This dissertations aims to examine the EU Foreign Policy, and more precisely map the High Representative (HR) and his impact on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the EU. Using two theoretical frameworks, leadership theory and institutional theory, the study tests the explanatory power of these theories to explain the HR and his impact on the CFSP. The study is limited to a period of time, from November 2002 until December 2003, when several different events took place within the framework of the CFSP. The conclusion indicates that both leadership theory and institutional theory can help explain the development and outcomes of the CFSP. Keywords: EU foreign policy, Common Foreign and Security Policy, High Representative of the CFSP, European Security and Defence Policy, Iraq war, European Security Strategy

Stater är de enda legitima enskilda aktörerna i det internationella systemet. Varje enskild statsträvar alltid att främja sina egna säkerhetsintressen liksom handelspolitiska och kulturellaintressen och staten gör detta genom olika medel som t.ex. diplomati och ekonomi för att baranämna några. Men utöver dessa medel har staten alltid haft förmågan att utöva våldsmakt bådemot andra stater och sina egna invånare. Våldsutövandet har också varit grunden för den modernastaten. Krigföring och våldsutövande har i sin tur givit upphov till en komplex byråkrati,skatteväsende och centralstyre i syfte att effektivare uppnå dessa strävanden. En annan aspekt avstaten har varit dess ständiga strävan att forma allianser i syfte att förbättra sitt säkerhetspolitiskaläge.Estland är en småstat som förväntas uppträda som fullvärdig stat och som sådan har Estland enFörsvarsmakt. Närheten till Ryssland gör att Estland använder stora resurser för att bygga upp sinFörsvarsmakt. En satsning som efter NATO medlemskapet har ifrågasatts av vissa politiker. Detsistnämnda har givit upphov till frågan om varför Estland har en Försvarsmakt. Är det enbart föratt försvara landet mot yttre motståndare eller finns det fler anledningar?Det primära syftet med uppsatsen är att pröva om Charles Tillys statsformeringsteori ocksåstämmer på Estland. Tilly presenterar ett antal faktorer som anses ligga till grund för behovet avförsvarsmakter. Alltså studerar jag om staten Estlands motiveringar för behovet av enförsvarsmakt överensstämmer med Tillys teori. Utöver detta finns ett underordnat syfte sominnebär att diskutera Estlands motiveringar i anslutning till en av dessa faktorer i en större kontext. / States are the only legitimate actors in the international system and are always expected to protecttheir own security, trade, and even cultural interests. They do this through diplomacy andeconomy, just to name some of the tools. However, beyond that, the states have always had theability to exercise violence not only towards other states but, their own population as well.Exercising violence has been a cornerstone of the modern state. The exercising of violence has inturn given rise to a complex bureaucracy, taxation systems and centralisation of power in order toachieve a higher degree of efficiency. Another aspect of the state has always been its endeavourto form alliances with the purpose of improving its security situation.Estonia is a small state, which nevertheless is expected to act as one, and as other states, it has itsdefence forces. The proximity to Russia forces Estonia to use large resources for building-up itsdefence. An effort which has been questioned by certain politicians after Estonia became amember of NATO. The latter has led me to ask, why does Estonia have its own defence forces? Isit only to defend the state against foreign enemies or are there other reasons?The main purpose of this thesis is to test Charles Tilly’s theory about state formation and if it isapplicable to Estonia. Therefore, I will examine if the Estonian state reasoning about theexistence of defence forces corresponds to Charles Tilly’s theoretical model about stateformation. In addition, the purpose of this thesis is to discuss certain aspects of the model andthereby put Estonia into a larger context. / Avdelning: ALB – Slutet Mag. 3 C-upps. Hylla: Upps. ChP 07-09

This study examines the evolution of the Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP) of the European Union before and after the Saint Malo Declaration of December 1998. The co-operation in foreign policy and security matters has always been a corollary element to the economic co-operation since the beginning of the European Integration process. Within this context this study argues that the conducting of co-operation in this field within the framework of European Community/European Union (EC/EU) was dependent on the national actors, the internal community/union factors, and the external dynamics. It is also asserted that, the European political co-operation is based on, on the one hand, the intergovernmentalist method of decision-making and implementation process, and on the other to the incrementalism through which the Member States could reconcile their diverging interests, which represent continuity within the EC/EU. The Saint Malo constitutes one of the momentous events in the trajectory of European foreign policy, security and defence co-operation, which launched the essentials of the CESDP. Within this framework, this study will analyse how a legally unbinding document has been incorporated into the legal framework of the European Union and consequently became the part of the acquis. Furthermore, the policies of France, Britain, and the United States within the process of establishment of the CESDP will be examined. Then, this thesis argues that, Saint Malo has initiated a ground for renegotiation of the terms of transatlantic relationship, which culminated in the redefinition of global roles and responsibilities of Americans and Europeans.

