This dissertation explores the role of information in justice, with an eye to taking choice seriously. Information is neither free nor ubiquitous, as has been obvious to economists for some time. Related puzzles are also prominent in epistemology and cognitive science, from framing effects to "fast and frugal heuristics". I import these concerns into distributive justice theory. One important goal of justice theory is to formulate what makes a socioeconomic institution just or unjust and provide criteria for judging whether one distribution of benefits and burdens is less unjust than another. Given the attention that voluntary choice has received in providing moral justification for unequal distributions, it is surprising that the related question of informed choice has been overlooked. Informed consent, for example, has more justificatory power than consent simpliciter. Information affects choice and choice affects outcomes. But if the costs and benefits of informing oneself are unknown to the agent before the point of choice but yet differ from agent to agent, then which allocation of information costs is just? This is a central question in this dissertation. Because the closest attempt to dealing with choices made under risk and uncertainty is Ronald Dworkin's brute/option luck distinction, I focus on option luck, framing distributive justice as interplay between process and pattern (chapter 2). I advance arguments for the following: option luck is insufficient for justice even if we presuppose ideal epistemic agents (chapter 3), how information is presented matters for justice between non-ideal epistemic agents (chapter 4), and informed choice requires cognitive fit between the agent and the agent's socioeconomic environment (chapter 5).I argue that Dworkin's hypothetical insurance market cannot guarantee any form of sufficientarianism even for affluent societies (chapter 6), proposing a different argument for sufficientarianism by combining (a) the perfect duty of beneficence with (b) the assumption that unfair disadvantages are unjust (chapter 7).I argue that the notion of option luck is ill-suited for cooperative contexts of socio-economic interactions (chapter 8) and outline how we could evaluate the justice of a given assignment of epistemic responsibilities, using buyer beware as a case study (chapter 9).

A recent movement within political philosophy called luck egalitarianism has attempted to synthesize the right’s regard for responsibility with the left’s concern for equality. The original motivation for subscribing to luck egalitarianism stems from the belief that one’s success in life ought to reflect one’s own choices and not brute luck. Luck egalitarian theorists differ in the decision procedures that they propose, but they share in common the general approach that we ought to equalize individuals with respect to brute luck so that differences in distribution are only a consequence of the responsible choices that individuals make. I intend to show that through the application of its own distributive procedures, the luck egalitarian approach actually undermines its original motivation by making the lives of individuals subject to brute luck.

This thesis is concerned with rights-based justifications for redistribution. Orthodox views are critically examined in three of the chapters. The case against fundamental moral rights to welfare, not derived from other more fundamental moral rights or principles, is pressed in chapter three. Chapter five distinguishes between rights-based and equality-based justifications for redistribution and argues that Ronald Dworkin's idea of a right to equal respect and concern is best understood as an equality-based justification. The enabling model of rights and deprivation is introduced in chapter six. This model says that liberty rights require that others ensure that the right-holder enjoys the means to do what he or she has the right to do as well as not interfere with him or her doing what he or she has the right to do. It is found to break down because it is unable to accommodate the right to do wrong. The other four chapters are concerned with defending an alternative model of rights and deprivation. The groundwork for this alternative model - the development model of rights and deprivation - is laid in chapters two and four. Chapter two presents a person-affecting theory of rights. The two principal conclusions of the development model of rights and deprivation are defended in chapter seven. It is argued, first, that from both of the abstract moral rights to liberty introduced in chapter four flow certain derivative rights against others to have one's needs met and, second, that the state is required to promote and protect particular forms of culture as well as to meet certain sorts of personal needs including special needs, collective needs, and the unmet personal needs that arise when the prevailing methods of meeting those needs breaks down. The final chapter discusses two general issues relating to the development model of rights and deprivation.

