Chapter 1: Tradable Permits under Environmental and Cost-reducing R&D: This chapter models simultaneous investments in both environmental and cost-reducing R&D by asymmetric Cournot duopolist. Pollution rights (emission permits) are allocated by the regulator and can be traded between firms. Both R&D competition and cooperation are considered. In a three-stage game, firms first invest in R&D, then trade permits, and then compete in output. The strategic interaction between different types of R&D investments is analyzed. It is found that giving more permits to one firm induces it to conduct more cost-reducing but less environmental R&D. The second-best optimal allocation of pollution rights is also analyzed. This allocation matters for social welfare under R&D competition, but is irrelevant under R&D cooperation. Moreover, the optimal allocation depends on R&D spillovers. This paper also studies the grandfathering of permits based on historical output. Compared with the second-best optimal allocation, the higher the emissions reduction level, the more likely that grandfathering allocates too few permits to the large firm and too many permits to the small firm. Adding an R&D budget constraint leads firms to under-invest in cost-reducing R&D relative to environmental R&D. Chapter 2: Tradable Permits under Environmental R&D between Upstream and Downstream Industries: This chapter models the simultaneous investments in environmental R&D by both downstream and upstream industries, with two symmetric firms within each industry competing à la Cournot. Pollution rights are allocated by the regulator, and firms can trade permits. R&D competition, intra-industry (horizontal), inter-industry (vertical) and both intra- and inter-industry (generalized) R&D cooperations are considered. In a four-stage game, firms first invest in R&D, then trade permits, then upstream firms compete in intermediate good production, and finally downstream firms compete in final food production. The strategic interactions between R&D investments are analyzed. It is found that an increase in either vertical or horizontal R&D spillovers reduce the permit price but increase production, but the spillover effects on R&D investments are ambiguous and they depend on the number of permits that a firm receives from the government. However, firms undertake more R&D under generalized cooperation than vertical cooperation, irrespective of spillovers and the allocation of permits, and this results in higher social welfare under generalized cooperation than vertical cooperation. The optimal allocation of pollution rights by the regulator is also considered. This allocation matters for social welfare under R&D competition and horizontal cooperation, but is irrelevant under vertical and generalized cooperations. Chapter 3: Is There a Principle of Targeting in Environmental Taxation?: This chapter studies whether the "principle of targeting", which is referred to by Dixit (1985) as the tax formulae for dirty goods have "additivity property" (Sandmo 1975) and externality-generating sources should be directly targeted (Bhagwati and Johnson 1960), can be applicable in the presence of a uniform commodity tax with an additional emissions tax. We consider three perfectly competitive markets, one of them produces a non-polluting good and the other two produce polluting goods. The regulator chooses optimal taxes on all three markets to maximize social welfare and finances an exogenous public expenditure. First all, it is found that the additivity property does not hold under differentiated taxes, and is even further weakened with a uniform commodity tax. It is also shown that the Pigouvian tax is unlikely to apply on the top of the uniform commodity tax. Furthermore, if there is only tax instrument available -- i.e. either the uniform commodity tax or the emissions tax -- then the uniform commodity tax (emissions tax) induces higher social welfare when marginal social damage is low (high).

Canada has long been a proponent of free trade while at the same time defending the current supply management system that protects the dairy industry from import competition. In the most recent Doha Development Round of talks amongst nations belonging to the World Trade Organization, the validity of Canada's protectionist position has been questioned and it is conceivable that Canada may have to make significant changes in the dairy industry to allow more liberal trade policies to be enacted. The key purpose of this study is to find out how free trade will affect the research and development (R&D) incentives of Canadian dairy farmers. On one hand they may be induced to perform more R&D due to competition effects in order to lower costs and achieve a competitive advantage over the main competitor, the United States. On the other hand they may be induced to perform less R&D due to the spillover effect, which allows the Canadian R&D efforts to be used by the United States at no additional cost. It is found that the outcome of these two opposing forces depends on the market scale effect. If Canada is a net importer when the border opens the spillover effect may dominate and Canadian dairy producers may invest less into R&D than under the current protectionist policies. These results however will switch if Canada is found to be the net exporters. The results also depend on the level of the quota currently in place. If the current quota is chosen at a quantity relatively close to the amount supplied at the monopolistic level, a free trade regime may promote R&D efforts more so than supply management. On the other hand, if the current quota level in Canada is closer to the quantity that would be supplied in a competitive industry, Canadian dairy producers may invest less heavily in R&D efforts under a free trade regime than a supply management system.

