This dissertation is a theoretical and empirical investigation of the actual changes in Federal S&L asset portfolios following the deregulation of the 1980's which loosened the restrictions on the amount of non-housing related lending that Federal S&L's could undertake. In particular the study focuses on the effects of deregulation and the forces promoting and constraining the individual S&L's expansion into non-housing related assets. The theoretical model provides a framework for the empirical examination of the deregulation in the DIDMCA of 1980 and Garn-St Germain Act of 1982. The theoretical model is an adaptation of the Mingo and Wolkowitz (1977) banking model. The peculiarities of the S&L industry are embodied through adaptations of the Mingo and Wolkowitz (1977) model which emphasize after-tax profit maximization (tax laws reward specialization in housing related assets), constrain diversification into non-housing related assets, and differentiate between mutual and stock associations. Using the method of Lagrange multipliers, an expression is obtained for the effect of a change in after-tax profits for a relaxation of the constraint on diversification which becomes the focus of the analysis. By integrating the Lagrange multiplier with economic and regulatory controls, systems of regressions are developed which examine the changes in asset portfolio composition for Federal associations using balance sheet and income statement data between 1979 and 1983. The findings and implications of the empirical analysis are summarized as follows: 1. The tax laws do not appear to have constrained the diversification. 2. Specialization effects with respect to housing related assets appear to have constrained the diversification into non-housing related assets. 3. Non-housing related assets and liquid assets appear to be substitutes. 4. Stock associations, on average, have expanded into non-housing related assets to a greater extent than mutual associations. 5. The changes in liability legislation appear to have restrained the diversification into non-housing related assets. 6. Large associations appear more able to acquire the expertise needed to diversify. 7. Profitability appears to be correlated with the expansion into "new products." / Ph. D.

Submitted by Pedro Carvalho (pedrooliveiracarvalho@gmail.com) on 2017-12-28T19:41:58Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação_Pedro_de_Oliveira_Carvalho_final.pdf: 2841114 bytes, checksum: 89d0bc290363e2040745d0bce5031e4c (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Rafaela Moraes (rafaela.moraes@fgv.br) on 2018-01-04T12:48:08Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação_Pedro_de_Oliveira_Carvalho_final.pdf: 2841114 bytes, checksum: 89d0bc290363e2040745d0bce5031e4c (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-01-17T11:38:49Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação_Pedro_de_Oliveira_Carvalho_final.pdf: 2841114 bytes, checksum: 89d0bc290363e2040745d0bce5031e4c (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-12-01 / The purpose of this dissertation is to study the role of the Brazilian Deposit InsuranceFund (Fundo Garantidor de Créditos – FGC), evidencing the benefits that an explicit guaranteestructure causes in the banking system. The focus is the last increase in the coverage limit fordepositors, in 2013. In addition, this paper discusses FGC's bailout capacity towards the financial system in order to minimize potential moments of market stress. Next, distortions the guarantee limit ofFGC increase may cause in the financial system will be discussed, highlighting the possibility of moral hazard. This paper also intends to measure the changes in the funding structure of the banking system, highlighting the relative reduction of the risks of refinancing liabilities, the effect of the diversification of funding products and number of investors and the trend of funding costs reduction. It assumes that liquidity have increased and refinancing risk, decreased, leading to funding diversification, with positive effect and declining costs. / A proposta deste trabalho é estudar o papel do Fundo Garantidor de Créditos (FGC),evidenciando os benefícios que uma estrutura de garantias explícita causa no sistema bancário,principalmente nas instituições de menor porte. Esta dissertação focará na última elevação dos limites de cobertura a depositantes, realizada em 2013.Além disso, discute a capacidade de socorro do FGC ao sistema financeiro, a fim de minimizar possíveis momentos de estresse de mercado. Em seguida, analisa distorções que o aumento do limite de garantia do FGC pode causar no mercado, destacando a possibilidade de risco moral.Este trabalho também mensura a mudança da estrutura de captação do sistema bancário,destacando a relativa redução do risco de refinanciamento de passivos, o efeito da pulverização da captação no número de investidores e a tendência de redução dos custos de captação. Parte se da hipótese de que a liquidez aumentou e o risco de refinanciamento diminuiu, fazendo com que a pulverização tivesse efeito positivo sobre a captação e os custos apresentassem tendência de redução.

