The aim of this thesis is to compare DGS European Union member states before the unification of law and analyze the current situation and developments in this area in the European Union with a more detailed focus on the Czech Republic. Another objective is to evaluate the significance of the Deposit Insurance Fund in the Czech Republic and its ability to meet its obligations. At first are given the fundamental characteristics of the elements of context and parameters of deposit insurance. Then it is made a legal analysis of important directives on deposit insurance, which determine the current situation and developments in this area in the European Union. On the basis of events caused by the financial crisis, a single fixed level of insurance coverage had been introduced in the European Union. The thesis contains a comparison of deposit insurance systems of the Member States prior to the unification of this law. Attention is paid to deposit insurance in the Czech Republic. A determined importance of the Deposit Insurance Fund and the characteristics of its activity are also described. Finally, the thesis contains an example describing the Deposit Insurance Fund meeting its commitments to Volksbank CZ, illustrated by the situation where this bank is unable to meet its obligations to beneficiaries.

Magister Legum - LLM / The research will evaluate and discuss the importance of Deposit Insurance Systems (DIS) and the necessity of having this system. Important to the evaluation is an analytical consideration of how the South African Reserve Bank (SARB), the National Treasury (NT) and other global financial bodies proposed the approach thereof. Insofar as most jurisdictions had already adopted the DIS as encouraged by the international financial institutions, the study shall determine whether it is plausible for South Africa to derive guidance in her approach taking into account the potential risks posed by the safety-net.

In late 2003 after two financial crises and many years of deliberation, the Russian Government introduced a deposit insurance scheme (DIS) aimed primarily at protecting the savings of the population. The DIS's stated objectives were to protect the right and legal interests of depositors, to strengthen public confidence in the banking system, and to encourage household savings. Recent official assessments of the scheme have been, at best, partial, have tended to use government statistics and have failed to establish a link between the banking sector outputs and the impact of the DIS. This thesis undertakes a detailed evaluation of the Russian DIS based on a comprehensive analysis of vast literature on deposit insurance schemes globally covering rationales for its establishment and its main features, as well as of the relevant Russian legislation and past attempts at evaluating the Russian DIS which were somewhat patchy. Adopting a cross-sectional, mixed methods approach, the study reports on the findings that emerged from a combination of surveys, interviews and observations conducted at six participating Russian banks in spring 2009. These were supplemented by documentary evidence from the banks and the Russian Deposit Insurance Agency. To facilitate the analysis and interpretation of the data, a theoretical framework was devised, and included a set of success criteria and impact indicators. The results of the analysis indicate that the Russian DIS does not appear to have fully achieved its stated objectives. Irrefutably, the Russian Government failed to establish an effective institutional and regulatory environment which could have enforced uniform provision of information about the DIS to retail depositors. This is evidenced by visible differences among bank practices in relation to the implementation of the DIS. Consequently, as a result of these variations in implementation, the retail depositors’ understanding of the DIS and its perceived impact differs depending on which bank they patronise. This research provides a number of original theoretical, empirical, analytical and methodological contributions

by Lo Hin-wo Walter. / Bibliography: leaf 43 / Thesis (M.B.A.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1986

Our country, the same type of deposit applies the same interest rate. The reserve ratio in the world has gradually been reduced even adjusted to zero. Because of the control policy increases in bank operating costs, and impact the efficiency of resource allocationa. The competent national authorities still see the control policy as the main monetary policy. Domestic banks under this system face a very high control costs. Presently our country is still unable to adopt "zero" reserve, so this study consider existing banking supervision system to develop a "Risk-Based Deposit System" for existing national reserve system.The concept of risk stratification derives from deposit insurance, using the capital adequacy ratio, banks integrated risk rating score and the financial leverage ratio. Each Bank based on their respective level of risk to employ different deposit reserve ratio. "Risk-Based Deposit System" can make the banking sector to spontaneously reduce their own business risk in order to meet the lower deposit reserve ratio of the risk criteria. Therefore, it will help banking sector to reduce regulatory burden, and assist banks in Taiwan to follow Basel III to strengthen its competitiveness and meet the world trend.