Stegia AB har sedan ett antal år tillbaka använt sig av outsourcing i olika former. Initialt med ganska liten egen involvering för att sedan involveras allt mer på senare åt genom en egen fabrik först placerad i Taiwan och nu i Shanghai Kina. Verksamheter med global spridda enheter utsätts löpande för utmaningar och svårigheter internt vilka kan kopplas till språk, geografisk läge och kultur utöver de tekniska och organisatoriska utmaningar som finns inom verksamheten. Inom ramen för detta bedriver Stegia AB R&D och försäljning i Sverige samt produktion i Shanghai, Kina. Detta för med sig många svårigheter som detta examensarbete undersöker närmare. Genom en fallstudie har samtliga personer som utbyter information inom företagets enheter involveras i projektet där R&D och produktion i globalt spridda verksamheter undersökts hur det påverkar verksamheten genom olika svårigheter. För att genomföra detta har intervjuer skett såväl i Sverige och i Shanghai för att förstå den miljö som arbetet löpande sker i. Data har samlats in från företagets processer kopplade till produktion av egenutvecklade produkter där cykeltider, materialflöden, ledtider och studier i produktionen genomförts för att kartlägga olika faktorer som påverkar det dagliga arbetet. Det har visat sig att förtroende mellan de olika enheterna, tid som åtgår för att invänta återkoppling på olika uppgifter samt olika synsätt på arbetet är faktorer med stor inverkan på det dagliga arbetet. För att hantera dessa problem föreslås förflyttningar enheterna emellan för att skapa förståelse för respektive enhet internt såväl om externt. Vidare finns flertalet utmaningar kopplat till kvalitetssäkring och flöden som påverkas av kommunikationen internt i företaget där brist på data och i flera fall felaktig data ger följd fel inom organisationen. Sammantaget blir kommunikationsutmaningarna påtagliga inom dessa typer av verksamheter där många mindre problem snabbt påverkar verksamheten. / Stegia AB have during recent years been using outsourcing in different configurations. Initially with a small involvement in the supply chain, but today with a greater involvement though their fully owned off shore production unit; first located in Taiwan and now located in Shanghai, China. Organizations that are utilizing globally distributed units are facing a number of challenges on top of the daliy technical and organizational aspects. Those extra challenges could be cultural differences and language barriers, but the geographical positioning brings additional obstacles to the company. In this environment Stegia AB runs sales and R&D from Västerås with their production unit in Shanghai. This setup brings a lot of difficulties that this thesis will look deeper into. A case study have been conducted to investigate how the decision of a globally distributed organization brings difficulties. In this thesis, interviews have been conducted in Västerås and Shanghai. The aim is to involve all employees in R&D and the production units, as well as to gain understanding of their daily work. Data have been collected from the company’s manufacturing processes where cycle times, material flow, lead time and general production studies have been conducted in order to map and understand how different factors affect their organization. Through this study some factors have been found to critically affect the daily operation of the company, such as: trust, time to reply messages within the organization and employees’ opinions about the given tasks. In order to tackle those challenges, rotations between the units is suggested. This is to increase the employees' understanding of the units both internally and externally. On top of those challenges, quality control and logistics have been negatively affected by the lack of communication and insufficiency of relevant data within the organization. All together, the communication challenges very soon become crucial in globally distributed units; where small problems affect the daily operations.

