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  • About
  • The Global ETD Search service is a free service for researchers to find electronic theses and dissertations. This service is provided by the Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations.
    Our metadata is collected from universities around the world. If you manage a university/consortium/country archive and want to be added, details can be found on the NDLTD website.
1

Dynamic Games and Multiobjective Optimization applied to designing Sustainable Urban Neighbourhoods

Vanin, Daniel 11 January 2013 (has links)
This thesis intends to utilize mathematical models for testing the development of sustainable urban neighbourhoods and analyze the impact of these developments at city level using dynamic and multiobjective optimization techniques. These techniques aim to monitor and lower urban carbon emission levels, while predicting the municipality’s projected tax revenues. This study shows how multiple decision making models can operate and re- late to help analyze the implementation of a sustainable neighbourhood design in a mid-size urban area.
2

Evolutionary finance and dynamic games

Xu, Le January 2010 (has links)
Evolutionary finance studies financial markets from an evolutionary point of view. A financial market can be interpreted in the context of its evolution: it can be understood as a dynamical system in which frequently interacting investment strategies compete for market capital. We are mainly interested in the long-run performance of investment strategies. This thesis explores the "Darwinian theory" of portfolio selection. An asset market can be modelled by a game-theoretic evolutionary model in which asset prices are endogenously determined by market clearing condition. A general version of the Kelly rule is shown to allow an investor to "survive" in the asset market. We then investigate the stochastic model with independent and identical distributed states of the world from a different, game-theoretic, angle and examine Nash equilibrium strategies, satisfying equilibrium conditions with probability one. Evolutionary finance and asset market games also provide new angles to present fundamental facts of capital growth theory. Relations between financial growth and the property of "survival" of investment strategies are established in the market selection process.
3

Essays in Dynamic Games

Ishii, Yuhta 06 June 2014 (has links)
This dissertation presents three independent essays. Chapter 1, which is joint work with Mira Frick, studies a model of innovation adoption by a large population of long-lived consumers who face stochastic opportunities to adopt an innovation of uncertain quality. We study how the potential for social learning in an economy affects consumers' informational incentives and how these in turn shape the aggregate adoption dynamics of an innovation. For a class of Poisson learning processes, we establish the existence and uniqueness of equilibria. In line with empirical findings, equilibrium adoption patterns are either S-shaped or feature successions of concave bursts. In the former case, our analysis predicts a novel saturation effect: Due to informational free-riding, increased opportunities for social learning necessarily lead to temporary slow-downs in learning and do not produce welfare gains. / Economics
4

Competition and dynamics in healthcare markets

Alam, Rubaiyat 22 March 2024 (has links)
In Chapter 1, I describe the hospice industry in California and highlight the key institutional details, then estimate a structural model of hospice choice by patients. Hospices are firms that give palliative care to dying patients. There is no price competition because Medicare pays hospices a fixed per-day rate for each patient, so hospices compete on reputation. I define a hospice's reputation as a stock of its past quality choices. Thus, a hospice can build up its reputation stock over time by consistently choosing high quality. The reputation stock also partially depreciates every period, meaning that a hospice which repeatedly shirks on quality will lose its reputation over time. To study reputation and hospice choice in this setting, I build and estimate a demand model of hospices using yearly hospice-level data from California for 2002-2018. Each consumer makes a discrete choice from a set of hospices in her market, taking into account hospices' reputations and characteristics. The demand estimates show that reputation plays a significant role in consumer choice and depreciates at an annual rate of 53%. In Chapter 2, I build a dynamic oligopoly model of hospices choosing quality to compete on reputation against rivals. This is used to recover the hospice cost function. I use my model and estimates to conduct the following policy counterfactuals. As reputation becomes more persistent - for instance, through the creation of an online hospice rating system - hospices choose higher quality. Hospices also choose higher quality as Medicare prices increase, but the response depends on how differentiated they are in characteristics from rivals. Finally, a hybrid per-day per-visit hospice reimbursement scheme achieves the same quality with nearly 30% lower spending than the current per-day Medicare scheme. In Chapter 3 (joint work with Rena Conti), we study market dynamics in the pharmaceutical industry after loss of market exclusivity by a branded drug. Branded drug manufacturers often respond to generic entry by releasing an Authorized Generic (AG), which is chemically identical to the branded drug but without the brand label attached. This is used to price discriminate between consumers, with the branded drug charging high price and AG charging low price to compete with generics. Using total drug sales and revenue data on US for 2004-2016, we build a stylized structural model to study entry and pricing decisions. We estimate a random-coefficients discrete choice demand model and find significant heterogeneity in brand valuation and price sensitivity among consumers. Then we build a dynamic structural model of generic entry, AG release, and pricing. Combined with calibrated entry-cost parameters, this is used to conduct policy counterfactuals. First, we study the impact of various demand-side policies (such as improving consumer valuation of non-branded drugs and increasing price-sensitivity) on market outcomes. Second, we show that a faster generic approval rate leads to greater generic entry, lower likelihood of AG being released, and lower prices. Third, we find that banning AGs leads to greater generic entry but also higher industry prices overall.
5

