Thesis (M.B.A.)--University of Hong Kong, 1995. / Includes bibliographical references (leaf 62-66).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, Graduate School of Business. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the Internet.

D.Comm. / In commercial corporations shareholders, at least in theory, evaluate the performance of the boards they have appointed. Such evaluation is mainly based on the financial performance of the entity. Public (state funded) entities have only the state as shareholder and the performance of their boards is not evaluated by the taxpayers who ultimately pay the directors' fees. The term "public entity" refers to 20 corporations with an annual turnover in excess of R 55 billion which are substantially tax-funded or are awarded a market monopoly in terms of legislation by parliament. Although these public entities are regularly criticised by the press, the academic literature reports neither an assessment of the quality of governance by their non-executive directors' nor any instrument to use in such an assessment. The aim of this study was to measure the expectations and perceptions of executives in public entities about their non-executive boards' corporate governance service. This began with a literature was analysis, firstly to define what "proper" corporate governance and secondly to find a recognised methodology to use in the development of an assessment instrument. It was found that two main corporate governance models were generally recognised, namely the United Kingdom model and the German model. The United Kingdom model advocates a single board comprising both executive and non-executive directors while the German model has a supervisory board of non-executive directors overseeing the activities of an executive management board. It was further found that, contrary to King's (1994) recommendation to use unitary boards, the 20 listed public entities all had supervisory boards as advocated in the German model. A procedure advocated by Churchill (1979:65-72), in his paradigm for developing measures of marketing constructs, proved to be very successful in the development in the United States of America of an instrument named SERVQUAL which was applied in the general service arena where a paying client evaluated a service. Churchill's method was therefore used in this study to develop an instrument called ECGSI to measure the quality of governance of listed public entities' non-executive boards. The opinions of executives attending board meetings, e.g. to make presentations, were used both to develop ECGSI and to measure the quality of the non-executive directors' service.

本文研究了海外背景的董事在中国上市公司中的表现和作用。本文从董事最基本的两个作用监督和指导出发，研究了海外背景的董事对于董事会治理和公司表现的各项投入和产出。研究结果表明，海外背景的董事在董事会会议的缺席记录更多，更少参与特殊委员会的工作。海外背景的董事对于高管薪酬水平的管理更弱，但在解雇表现不佳的CEO有积极的作用。在指导作用上，海外背景的董事表现得并不尽如人意。海外背景的董事并没有利用自己的海外经历为公司在海外并购业务来带好处。最后，海外背景董事占比最高的公司，托宾Q所代表的公司表现更低。这篇文章的重要性在于，这是第一篇用国内数据研究海外背景董事在公司治理和表现中的作用的文章，同时也是第一篇详细阐述不同的海外背景所具有的不同影响的文章。 / This paper discusses the presence and the roles of directors with foreign backgrounds in China’s listed companies. Starting from the two basic roles of boards, monitoring and directing, this paper examines the inputs and outputs of foreign-background directors (FBDs) on board governance and firm performance. The result shows that FBDs are associated with worse board meeting attendance records, less special committee assignments, weaker control in senior executive compensation level, but more strength in firing underperforming CEOs. In directing-related functions, FBDs does not meet the expectation that they can benefit the firm’s cross-border merger and acquisition decision by taking advantage of their foreign background knowledge. Finally, firms with higher fraction of FBDs on board are associated with poorer performance in terms of Tobin's Q. This research is significant because it is the first exploration of the functions of FBDs in listed corporations using China’s data, and the first attempt to identify the role of each different foreign background. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Xia, Keqin. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2012. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 30-34). / Abstracts also in Chinese. / Foreign Background Directors and Corporate Performance: Empirical Evidence from China’s listed Companies --- p.I / ABSTRACT --- p.II / 摘要： --- p.III / ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS --- p.IV / Chapter SECTION I --- : INTRODUCTION --- p.1 / Chapter SECTION II --- : LITERATURE REVIEW --- p.3 / Chapter 2.1 --- Board Functions--Monitoring and Directing --- p.3 / Chapter 2.1.1 --- Monitoring function & agency problem --- p.3 / Chapter 2.1.2 --- Directing function --- p.6 / Chapter 2.2 --- Board Governance and Firm Performance --- p.6 / Chapter SECTION III --- : DATA AND METHODS --- p.7 / Chapter 3.1 --- Individual characteristics --- p.7 / Chapter 3.2 --- Board characteristics --- p.8 / Chapter 3.3 --- Firm characteristics --- p.10 / Chapter 3.4 --- Different foreign backgrounds --- p.10 / Chapter SECTION IV --- : EMPIRICAL RESULTS --- p.12 / Chapter 4.1 --- Board Meeting Attendance Problem and FBDs --- p.12 / Chapter 4.1.1 --- Regression analysis of absence ratio --- p.14 / Chapter 4.1.2 --- Regression analysis of the total absence ratio --- p.15 / Chapter 4.1.3 --- Conclusion on attendance problem and foreign backgrounds --- p.17 / Chapter 4.2 --- Probit Regression Analysis of Committee Assignments --- p.17 / Chapter 4.3 --- Regression Analysis of Senior Executives’ Compensation --- p.19 / Chapter 4.4 --- Regression Analysis of CEO Turnover Rate --- p.21 / Chapter 4.5 --- An Event Study: Cross-border Mergers & Acquisitions (M&A) Analysis --- p.23 / Chapter 4.6 --- Firm Performance Regression Analysis: FBDs and ROA --- p.26 / Chapter 4.7 --- Firm Performance Regression Analysis: Tobin’s Q and FBDs --- p.28 / Chapter SECTION V --- : SUMMARY --- p.29 / REFERENCES --- p.30 / FIGURES AND TABLES --- p.35

