The Liar Paradox and related semantic antinomies seem to challenge our deepest intuitions about language, truth and logic. Many philosophers believe that to solve them, we must give up either classical logic, or the expressive resources of natural language, or even the “naïve theory of truth” (according to which "P" and “it is true that 'P'” always entail each other). A particularly extreme form of radical surgery is proposed by figures like Graham Priest, who argues for “dialetheism”—the position that some contradictions are actually true—on the basis of the paradoxes. While Priest’s willingness to dispense with the Law of Non-Contradiction may be unpopular in contemporary analytic philosophy, figures as significant as Saul Kripke and Hartry Field have argued that, in light of the paradoxes, we can only save Non-Contradiction at the expense of the Law of the Excluded Middle, abandoning classical logic in favor of a “paracomplete” alternative in which P and ~P can simultaneously fail to hold. I believe that we can do better than that, and I argue for a more conservative approach, which retains not only “monaletheism” (the orthodox position that no sentence, either in natural languages or other language, can have more than one truth-value at a time), but the full inferential resources of classical logic.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Texas at El Paso, 2008. / Title from title screen. Vita. CD-ROM. Includes bibliographical references. Also available online.

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Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-27T17:27:04Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Diogo Henrique Bispo Dias.pdf: 817652 bytes, checksum: a9c449589ddd37e8416ba66f62fb6285 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-06-07 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / This master' s thesis comprehends the philosophical aspects of paraconsistent logic. It will analyze the history of the fundamental logical principles to this particular logic, namely: the law of non-contradiction and the principle of explosion, as well as the history of paraconsistency. Moreover, an interpretation of paraconsistency that defends the existence of true contradiction, known as dialetheism, will be discussed, as well as the criticism to' this position, and, in general, to paraconsistent logics. The philosophical character of this thesis does not mean that the text will be exempt from theorems, formulas, demonstrations and other formal questions. But this formal aspect will not be treated as a end in itself. The formalism will be used to present two proposicional paraconsistent systems, namely: paraclassicallogic and paraclassical logic with inclusion, and to compare them with classical logic. The theoretical framework built for such aim is philosophically relevant, for the discussion on central points in logic, such as the existence of logical laws, its a priori character, and even the very definition of logic. Finally, a method will be proposed in order to find, from a given logic, its paraconsistent version. Due to the multiplicity of paraconsistent systems,' I this study is important in order to explore the general features of paraconsistent logics, their specificities and, mainly, abstract methods for generation of paraconsisent logic / Este trabalho abordará os aspectos filosóficos das lógicas paraconsistentes. Analisaremos a história dos princípios lógicos fundamentais para esta lógica, a saber: a lei de não-contradição e o princípio de explosão, bem como a história do surgimento da paraconsistência. Ademais, discutiremos uma interpretação da paraconsistência que defende a existência de contradições verdadeiras, denominada dialeteismo, e as possíveis críticas ao dialeteismo e, de forma geral, às lógicas paraconsistentes. O caráter filosófico do trabalho não significa que o texto estará isento de teoremas, fórmulas, demonstrações e outras questões formais. Porém, este aspecto formal não será tratado como um fim em si mesmo. O formalismo será utilizado para apresentar dois sistemas proposicionais paraconsistentes - lógica para clássica e lógica para clássica com inclusão - e compará-los com a lógica proposicional clássica. O arcabouço teórico construído para tal fim é filosoficamente relevante para discutir questões centrais à lógica" como a existência de leis lógicas, seu caráter a priori e, até mesmo, a própria definição de lógica. Por fim, será apresentado um método para encontrar, a partir de uma lógica dada, sua versão paraconsistente. Face à multiplicidade, de sistemas lógicos paraconsistentes, este estudo é importante, pois permite explorar as possíveis características gerais das lógicas paraconsistentes, suas especificidades e, principalmente, métodos abstratos para gerar lógicas paraconsistentes

Link to dataset: https://doi.org/10.25399/UnisaData.14152106.v1 / The work of Bruce Nauman can be understood as an enquiry into the absurd. His work is a critique of art, the artist and society, and is in part viewed as a mediation of stereotypical ‘truth’. The absurd is defined and analysed to elucidate the nature of art and human behaviour by means of literary comparison, in particular of Camus, Sartre and Wittgenstein. This research focusses on Nauman’s subversive performance- based work and analyses how he simulates a particular work of Duchamp. I propose that Nauman espouses human activity into the functionality of objects, such as fountains. My artworks expand on Nauman’s interrogation of the concept of a ‘true artist’ by embodying an absurd fountain as a Sisyphean construct. In contextualising my work in relation to incessant duty, insecurity and double negatives, I offer a regenerative vigour against idolisation of success through contemplation of the artist’s doubt and the absurd. / Art History, Visual Arts and Musicology / M.A. (Visual Arts)