Three Essays on Analyses of Marine Resources Management with Micro-data

Huang, Ling January 2009 (has links)
<p>Chapter 1: Although there are widely accepted theoretical explanations for overexploitation of common-pool resources, empirically we have limited information about the micro-level mechanisms that cause individually efficient exploitation to result in macro inefficiency. This paper conducts the first empirical investigation of common-pool resource users' dynamic and strategic behavior at the micro level. With an application to the North Carolina shrimp fishery, we examine fishermen's strategies in a fully dynamic game that accounts for latent resource dynamics and other players' actions. Combining a simulation-based Conditional Choice Probability estimator and a Pseudo Maximum Likelihood estimator, we recover the profit structure of the fishery from fishermen's repeated choices. Using the estimated structural parameters, we compare the fishermen's actual exploitation path to the socially optimal one under a time-specific limited entry system with transferrable permits, and then quantify the dynamic efficiency costs of common-pool resource use. We find that individual fishermen respond to other users by exerting a higher level of exploitation effort than what is socially optimal. Based on our counterfactual experiments, we estimate the efficiency costs of this behavior to be 17.39\% of the annual revenues from the fishery, which translates into 31.4\% of the rent without deducting the cost of capital. </p><p>Chapter 2: Although hypoxia is a threat to coastal ecosystems, policy makers have limited information about the potential economic impacts on fisheries. Studies using spatially and temporally aggregated data generally fail to detect statistically significant fishery effects of hypoxia. Limited recent work using disaggregated fishing data (microdata) reports modest effects of hypoxia on catches of recreationally harvested species. These prior studies have not accounted for important spatial and temporal aspects of the system, however. For example, the effects of hypoxia on catches may not materialize instantaneously but instead may involve a lagged process with catches reflecting cumulative past exposure to environmental conditions. This paper develops a differenced bioeconomic model to account for the lagged effects of hypoxia on the North Carolina brown shrimp fishery. It integrates high-resolution oxygen monitoring data with fishery-dependent microdata from North Carolina's trip ticket program to investigate the detailed spatial and temporal relationships of hypoxia to commercial fishery harvest. The main finding is that hypoxia potentially resulted in a 12.9\% annual decrease in brown shrimp harvest from 1999-2005. The paper also develops two alternative models---a non-differenced model and a polynomial distributed lag model---and results are consistent with the main model.</p><p>Chapter 3: The emergence of ecosystem-based management suggests that traditional fisheries</p><p>management and protection of environmental quality are increasingly interrelated. Fishery managers, however, have limited control over most sources of marine and estuarine pollution and at best can only adapt to environmental conditions. We develop a bioeconomic model of optimal harvest of an annual species that is subject to an environmental disturbance. We parameterize the model to analyze the effect of hypoxia (low dissolved oxygen) on the optimal harvest path of brown shrimp, a commercially important species that is fished in hypoxic waters in the Gulf of Mexico and in estuaries in the southeastern United States. We find that hypoxia alters the qualitative pattern of optimal harvest and shifts the season opening earlier in the year; more severe hypoxia leads to even earlier season openings. However, the quantitative effects of adapting fishery management to hypoxia in terms of fishery rents are small. This suggests that it is critical for other regulatory agencies to control estuarine pollution, and fishery managers need to generate value from the fishery resources through other means such as rationalization.</p> / Dissertation
6