Drawing on a theoretical framework based on securitization and threat construction, the attempt in this study was to broaden the understanding of how the perception of a Russian threat in the Baltic Sea is influencing Swedish defence and security policy. The method used was based on Bacchis WPR-approach. Three questions were asked at the beginning of this study, regardning how Russia is viewed in Sweden, how the representation of Russia has changed from the war in Georgia in 2008 until 2018, as well as how Sweden is to strengthen it's defence capacity, nationally and through cooperation, to tacle the Russian threat. Four key aspects of Russian behaviour that is considered threatening were identified. Russia is viewed as a country with power ambitions and expansionist tendencies; characterised as tactically unpredictable; looked upon as a risk calculating actor; and considered misstrusting in its views of the West. The perception of Russia is complex which creates difficulties regarding how the threat is to be met. Policy makers have urged the strengthening of Swedish national defence capacity to create a conflict threshold in the region. To further strengthen this threshold, the bilateral defence cooperation with Finland has deepened. In addition, the question of military non-alignment has been raised in relation to a possible Swedish membership in Nato. The answer to whether or not Sweden should join depends on political affiliation. This underlines the theoretical assumptions; security and defence policy is not merely a response to an external circumstance, but rather the result of an interplay between circumstance and actor.

This paper examines the relationship between Europeanisation and the recent changes of the Norwegian and Swedish security identities. Since the mid-1990s, these two countries have gone different ways, the former as an active non-member with no decision-making powers and the latter as an active participant in the development of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Concerning Norway and Sweden’s security identity, both have changed exceedingly over the years. Norway, which has valued the US and the transatlantic partnership through NATO, namely being an ‘Atlanticist’, seeks a deeper connection to the EU as a security actor over the last fifteen years, despite the authorities emphasizing that NATO remains the cornerstone for Norwegian security policy. Sweden, which maintained strongly neutral and non-aligned throughout the 20th century, was initially sceptic to partaking in the security and defence dimension of the Union. Nonetheless, Sweden, as a member, managed to change its perception of EU’s security policy through highlighting crisis management and turned out to become one of EU’s most active contributors in shaping the ESDP. This paper concludes that Norway and Sweden have seen similar outcomes concerning Europeanisation, despite holding different positions in relation to the EU. Norway has not been able to hold an influential role respecting its European integration process, even though the authorities seek to gain as much input as possible into the ESDP through associate membership. Sweden, in contrast, entered the Union with an initial negative attitude concerning the security and defence policy but has changed its perception and chosen to play an active part in the policy making process through influencing and deepening its cooperation.

The world is increasingly coalescing, ecologically, economically and culturally. Many problems can no longer be solved within the own state borders and the limitation of the territorial state is obvious. Jürgen Habermas means that a world domestic politic without a world government is what this progress need. Therefore it is important that national interests become less central and the solidarity between people is given priority in international relations. The focus of this thesis is therefore a critical discourse analysis of the current position of the internationalisation of Swedish security and defence policy. The discourse analysis shows that the morality and solidarity is described as important issues for the increasing Swedish international military engagement. One conclusion of the discourse is that the peace no longer is something that Sweden retains on it’s own. Instead the peace is secured in co-operation with other states. Hence, in the presence of thefuture, it’s interesting to consider Immanuel Kants thought, zum ewigen Frieden.

The Swedish Defence bill of 2015 demonstrated a rapid change in policy objectives, consequently moving away from an expeditionary force and converging into a territorial defence force. Previous research has attributed and explained the quick shift to the geostrategic unbalance that followed after the illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014. Yet, major policy changes are often years in the making, indicating that there must be additional explanations to the rapid shift. By applying a modified version of John Kingdon’s (2011) Multiple Streams Framework on the case of Sweden changing its security and defence policy, this thesis examines the policy process that preceded the official policy decision. The thesis provides further explanation to why the rapid policy change occurred by utilising qualitative content analysis. The analysis shows that the new policy was adopted due to several factors: one being the attention brought to several problems pertaining to the previous policy, another one was found in the timing between focusing events and the on-going work process of the Swedish defence commission, and lastly, strong actors within the policy field were in favour of a change in policy. The thesis concludes that the presence of several factors within the processes of politics, policy and problems enabled the rapid policy change.

The work is a case study that focuses on the attitude of the Czech Republic towards security and defence dimension of the European Union. It focuses on the context of European security and defence policy. It gives a detailed insight into the system formed by the European institutions, their powers and decisions on the one hand and Member States on the other. Within this context, formulates four major issues that the European security and defence policy reflected in the security policy of the Member States. The study focuses and examines the most significant of these problems, and probes whether and how these problems appear in the attitudes of the actors of the Czech security policy. Key words: European Union, Common Security and Defence Policy, Czech Republic, security policy

