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Corporate governance in P.R.C. equity joint ventures : the activities and roles of boards and their directors in Sino-Western equity joint ventures /Clatterbuck, Byron James. January 1995 (has links)
Thesis (M.B.A.)--University of Hong Kong, 1995. / Includes bibliographical references (leaf 62-66).
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Board of director incentive alignment and the design of executive compensation contracts /Milliron, Jennifer C. January 2000 (has links)
Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, Graduate School of Business. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the Internet.
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Service quality measurement for non-executive directors in public entitiesVan Wyk, M.F. 12 September 2012 (has links)
D.Comm. / In commercial corporations shareholders, at least in theory, evaluate the performance of the boards they have appointed. Such evaluation is mainly based on the financial performance of the entity. Public (state funded) entities have only the state as shareholder and the performance of their boards is not evaluated by the taxpayers who ultimately pay the directors' fees. The term "public entity" refers to 20 corporations with an annual turnover in excess of R 55 billion which are substantially tax-funded or are awarded a market monopoly in terms of legislation by parliament. Although these public entities are regularly criticised by the press, the academic literature reports neither an assessment of the quality of governance by their non-executive directors' nor any instrument to use in such an assessment. The aim of this study was to measure the expectations and perceptions of executives in public entities about their non-executive boards' corporate governance service. This began with a literature was analysis, firstly to define what "proper" corporate governance and secondly to find a recognised methodology to use in the development of an assessment instrument. It was found that two main corporate governance models were generally recognised, namely the United Kingdom model and the German model. The United Kingdom model advocates a single board comprising both executive and non-executive directors while the German model has a supervisory board of non-executive directors overseeing the activities of an executive management board. It was further found that, contrary to King's (1994) recommendation to use unitary boards, the 20 listed public entities all had supervisory boards as advocated in the German model. A procedure advocated by Churchill (1979:65-72), in his paradigm for developing measures of marketing constructs, proved to be very successful in the development in the United States of America of an instrument named SERVQUAL which was applied in the general service arena where a paying client evaluated a service. Churchill's method was therefore used in this study to develop an instrument called ECGSI to measure the quality of governance of listed public entities' non-executive boards. The opinions of executives attending board meetings, e.g. to make presentations, were used both to develop ECGSI and to measure the quality of the non-executive directors' service.
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Foreign background directors and corporate performance: empirical evidence from China's listed companies.January 2012 (has links)
本文研究了海外背景的董事在中国上市公司中的表现和作用。本文从董事最基本的两个作用监督和指导出发,研究了海外背景的董事对于董事会治理和公司表现的各项投入和产出。研究结果表明,海外背景的董事在董事会会议的缺席记录更多,更少参与特殊委员会的工作。海外背景的董事对于高管薪酬水平的管理更弱,但在解雇表现不佳的CEO有积极的作用。在指导作用上,海外背景的董事表现得并不尽如人意。海外背景的董事并没有利用自己的海外经历为公司在海外并购业务来带好处。最后,海外背景董事占比最高的公司,托宾Q所代表的公司表现更低。这篇文章的重要性在于,这是第一篇用国内数据研究海外背景董事在公司治理和表现中的作用的文章,同时也是第一篇详细阐述不同的海外背景所具有的不同影响的文章。 / This paper discusses the presence and the roles of directors with foreign backgrounds in China’s listed companies. Starting from the two basic roles of boards, monitoring and directing, this paper examines the inputs and outputs of foreign-background directors (FBDs) on board governance and firm performance. The result shows that FBDs are associated with worse board meeting attendance records, less special committee assignments, weaker control in senior executive compensation level, but more strength in firing underperforming CEOs. In directing-related functions, FBDs does not meet the expectation that they can benefit the firm’s cross-border merger and acquisition decision by taking advantage of their foreign background knowledge. Finally, firms with higher fraction of FBDs on board are associated with poorer performance in terms of Tobin's Q. This research is significant because it is the first exploration of the functions of FBDs in listed corporations using China’s data, and the first attempt to identify the role of each different foreign background. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Xia, Keqin. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2012. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 30-34). / Abstracts also in Chinese. / Foreign Background Directors and Corporate Performance: Empirical Evidence from China’s listed Companies --- p.I / ABSTRACT --- p.II / 摘要: --- p.III / ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS --- p.IV / Chapter SECTION I --- : INTRODUCTION --- p.1 / Chapter SECTION II --- : LITERATURE REVIEW --- p.3 / Chapter 2.1 --- Board Functions--Monitoring and Directing --- p.3 / Chapter 2.1.1 --- Monitoring function & agency problem --- p.3 / Chapter 2.1.2 --- Directing function --- p.6 / Chapter 2.2 --- Board Governance and Firm Performance --- p.6 / Chapter SECTION III --- : DATA AND METHODS --- p.7 / Chapter 3.1 --- Individual characteristics --- p.7 / Chapter 3.2 --- Board characteristics --- p.8 / Chapter 3.3 --- Firm characteristics --- p.10 / Chapter 3.4 --- Different foreign backgrounds --- p.10 / Chapter SECTION IV --- : EMPIRICAL RESULTS --- p.12 / Chapter 4.1 --- Board Meeting Attendance Problem and FBDs --- p.12 / Chapter 4.1.1 --- Regression analysis of absence ratio --- p.14 / Chapter 4.1.2 --- Regression analysis of the total absence ratio --- p.15 / Chapter 4.1.3 --- Conclusion on attendance problem and foreign backgrounds --- p.17 / Chapter 4.2 --- Probit Regression Analysis of Committee Assignments --- p.17 / Chapter 4.3 --- Regression Analysis of Senior Executives’ Compensation --- p.19 / Chapter 4.4 --- Regression Analysis of CEO Turnover Rate --- p.21 / Chapter 4.5 --- An Event Study: Cross-border Mergers & Acquisitions (M&A) Analysis --- p.23 / Chapter 4.6 --- Firm Performance Regression Analysis: FBDs and ROA --- p.26 / Chapter 4.7 --- Firm Performance Regression Analysis: Tobin’s Q and FBDs --- p.28 / Chapter SECTION V --- : SUMMARY --- p.29 / REFERENCES --- p.30 / FIGURES AND TABLES --- p.35
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The relationship between directors' remuneration and financial performance : an investigation into South African JSE-listed industrial firmsCrafford, Wessel Lourens 12 1900 (has links)
Thesis (MComm)--Stellenbosch University, 2015. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: For the past few decades the remuneration of directors has been in the spotlight,
especially in view of the corporate scandals that occurred around the turn of the 20th
century. Generally, managers need to manage firms in such a way that shareholders’
value is maximised. Unfortunately, shareholders of firms and the general public have
the perception that directors are over-compensated, and that there is no relationship
between the remuneration of directors and the financial performance of the firms to
enhance shareholders’ value. A lack of transparency, inadequate disclosure by firms
and remuneration committees’ conflict of interest are reasons cited for these
perceptions. Although South Africa is ranked as a global leader in terms of its corporate
governance practices, many firms still do not adhere to the King reports’ principles. This research study investigated whether a relationship exists between the
remuneration of directors and the financial performance of firms. The firms selected for
the study included both listed and delisted firms from the Industrial Sector of the
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) for the time period 2002 until 2010. Ninety-three
firms complied with the requirements to be included in the study. All these firms had
effective remuneration strategies in place to promote financial performance and growth
of the firms. Secondary data were collected for the nine consecutive years of the study
period, representing a period prior to substantial changes in accounting and disclosure
regulation that influenced the comparability of financial reporting of the firms. It is important to note that directors’ remuneration is not the only motivating factor for
firm performance, but one of many. Directors’ remuneration and incentives should be
optimally utilised to increase performance and growth in the firms, and it should not
merely be a case of directors being overcompensated for services rendered.
In order to operationalize directors’ remuneration, it was converted and subcategorised
into four variables. These dependent variables for directors’ remuneration
consisted of basic salary, bonuses (performance), gains on share purchases or share
options and what was termed as “other” remuneration. “Other” remuneration included
pension, medical, motor, and telephone allowances. To measure the financial
performance of the firms, the following market and accounting measures were
employed: turnover, earnings per share (EPS), total share return (TSR) and market
value added (MVA). Analysing these variables’ data by means of selected descriptive statistical measures and inferential regression analysis, it appeared that the data were
significantly skewed, but that financial performance of the firms was a strong
determinant of the change in directors’ remuneration.
Additional regression analyses were performed to investigate whether a lagged
relationship existed between the dependent variable, namely directors’ remuneration,
and the independent variables, as reflected by the various financial performance
measures. Results from these regression analyses strengthened the findings of the
study to show that a relationship existed between directors’ remuneration and the
financial performance of the firms investigated. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Direkteursvergoeding trek vir die afgelope paar dekades gereeld aandag, veral weens
die korporatiewe skandale wat aan die lig gekom het rondom ongeveer die
eeuwisseling. Normaalweg stel firmas direkteure aan om aandeelhouerswelvaart te
verhoog. Daar bestaan ongelukkig ʼn opvatting onder talle aandeelhouers asook die
algemene publiek dat direkteure oorbetaal word, en dat daar geen verwantskap
bestaan tussen direkteursvergoeding en die finansiële prestasie van firmas om
aandeelhouerswelvaart te verhoog nie. Redes wat aangevoer word vir hierdie sienings
sluit in die tekort aan deursigtigheid, onvoldoende openbaarmaking deur firmas en
vergoedingskomitees se botsende belange. Alhoewel Suid-Afrika geklassifiseer word
as ’n wêreldleier op die gebied van korporatiewe bestuur, is daar steeds firmas wat nie
voldoen aan die beginsels van die King-verslae nie. Hierdie navorsingstudie ondersoek die moontlike verwantskap tussen
direkteursvergoeding en die finansiële prestasie van firmas. Die geselekteerde firmas
vir die studie was genoteerde en voorheen-genoteerde firmas in die nywerheidsektor
op die Johannesburgse Aandelebeurs (JSE), vir die periode 2002 tot en met 2010.
