Thesis advisor: Elizabeth A. Kensinger / A key feature of human memory is the ability to remember not only discrete pieces of information but also to form novel associations between them. A special type of association, called an "integration", can be formed when the pieces are encoded as a single representation in memory (Wollen, Weber and Lowry, 1972; Murray and Kensinger, 2012). The work presented here investigates what neural mechanisms underlie the formation and subsequent retrieval of integrated mental images in younger adulthood (individuals aged 18-30), whether those mechanisms differ based on the emotional content of the integration, and whether older and younger adults generate and remember emotional integrations differently from one another. I show that younger adults utilize two different routes to form integrations, depending on their emotional content: a rapid, perceptually-supported route that allows for fast integration of emotional pairs but that leads to poor downstream memory for the associates, and a slow, conceptually-supported route for neutral pairs that takes more time but that leads to strong downstream memory. Conversely, older adults utilize slow, controlled processing of emotional integrations that leads to strong memory, but they fail to produce durable memory for non-emotional pairs due to age-related associative deficits. Together, these results highlight differences both within and between age groups in the formation and retrieval of emotional and non-emotional integrations, and suggest a circumstance - integration of emotional pairs - in which older adults can overcome previously reported age-related deficits. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2013. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Psychology.

Thesis advisor: Elizabeth A. Kensinger / Research in three parts investigated sleep’s preferential consolidation of memories for experiences that are prioritized at encoding due to intrinsic characteristics (e.g., emotion), extrinsic characteristics (e.g., instructed learning, reward), or both. Results showed that sleep broadly strengthens memory for future-relevant information, with these prioritization cues at encoding aiding in the selection process for what is subsequently strengthened during sleep. Part I investigated the effects of sleep on the consolidation of information that was prioritized at encoding due to the intrinsic cue of emotion. Results showed that even once the emotionally salient aspect of the stimuli was removed (i.e., when memory was tested using a neutral cue), residual effects of emotion were reflected in enhanced visual activity following sleep, with this visual activity correlating with the percentage of rapid eye movement sleep obtained during consolidation and likely driven by enhanced occipital-hippocampal connectivity following sleep. This suggests that sleep prioritizes information that was salient due to the intrinsic cue of emotion at encoding, leading to changes in neural activity during retrieval even once that intrinsic cue is no longer present. As in Part I, most prior research has examined how sleep preferentially consolidates memory for information that is salient due to a single cue for future relevance. Part II investigated whether future relevance can be assigned to stimuli via top-down manipulations (i.e., extrinsic prioritization cues), as well as how sleep prioritizes memory for information when intrinsic and extrinsic cues for future relevance co-occur within the same stimuli. Results suggest that when multiple dimensions of future relevance co-occur, sleep prioritizes extrinsic cues (i.e., instructed learning, and to a lesser degree, reward) over intrinsic cues (i.e., emotion). Further, results suggest that additional cues for future relevance do not have additive effects on consolidation, but rather that sleep may binarize information based on whether it is future-relevant or not, preferentially consolidating memory for the former category. Lastly, Part III focused on a manipulation of extrinsic prioritization at encoding to investigate both how the effects of prioritization on memory differ minutes after encoding relative to after long-term consolidation processes take place, and also whether these effects depend on if a healthy versus restricted amount of nocturnal sleep is obtained during the consolidation interval. Results showed that a top-down manipulation of prioritization (i.e., typographical cueing) was effective in enhancing memory; highlighted relative to non-highlighted content was better remembered at multiple time points, with evidence suggesting that N3 (slow-wave) sleep may contribute to these memorial benefits. Together, findings across Parts I-III suggest that sleep selectively strengthens future-relevant information, elucidating which cues for future relevance at the time of encoding lead to enhanced consolidation following sleep, as well as how sleep acts on intrinsic and extrinsic prioritization cues when they co-occur. In identifying intrinsic targets of sleep’s selective consolidation effects, as well as extrinsic manipulations that can be applied to use sleep as a tool to enhance consolidation, these three studies have important implications for optimizing memory that are relevant across domains. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2016. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Psychology.