Thesis (MComm)--Stellenbosch University, 2015. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: For the past few decades the remuneration of directors has been in the spotlight, especially in view of the corporate scandals that occurred around the turn of the 20th century. Generally, managers need to manage firms in such a way that shareholders’ value is maximised. Unfortunately, shareholders of firms and the general public have the perception that directors are over-compensated, and that there is no relationship between the remuneration of directors and the financial performance of the firms to enhance shareholders’ value. A lack of transparency, inadequate disclosure by firms and remuneration committees’ conflict of interest are reasons cited for these perceptions. Although South Africa is ranked as a global leader in terms of its corporate governance practices, many firms still do not adhere to the King reports’ principles. This research study investigated whether a relationship exists between the remuneration of directors and the financial performance of firms. The firms selected for the study included both listed and delisted firms from the Industrial Sector of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) for the time period 2002 until 2010. Ninety-three firms complied with the requirements to be included in the study. All these firms had effective remuneration strategies in place to promote financial performance and growth of the firms. Secondary data were collected for the nine consecutive years of the study period, representing a period prior to substantial changes in accounting and disclosure regulation that influenced the comparability of financial reporting of the firms. It is important to note that directors’ remuneration is not the only motivating factor for firm performance, but one of many. Directors’ remuneration and incentives should be optimally utilised to increase performance and growth in the firms, and it should not merely be a case of directors being overcompensated for services rendered. In order to operationalize directors’ remuneration, it was converted and subcategorised into four variables. These dependent variables for directors’ remuneration consisted of basic salary, bonuses (performance), gains on share purchases or share options and what was termed as “other” remuneration. “Other” remuneration included pension, medical, motor, and telephone allowances. To measure the financial performance of the firms, the following market and accounting measures were employed: turnover, earnings per share (EPS), total share return (TSR) and market value added (MVA). Analysing these variables’ data by means of selected descriptive statistical measures and inferential regression analysis, it appeared that the data were significantly skewed, but that financial performance of the firms was a strong determinant of the change in directors’ remuneration. Additional regression analyses were performed to investigate whether a lagged relationship existed between the dependent variable, namely directors’ remuneration, and the independent variables, as reflected by the various financial performance measures. Results from these regression analyses strengthened the findings of the study to show that a relationship existed between directors’ remuneration and the financial performance of the firms investigated. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Direkteursvergoeding trek vir die afgelope paar dekades gereeld aandag, veral weens die korporatiewe skandale wat aan die lig gekom het rondom ongeveer die eeuwisseling. Normaalweg stel firmas direkteure aan om aandeelhouerswelvaart te verhoog. Daar bestaan ongelukkig ʼn opvatting onder talle aandeelhouers asook die algemene publiek dat direkteure oorbetaal word, en dat daar geen verwantskap bestaan tussen direkteursvergoeding en die finansiële prestasie van firmas om aandeelhouerswelvaart te verhoog nie. Redes wat aangevoer word vir hierdie sienings sluit in die tekort aan deursigtigheid, onvoldoende openbaarmaking deur firmas en vergoedingskomitees se botsende belange. Alhoewel Suid-Afrika geklassifiseer word as ’n