Essays in Industrial Organization and Econometrics

Blevins, Jason Ryan January 2010 (has links)
<p>This dissertation consists of three chapters relating to</p> <p>identification and inference in dynamic microeconometric models</p> <p>including dynamic discrete games with many players, dynamic games with</p> <p>discrete and continuous choices, and semiparametric binary choice and</p> <p>duration panel data models.</p> <p>The first chapter provides a framework for estimating large-scale</p> <p>dynamic discrete choice models (both single- and multi-agent models)</p> <p>in continuous time. The advantage of working in continuous time is</p> <p>that state changes occur sequentially, rather than simultaneously,</p> <p>avoiding a substantial curse of dimensionality that arises in</p> <p>multi-agent settings. Eliminating this computational bottleneck is</p> <p>the key to providing a seamless link between estimating the model and</p> <p>performing post-estimation counterfactuals. While recently developed</p> <p>two-step estimation techniques have made it possible to estimate</p> <p>large-scale problems, solving for equilibria remains computationally</p> <p>challenging. In many cases, the models that applied researchers</p> <p>estimate do not match the models that are then used to perform</p> <p>counterfactuals. By modeling decisions in continuous time, we are able</p> <p>to take advantage of the recent advances in estimation while</p> <p>preserving a tight link between estimation and policy experiments. We</p> <p>also consider estimation in situations with imperfectly sampled data,</p> <p>such as when we do not observe the decision not to move, or when data</p> <p>is aggregated over time, such as when only discrete-time data are</p> <p>available at regularly spaced intervals. We illustrate the power of</p> <p>our framework using several large-scale Monte Carlo experiments.</p> <p>The second chapter considers semiparametric panel data binary choice</p> <p>and duration models with fixed effects. Such models are point</p> <p>identified when at least one regressor has full support on the real</p> <p>line. It is common in practice, however, to have only discrete or</p> <p>continuous, but possibly bounded, regressors. We focus on</p> <p>identification, estimation, and inference for the identified set in</p> <p>such cases, when the parameters of interest may only be partially</p> <p>identified. We develop a set of general results for</p> <p>criterion-function-based estimation and inference in partially</p> <p>identified models which can be applied to both regular and irregular</p> <p>models. We apply our general results first to a fixed effects binary</p> <p>choice panel data model where we obtain a sharp characterization of</p> <p>the identified set and propose a consistent set estimator,</p> <p>establishing its rate of convergence under different conditions.</p> <p>Rates arbitrarily close to <italic>n<super>-1/3</super></italic> are</p> <p>possible when a continuous, but possibly bounded, regressor is</p> <p>present. When all regressors are discrete the estimates converge</p> <p>arbitrarily fast to the identified set. We also propose a</p> <p>subsampling-based procedure for constructing confidence regions in the</p> <p>models we consider. Finally, we carry out a series of Monte Carlo</p> <p>experiments to illustrate and evaluate the proposed procedures. We</p> <p>also consider extensions to other fixed effects panel data models such</p> <p>as binary choice models with lagged dependent variables and duration</p> <p>models.</p> <p>The third chapter considers nonparametric identification of dynamic</p> <p>games of incomplete information in which players make both discrete</p> <p>and continuous choices. Such models are commonly used in applied work</p> <p>in industrial organization where, for example, firms make discrete</p> <p>entry and exit decisions followed by continuous investment decisions.</p> <p>We first review existing identification results for single agent</p> <p>dynamic discrete choice models before turning to single-agent models</p> <p>with an additional continuous choice variable and finally to</p> <p>multi-agent models with both discrete and continuous choices. We</p> <p>provide conditions for nonparametric identification of the utility</p> <p>function in both cases.</p> / Dissertation
7