Thesis advisor: James A. Russell / The claim that certain emotions are universally recognized from facial expressions is based primarily on the study of expressions that were posed. The current study was of spontaneous facial expressions shown by aborigines in Papua New Guinea (Ekman, 1980) -- 18 faces claimed to convey one (or, in the case of blends, two) basic emotions and four faces claimed to show other universal feelings. For each face, ten samples of observers-- South Koreans speaking Korean (n=66), Spaniards speaking Spanish (n=54), Israelis speaking Hebrew (n=60), Chinese speaking English (n=83), Chinese speaking Cantonese (n=64), Japanese speaking English (n=71), Japanese speaking Japanese (n=72), Indians speaking English (n=65), Indians speaking Kannada (n=62), and Indians speaking Hindi (n=120)--rated the degree to which each of the 12 predicted emotions or feelings was conveyed. The modal choice across all ten samples of observers was the predicted label for only 2 (of the 22) faces, predicted to convey exclusively happiness. Observers endorsed the predicted emotion or feeling moderately often (mean=56%), but also denied it moderately often (mean=44%). They also endorsed more than one (or, for blends, two) label(s) in each face - on average, 1.8 of basic emotions and 3.7 of other feelings. There were both similarities and differences across culture and language, but the emotional meaning of a facial expression is not well captured by the predicted label(s) or, indeed, by any single label. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2014. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Psychology.

The mechanisms accounting for how negative mood, intolerance of uncertainty (IU), and low problem-solving confidence (PSC) increase worrying are poorly understood. One possibility is that these variables result in a detailed, analytical, and cognitively demanding form of information processing, known as systematic processing. This thesis examines whether worry promoters (negative mood, IU, and low PSC) increase an individual's likelihood of deploying systematic processing. Furthermore, the impact of these variables on threat perception and coping beliefs – factors affecting both worry and systematic processing – is explored. Six studies were conducted. The first five utilised experimental manipulations of mood, IU and PSC, whilst the sixth used questionnaires. Systematic processing deployment was indexed by sufficiency threshold measures (confidence that processing goals are satisfactorily accomplished) and a questionnaire. Participants induced into a negative mood had raised sufficiency thresholds; they were more likely to deploy systematic processing High IU and low PSC manipulations did not cause an increase in the likelihood of using systematic processing, but these variables correlated with an increased likelihood of deploying systematic processing Only negative mood correlated with increased threat perception when regression analyses were conducted controlling for each of the worry promoters All three worry promoters correlated with decreased threat coping beliefs A small negative correlation was found between worry and systematic processing PSC showed some construct overlap with systematic processing Consequently, negative mood states may encourage individuals to systematically process threats that they perceive. But worry is also defined by IU and low PSC, factors which diminish self-efficacy appraisals in the form of coping beliefs. These low coping beliefs may serve to dissuade the individual from typically deploying cognitively demanding systematic processing. The implications of these findings are discussed in terms of the role of systematic processing as a mechanism of perseverative worry.

I argue that emotion is an ontologically emergent and sui generis. I argue that emotion meets both of two individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for ontological emergence. These are, (i) that emotion necessarily has constituent parts to which it cannot be reduced, and (ii) that emotion has a causal effect on its constituent parts (i.e. emotion demonstrates downward causation). I argue that emotion is partly cognitive, partly constituted by feelings and partly perceptual. 1) I argue that both the type and the intensity of an emotion supervene on cognitive factors. But emotion cannot be reduced to cognition because emotions are paradigmatically valenced and cognitions are not. 2) I argue that the phenomenal properties of emotion are determined by bodily feelings, thus emotion necessarily requires feelings. But emotion cannot be reduced to feelings because emotion has rational properties not held by bodily feelings. 3) I argue that the intentional objects of emotion are perceptual objects, and hence emotion necessarily requires perception. But emotion cannot be reduced to perception because emotion has second orders (as evidenced by metaemotion) and perception does not. Thus emotion meets the first necessary condition for ontological emergence; emotion has constituent parts to which it cannot be reduced. I go on to argue that emotion has a causal effect on its 4) cognitive, 5) feeling, and 6) perceptual parts, both as a faculty and at the level of the individual emotion. Emotion meets the two individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for ontological emergence: (i) emotion has composite parts to which it cannot be reduced, and (ii) emotion has a causal effect on its composite parts. Thus emotion is ontologically emergent. Being ontologically emergent, emotion is sui generis.