wêreldleier op die gebied van korporatiewe bestuur, is daar steeds firmas wat nie voldoen aan die beginsels van die King-verslae nie. Hierdie navorsingstudie ondersoek die moontlike verwantskap tussen direkteursvergoeding en die finansiële prestasie van firmas. Die geselekteerde firmas vir die studie was genoteerde en voorheen-genoteerde firmas in die nywerheidsektor op die Johannesburgse Aandelebeurs (JSE), vir die periode 2002 tot en met 2010. Drie-en-negentig firmas het voldoen aan die vereistes om ingesluit te word in die steekproef van die studie. Al die geselekteerde firmas het doeltreffende vergoedingstrategieë in plek gehad om finansiële prestasie en groei in die firmas aan te spoor. Sekondêre data is vir die nege agtereenvolgende jare van die studie ingesamel. Veranderinge in regulasies voor en na die studieperiode het dit moeilik gemaak om periodes buite hierdie tydgleuf vir vergelykingsdoeleindes in te sluit. Dit is belangrik om daarop te let dat direkteursvergoeding nie die enigste faktor is wat ʼn firma se finansiële prestasie kan beïnvloed nie, maar slegs een van vele. In die lig hiervan, moet direkteursvergoeding en ander aansporingsmaatstawwe optimaal gebruik word om finansiële prestasie in firmas aan te moedig. Om ʼn duideliker skets rakende direkteursvergoeding te verkry, is vergoeding onderverdeel in vier sub-kategorieë veranderlikes. Die afhanklike veranderlikes van direkteursvergoeding is soos volg geklassifiseer: basiese salaris, bonusse (prestasie), opbrengste uit aandeelaankope en aandeleopsies en ʼn laaste kategorie wat as “ander” vergoeding geklassifiseer is. Hierdie “ander” vergoedingskomponent het grootliks bestaan uit pensioen- en mediese bydraes asook motor-, en telefoonvoordele. Ten einde die onafhanklike veranderlike, naamlik die finansiële prestasie van firmas, te meet, is die volgende mark- en rekeningkundige maatstawwe gebruik: omset, verdienste per aandeel (VPA), markwaarde toevoeging (MWT) en aandeelopbrengs. Met die ontleding van al die veranderlikes het beskrywende statistiek en inferensiële regressietoetse aangedui dat die data ʼn merkbare skewe verspreiding het, maar dat finansiële prestasie in die firmas ʼn beduidende faktor was wanneer direkteursvergoeding aangepas is. Bykomende regressietoetse is gedoen om te ondersoek of daar vertragingstydperke was tussen die afhanklike veranderlike, naamlik direkteursvergoeding, en die onafhanklike veranderlike, finansiële prestasie van firmas. Hierdie toetse het die studie se bevindinge bevestig dat daar inderdaad ʼn verwantskap bestaan tussen direkteursvergoeding en die finansiële prestasie van firmas.

published_or_final_version / Economics and Finance / Doctoral / Doctor of Philosophy

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oregon, 2006. / Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 104-109). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, Graduate School of Business, August 2001. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the Internet.

This study analyzes ownership and directorship links among larger Canadian-owned corporations. These links have received insufficient attention from Canadian economists. It shows that these corporations did not undergo the radical changes predicted for their counterparts in other countries: proprietor ownership remains high, and the board of directors persists as the centre of power. / Ownership links form the basis for the development and empirical investigation of the "Shadow Group" concept. The taxonomical classification of shadow groups reveals complex structures accompanying diversification strategies. Interlocking directorships exist among "core" corporations inside the groups and are frequent between the shadow groups and the rest of the economy. / Shadow groups were at the heart of mergers and acquisitions between 1978 and 1981. A case study shows that external growth (especially takeovers) is their characteristic tactic for expansion. Hence, the necessity exists for amending economic theories to account for the behaviour of these groups.

Thesis (LLM)--University of Stellenbosch, 2007. / Bibliography. Also available via the Internet.