The purpose of this study is to discuss the appropriateness of a cognitive approach to Donald Davidson&#039 / s meaning theory. Davidson makes the bold proposal that a truth theory, modified for a natural language, may be treated as a meaning theory for that language. According to Davidson, a meaning theory is an empirical theory. Radical Interpretation is at the center of such an empirical inquiry which places restrictions on the truth theory to make it suitable as a meaning theory without appeal to semantic notions. Davidson&lsquo / s aim in presenting this bold proposal and radical interpretation is to shed light on the concept of meaning, not to define the actual semantic competence of language users. But what Davidson&lsquo / s project does not aim to define is the main thing that a cognitive approach must account for. Whether a truth theory can represent the semantic competence of language users is discussed in this work. It is concluded that, although there is no a priori reason for such a representation claim, the cognitive approach&mdash / with the right assumptions to make the claim testable&mdash / can lead to an empirical research programme.

This thesis examines the ineliminable status of pluralism in contemporary sciences, especially in biology. Pluralism in science is endorsed to avoid loss of knowledge, unproductive debates and explanatory inflexibility while the plurality indicates the disunited nature of knowledge in some areas. The pluralist stance approach, as an epistemological stance, argues that it is possible to reduce modest forms of pluralism to sophisticated forms of monism. However, the pluralist stance is vulnerable to the monist challenge that today&rsquo / s science is incomplete and brings a sort of epistemological disorder to scientific territory. This thesis tries to answer the following question: is it more beneficial if a modest form of pluralism is adopted for a better scientific practice? Integrative pluralism as a type of modest pluralism can be as pragmatic as the pluralist stance, without seeking theoretical unification but advocating explanatory resolution for a better scientific conduct.

Free will is a paramount concept that is central to our everyday lives, society and moral judgements. In this thesis, I search for the conditions under which free will can exist. This is done in relation to two topics: determinism and agency. Finally, I also explore the relation between free will and several social and philosophical concepts, and discuss briefly what would be the case if there were no free will.

What is the meaning of life? This has been one of the major questions of philosophy for centuries / from Socrates to Nietzsche and from Tolstoy to the famous comedy writers&rsquo / group Monty Python. People from diverse intellectual backgrounds asked what the meaning of life is. Although there are doubts that this question is now outdated, meaning of life seems to me still an intriguing subject. In this thesis I argue that life&rsquo / s meaning must be discussed according to two different notions. One of these notions is the content of life where life&rsquo / s meaning can be analyzed according to its coherence with a value system, its achievements or its influence on others. The other is the notion of life&rsquo / s meaning as a mental concept, as an experience. I provide reasons to think life&rsquo / s meaning as a composite mental state and propose its components. My point of view carries subjectivist implications, however by introducing necessary conditions of the formation of the composite mental state that provides a life with meaning I argue that such a mental state attains objectivity.

ABSTRACT CAMUS: A REBEL AT THE JUNCTION OF EXISTENTIALISM AND SKEPTICISM (Basar) Baskaya, Dilek Ph.D., Department of Philosophy Supervisor: Prof. Dr. S. Halil Turan May 2011, 190 pages The purpose of this thesis is to examine Albert Camus&rsquo / s stance in existentialism and scepticism, to discuss his philosophy by referring to his life, which, in many respects, forms a foundation for his philosophy and to exhibit that he maintains his contemporariness in the 21st century. As existentialism is treated differently by different philosophers, the main concern of the thesis is to discuss how Camus handles it. This is done by focusing on his approach to issues appearing commonly in existentialism, such as the absurd, suicide, God, rebellion, freedom, and alienation and by scrutinising the link between existentialism and skepticism. According to Camus, the absurd is the paradoxical condition caused by a contradiction or a confrontation of two unequal concepts or situations. The merit, for Camus, is to survive despite the disillusionment the absurd brings about. Consequently, he is against suicide because he regards it as surrender to the absurd. Camus claims that it is man himself who can make his own life meaningful. Thus, man may question the existence of God and revolt metaphysically against the absurdity and injustice in the world. The metaphysical rebel can then establish the unity and order that he believes is lacking in the world. Camus attaches great importance to rebellion because it brings man freedom. And freedom is indispensable because being deprived of freedom means submission to an authority and, therefore, loss of human dignity. Alienation is a major issue for Camus, too, as it is a result of man&rsquo / s &lsquo / thrownness&rsquo / on to the world and displays the human situation. The thesis analyses the above items in detail with reference to all Camus&rsquo / s major works.