Applications of Hybrid Dynamical Systems to Dynamics of Equilibrium Problems

Greenhalgh, Scott 05 September 2012 (has links)
Many mathematical models generally consist of either a continuous system like that of a system of differential equations, or a discrete system such as a discrete game theoretic model; however, there exist phenomena in which neither modeling approach alone is sufficient for capturing the behaviour of the intended real world system. This leads to the need to explore the use of combinations of such discrete and continuous processes, namely the use of mathematical modeling with what are known as hybrid dynamical systems. In what follows, we provide a blueprint for one approach to study several classes of equilibrium problems in non-equilibrium states through the direct use of hybrid dynamical systems. The motivation of our work stems from the fact that the real world is rarely, if ever, in a state of perfect equilibrium and that the behaviour of equilibrium problems in non-equilibrium states is just as complex and interesting (if not more so) than standard equilibrium solutions. Our approach consists of an association of classes of traffic equilibrium problems, noncooperative games, minimization problems, and complementarity problems to a class of hybrid dynamical system called projected dynamical systems. The purposed connection between equilibrium problems and projected dynamical system is made possible through mutual connections to the robust framework of variational inequalities. The results of our work include theoretical contributions such as showing how evolution solutions (non-equilibrium solutions) can be analyzed from a theoretical point of view and how they relate to equilibrium solutions; computational methods for tracking and visualizing evolution solutions and the development of numerical algorithms for simulation; and applications such as the effect of population vaccination decisions in the spread of infectious disease, dynamic traffic networks, dynamic vaccination games, and nonsmooth electrical circuits.
8

Jeux dynamiques relatifs au changement climatique / Dynamic games relative to climate change