This dissertation examines the relationship between productivity growth and research activities of heterogeneous firms, and the contribution of firm heterogeneity to business cycle fluctuations. The first chapter uses a dynamic model to study firms' decisions on whether to conduct research in house, with external units or via both modes. Productivity is modeled to evolve endogenously according to Research and Development (R&D) modes, and the costs of starting and continuing research are random and mode specific. Model estimates from a panel of Chinese manufacturing firms show that in-house R&D is more effective and costs less to maintain, but smaller firms choose external R&D because of its lower startup cost. These estimates are consistent with the observed cross-sectional differences in firm size by research status, and can match the persistence and transition dynamics in R&D modes. Simulation exercises show that continuation cost reduction induces more changes in R&D decisions, but start up cost reduction leads to most of the aggregate productivity gain. The second chapter investigates the impact of innovation on firm level prices. This impact depends on how innovation affects quality and efficiency and how the firm passes these changes onto prices. Estimation results of the empirical model with a panel of Spanish firms show that firms take advantage of process innovations to enlarge markups by not completely passing onto prices the decrease in cost. Product innovations could increase or decrease cost but they do not affect markups, thus we do not find prices to change systematically with them. The third chapter examines the contribution of firm level shocks to output fluctuations for four OECD countries (US, Germany, Canada and the UK). Recent studies stemming from Gabaix (2011) show that when few firms account for a disproportionately large share of production, shocks to these firms can propagate to generate business cycle fluctuations. However, we find that while firm size distribution is highly skewed in these four economies, the ability of the largest firms to transmit shocks is not universal and thus should not be taken for granted.

Prior research shows returns are positive when firms meet or beat analysts’ consensus forecasts but negative when firms miss. Past studies also show managers frequently cut R&D expenses in order to meet the consensus forecast. Despite these findings, there is limited evidence about how the market responds when firms beat the forecast by cutting R&D. This study shows the stock market penalizes firms that use R&D cuts to manage earnings and exacts a discount to the market reward if beating the forecast requires cutting R&D. The discount is only partial and firms are still better off doing so in the short run. Furthermore, this study shows the R&D cuts used to manage earnings are concentrated in specific industries and are likely temporary, as firms tend to increase R&D spending in the subsequent period. Investors appear to recognize these short-term cuts and treat them similar to accruals. / 10000-01-01

Os investimentos em Pesquisa e Desenvolvimento têm se constituído como fonte importante de vantagem competitiva, especialmente com o aprofundamento das decorrências da globalização dos mercados. A soma dos investimentos em P&D que os 27 países-membros da Comunidade Européia fizeram em 2007 superou EUR227 bilhões, ao passo que no mesmo ano os EUA investiram US$368 bilhões em P&D. Dados da OCDE e UNESCO apontam para um aumento do investimento global em P&D de US$525 bilhões em 1996 para mais de US$1 trilhão em 2006. Tendo em vista o cenário de franca expansão das funções de Pesquisa e Desenvolvimento e do já consolidado movimento de descentralização do P&D em direção às subsidiárias da empresa multinacional, emerge a necessidade de coordenação global de esforços e uso racional dos recursos, de modo a tornar os investimentos e a gestão de P&D mais eficazes. A eficácia à qual se refere está na base da competitividade, na medida em que pode facilitar a flexibilidade da organização para fazer frente à dinâmica do mercado, auxiliar na economia de recursos e maximizar o retorno sobre os investimentos em infraestrutura e capacitação da mão-de-obra. Essa pesquisa se debruça sobre a questão da coordenação dos esforços de P&D em uma empresa multinacional de base tecnológica que tem centros de P&D em diversos países. São tratados temas relativos aos mecanismos de coordenação, sua implementação dada a estratégia de internacionalização de P&D adotada pela empresa, assim como é discutido em que medida as tecnologias de informação e comunicações podem auxiliar a empresa na missão de coordenar e integrar os esforços de todo seu P&D. Por fim, são identificados os aspectos críticos para a coordenação global dos centros de P&D, por meio da discussão sobre seus fatores facilitadores. / Investments in Research and Development have constituted an important source of competitive advantage, especially with the deepening of globalization of markets and its consequences. The sum of investments that the 27 member countries of the European Community did in 2007 exceeded EUR227 billion, while in the same year U.S. had invested $368 billion in R&D. UNESCO and OECD data show an increase in overall investment in R&D from $525 billion in 1996 to more than $1 trillion in 2006. Given the scenario of increasing business impact of Research and Development and the movement towards its decentralization towards the subsidiaries of multinational company, arises the need for global coordination and synergic use of resources in order to make investment and management of R&D more effective. This effectiveness lies on the basis of competitiveness, as it can facilitate the organization\'s flexibility to cope with market dynamics, can help save resources and maximize return on investments in infrastructure and training of the workforce. This research focuses on the issue of global R&D coordination in a multinational company that has geographically dispersed R&D centers. The scope encompasses issues related to coordination mechanisms implementation, the relationship between R&D internationalization and coordination mechanisms, to what extent information technologies and communications can help the company in the mission to coordinate and integrate efforts of all its R&D facilities. Finally, it is identified critical issues for the global R&D coordination, through the discussion of coordination facilitators.

Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-12T17:42:33Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 arquivo7483_1.pdf: 2263537 bytes, checksum: 1f0340a48a095e689d8d42374e8da4dd (MD5) license.txt: 1748 bytes, checksum: 8a4605be74aa9ea9d79846c1fba20a33 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2005 / Este trabalho visa apresentar um estudo dos aspectos relacionados ao aprendizado e à inovação que caracterize uma mudança do paradigma do treinamento para o paradigma do aprendizado. O desenvolvimento do capital humano extrapola a esfera dos programas de treinamento (supera a barreira estática dos aprimoramentos de competências formais) e resulta numa visão holística do processo de inovação (dinamismo do aprendizado organizacional). De modo a tornar tangível para a gestão da empresa os elos entre os programas de T&D, um modelo de aprendizado organizacional e a ação do próprio indivíduo como agente propulsor do processo de inovação, desenvolveu-se o Modelo do Tetraedro dos Processos de Inovação. Este modelo é formado pelo seguinte conjunto de ferramentas: Tetraedro dos Processos de Inovação, Diagrama dos Processos de Inovação, Tabelas dos Vértices da Base, e o Questionário para Avaliação do Desenvolvimento do Capital Humano. O tetraedro tem a finalidade de estruturar e de tornar as três perspectivas centrais do modelo (estratégica, operacional e provocativa) aptas para serem transferidas pela empresa. O diagrama desenvolvido fornece uma apreciação que enaltece tanto o lado hard (razão, dedução, explícito), como o soft (emoção, empírico e implícito) e o insight (discernimento, compreensão clara e soluções criativas) do domínio do conhecimento dentro das empresas. As tabelas apresentam o significado, a finalidade e os processos necessários para o desenvolvimento de cada elemento do modelo. O questionário elaborado neste trabalho proporciona um diagnóstico inicial do desenvolvimento do capital humano.Este questionário foi aplicado em uma empresa do setor elétrico. Seus resultados revelaram quais as questões necessitam de melhorias, com uma classificação e ponderação dos elementos envolvidos. Desta forma, o acompanhamento dos indicadores habilita o modelo a receber os feedbacks necessários para promover o correto encaminhamento dos investimentos em conhecimento da empresa. Assim, o modelo pode contribuir para a organização projetar um contexto organizacional que promova comportamentos voltados ao aprendizado e à inovação, bem como orientar o fluxo de conhecimento dentro da empresa

Canada has long been a proponent of free trade while at the same time defending the current supply management system that protects the dairy industry from import competition. In the most recent Doha Development Round of talks amongst nations belonging to the World Trade Organization, the validity of Canada's protectionist position has been questioned and it is conceivable that Canada may have to make significant changes in the dairy industry to allow more liberal trade policies to be enacted. The key purpose of this study is to find out how free trade will affect the research and development (R&D) incentives of Canadian dairy farmers. On one hand they may be induced to perform more R&D due to competition effects in order to lower costs and achieve a competitive advantage over the main competitor, the United States. On the other hand they may be induced to perform less R&D due to the spillover effect, which allows the Canadian R&D efforts to be used by the United States at no additional cost. It is found that the outcome of these two opposing forces depends on the market scale effect. If Canada is a net importer when the border opens the spillover effect may dominate and Canadian dairy producers may invest less into R&D than under the current protectionist policies. These results however will switch if Canada is found to be the net exporters. The results also depend on the level of the quota currently in place. If the current quota is chosen at a quantity relatively close to the amount supplied at the monopolistic level, a free trade regime may promote R&D efforts more so than supply management. On the other hand, if the current quota level in Canada is closer to the quantity that would be supplied in a competitive industry, Canadian dairy producers may invest less heavily in R&D efforts under a free trade regime than a supply management system. / Land and Food Systems, Faculty of / Graduate

