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The problem which spurred this thesis has three components. First, there are entities which we may call stuff – alluded to by uncountable nouns; these entities seem to have a duality for behaving like both (i) an object or a discrete middle size substance – which are supposed to be non-repetitive and independent, and as well as (ii) a concept or a universal – which are repetitive but dependent (on some independent substances). Second, a dichotomy persists between the two aspects of the duality: what is non-repeatable cannot be repeatable and, conversely what is repeatable cannot be non-repeatable. Third, there is a background of how we conventionally do logic, and our present trend of doing – or rather, doing away with – metaphysics. The thesis then came up with four chapters. Chapter 1 deals with the question – how can, or how do we deal with stuff predication following the conventional guidelines? – where by stuff predication I mean any predication involving stuff. I also tried there to find out some clues from Frege’s works. Chapter 2 dives into some related issues pertaining to language, grammar and the notion of constitution. Chapter 3 examines critically two types of theories or views (one of them has been recently championed by Michael Dummett and P.F. Strawson; the other by David Armstrong) arguing how repetitive entities differ from the non-repetitive ones. My counter argument is that those arguments are either fallacious or not even complete. Chapter 4 takes an Aristotelian perspective following the lead of E.J. Lowe. The thesis has a pessimistic tone at the end: the conventional method is quite inadequate as it misses some subtleties pertaining to stuff, nor could Lowe’s Aristotle take us too far. Nevertheless, one cannot – I hope – miss some deeper insights glimpsing into this work. Particularly, Chapter 3 opens up some new venues to think about: our thoughts about our own arguments and proofs may need some revamping.

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Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-27T17:27:04Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Diogo Henrique Bispo Dias.pdf: 817652 bytes, checksum: a9c449589ddd37e8416ba66f62fb6285 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-06-07 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / This master' s thesis comprehends the philosophical aspects of paraconsistent logic. It will analyze the history of the fundamental logical principles to this particular logic, namely: the law of non-contradiction and the principle of explosion, as well as the history of paraconsistency. Moreover, an interpretation of paraconsistency that defends the existence of true contradiction, known as dialetheism, will be discussed, as well as the criticism to' this position, and, in general, to paraconsistent logics. The philosophical character of this thesis does not mean that the text will be exempt from theorems, formulas, demonstrations and other formal questions. But this formal aspect will not be treated as a end in itself. The formalism will be used to present two proposicional paraconsistent systems, namely: paraclassicallogic and paraclassical logic with inclusion, and to compare them with classical logic. The theoretical framework built for such aim is philosophically relevant, for the discussion on central points in logic, such as the existence of logical laws, its a priori character, and even the very definition of logic. Finally, a method will be proposed in order to find, from a given logic, its paraconsistent version. Due to the multiplicity of paraconsistent systems,' I this study is important in order to explore the general features of paraconsistent logics, their specificities and, mainly, abstract methods for generation of paraconsisent logic / Este trabalho abordará os aspectos filosóficos das lógicas paraconsistentes. Analisaremos a história dos princípios lógicos fundamentais para esta lógica, a saber: a lei de não-contradição e o princípio de explosão, bem como a história do surgimento da paraconsistência. Ademais, discutiremos uma interpretação da paraconsistência que defende a existência de contradições verdadeiras, denominada dialeteismo, e as possíveis críticas ao dialeteismo e, de forma geral, às lógicas paraconsistentes. O caráter filosófico do trabalho não significa que o texto estará isento de teoremas, fórmulas, demonstrações e outras questões formais. Porém, este aspecto formal não será tratado como um fim em si mesmo. O formalismo será utilizado para apresentar dois sistemas proposicionais paraconsistentes - lógica para clássica e lógica para clássica com inclusão - e compará-los com a lógica proposicional clássica. O arcabouço teórico construído para tal fim é filosoficamente relevante para discutir questões centrais à lógica" como a existência de leis lógicas, seu caráter a priori e, até mesmo, a própria definição de lógica. Por fim, será apresentado um método para encontrar, a partir de uma lógica dada, sua versão paraconsistente. Face à multiplicidade, de sistemas lógicos paraconsistentes, este estudo é importante, pois permite explorar as possíveis características gerais das lógicas paraconsistentes, suas especificidades e, principalmente, métodos abstratos para gerar lógicas paraconsistentes