Dullieux, Rémy 07 June 2013 (has links)
La thèse est consacrée à l'étude de jeux dynamiques dans le domaine climatique. Pour lutter contre l'accumulation de gaz à effet de serre dans l'atmosphère, la mise en place d'une taxe carbone est une solution possible. Toutefois on suppose ici que cette taxe carbone a pour les pays consommateurs d'énergie fossile des motivations qui ne se limitent pas à l'internalisation du dommage environnemental : il s'agit par un comportement stratégique d'essayer de capturer une partie de la rente des producteurs. On aboutit à la possibilité d'une taxe carbone à finalité Pigouvienne mais aussi stratégique. Des jeux dynamiques non coopératifs entre pays producteurs supposés cartellisés et pays consommateurs supposés également cartellisés peuvent être alors être envisagés dans ce contexte. Une littérature de jeux différentiels non coopératifs s'est d'ailleurs développée depuis une vingtaine d'années autour de cette idée d'une taxe carbone à visée stratégique. Dans l'introduction on rappelle le cadre économique de ces jeux, leur cadre analytique (jeux différentiels) et la littérature théorique afférente. On présente trois jeux qui forment le corps de la thèse. Chacun des trois chapitres suivants est consacré à un jeu différentiel original. Le premier jeu est un jeu non coopératif entre un bloc de consommateurs et un bloc de producteurs avec un plafond de pollution comme contrainte environnementale principale. L'existence de ce plafond modifie les conclusions classiques de ce type de jeu. Dans le deuxième jeu il y a également un jeu non coopératif entre un bloc de consommateurs (pays riches) et un bloc de producteurs mais il y a en plus un second bloc de consommateurs (pays pauvres et émergents), qui ne joue pas dans le jeu mais met en place la taxe carbone résultant à chaque instant du jeu en contrepartie d'un transfert de la part du premier bloc de consommateurs. Il apparaît que sous certaines conditions le second bloc a intérêt à ce schéma « taxe carbone contre transfert ». Dans le troisième jeu il y a aussi deux zones de consommation mais elles jouent maintenant un jeu non coopératif entre elles, les producteurs étant passifs. Il y a une taxe carbone par bloc et pas mondiale et pourtant le jeu fait apparaître sous certaines conditions une situation meil1eure pour les blocs de consommation qu'une situation de passivité face aux producteurs. La conclusion d'ensemble de ces trois jeux est que sous certaines conditions les pays consommateurs peuvent avoir intérêt à un comportement stratégique et pas seulement Pigouvien en matière de taxe carbone. / The world we are in : dynamic games relative to climate change. In these games the setting up of a carbon tax has Pigouvian grounds (to take into account the damage resulting of the accumulation of Green House Gas in the atmosphere due to the consumption of fossil energy) but it has also other aims that are strategic. For fossil energy consuming countries, indeed, a carbon tax can be a way to "eat" a part of the producing countries' rent. Then the resulting carbon tax has a Pigouvian part but also a strategic part. The literature developed during the last twenty years in this field is all about non cooperative games between an area of cartelized consuming countries and an area of cartelized producing countries. In the introduction, we lay out the economic framework of this type of games, their analytical framework (differential games) and the theoretical literature. Then the three original games that make up the bulk of the present work are introduced. Each of the three following chapters is devoted to one of these three games. The first one is a non-cooperative game between an area of consuming countries and an area of producing countries but with an upper limit of atmospheric carbon concentration as the main environmental constraint. This new type of constraint changes the classical results of this type of game. The second one is also a non-cooperative game between an area of consuming countries (here the old rich countries) and an area of producing countries but there is also another area of consuming countries (poor and emergent countries) that does not play the game while it sets up the tax resulting of the game. The setting up of such a tax in this area is the consequence of a transfer from the other consuming area. The conclusion is that under specific conditions this area (but also the financing area) wins some welfare in this framework versus a passive behavior in front of the producers. In the last game, there are also two consuming areas but now they play a non-cooperative game between themselves, while the producing area is passive. In consequence there is not a worldwide carbon tax but two regional carbon taxes. However, under some specific conditions, this framework is better for the two consuming areas than the passive attitude in front of the producers. The main conclusion of the three games is that in some circumstances the consuming countries can get some extra welfare from a strategic stance when setting up a carbon tax.
9