It has been argued that there are physically different ways of instantiating mental properties, the nature of which is the subject matter of cognitive science. This claim has been known as the Multiple Realizability Thesis (MRT). It has been suggested that the MRT shows that a reduction of mental properties to physical properties is impossible, as there cannot be one-to-one correspondences of mental properties to the properties of the brain. Moreover, it has been argued that the latter point shows that physical explanations are not relevant to the explanations of cognitive science, as they would lack the generality of psychological explanations. This thesis will try to explain from which assumptions of a traditional cognitive science perspective the MRT follows. It will also discuss several responses that have been introduced against both the MRT and the anti-reductionist conclusions that are assumed to follow from it. The responses include a challenge to the scientific status of cognitive science. According to this challenge, the MRT entails that the subject matter of cognitive science, namely mental properties, lack a similarity in the physical level, hence an instance of a mental property is not informative about another instance. While discussing these theories, a revision of the MRT will be proposed. According to this revision, the MRT is compatible with the assumption that there could be an underlying similarity between different physical realizers of a given mental property. It will be argued that by means of this revision, both the challenge to the scientific status of cognitive science, and the argument for the irrelevance of physical explanations will fail.

The purpose of this thesis is to elaborate on the Marx&rsquo / s theory of knowledge. Historical materialism presented in the German Ideology and the methodological remarks in Grundrisse have led to many discussions concerning the relation between knowledge and reality in Marx&rsquo / s philosophy. This thesis tried to explore the interrelationships between the kinds of knowledge we produce, abstract concepts and the concrete material conditions, as elaborated by Marx. In contrast to traditional epistemology, and more along the lines of Hegel&rsquo / s epistemology, Marx does not see theory and reality as belonging to two distinct spheres. This thesis endeavors to elucidate the terms abstract and concrete in Marx&rsquo / s usage and tries to make a clear Marx&rsquo / s relations to Hegel in light of these terms.

This study aims at investigating the problem of universals, which is one of the most venerable issues in the history of philosophy. The problem of universals emerges from the ontological status of properties and relations / i.e., the existence and nature of properties and relations. It can be defined as the problem of how two or more different objects can have the same property or how a property can be a part of different things. The problem of universals consists of not a single problem but rather a network of problems. The aim of this study is to reconsider the problem of universals which involves the three interrelated problems: ontological problem of predication, the linguistic problem of predication and the problem of abstract reference. Any adequate account for the problem of universals must deal with these problems. Nominalism, Trope theory, and Realism are three major theories that have proposed solutions to the problem of universals. In this study, these accounts have been discussed and it has been tried to reveal whether any of these accounts can deal with these problems. As a conclusion, this study proposes that among the theories that try to deal with the problem of ontological predication and the problem of abstract reference, only Object-Trope theory and Armstrong&rsquo / s Realism have been successful. However, Object-Trope theory is found to be a bit more superior to Armstrong&rsquo / s Realism when Ockham&rsquo / s razor is appealed to.

Hegel&#039 / s system, with a purpose of being the newest philosophy, represents a turning point in the history of thought. In contrast to the philosophical thoguht of Enlightenment which seperates branches of knowledge, or that of philosophy, Hegel tries to recombine them. In this study, I intend to reveal the close connection of the concepts appeared in the two works of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, namely, The Phenomenology of Spirit (Ph&auml / nomenologie des Geistes) and Elements of the Philosophy of Right (Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts). These concepts are consciousness, self-consciousness, desire, recognition, freedom and intersubjectivity that are very important for considering self-actualization of the individual and for understanding also the process of human socialization. In this sense, Hegel&rsquo / s philosophy, in general, is an attempt to analyze modern society through the light of these conceptions which are still central to our aspirations as reflective social beings.

ABSTRACT A MISCONSTRUAL OF EVIDENTIALISM: ALVIN PLANTINGA AND BELIEF IN GOD Aydin, S&uuml / leyman Ph.D., Department of Philosophy Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. David Gr&uuml / nberg August 2004, 183 pages The evidentialist objection to belief in God is the claim that theists do not have sufficient evidence for the existence of God, therefore are they irresponsible to continue holding their belief in God in the face of insufficient evidence. Alvin Plantinga assumes that evidentialism, being a dogma characterized by classical foundationalism which itself has a faulty picture of rationality, should be set aside altogether in the assessment of epistemic status of belief in God. Behind Plantinga&rsquo / s assumption is the suggestion that the epistemic status of belief in God has been misinterpreted by philosophers, since the vast majority of religious epistemologists have remained within the evidentialist tradition. In my evaluation of Plantinga&rsquo / s assumption, I undertake two tasks: First, I seek to clarify his presumption that classical foundationalism had a faulty picture of rationality: I attempt to show that the insufficiency of classical foundationalism is not as problematic as Plantinga assumes. Secondly, I analyze and evaluate evidentialism in a larger perspective to show that: (1) evidentialism is a broader category than classical foundationalism, (2) evidentialism can not be put aside completely in any epistemological enterprise. I conclude that Plantinga&rsquo / s argument for belief in God is based on a faulty assumption, and I argue that evidentialism can best be seen to be a &ldquo / demand of clarity&rdquo / with regard to knowledge claims which on no grounds can legitimately be escaped altogether.