Public goods are goods that are non-rival and non-excludable. One person enjoying the benefits of a public good will not reduce the value of the good for others. And nobody within a particular population can be excluded from enjoying those benefits. While we often think of the relevant population being co-citizens of a state - national defence is taken to be the archetypal public good - in recent years the importance of public goods that benefit individuals across different countries has increasingly been recognised. We can refer to these as "global public goods". When global public goods are supplied, various costs and benefits are generated, and these costs and benefits can be shared among countries in different ways. This thesis explores how justice requires us to share them; I develop a theory of distributive justice for global public goods. I begin by developing two principles for assigning the costs and benefits of supplying public goods within a state, and then argue that these should, for the most part, also govern the distribution of costs and benefits arising from global public good production. Finally, I assess how certain private goods that the supply of public goods make possible should be shared among states. The fact that these goods rely for their production on the supply of global public goods, I argue, will affect the principles of distributive justice that should govern these.

Distributive justice in the health sector in the context of the rationalization of health care This paper should briefly introduce the major principle of health service in the Czech Republic but also practised in most developed countries. Distributive justice is a system of accumulating and redistributing wealth in order to seek balance in society. In health sector it is most commonly associated with rationing i.e. distribution of limited and costly medical sources among those who are in need of medical care in a justifiable way. Not to be mistaken distributive justice with social justice even though there is a fine line between the two. The thesis is divided into fifteen chapters each describing certain aspect of distributive justice in the health sector or a related issue. Opening chapters are dedicated to theoretical, historical and philosophical overview; following part contains single elements of distributive justice both in general and in context of health care. Issues of medical standards and regulatory charges are discussed in subsequent chapters with regard to recent case law of the Constitutional court. In conclusion the problem of distributive justice in health care can be approached from two different points - communitarian and liberal. These issues are also political, philosophical and...

Cette thèse propose une étude des partenariats pour le développement en prenant pour exemple le cas du partenariat entre l’Inde et le Sénégal. La revendication de bénéficies mutuelles se trouve au cœur de ce partenariat. L’Inde et le Sénégal étant deux démocraties vibrantes, nous pouvons supposer que les dits bénéfices ont pour finalité d’augmenter le bien-être des citoyens de ces deux pays. Ainsi, cette thèse se fonde sur l’étude du développement dans la mesure où il contribue à l’augmentation des capacités, de la liberté et des perspectives du peuple dans les deux pays étudiés (comme le définit Amartya Sen 1999, 2002). Basée sur ces hypothèses, la thèse pose la question suivante : « Un partenariat revendiquant des bénéfices mutuels peut-il conduire à un développement mutuel ?». Le corollaire induit par cette problématique questionne l’équité dans la distribution des bénéfices aux partenaires, c’est-à-dire, est ce que le partenariat est équitable et juste comme il se revendique ? L’étude des acteurs, des motivations, des moyens, des instruments, des méthodes, de la nature et des finalités de ce partenariat feront objet de cette thèse. La thèse conclue en indiquant que les divergences, erreurs, l’ignorance, la malhonnêteté et même l’identification peuvent créer des désaccords en contradiction avec le comportement juste en faveur du développement. Néanmoins, en s’appuyant sur le travail de Froese (2001), Nussbaum (2011), Rawls (1999), Rousseau (2012) et Tocqueville (1981) la thèse soutient que le développement mutuel et juste est en faveur de la poursuite du partenariat. / Taking cue from Rawls’s (2012) work on distributive justice, the thesis studies development partnership through the case study of India and Senegal. Mutual benefits have been asserted time and again as the core element of this partnership. Being two thriving democracies, it shall be assumed that the ultimate beneficiaries of the ‘intended benefits’ are to be the people of India and Senegal. Hence, in this thesis we choose to see development as it should enhance capability, freedom and opportunity (as put forward by Sen 1999, 2002) for the citizens of the two countries being studied. With such beliefs, the thesis is naturally centred on the question, “Can a relationship based on mutual benefits lead to mutual development?” An important corollary to the problematic is the equity in the distribution of benefits adhering to the partners’ i.e. whether at all the partnership is equal and faire as it is claimed to be? It is hence, worth studying the ‘who’, the ‘why’, the ‘how’ and the ‘what’ of this partnership through the actors, the motivations, the means, the methods, the nature and the ‘ends’ of it. The thesis argues strongly in favour of equity for fair and sustainable development. The thesis argues that discrepancies, errors, identification, unawareness and unethical behaviour might lead to distortions from just behaviour expected in favour of development. However, drawing on the works of Froese (2001), Nussbaum (2011), Rawls (1999), Rousseau (2012) and Tocqueville (1981) the thesis concludes that fair, mutual development would be in the favour of the partnership.