Essays on Economic Decision Making

Lee, Dongwoo 17 May 2019 (has links)
This dissertation focuses on exploring individual and strategic decision problems in Economics. I take a different approach in each chapter to capture various aspects of decision problems. An overview of this dissertation is provided in Chapter 1. Chapter 2 studies an individual's decision making in extensive-form games under ambiguity when the individual is ambiguous about an opponent's moves. In this chapter, a player follows Choquet Expected Utility preferences, since the standard Expected Utility cannot explain the situations of ambiguity. I raise the issue that dynamically inconsistent decision making can be derived in extensive-form games with ambiguity. To cope with this issue, this chapter provides sufficient conditions to recover dynamic consistency. Chapter 3 analyzes the strategic decision making in signaling games when a player makes an inference about hidden information from the behavioral hypothesis. The Hypothesis Testing Equilibrium (HTE) is proposed to provide an explanation for posterior beliefs from the player. The notion of HTE admits belief updates for all events including zero-probability events. In addition, this chapter introduces well-motivated modifications of HTE. Finally, Chapter 4 examines a boundedly rational individual who considers selective attributes when making a decision. It is assumed that the individual focuses on a subset of attributes that stand out from a choice set. The selective attributes model can accommodate violations of choice axioms of Independence from Irrelevant Alternative (IIA) and Regularity. / Doctor of Philosophy / This dissertation focuses on exploring individual and strategic decision problems in Economics. I take a different approach in each chapter to capture various aspects of decision problem. An overview of this dissertation is provided in Chapter 1. Chapter 2 studies an individual’s decision making in extensive-form games under ambiguity. Ambiguity describes the situation in which the information available to a decision maker is too imprecise to be summarized by a probability measure (Epstein, 1999). It is known that ambiguity causes dynamic inconsistency between ex-ante and interim decision making. This chapter provides sufficient conditions under which dynamic consistency is maintained. Chapter 3 analyzes the strategic decision making in signaling games in which there are two players: informed sender and uninformed receiver. The sender has a private information about his type and the receiver makes an inference about hidden information. This chapter suggests a notion of the Hypothesis Testing Equilibrium (HTE), which provides an alternative explanation for the receiver’s beliefs. The idea of the HTE can be used as a refinement of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) in signaling games to cope with the known limitations of PBE. Finally, Chapter 4 examines a boundedly rational individual who considers only salient attributes when making a decision. The individual considers an attribute only when it stands out enough in a choice set. The selective attribute model can accommodate violations of choice axioms of Independence from Irrelevant Alternative (IIA) and Regularity.
10