My research focuses on the reasons for banking crises and the corresponding policy rules that could help prevent such crises. This abstract briefly reviews the two essays in my dissertation. The first essay focuses on the optimal mechanism design of the deposit insurance system while the second essay studies the impact of international illiquidity on domestic banking crises. The Recent Deposit Insurance Reform in the U.S. raised the coverage limit for certain types of deposits. In chapter II, I study the optimal coverage limit in a model of deposit insurance in the banking system. Because of the coverage limit, depositors have incentives to monitor the bank’s risk-taking behavior, threatening banks with the withdrawal of deposits if necessary. The model includes risk-taking banks, heterogeneous depositors, and a benevolent insurance company providing deposit insurance. I find that partial coverage combined with risk-sensitive premia in the presence of capital requirements can improve social welfare and manage banks’ risktaking behavior. Moreover, when a partial coverage limit is in place, banks are better off by finding a balance between the higher premia and the depositors’ monitoring and withdrawals. Unlike chapter II, chapter III focuses on the role played by international illiquidity. I build a dynamic general equilibrium model (DGEM) of a small, open economy. The features I include in the model are nontrivial demands for fiat currencies, unanticipated sunspots, and financial/banking crises originated by sudden stops of foreign capital inflows are. This chapter gives us a better understanding of the performance of alternative exchange rate regimes and associated monetary policies under a simple setup. I show the existence of multiple equilibria that may be ranked based on the presence of binding information constraints and on welfare. Moreover, I show that a strong connection of the scope for existence and for indeterminacy of equilibria with the underlying policy regime. I also find that the presence of binding multiple reserve requirements help in reducing the scope for financial fragility and panic equilibria.

This dissertation is a theoretical exploration of commonly used policy tools meant to improve market performance. The first chapter examines the use of prizes and grants as instruments for encouraging research and development. The second chapter investigates the welfare impact of price caps in oligopoly markets with endogenous entry. The third chapter studies the relationship between deposit insurance and bank risk taking, when a banker is motivated by reciprocity. The first chapter explores the use of grants and prizes as tools for encouraging research activity and innovation. Grants and prizes are commonly used by public and private research funders, and encourage R&D activity in different ways. Grants encourage innovation by subsidizing research inputs, while prizes reward research output. A common rationale for prizes is moral hazard; if a funder cannot observe all relevant research inputs then prizes create a strong incentive for R&D activity. In this chapter, it is shown that grants are a more efficient means of funding when a researcher's ability is unknown to the funder (adverse selection). When both adverse selection and moral hazard problems exist, a grant may emerge as an optimal funding mechanism, provided the moral hazard problem is relatively weak. In settings where the moral hazard problem is sufficiently strong, a grant emerges as part of an optimal funding mechanism, in conjunction with a prize. These results are useful for understanding different funding mechanisms used by both public and private entities. The second chapter, which is based on joint work with Stan Reynolds, examines the impact of price caps in oligopoly markets with endogenous entry. In the case of deterministic demand, reducing a price cap yields increased total output, consumer welfare, and total welfare. This result falls in line with classic results on price caps in monopoly markets, and with results for oligopoly markets with a fixed number of firms. These comparative static results for price caps need not hold when demand is stochastic and the number of firms is fixed, but recent results in the literature show that a welfare improving price cap does exist. We show that a welfare-improving cap need not exist in the case where demand is stochastic and entry is endogenous. In addition, we provide restrictions on the demand function such that a welfare-improving price cap exists under endogenous entry and stochastic demand. The third chapter, which is based on a joint project with Martin Dufwenberg, investigates the relationship between deposit insurance, risk taking, and insolvency. Empirical evidence suggests that the introduction of deposit insurance increases risk taking by banks and results in a greater chance of insolvency. The common rationale for this connection is that deposit insurance decreases the incentive for customers to monitor their banks, and invites excessive risk taking. In this chapter, it is argued that this classic explanation is somewhat puzzling. If customers can monitor their bank's behavior, certainly the insurance provider (FDIC) has this same ability. If this is the case, appropriate mechanisms could limit the moral hazard problem. We put forth an alternative explanation, and demonstrate that deposit insurance invites excessive risk taking when a banker is motivated by reciprocity.

This dissertation consists of three essays: (I) Double Liability, Moral Hazard and Deposit Insurance Schemes, (II) Contract Costs, Lender Identity and Bank Loan Pricing, and (III) Bank Capital Structure and Differential Lending Behaviour. The first essay proposes to add double liability to a deposit insurance scheme to induce insurees (depository financial institutions) to reveal their true risk types. The second essay looks at the differential lending patterns of American banks versus Japanese banks. The third essay discusses the relationship between the characteristics of a lender and those of the borrower.

Deposit insurance varies greatly across countries due to each country’s specific environment. The purpose of this study is to find what factors may affect coverage limit in deposit insurance. First, we implement panel data over the period of 1960 to 2008 including 78 countries’ political setting, bank industry’s structural differences and overall economic factors. The empirical results show that countries with lower saving rate, interest spread and government debt tend to have higher coverage. However, coverage tends to be lower in more political open countries. Second, we performed panel data logit model to find that increasing government debt would reduce the probability of increasing coverage limits. Third, the regression of variable changes shows strong negative significance in the relationship of interest spread and coverage over GDP per capita. The main contribution of this thesis is to identify significant influences to the coverage limit. This could provide reference factors when considering the setting of Deposit insurance scheme to insure financial stability.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--George Mason University, 2007. / Title from PDF t.p. (viewed Jan. 21, 2008). Thesis director: Bryan Caplan. Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Economics. Vita: p. 150. Includes bibliographical references (p. 142-149). Also available in print.