The thesis begins by asking why American tax policy is both attracted to and repelled by the idea of justice. Accepting the invitation of mid-twentieth-century economist Henry Simons to acknowledge that tax justice is a theological concept, the thesis seeks to excavate theological doctrines of taxation throughout Christian history in a way that can answer the presenting question. After analyzing the confusions in contemporary American tax policy (Chapter One), the thesis argues that Christian theology relativized property interests (the moral category most closely related to taxation). Taxation came to express different interests simultaneously and balanced them, while the idea of necessitas (need) emerged as the fulcrum of that balance (Chapter Two). The thesis develops the themes incipient in the early history by highlighting three salient theological moments. Thomas Aquinas clarified his predecessors' doctrines of property, resolving the tension between communal and private property through the interplay of natural and positive law (Chapter Three). In Thomas' account, the positive law of private ownership yields to the natural law substrate of communal property at the boundary between need and superabundance. Taxation can serve to implement that balance. The redistributive logic of Martin Luther's thinking extended to his political theology, as most clearly expressed in his "Preface to the Ordinance of a Common Chest" (Chapter Four), while John Calvin invoked the idea that economic inequality puts in motion both the circulation of goods and the need for redistribution of resources (Chapter Five). By way of conclusion, the thesis suggests a possible narrative connecting early modern to contemporary views on taxation. In the theological account, taxation's balancing function "legitimates" it. Modern tax theory, on the other hand, represents in some ways a return to the Greco-Roman model of tax "justification" instead of legitimacy.

In order to solve the NBM Nash formulates an optimization problem. The unique solution of this problem is the famous Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS). We revise this optimization problem and supplement some new selection criteria of profit allocation to develop some bargaining mechanisms appropriate for the two situations of our model respectively. Each bargaining mechanism offers the alliance one, two, or several reasonable profit distribution(s) which can be selected by these two parties. Subsequently for any situation we propose some novel dynamic programming algorithms with respect to several specific utility function structures involving job schedules respectively to implement those relevant mechanisms in pseudo-polynomial time. / In this dissertation we investigate a new cooperative game model, where two parties comprise an alliance to process a number of jobs offered by a customer and bargain about a reasonable processing profit distribution determined by a two-partition of these jobs. / In this model the non-negative integer-valued parameters of each job, which are the basic assumptions in traditional discrete scheduling models, are still adopted. We also assume each job is non-preemptive. Any party's utility function of the two-partition of these jobs does not possess any elegant continuous or concave property which is critical for the original Nash Bargaining Model (NBM), and furthermore we are only concerned with the integer-valued utility function. Consequently these assumptions result in a new discrete variation of the NBM. In this dissertation we highlight an important special case of our model, where after a two-partition of these jobs is given, each party's utility of processing the jobs assigned to him is related with an optimal schedule of these jobs which minimizes a cost (penalty) function. / This new model is motivated at least by the following real world phenomenon: after two manufacturers have jointly contracted with a customer for processing a number of jobs owing to their insufficient operation facilities, these two par ties need to negotiate a two-partition of these jobs to obtain a profit distribution acceptable for each one. In this dissertation we consider two situations of this model. In the first situation these two parties basically possess the same bargaining power. In the second situation one party possesses the greater bargaining power and can design some bargaining mechanisms more beneficial for himself attributed to his more operation techniques or facilities than the other's. / Chen, Quanle. / "November 2006." / Adviser: Xiaogiang Cai. / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 68-08, Section: B, page: 5489. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 150-153). / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Electronic reproduction. [Ann Arbor, MI] : ProQuest Information and Learning, [200-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / School code: 1307.