Drie-en-negentig firmas het voldoen aan die vereistes om ingesluit te word in die
steekproef van die studie. Al die geselekteerde firmas het doeltreffende
vergoedingstrategieë in plek gehad om finansiële prestasie en groei in die firmas aan
te spoor. Sekondêre data is vir die nege agtereenvolgende jare van die studie
ingesamel. Veranderinge in regulasies voor en na die studieperiode het dit moeilik
gemaak om periodes buite hierdie tydgleuf vir vergelykingsdoeleindes in te sluit.
Dit is belangrik om daarop te let dat direkteursvergoeding nie die enigste faktor is wat
ʼn firma se finansiële prestasie kan beïnvloed nie, maar slegs een van vele. In die lig
hiervan, moet direkteursvergoeding en ander aansporingsmaatstawwe optimaal
gebruik word om finansiële prestasie in firmas aan te moedig. Om ʼn duideliker skets rakende direkteursvergoeding te verkry, is vergoeding
onderverdeel in vier sub-kategorieë veranderlikes. Die afhanklike veranderlikes van
direkteursvergoeding is soos volg geklassifiseer: basiese salaris, bonusse (prestasie),
opbrengste uit aandeelaankope en aandeleopsies en ʼn laaste kategorie wat as “ander”
vergoeding geklassifiseer is. Hierdie “ander” vergoedingskomponent het grootliks
bestaan uit pensioen- en mediese bydraes asook motor-, en telefoonvoordele. Ten einde die onafhanklike veranderlike, naamlik die finansiële prestasie van firmas,
te meet, is die volgende mark- en rekeningkundige maatstawwe gebruik: omset,
verdienste per aandeel (VPA), markwaarde toevoeging (MWT) en aandeelopbrengs.
Met die ontleding van al die veranderlikes het beskrywende statistiek en inferensiële
regressietoetse aangedui dat die data ʼn merkbare skewe verspreiding het, maar dat
finansiële prestasie in die firmas ʼn beduidende faktor was wanneer
direkteursvergoeding aangepas is.
Bykomende regressietoetse is gedoen om te ondersoek of daar vertragingstydperke
was tussen die afhanklike veranderlike, naamlik direkteursvergoeding, en die
onafhanklike veranderlike, finansiële prestasie van firmas. Hierdie toetse het die studie
se bevindinge bevestig dat daar inderdaad ʼn verwantskap bestaan tussen
direkteursvergoeding en die finansiële prestasie van firmas.
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Two essays on initial public offeringsYu, Lei, 于雷 January 2008 (has links)
published_or_final_version / Economics and Finance / Doctoral / Doctor of Philosophy
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Board independence, excess cash and corporate payout policy /Shan, Liwei. January 2006 (has links)
Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oregon, 2006. / Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 104-109). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users.
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Honey, Calpers shrank the board! and the choice of equity-selling mechanisms /Wu, Yi Lin. January 2001 (has links)
Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, Graduate School of Business, August 2001. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the Internet.
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Ownership and control of the largest Canadian owned corporations, 1979Antoniou, Andreas. January 1983 (has links)
This study analyzes ownership and directorship links among larger Canadian-owned corporations. These links have received insufficient attention from Canadian economists. It shows that these corporations did not undergo the radical changes predicted for their counterparts in other countries: proprietor ownership remains high, and the board of directors persists as the centre of power. / Ownership links form the basis for the development and empirical investigation of the "Shadow Group" concept. The taxonomical classification of shadow groups reveals complex structures accompanying diversification strategies. Interlocking directorships exist among "core" corporations inside the groups and are frequent between the shadow groups and the rest of the economy. / Shadow groups were at the heart of mergers and acquisitions between 1978 and 1981. A case study shows that external growth (especially takeovers) is their characteristic tactic for expansion. Hence, the necessity exists for amending economic theories to account for the behaviour of these groups.
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Korporatiewe bestuur en die demografiese profiel van nie-uitvoerende maatskappydirekteure in Suid-Afrika /Dippenaar, Annelene. January 2007 (has links)
Thesis (LLM)--University of Stellenbosch, 2007. / Bibliography. Also available via the Internet.
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