Banks play a pivotal role in economic growth and development of all countries and therefore the stability of the banking system is a vital goal of bank supervisors. Banks act as delegated monitors of depositors’ funds and this relationship, like all principal-agent relationships, presents agency problems. In the case of banks agency problems arise because depositors cannot accurately assess the financial health of banks due to the asymmetry of information existing between banks and depositors. Because banks possess private information on their borrowers, which depositors cannot access, it exposes depositors to risk of loss of deposits in cases of bank failures originating from nonrepayment of such loans. This asymmetry of information also exposes banks to runs by depositors and these runs can lead to bank failures with devastating effects for the financial system and the economy at large. It is for this reason that banks are regulated and supervised more than other institutions. Bank failures are a worldwide phenomenon and South Africa is no exception as evidenced by historical and recent bank failures in South Africa. This thesis investigates the desirability of introducing an explicit deposit insurance scheme in South Africa as a means of protecting small, unsophisticated depositors who are almost always the losers when banks fail, and promoting financial stability. The study finds that bank failures in South Africa are mainly attributable to mismanagement of banks, liquidity problems and fraud. Bank failures as a result of the aforementioned reasons have led to depositors losing their deposits in South Africa. The absence of a clearly defined depositor protection scheme in South Africa, the inadequacy of the hitherto implicit guarantee system to protect depositors, and the poor record of the South African Reserve Bank in bank failure resolution, form the basis of the conclusion of the study, i.e., there is a case for the introduction of deposit insurance in South Africa. In order to assist South African policymakers in designing an effective deposit insurance scheme for the country, the thesis further provides a guide on how the most important design features of deposit insurance should be handled. This is in an attempt to ensure that the moral hazard problem inherent in deposit insurance is overcome.

Thesis (MBA)--Stellenbosch University, 2002. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The new Basel Capital Accord is intended to align capital adequacy of banks more closely with the key components of banking risk and to provide incentives for banks to improve their risk measurement and management capabilities. This has important implications for banks, particularly in the area of credit risk management. The purpose of this study is to take an in-depth look at the implications for banks in the area of credit risk management and the choice of approach (i.e. standardised versus internal ratings based approach) to be adopted. These changes in approach to credit risk will have broader economic implications and the study will in its final analysis explore these in the context of South Africa, as an emerging market. The study is split into three sections: Section A • Introduction and background to the New Basel Capital Accord; • Detailed overview on the New Basel Capital Accord with a particular emphasis on the internal ratings based approach to calculating minimum capital. Section B An in-depth discussion of credit risk management and the practical implications of moving towards an internal ratings based approach, which will eventually allow banks to take on a full portfolio approach to credit risk management. This will enable banks to manage credit risk across sub-portfolios and set economic capital based on the portfolio loss distribution of the banks entire lending book. This is an extremely important development in credit risk management and as a consequence is covered in some detail. The adoption of an internal ratings based approach offers significant rewards in the form of lower statutory capital. A profile of the current capitalisation of SA banks is provided followed by the likely effect of the standardised versus the internal ratings based approach to credit risk management, on the minimum level of statutory capital of banks. Section C The final section covers the envisaged macro effects of the New Accord on emerging markets (procyclical trends, lending concentrations, foreign capital flows and bank failures) with specific comment provided on the implications for the SA banking environment and economy. In conclusion, South African banks should as a priority move towards an internal ratings based approach to credit risk management in order to benefit from the lower statutory requirements, which accrue in the advanced phase. While the accord is likely to impact significantly on emerging markets, South Africa fortunately has a sophisticated banking system by international standards, making the adoption of an internal ratings based approach by the larger SA banks inevitable. The benefits for smaller banks are questionable and at this stage they are unlikely to move beyond the standardised approach, unless compelled to do so. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die "New Basel Capital Accord" het ten doel om die kapitaal vereistes neergelê vir banke meer in lyn te bring met die risiko komponent gekoppel bankwese. Dit hou 'n belangrike implikasie vir banke in en verskaf voorts ook 'n dryfveer vir banke om die bestuur van krediet risiko en algehele bestuursvaardighede te verbeter. In hierdie studie word 'n indiepte ondersoek onderneem aangaande die implikasie op banke van krediet risiko-bestuur en die keuse van die benadering wat gevolg word. Hierdie veranderings in die benadering (dws.standard teenoor interne-graderings benadering) tot krediet risiko hou breër ekonomiese implikasies vir banke in. Hierdie ekonomiese implikasies op SA as 'n ontwikkelende mark word in die finale analise ondersoek. Die studie kan in drie afdelings verdeel word: Afdeling A: • Inleiding en agtergrond tot die "New Basel Capital Accord" en • 'n Gedetaileerde oorsig van die "New Basel Capital Accord" met spesifieke verwysing na die interne-graderings benadering om die minimum vereiste kapitaal te bepaal. Afdeling B: Hierdie afdeling ondersoek krediet risiko bestuur en die praktiese implikasies van die aanvaarding/instelling van 'n interne graderings benadering, en die effek wat dit sal hê op 'n totale portefeulje benadering tot krediet risiko. Die gevolg is dat banke krediet risiko oor sub-portefeuljes sal kan bestuur en kapitaal vlakke vasstel gebaseer op verwagte portefeulje verliese. Hierdie is 'n belangrike ontwikkeling in krediet risiko bestuur en word vervolgens in diepte behandel. Die aanvaarding van 'n interne-graderings benadering tot gradering hou voordele in vir banke in die vorm van laer statutêre kapitaal vereistes. 'n Profiel van die kapitalisasie van SA banke word verskaf, gevolg deur die verskil in die effek van die standaard benadering tot die interne graderings benadering op krediet risiko bestuur en die vereiste minimum statutêre kapitaal. Afdeling C: Die finale afdeling ondersoek die beoogde makro ekonomiese effek van die "New basel capital Accord" op ontwikkelende marke (pro-sikliese neiging, lenings konsentrasies en bank mislukkings) met spesifieke verwysing na die implikasies op SA bankwese en ekonomie. Ter afsluiting moet SA banke so spoedig moontlik die interne-graderings benadering tot krediet risiko aanvaar om voordeel te trek uit die laer kapitaal vereistes wat "ophoop in die gevorderde stadium." Daar word verwag dat die "New Basel Capital Accord" 'n wesenlike invloed op die ontwikkelende mark sal hê. SA het egter 'n gesofistikeerde en gevestigde bankstelsel wat goed vergelyk met internasionale standaarde. Die aanvaarding van 'n interne-graderings benadering deur die die groter SA banke is onafwendbaar. Die voordele wat dit vir kleiner banke inhou kan bevraagteken word en is op hierdie stadium onwaarskynlik dat so 'n benadering deur hulle geïmplimenteer sal word.

Law Faculty Charles University in Prague DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCIAL LAW Regulation of the Investor Compensation Scheme in the Legal System of the Czech Republic Abstract of the dissertation Dissertation Supervisor: doc. JUDr. Ivana Štenglová Author: JUDr. Libor Němec April 2012 This dissertation deals with the Czech legal regulation of the investor compensation schemes. The investor compensation schemes are special compensation mechanisms financed by investment firms (securities broker dealers) whose main purpose is a protection of retail investors, customers of securities brokers dealers, against a default of securities broker dealers (investment firms) resulting in their inability to meet their obligations against their clients and to return to the clients their assets which were entrusted to these firms in connection with investment business. In the case of such failure the compensation schemes will compensate the loss to the clients (in a specified amount and under given conditions). The investor compensation schemes therefore substantially strengthen the confidence of investors in the capital market which is absolutely necessary not only for their smooth operation but also for the smooth operation of the whole economy. Regarding the importance of investor compensation schemes for preservation of the...