The modern principle of freedom of subjectivity sets a moral standard which radically departs from Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean: modern moral agents, exemplified by the rising middle class, are granted the right to develop extreme dispositions towards goods like honour and wealth. Given that Aristotle considers such goods divisible in the sense that when one person gets more another gets less―the basic definition of distributive injustice―it isn’t surprising that modern philosophers like Kant have trouble reconciling this right with duty to others. Failing to resolve this dilemma satisfactorily in ethical terms, Kant and others turn to aesthetics, but Kant, at least, takes no account there of moral agents’ interest in the actual existence of goods. In this respect, the alternative to the Kantian aesthetic response I document in my dissertation is more Stoic than modern. This response, the modern mediocre-artist narrative, features a mediocre artist who fails to achieve the new standard of distributive justice and a genius who ostensibly succeeds. Though other critics discuss the ethical dimension of mediocre-artist narratives, they don’t consider the possibility that the mediocre artist’s failure might be due to the ethical dilemma just described. They therefore tend to uphold uncritically the narratives’ negative judgments of mediocrity, ascribing the latter’s failure to egotism. By contrast, I examine the genius’ artistic efforts for evidence of a similar failure. Ultimately, I demonstrate that the genius does indeed fail, albeit less spectacularly, arguing on this basis that egotistical characterizations of mediocrity are unjust. But the mediocre aren’t the only victims: in “concealing” genius’ failure, mediocre-artist narratives ignore unmet claims on its fruits. Finally, I invoke Derrida’s notion of the “lesser violence” to outline a new genre that recognizes the unattainability of the modern standard of justice. I call this genre morally progressive, rejecting Jürgen Habermas’ view that freedom of subjectivity has hit a dead end, and that we must backtrack to a philosophical turning indicated but not taken by Hegel, namely, the path of intersubjective freedom.

In this study, procedural justice, distributive justice and performance appraisal values to explore and understand the workplace in organizational justice (procedural justice, distributive justice) and the degree of emphasis on the staff performance appraisal values to job involvement and supervisory trust¡¦s influence, in addition, recognized individuals in their work performance evaluation of values, procedural justice, distributive justice, supervisory trust and job involvement are also included in the scope of regulation. The design of this questionnaire is divided into two parts, first part was in charge of the staff performance appraisal to the implementation of the program is consistent with principles of procedural fairness, the respective high and low procedural justice two kinds of situations. The second part of the assessment results for the charge of the staff can feel a fair, competent staff there to the list of recommended salary increases for the results of the judgments of the respective high and low equity allocation of a fair distribution of two kinds of situations. By these two factors, staggered to form four kinds of different situations, but the questionnaire asked the same item. The 242 valid questionnaires were collected, results are as follows: 1. High attention to performance appraisal values of person who cares about the fairness of the process and the fairness of reward distribution, shown more positive behavior and attitude that is a geometric results and paid, so the relative level of pay and the investment will more. 2. Whether it is good for promotion or pay less attention to whether or not the person is on the results than those who do not care if the charge given to the fairness of the competition, will have the role of subordinates have incentives, in turn will increase its performance. 3. Competent to conduct any type of operation regardless of behavior would have on our high importance for the performance assessment process, people will have a better work attitude and output, and will not be competent to act and change the emphasis on performance assessment for high allocation of resources of people, but no obvious effect. 4. In the high attention to procedural justice, distributive justice values in the trust's impact on the charge of little, and in the low distributive justice in the gap produced significant effects.