Thesis (Ph. D.)--Carleton University, 1992. / Also available in electronic format on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Hong Kong, 2010. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 207-220). Also available in print.

Thesis (M.A.)--Ohio University, November, 2004. / Title from PDF t.p. Includes bibliographical references (p.87-88)

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Hong Kong, 2010. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 207-220). Also available online.

This is a thesis about our basic moral equality as human beings: its meaning, its justification and its implications for our society. It offers the fundamental principles of how we are obligated to live together in a Society of Equals. Its major conclusions are as follows. First, whilst there is more than one meaning to the claim that 'we are one another's basic moral equals', the most important meaning for political philosophy is that each individual has Equal Authority. More specifically, each individual has fundamental authority over herself, and herself alone. Secondly, the justification of this fundamental authority over ourselves lies in our common limitation: we are all fallible. Further, we are not merely all fallible in the sense that any one of our beliefs could be false, but also in the sense that we have no non-circular way of judging the reliability of any of our beliefs. This aspect of our natural epistemic position justifies our equal, fundamental, practical authority over ourselves alone. Finally, the most important implication of this justification is that each individual's most basic reason for action is to promote not merely her own, but each and every individual's compliance with her fundamental authority over herself. It follows that each individual has decisive reason to constrain her own compliance with her own fundamental authority over herself, where necessary, to allow the equal promotion of someone else's compliance with her fundamental authority over herself. This principle is called 'Equal Respect'. Upon this principle of Equal Respect arises an architectonic System of Right, and correlative duties, that is called Equal Sovereignty. Under this system, our rights and duties with respect to one another are distributed in accordance with a hypothetical auction and insurance scheme to ensure that each individual is truly sovereign over their own equal share of the world.

No description available.

No description available.

This study explored the convergence between attributional egotism and felt injustice, and the consequences of these two constructs on subsequent reward allocations. Drawing from the work of Crosby (1984), Heider (1958), and Snyder, Stephan and Rosenfield (1978), it was contended that individuals who felt that they are victims of injustice use causal inferences similar to those characteristically employed for ego defense. This hypothesis was evaluated in an experimental paradigm which induced feelings of injustice and attributional egotism. Undergraduate participants (N=153) were provided with one of three descriptions of an experimental task. They were told that the task was used to assess the cognitive abilities of high school sophomores (a low prestige referent), college juniors (a high prestige referent), or merely that it was a standardized achievement test (control). Following this expectancy manipulation, subjects were given implicit success or failure feedback by being given an easy or difficult 30-minute task. When the 30-minutes had elapsed, subjects were asked to imagine that they were to provide feedback in the form of rewards to hypothetical students who had completed the same test the subject had just taken. Following the reward allocation exercise, subjects provided causal accounts for their performance and responded to a number of measures designed to assess their perceptions of the test and self-affect. Analyses revealed that the manipulations were successful, but that the attributional egotism and deprivation induction were of modest magnitude. Allocation policies across the six different conditions varied, in some cases supporting predictions, in others not. These findings support the contention that attributional defensiveness and deprivation are similar, but surprisingly show that enhancement biases and relative gratification can operate simultaneously. Discussion centered on the explanation of these findings and the implications for future research in this area. / Master of Science

Does choice excuse inequality? Some contemporary egalitarians – often referred to as “Luck Egalitarians” – believe it does. However, many seemingly chosen inequalities obtain between men and women as a group. A recent surge of empirical literature has sought to demonstrate the role that individual choice plays in producing and maintaining a subset of existing gender inequalities (e.g. the gender wage gap). This thesis considers the status of such inequalities in the context of the Luck Egalitarian project. More precisely, it considers whether the claim that choice excuses inequality is appropriate to the phenomenon of gendered choice. In Chapter 1, I argue that Luck Egalitarianism, as it currently stands, does not adequately deal with the topic of gendered choice. I maintain that this is due largely to the fact that it is not sufficiently attentive to the social forces shaping gendered choices (e.g. socialization, hostile social climates). In Chapter 2, I discuss whether attending more fully to factors that facilitate autonomy gives Luck Egalitarianism a way to incorporate a more robust discussion of gender into its account of responsible choice. I argue that contextualizing the choice/circumstance principle is the key to ensuring that it tracks truly autonomous choice, and avoids treating choices shaped by gender norms as justifiably disadvantage-conferring. In Chapter 3, I begin the project of articulating a set of background conditions against which we can deem choices authentic. I draw on feminist approaches to the philosophy of autonomy to inform this project. I come to the conclusion that choice excuses inequality only if such choices are made against conditions which actively work against gender-specific constraints on choice. / Graduate / 0422 / emma.e.byrnes@gmail.com

In the last four decades, luck egalitarianism has emerged as a hotly debated theory of distributive justice. The tenet, in its most normative sense, calls for distribution or assistance when circumstances of disadvantage arise from bad luck that is independent of human influence. Disadvantages that can be traced back to individual choice and responsibility, on the other hand, are left for the sufferer to bear. In this paper, I argue that luck egalitarianism should be abandoned as a standard for determining whether a disadvantage should be addressed, because the assumption that there are instances of disadvantage completely attributable to individual choice is flawed. Brute luck, or luck that emerges from beyond human control, influences most human outcomes, making it difficult to confidently attribute outcomes to option luck, or luck that stems from human choice. Without option luck, luck egalitarianism becomes obsolete as the principle rests on the distinction between brute and option luck.