本研究結果的重點如下：一、各樣本金融機構經由模型計算出的費率差異 頗大，顯示財務結構的不同，確實應課收不同保費。而現行的單一費率對 於好壞金融機構收取的費率一視同仁無法反應金融機構其經營風險的差異 ，也就無法避免低風險金融機構補貼高風險金融機構的弊病。因此應實施 差別費率較為合理。二、根據研究結果顯示，若以金融機構性質為分類， 其費率估計負擔由低至高依序為：一般民營銀行、國家行局、省市屬行庫 、民營中小企業銀行、信託投資公司、外商銀行、信用合作社、漁會信用 部、農會信用部。而此法的一大優點在於可對個別機構評估其相對風險性 的高低，即可依各自經營情況、組織結構分別評估其風險，以達精算上的 合理性。三、由各家樣本金融機構應負擔之估計存保費率可知，只要金融 機構資產結構稍有不同，便會使存保公司的負擔不同。換言之，因金融機 構體質的互異，其為存保公司所帶來的承保風險也有別，為避免資源配置 不當的缺失，實施以個別金融機構風險為基礎的差別費率是較公平、合理 的方式。四、承保比率亦是影響費率估計的一項因素，由實證可知承保比 率對費率估計有顯著的影響。即承保比率高的金融機構，其估計費率與全 部承保時的差異較小；承保比率低者，其估計費率與全部承保時的差異較 大。

銀行恐慌現象的探討一直都廣受研究金融危機與系統性風險等領域的經濟學者所青睞，而銀行擠兌潮更經常被視為導致銀行恐慌的主因之一。由於金融全球化已是時勢所趨，因此金融危機的蔓延更加受到學術界重視。Allen and Gale (2000)建構出不同型態的銀行同業拆借市場(Interbank market)，並以此為基礎進一步探討在最佳風險分攤的前提之下，銀行與消費者如何決定其投資與消費的最佳資源配置。 本文的基本架構係基於Allen and Gale (2000)所提出的經濟模型，配合存款保險制度的導入，嘗試驗證他們所提出的最佳資源配置是否仍然成立。而本文的結果證實政府實施存款保險制度，銀行與消費者仍然可以得到他們在投資與消費的最佳配置，即使在完美與不完美的銀行同業拆借市場，其結果仍然成立。另外本文也嘗試對存款保險制度是否能有效預防銀行恐慌與其蔓延作出驗證。其結果證實提高存款保險稅率後，銀行擠兌潮的發生需要較高的不可預期流動性需求。換言之，存款保險制度有效提高了銀行倒閉門檻。而對於預防透過銀行同業拆借市場所衍生的金融危機蔓延，存款保險制度的有效性也在本文中獲得證實。 然而存款保險制度並非具絕對優勢，過多則損害消費者的預期效用。因此本文將銀行倒閉風險機率納入模型，利用軟體模擬消費者預期效用極大化條件下的最適存款保險稅率。並且進一步證實，長期資產到期日清算與到期前清算，其兩者報酬率之間的利差愈大，存款保險最適稅率須同步增加，才能使消費者效用最大。另外我們也證實存款保險制度能夠提高社會福利水準與降低銀行倒閉風險。 / Bank panic serves as a favored subject for economists who engage in researches of financial crisis and systematic risk. Because financial liberalization and globaliza-tion have been inevitable, economic scholars have regarded financial contagion. Allen and Gale (2000) established different interbank market structures to achieve the first-best allocation of banks’ investment portfolio and depositors’ consumptions. In this paper, we try to confirm Allen and Gale’s first-best allocation when the deposit insurance is implemented, and we obtain the same consequence as well. Be-sides, we also approve that occurrence of a bank run must accompany by a high level of unexpected liquidity shock if the deposit insurance exists. In other words, it raises the threshold of bankruptcy. Therefore, the deposit insurance is feasible to avert bank panic. With regard to the contagion effect, the deposit insurance undoubtedly de-creases its negative influence because financial interdependence between different financial sectors will be attenuated by imposing a deposit-insurance tax on depositors. The deposit insurance, however, is not constantly superior due to the depositors’ loss in consuming utility. We achieve the optimal deposit-insurance tax rate by intro-ducing probability of bank’s bankruptcy, and find that the optimal tax rate may be raised, so as to boost consumers’ utility if return spread between early and late with-drawn long assets keeps higher. We also testify that the deposit insurance can enhance the social welfare and decrease the incidence of bankruptcy.