Using data from the Kauffman Firm Survey (KFS), this thesis explores the effects that innovation activities has on the survival of new firms. The KFS follows 4,928 American start-ups from 2004 to 2011. A probit model is used to examine the relationships that may exist between a number of different variables relating to innovation and survival. The results indicate that firms that invest in research and development (R&D) and machinery and equipment persistently are more likely to survive than those that do not, or those that only invest once in these types of innovative business activities. Also, with regards to intellectual property (copyrights, trademarks and patents), firms that hold these types of intellectual property have a better chance of survival than those that do not hold any intellectual property.

Chapter 1: Tradable Permits under Environmental and Cost-reducing R&D: This chapter models simultaneous investments in both environmental and cost-reducing R&D by asymmetric Cournot duopolist. Pollution rights (emission permits) are allocated by the regulator and can be traded between firms. Both R&D competition and cooperation are considered. In a three-stage game, firms first invest in R&D, then trade permits, and then compete in output. The strategic interaction between different types of R&D investments is analyzed. It is found that giving more permits to one firm induces it to conduct more cost-reducing but less environmental R&D. The second-best optimal allocation of pollution rights is also analyzed. This allocation matters for social welfare under R&D competition, but is irrelevant under R&D cooperation. Moreover, the optimal allocation depends on R&D spillovers. This paper also studies the grandfathering of permits based on historical output. Compared with the second-best optimal allocation, the higher the emissions reduction level, the more likely that grandfathering allocates too few permits to the large firm and too many permits to the small firm. Adding an R&D budget constraint leads firms to under-invest in cost-reducing R&D relative to environmental R&D. Chapter 2: Tradable Permits under Environmental R&D between Upstream and Downstream Industries: This chapter models the simultaneous investments in environmental R&D by both downstream and upstream industries, with two symmetric firms within each industry competing à la Cournot. Pollution rights are allocated by the regulator, and firms can trade permits. R&D competition, intra-industry (horizontal), inter-industry (vertical) and both intra- and inter-industry (generalized) R&D cooperations are considered. In a four-stage game, firms first invest in R&D, then trade permits, then upstream firms compete in intermediate good production, and finally downstream firms compete in final food production. The strategic interactions between R&D investments are analyzed. It is found that an increase in either vertical or horizontal R&D spillovers reduce the permit price but increase production, but the spillover effects on R&D investments are ambiguous and they depend on the number of permits that a firm receives from the government. However, firms undertake more R&D under generalized cooperation than vertical cooperation, irrespective of spillovers and the allocation of permits, and this results in higher social welfare under generalized cooperation than vertical cooperation. The optimal allocation of pollution rights by the regulator is also considered. This allocation matters for social welfare under R&D competition and horizontal cooperation, but is irrelevant under vertical and generalized cooperations. Chapter 3: Is There a Principle of Targeting in Environmental Taxation?: This chapter studies whether the "principle of targeting", which is referred to by Dixit (1985) as the tax formulae for dirty goods have "additivity property" (Sandmo 1975) and externality-generating sources should be directly targeted (Bhagwati and Johnson 1960), can be applicable in the presence of a uniform commodity tax with an additional emissions tax. We consider three perfectly competitive markets, one of them produces a non-polluting good and the other two produce polluting goods. The regulator chooses optimal taxes on all three markets to maximize social welfare and finances an exogenous public expenditure. First all, it is found that the additivity property does not hold under differentiated taxes, and is even further weakened with a uniform commodity tax. It is also shown that the Pigouvian tax is unlikely to apply on the top of the uniform commodity tax. Furthermore, if there is only tax instrument available -- i.e. either the uniform commodity tax or the emissions tax -- then the uniform commodity tax (emissions tax) induces higher social welfare when marginal social damage is low (high).