Essays on coordination problems in economics

Pereira, Ana Elisa Gonçalves 24 June 2016 (has links)
Submitted by Ana Elisa Gonçalves Pereira (anaelisagpereira@gmail.com) on 2016-07-15T20:58:30Z No. of bitstreams: 1 tese_biblio.pdf: 1099623 bytes, checksum: 3fae0f61b515374855a0c7773cd4cb47 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Suzinei Teles Garcia Garcia (suzinei.garcia@fgv.br) on 2016-07-18T12:03:10Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 tese_biblio.pdf: 1099623 bytes, checksum: 3fae0f61b515374855a0c7773cd4cb47 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-07-18T13:39:54Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 tese_biblio.pdf: 1099623 bytes, checksum: 3fae0f61b515374855a0c7773cd4cb47 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-06-24 / There are several economic situations in which an agent’s willingness to take a given action is increasing in the amount of other agents who are expected to do the same. These kind of strategic complementarities often lead to multiple equilibria. Moreover, the outcome achieved by agents’ decentralized decisions may be inefficient, leaving room for policy interventions. This dissertation analyzes different environments in which coordination among individuals is a concern. The first chapter analyzes how information manipulation and disclosure affect coordination and welfare in a bank-run model. There is a financial regulator who cannot credibly commit to reveal the situation of the banking sector truthfully. The regulator observes banks’ idiosyncratic information (through a stress test, for example) and chooses whether to disclose it to the public or only to release a report on the health of the entire financial system. The aggregate report may be distorted at a cost – higher cost means higher credibility. Investors are aware of the regulator’s incentives to conceal bad news from the market, but manipulation may still be effective. If the regulator’s credibility is not too low, the disclosure policy is state-contingent and there is always a range of states in which there is information manipulation in equilibrium. If credibility is low enough, the regulator opts for full transparency, since opacity would trigger a systemic run no matter the state. In this case only the most solid banks survive. The level of credibility that maximizes welfare from an ex ante perspective is interior. The second and the third chapters study coordination problems in dynamic environments. The second chapter analyzes welfare in a setting where agents receive random opportunities to switch between two competing networks. It shows that whenever the intrinsically worst one prevails, this is efficient. In fact, a central planner would be even more inclined towards the worst option. Inefficient shifts to the intrinsically best network might occur in equilibrium. When there are two competing standards or networks of different qualities, if everyone were to opt for one of them at the same time, the efficient solution would be to choose the best one. However, when there are timing frictions and agents do not switch from one option to another all at once, the efficient solution differs from conventional wisdom. The third chapter analyzes a dynamic coordination problem with staggered decisions where agents are ex ante heterogeneous. We show there is a unique equilibrium, which is characterized by thresholds that determine the choices of each type of agent. Although payoffs are heterogeneous, the equilibrium features a lot of conformity in behavior. Equilibrium vii thresholds for different types of agents partially coincide as long as there exists a set of beliefs that would make this coincidence possible. However, the equilibrium strategies never fully coincide. Moreover, we show conformity is not inefficient. In the efficient solution, agents follow others even more often than in the decentralized equilibrium. / No estudo da economia, há diversas situações em que a propensão de um indivíduo a tomar determinada ação é crescente na quantidade de outras pessoas que este indivíduo acredita que tomarão a mesma ação. Esse tipo de complementaridade estratégica geralmente leva à existência de múltiplos equilíbrios. Além disso, o resultado atingido pelas decisões decentralizadas dos agentes pode ser ineficiente, deixando espaço para intervenções de política econômica. Esta tese estuda diferentes ambientes em que a coordenação entre indivíduos é importante. O primeiro capítulo analisa como a manipulação de informação e a divulgação de informação afetam a coordenação entre investidores e o bem-estar em um modelo de corridas bancárias. No modelo, há uma autoridade reguladora que não pode se comprometer a revelar a verdadeira situação do setor bancário. O regulador observa informações idiossincráticas dos bancos (através de um stress test, por exemplo) e escolhe se revela essa informação para o público ou se divulga somente um relatório agregado sobre a saúde do sistema financeiro como um todo. O relatório agregado pode ser distorcido a um custo – um custo mais elevado significa maior credibilidade do regulador. Os investidores estão cientes dos incentivos do regulador a esconder más notícias do mercado, mas a manipulação de informação pode, ainda assim, ser efetiva. Se a credibilidade do regulador não for muito baixa, a política de divulgação de informação é estado-contingente, e existe sempre um conjunto de estados em que há manipulação de informação em equilíbrio. Se a credibilidade for suficientemente baixa, porém, o regulador opta por transparência total dos resultados banco-específicos, caso em que somente os bancos mais sólidos sobrevivem. Uma política de opacidade levaria a uma crise bancária sistêmica, independentemente do estado. O nível de credibilidade que maximiza o bem-estar agregado do ponto de vista ex ante é interior. O segundo e o terceiro capítulos estudam problemas de coordenação dinâmicos. O segundo capítulo analisa o bem-estar em um ambiente em que agentes recebem oportunidades aleatórias para migrar entre duas redes. Os resultados mostram que sempre que a rede de pior qualidade (intrínseca) prevalece, isto é eficiente. Na verdade, um planejador central estaria ainda mais inclinado a escolher a rede de pior qualidade. Em equilíbrio, pode haver mudanças ineficientes que ampliem a rede de qualidade superior. Quando indivíduos escolhem entre dois padrões ou redes com níveis de qualidade diferentes, se todos os indivíduos fizessem escolhas simultâneas, a solução eficiente seria que todos adotassem a rede de melhor qualidade. No entanto, quando há fricções e os agentes tomam decisões escalonadas, a solução eficiente difere ix do senso comum. O terceiro capítulo analisa um problema de coordenação dinâmico com decisões escalonadas em que os agentes são heterogêneos ex ante. No modelo, existe um único equilíbrio, caracterizado por thresholds que determinam as escolhas para cada tipo de agente. Apesar da heterogeneidade nos payoffs, há bastante conformidade nas ações individuais em equilíbrio. Os thresholds de diferentes tipos de agentes coincidem parcialmente contanto que exista um conjunto de crenças arbitrário que justifique esta conformidade. No entanto, as estratégias de equilíbrio de diferentes tipos nunca coincidem totalmente. Além disso, a conformidade não é ineficiente. A solução eficiente apresentaria estratégias ainda mais similares para tipos distintos em comparação com o equilíbrio decentralizado.

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