Abstract This dissertation explores two interrelated aspects of banking crises and bank regulations in perspective of regulator¡¦s soft budget constraints (SBCs in brief) and bank top management compensation. First, this paper models, in a game of incomplete information, bank behavior during banking crises when asymmetric information exists between regulators and banks. Here, I show that the situation creates the incentives for banks to roll over their defaulting loans to disguise their financial statements. Although a prudential regulator may mitigate this incentive by offering a ¡§slack¡¨ rescue packages, the bank¡¦s reputational concern may cause them to reject rescue offers. In this instance, regulators may be forced to offer amounts of recapitalization that will meet the amount necessary to restore banks to solvency. Otherwise, banks may have to gamble for resurrection, or wait until the banking crises become severe, and then more banks become insolvent, regulators have to offer optimal rescue packages subject to SBCs. New findings include (1) During banking crises, the optimal regulatory policies, on the one hand, may cause regulators have to offer rescue or bailout packages subject to different SBCs, on the other hand, mitigate banker¡¦s moral hazard. The more severe the crises will be, the greater soft budget constrained to regulators. (2) The potential severity of banking crises can be measured by the ratios, getting from net worth over the total amount of recapitalization offered by regulators and recovered from nonperforming loans. (3) As banking crises become severe, the cost of rescue becomes larger than that of bailout, the best regulatory policy is to intervene; On the contrary, if a situation labeled ¡§ too-many-to-fail¡¨ arises, the regulators may offer to rescue distressed banks subject to SBC. (4)As Bayesian equilibrium cost of regulator in crises is increasing, a random creative ambiguity for regulators to offer bailout or rescue plans may be the optimal policy to mitigate the expectation of SBC for banks . Second, this paper also shows that in the circumstances of universal banking or bank holding company, concentrating bank regulation on bank capital ratios and risk-based deposit insurance may be ineffective in controlling banker¡¦s risk-taking and moral hazard. Here, this paper follows, a more direct mechanism of influencing bank risk-taking incentives, in which the insurance premium scheme incorporate features of top management compensation. In a model of universal banking with two-periods and three-subsidiaries or departments, bank owner pre-commits to regulators to pick an optimal management compensation structure that induces the first-best value-maximizing investment choices by a bank¡¦s management. Findings include (1) If insurance premium is not fairly priced, the incentives are created for banks to have a ¡§regulatory arbitrage¡¨ by segregating its nonperforming assets from the investment bank, and shift it to the commercial bank, that increases the deposit-insurer an additional risk liability, and aggravates the risk-shifting within the universal bank; and vice versa. (2) Given management contracts{ fixed salary, a bonus paid, a fraction of equity of the bank} and { fixed salary, a penalty , a fraction of equity}for bank and security investment department respectively ; and a capitalization level corresponding must exceed the lower risky investment outcome , here bonus paid larger than 0, a penalty larger than 0, a fraction of equity between 0 and 1, then the investment policies implemented by managers, is less risky than when manger¡¦s interests are fully aligned with the equity interests. (3) Given a fairly priced insurance premium, and capitalization level corresponding must exceed the lower risky investment outcome, then the optimal management compensation structure can internalize the cost of moral hazard and induce the Pareto-optimal and department-equilibrium investment policies, thus mitigate moral hazard under universal banking. Finally, the state-owned and half-state-owned banks have experienced the institution-induced ineffectiveness; and the latter suffer from poor business performance level, partially because of the issues of ownership structure. This paper shows the investment policy with moral hazard under these banks incorporated with optimal compensation structures, and given capitalization level corresponding must exceed the lower risky investment outcome, then the optimal policies induced, that will improve their business performance level. This paper also shows that as the controlling shareholders have power over banks in excess of their cash flow rights, the incentives will be created for them to expropriate the minority shareholders. And, when the incentives for expropriation exists, the investment policy will be distorted with the managerial bias induced by their private benefits, and deteriorate morale of the banks. The regulatory mandatory requirements of one-share-one-vote principle may be proposed, instead.