This thesis asks why Japan decided to procure BMD if it meant building an infrastructure which, because of its technological nature, had the potential to disrupt Japan’s preferred security strategy of hedging, that is, maintaining ambiguity of commitment, vis-à-vis China and the US. The investigation was divided into three parts dealing with the following questions – Why did Japan's BMD procurement matter? Who mattered? Why were the BMD and related decisions made? Such a structure of research was informed by “neoclassical realism,” according to which the relative material power of a country sets the parameters of its foreign policy, but the policy choices within these international constraints are made by political elites. A range of policymaking heuristics were used to investigate the domestic element of the approach. In addition to the conventionally specified policymaking actors such as MOD, MOFA, Prime Ministers, an original attempt was made to identify the possible influences of several elite networks. On the basis of the notes from the Japan-US Security Strategy Conference, two elite networks were analysed, namely the Japan’s Congressional National Security Research Group and Japan-US Centre for Peace and Cultural Exchange. It was concluded that they have probably had some influence on shaping Japan's BMD decisions. The conclusion of this research is that BMD was procured despite its disruptive potential because it was a tool of shifting Japanese policy from one hedging policy to another, that is, from one based on self-imposed restraints toward one exercised from the position of military strength. An analysis of international relations in East Asia in 1994-2007 and an analysis of the views of the security elites make Japan's transition toward a military strength-based hedging appear rational and confirm BMD's utility as a tool in this transition. Some negative consequences of a possible disruption to hedging, induced by BMD, can be contained exactly because of such a reformatting of hedging.

Med anledning av den förändrade säkerhetsmiljön i Europa startade en process som syftade till att öka samarbetet inom säkerhets- och försvarsområdet inom EU. Detta försvarssamarbete kallas det Permanenta strukturerade samarbetet (Pesco) och innebär ett mer upptrappat och konkret militärt samarbete än tidigare inom EU. Genom ett medlemskap i Pesco förbinder sig medlemmarna till att mer intensivt utveckla sin egen försvarskapacitet inom forskning och anskaffning av försvarsmateriel, men även att uppbringa och bibehålla en stark försvarsbudget. Vidare ska även medlemstater bidra med stridsgrupper i beredskap för insatser inom EU:s ram. Hur kan vi förstå logiken i att Sverige ingår med i ett mer bindande försvarssamarbete som Pesco. Syftet med denna studie är att identifiera bakomliggande drivkrafter för att förstå varför Sverige beslutade att ingå i Pesco. Denna fallstudie har nyttjat ett teoretiskt perspektiv som utgått ifrån Graham Allisons konceptuella modeller för att identifiera dessa bakomliggande drivkrafter. Genom en kvalitativ textanalys studeras materialet i denna fallstudie bestående av regeringens proposition gällande deltagande i Pesco, Försvarsutskottets betänkande gällande Pesco och förvarspolitisk inriktning 2016-2020. För att komplettera textmaterialet har även mailintervjuer genomförts med strategiskt utvalda informanter i form av riksdagsledamöter och stabsofficerare i Försvarsmakten. Studiens slutsatser påvisar att de bakomliggande drivkrafterna för beslutet var flera. Den främsta drivkraften var att Sverige sedan tidigare ratificerat EU:s solidaritetsklausul och uttalat en solidaritetsförklaring gentemot övriga medlemstater i EU. Genom att ingå i Pesco förväntas det öka Sveriges trovärdighet som medlemsstat i EU. En ytterligare drivkraft var att ingå i Pesco i ett tidigt skede i syfte att forma samarbetet och ha inflytande i den riktning som Sverige anser var förenliga med militär alliansfrihet, samt att fortsatt driva den mellanstatliga prägel som samarbetet nu innehar. En drivkraft var också att bygga upp det nationella försvaret, öka den operativa förmågan och stärka totalförsvaret genom försvarssamarbetet. En majoritet av Riksdagens partier var överens om Sveriges ingående i Pesco, detta på grund av tidigare beslutad Försvarsinriktningsperiod 2016-2020 som också var en bärande drivkraft till varför Sverige valde att ingå i Pesco. / In response to the changing security environment in Europe a process started aimed at increasing cooperation in the security and defence area within the EU. This defence cooperation is called the Permanent structured cooperation (Pesco) and means a more gradual and substantial military cooperation than before in the EU. Through a membership in Pesco, the members commit to more intensively develop of its own defence capabilities in research and acquisition of defence equipment, but also to obtain and maintain a strong defence budget. In addition, the member states should also contribute with battle groups ready for military missions within the framework of the EU. How can we understand the logic of Sweden joining more binding defence cooperation like Pesco. The purpose of this study is to identify the underlying driving forces to understand why Sweden decided to join Pesco. This case study uses a theoretical perspective based on Graham Allison's conceptual models to achieve this purpose. Through a qualitative text analysis, the data that is studied in this case study consisting of Swedish government proposition and Defence committee report regarding Pesco and Defence bill 2016-2020. In order to widen the study, mail interviews were conducted with strategically selected informants. Those were members of the Swedish parliament and staff officers in the Swedish Armed Forces. The study concludes that the underlying driving forces for the decision were several. The main driving force was that Sweden previously ratified the EU solidarity clause and stated a declaration of solidarity in relation to other member states of the EU. By joining Pesco is also expected to boost Sweden's credibility as a member state of the EU. An additional driving force was to join Pesco at an early stage in order to forge cooperation and have influence in the direction in which Sweden considers compatible with own military nonalignment, and also to continue to drive the intergovernmental nature that Pesco now holds. An additional driving force was also building up the national defence, increase the operational capacity and strengthen the armed forces through the defence cooperation. A majority of the parliamentary parties agreed on joining Pesco because of the previously decided defence bill 2016-2020, which also considers as a driving force for why Sweden chose to join Pesco.