. The few studies that examine his contribution utilise conventional analytical approaches that fail to fully assess his policymaking impact. The end of the Cold War, however, has brought additional insight into the policy concerns that dominated the conflict, new analytical approaches to its scholarship and fresh material on which to base a re-assessment. As this thesis demonstrates, the employment of new methodologies to study Forrestal’s impact is long overdue. By drawing on theories specifically related to leadership and decision-making behaviour, this thesis brings a deeper, fuller understanding of Forrestal’s policy-making impact as a Cold War official through an examination of his professional conduct. Despite Forrestal’s many successes, political controversies surrounding his defence career overshadowed his many achievements. This thesis argues that such controversies were the result of Forrestal’s dedication as a public official, his policy-making and management styles, and the structure of his authority as defence secretary. They were not, as some have argued, the result of his ineffectiveness as a policy-maker, “hawkish” attitudes or declining mental health. His collapse, furthermore, was not the natural conclusion of any paranoid delusions or obsessive nature, but rather a result of Forrestal’s dedication to his work at the expense of his own health. This thesis undertakes a content analysis of Forrestal’s writings and an examination of his policy-making approach, concentrating on the evolution and execution of his policy advice and initiatives, as well as the structure of his authority as secretary of defence. It begins with a biographical overview of his life and public service career, as well as an assessment of existing Cold War scholarship and its general tendency to underestimate Forrestal’s significance. The components of his legacy are then analysed thematically, with chapters devoted to his foreign policy influence, his role in the unification controversy and his administrative efforts as defence secretary. Throughout, Forrestal’s career and significance is reassessed both in the application of new theoretical and methodological insights, and the analysis of recently declassified and reorganised documents, particularly the complete and unexpurgated version of Forrestal’s official diaries.

This thesis critically examines the career and significance of America’s first Secretary of Defence James V. Forrestal from a post-Cold War perspective. Within traditional Cold War scholarship, Forrestal’s legacy is problematic. The nature of his role as a defence administrator, combined with his suicide in 1949, has led scholars to underestimate his significance and relegate his legacy to the occasional biography. The few studies that examine his contribution utilise conventional analytical approaches that fail to fully assess his policymaking impact. The end of the Cold War, however, has brought additional insight into the policy concerns that dominated the conflict, new analytical approaches to its scholarship and fresh material on which to base a re-assessment. As this thesis demonstrates, the employment of new methodologies to study Forrestal’s impact is long overdue. By drawing on theories specifically related to leadership and decision-making behaviour, this thesis brings a deeper, fuller understanding of Forrestal’s policy-making impact as a Cold War official through an examination of his professional conduct. Despite Forrestal’s many successes, political controversies surrounding his defence career overshadowed his many achievements. This thesis argues that such controversies were the result of Forrestal’s dedication as a public official, his policy-making and management styles, and the structure of his authority as defence secretary. They were not, as some have argued, the result of his ineffectiveness as a policy-maker, “hawkish” attitudes or declining mental health. His collapse, furthermore, was not the natural conclusion of any paranoid delusions or obsessive nature, but rather a result of Forrestal’s dedication to his work at the expense of his own health. This thesis undertakes a content analysis of Forrestal’s writings and an examination of his policy-making approach, concentrating on the evolution and execution of his policy advice and initiatives, as well as the structure of his authority as secretary of defence. It begins with a biographical overview of his life and public service career, as well as an assessment of existing Cold War scholarship and its general tendency to underestimate Forrestal’s significance. The components of his legacy are then analysed thematically, with chapters devoted to his foreign policy influence, his role in the unification controversy and his administrative efforts as defence secretary. Throughout, Forrestal’s career and significance is reassessed both in the application of new theoretical and methodological insights, and the analysis of recently declassified and reorganised documents, particularly the complete and unexpurgated version of Forrestal’s official diaries.

This thesis critically examines the career and significance of America’s first Secretary of Defence James V. Forrestal from a post-Cold War perspective. Within traditional Cold War scholarship, Forrestal’s legacy is problematic. The nature of his role as a defence administrator, combined with his suicide in 1949, has led scholars to underestimate his significance and relegate his legacy to the occasional biography. The few studies that examine his contribution utilise conventional analytical approaches that fail to fully assess his policymaking impact. The end of the Cold War, however, has brought additional insight into the policy concerns that dominated the conflict, new analytical approaches to its scholarship and fresh material on which to base a re-assessment. As this thesis demonstrates, the employment of new methodologies to study Forrestal’s impact is long overdue. By drawing on theories specifically related to leadership and decision-making behaviour, this thesis brings a deeper, fuller understanding of Forrestal’s policy-making impact as a Cold War official through an examination of his professional conduct. Despite Forrestal’s many successes, political controversies surrounding his defence career overshadowed his many achievements. This thesis argues that such controversies were the result of Forrestal’s dedication as a public official, his policy-making and management styles, and the structure of his authority as defence secretary. They were not, as some have argued, the result of his ineffectiveness as a policy-maker, “hawkish” attitudes or declining mental health. His collapse, furthermore, was not the natural conclusion of any paranoid delusions or obsessive nature, but rather a result of Forrestal’s dedication to his work at the expense of his own health. This thesis undertakes a content analysis of Forrestal’s writings and an examination of his policy-making approach, concentrating on the evolution and execution of his policy advice and initiatives, as well as the structure of his authority as secretary of defence. It begins with a biographical overview of his life and public service career, as well as an assessment of existing Cold War scholarship and its general tendency to underestimate Forrestal’s significance. The components of his legacy are then analysed thematically, with chapters devoted to his foreign policy influence, his role in the unification controversy and his administrative efforts as defence secretary. Throughout, Forrestal’s career and significance is reassessed both in the application of new theoretical and methodological insights, and the analysis of recently declassified and reorganised documents, particularly the complete and unexpurgated version of Forrestal’s official diaries.

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This thesis asks why the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) continues to exist and remain relevant in the defence of North America following the disappearance of the threat of the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War. This thesis argues that NORAD’s binational nature is key to understanding the command’s continued role in continental defence. By employing the international relation theories of functionalism and neoliberal institutionalism as a lens of analysis to understand binational defence cooperation, NORAD’s origins as a binational defence command tasked with the air defence of North America, and its acquisition of its responsibilities for drug interdiction, the continental interior, and for maritime warning are analyzed. NORAD’s longevity and continued relevance can be attributed to the command’s binational nature, which has allowed the command to focus on and institutionalize specific functional-technical solutions to select issues of mutual concern in continental defence and security for Canada and the U.S. / May 2016