In this dissertation, I propose that a Deweyan ethic—supplemented by Care ethics and ecofeminism can better evaluate, enhance, and nurture human/nonhuman animal relationships. While Peter Singer’s utilitarianism and Tom Regan’s deontology are considered the dominant ethical theories in the field of animal ethics, they cannot fully attend to the complexities of human/nonhuman animal relationships. Some of the shortcomings of Singer’s and Regan’s theories explored in this dissertation are the absence of context, the dichotomization of reason/emotion and human/animal, the calculative sterility of moral deliberation, and the problematic language of ‘rights.’ Further, I propose that a supplemented Deweyan ethic might be fruitfully applied to two canine-training programs in prisons: Paws in Prisons (PIP) and A Dog On Prison Turf (ADOPT). I use the work of Angela Davis and Bénédicte Boisseron on prisons to explore how a Deweyan ethic might be better equipped to evaluate and enhance these relationships, given their location. To fully appreciate the capacity of a Deweyan ethic in human/nonhuman animal relationships, one must wrestle with the messiness of the program’s location while at the same time acknowledge that despite the fact that they are in prison, something meaningful happens here between human/nonhuman animals. In the Deweyan spirit, I test this hypothesis by interviewing participants in these programs and use those qualitative aspects as feedback for my initial hypotheses.

It is the position of this paper that the body plays a crucial role in the manifestation of cognition and motivation. Cognition is situationally specific and emergent from a natural, habitual functioning process that is based on the embodied needs to transact with the environment. That natural function is the well-known Disequilibrium-Equilibrium function ( D-E f ), and the denied affective [the precognitive] is the embodied needs, desires and interests that frame selective attention and are the catalyst for emerging cognitive action. This precognitive catalyst usually contributes more to motivation than cognition. Motivation also has a cognitive component. The Disequilibrium-Equilibrium function ( D-E f ) process is part of a larger holistic embodied transaction where "knowing" is a way of behaving. This larger embodied transaction is Dewey's "Transactional Realism." In this transaction "inquiry" is the tool of the goal "sense" [or equilibrium] and "knowledge" is the product of a transformed context. On an individual level this transformation is learning, enculturation and reflection. On a cultural level this transformation is consensual validation. / Master of Arts

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

John Dewey. A perspective of his Concept of Truth”. Rorty proposes his view as being an heir of pragmatism, such as J. Dewey’s, emphasizing that it stems, among other things, from the pragmatist notion of truth. Differing from many of Rorty’s ideas, I attempt to expound some notions I deem relevant in J. Dewey’s philosophy, and especially discuss some aspects of his conceptof truth. I plan to show that Dewey’s pragmatism takes up some traces of our everyday concept of truth, related to correspondence, but that this does not imply an engagement with a robust notion of truth. At the same time, I believe that the acceptance of such traces, although it does not suppose a definition or clear explanation regarding the content” of truth, suffices to distinguish between truth’s normative aspect and any justificationist view that may operate as knowledge’s epistemic support. / Rorty nos propone su visión como herencia del pragmatismo, entreellos el de J. Dewey, marcando con énfasis que su concepción se desprende, entre otras cosas, de la concepción pragmatista de la verdad. En contraposición a varias ideas de Rorty, pretendo exponer algunas ideas que creo centrales en la filosofía de J. Dewey; en particular, discutir, desde cierta perspectiva, algunaslíneas de su concepción de la verdad. Pretendo mostrar que el pragmatismo de Dewey asume algunos rasgos de nuestro concepto cotidiano de verdad, vinculados a la correspondencia, y que ello no implica un compromiso con una noción robusta de verdad. A la vez, creo que la aceptación de tales rasgos, aunque no supone una definición ni una clara explicación del contenido” de la verdad, es suficiente para permitirnos mantener la diferencia entre el aspecto normativo que implica la noción de verdad, respecto a cualquier concepción justificacionista que opere como respaldo epistémico del conocimiento.