Submitted by Gustavo Henrique Verhalen (ghver@yahoo.com) on 2017-03-18T00:16:54Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação Final GHV.pdf: 1235856 bytes, checksum: eaf60dff7b6ccaef4dab366813279847 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Renata de Souza Nascimento (renata.souza@fgv.br) on 2017-03-20T23:36:33Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação Final GHV.pdf: 1235856 bytes, checksum: eaf60dff7b6ccaef4dab366813279847 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-03-21T11:55:29Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação Final GHV.pdf: 1235856 bytes, checksum: eaf60dff7b6ccaef4dab366813279847 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-02-22 / The banking industry is a poorly competitive market, there are several reasons related to this, entry costs are high, there are technological barriers to the creation of new banks, and there may be institutional barriers that prevent the entry of new firms. There are, however, elements that act to decrease banking concentration, and deposit insurance programs can act as an incentive for this decrease. The main purpose of deposit insurance is to stabilize banking systems, the guarantee on deposits that it provides aims to prevent the occurrence of bank runs. However, when this guarantee is added to the system, it levels up banks with different risk perceptions, thus allowing a rebalancement of deposits between banks. This dissertation aims to verify if the Brazilian deposit insurance program managed by the FGC (Brazilian deposit insurance fund) had a positive impact on the deconcentration of the Brazillian banking market. Empirical tests assesses whether there are distinctions between a group of banks considered of systemic importance and the other banks, which compose the Brazilian financial system (SFN in Portuguese). Hence, the dissertation investigates if the increase in the FGC coverage value increased the funds deposited into the Poupança (a popular kind of remunerated account) and term accounts of banks that do not have systemic importance. Evidence suggests that the performance of the FGC played an important role in compensating the process of market concentration in the Brazilian banking industry in the period between October 2006 and April 2012. / A indústria bancária é um mercado pouco competitivo, diversas razões estão relacionadas a isso, os custos de entrada são altos, há barreiras tecnológicas para a constituição novos bancos e, podem existir barreiras institucionais que impedem a entrada de novas firmas. Há, contudo, fatores que atuam para diminuir a concentração bancária, e os programas de seguro depósito podem atuar como um dos catalizadores dessa diminuição. A principal finalidade dos seguros depósito é de estabilização dos sistemas bancários, a garantia sobre depósitos proporcionada por eles tem como objetivo prevenir a ocorrência de corridas bancárias. Mas, quando essa garantia é inserida no sistema ela coloca no mesmo nível instituições bancárias que antes possuíam percepções de risco diferentes e, isto atua rebalanceando o acesso aos depósitos entre os bancos. Essa dissertação tem por objetivo verificar se o programa de seguro depósitos administrado pelo Fundo Garantidor de Créditos (FGC), teve impacto positivo na desconcentração do mercado bancário brasileiro. São realizados testes empíricos para avaliar se a atuação do FGC propicia esse aumento na competição bancária. A maneira de averiguar isso se dá através da comparação entre um grupo de bancos considerados de importância sistêmica, assim a cobertura do FGC teria pouco ou nenhum impacto sobre as captações desses bancos, e os demais bancos do Sistema Financeiro Nacional (SFN). Dessa forma a dissertação investiga se o aumento no valor de cobertura do FGC incrementou as captações de depósitos de poupança e de depósitos a prazo dos bancos que não possuem importância sistêmica. As evidências sugerem que o FGC desempenhou um papel importante na redução do processo de concentração do setor bancário brasileiro no período estudado: entre outubro de 2006 e abril de 2012.

The thesis studies the impact of European banking regulatory reforms on the stability of Central and Eastern European countries after the financial crisis with the annual data from Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia from 2009 to 2019. The thesis reaches several conclusions. Firstly, increasing minimum Tier 1 capital adequacy ratio through CRR/CRD IV did not significantly promote the bank stability in sample countries. However, total capital adequacy ratio is found to have positive and significant association with overall insolvency risk. Secondly, relaxing restrictions would have negative impact on bank stability measured by bank z-score. Thirdly, countries that are more open on the regulation may have more stable banks, while tighter entry restrictions boost bank fragility. Fourthly, when only taking deposit insurance variables as explanatory variables, increasing the level of deposit insurance coverage may dampen the bank stability. However, when controlling other regulation and supervision indexes, the results do not show any significant effect of deposit insurance scheme on bank z-score. Lastly, the supervisory variables are not significantly associated with bank stability in sample countries.