This thesis investigates how particular psychological motivations operate in different social and physical contexts. Through a series of four papers, it both extends and empirically tests some of the theoretical claims made by motivated identity construction theory (MICT, Vignoles, 2011), which proposes that people construct their identities in ways to maximise or maintain the satisfaction of identity motives for self-esteem, continuity, distinctiveness, belonging, efficacy, and meaning. Although these identity motives been found to influence identity construction at individual, relational and collective levels of self-representation (e.g. Vignoles, Regalia, Manzi, Golledge, & Scabini, 2006), Paper 1 extends this by showing not only that identification with novel groups tracks the satisfaction of identity motives over time, but also, crucially, that different motives are related to identification with different types of groups. MICT further proposes that each of the motives can be satisfied in various ways, and that particular contexts promote and emphasise certain ways over others. Paper 2 extends this theorising to the belonging motive, showing that there are different ways that people can gain feelings of belonging from their group memberships, and that this depends on the type of groups involved. Paper 3 examines the effects of the built environment on the belonging motive, showing that physical features within flats that encourage the use of common areas increase the frequency with which flatmates coincidently meet each other. This increases their feelings of belonging associated with the group, leading, in turn, to increases in well-being. Paper 4 focuses on the distinctiveness motive and, using a large cross-cultural dataset, finds support for MICT's claims that the way the distinctiveness motive is satisfied varies according to the level of urbanisation in an individual's surrounding environment, in addition to their cultural context. The importance of incorporating social and physical contexts into psychological theories is discussed.

The thesis explores the impacts of being exposed to hate material online, so called cyberhate, using social psychological theories of group identity as a framework to explore victimisation experiences when targeted directly or witnessing others from the same identity group being targeted, known as indirect victimisation. Three papers examine these impacts with two commonly stigmatised groups; Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender people (LGB&T) and Muslims. Paper 1 reports the results from two online surveys about the nature of cyberhate experienced by these two groups. Results indicate it is a common and frequent problem occurring over a range of internet platforms and mediums and there are a number of negative emotional reactions and behavioural intentions similar to those reported by Intergroup Emotions Theory after group identity challenges. Paper 2 uses qualitative interviews with victims of cyberhate to gain a detailed understanding of the impacts of being victimised. Participants indicated that there is a level of resilience to being targeted as bad behaviour is expected online, but being exposed to hateful material causes many to take avoidance action, avoiding certain parts of the internet. Paper 3 presents the results of an innovative experimental study exposing members of the stigmatised groups and a control to hate material. Those viewing group specific hate material felt angrier than when just viewing generally unpleasant material. The current research finds that being targeted online has similar negative impacts to offline hate crime, both to those who are targeted directly but also those who are indirectly victimised.

Vicarious pain refers to the processes and experiences that arise from observations of other people in pain. Due to the interpersonal and multi-modal nature of these processes, research into the field is highly relevant for a number of key concepts in social cognitive neuroscience, such as empathy, multi-sensory processing and social cognition. The dominant approach in the field has been to focus on normative samples with little focus being given to inter-individual differences. The discovery of a subsample of the population who report conscious experiences of pain when observing it, so called 'mirror-pain responders', presents a significant opportunity for developing our understanding of the neural processes and characteristics associated with vicarious pain. The present thesis aims to extend understanding of this group who appear to lie on an extreme end of a spectrum of vicarious pain perception. Although past research has highlighted this group and made some attempts to identify their prevalence, few formal attempts have been made to stringently discover the prevalence and identify the characteristics of their qualitative experience. As such, ARTICLE I developed a questionnaire, named the Vicarious Pain Questionnaire (VPQ), which characterises mirror-pain responders based on their subjective experiences of pain. The results showed a surprisingly high prevalence rate for the condition, ~30%. In addition through the use of a cluster analysis, the VPQ identified subgroups within mirror-pain responders, which included a group who experienced sensory and localised mirror-pain, and a group that experienced affective and generalised mirror-pain. ARTICLE I and ARTICLE II both aimed at assessing the neural basis for the experiences and successfully highlighted the role of hyperactivity in vicarious somatosensory processing, through the use of electrophysiological (EEG) neuro-markers for somatosensory processing (mu rhythm) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) activation in the somatosensory cortex during pain observation. Additionally, these articles highlighted the role of self-other processing regions through the use of voxel-based morphometry (VBM) which revealed reduced grey-matter volume in the right temporo-parietal junction (rTPJ), and psycho-physiological interactions (PPI) of fMRI processing which revealed connectivity networks between pain matrix regions and self-other processing regions (rTPJ and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC)). Characteristics of the mirror-pain were further assessed in ARTICLE III which in a battery of behavioural and physiological tests were administered to mirror-pain responders and controls. This study showed abnormal autonomic nervous system processing for Affective/General mirror-pain responders and confirmed the link between the condition and questionnaire measures of empathy. Finally, ARTICLE IV failed to provide a causal link between self-other processing regions (rTPJ) and somatosensory activation in response to pain observations through the use of theta-burst transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) in non-responders. This calls into question the direct causality of neural mechanisms associated with self-other theories of mirror-pain. This thesis demonstrates the importance of studying inter-individual differences in vicarious pain by reporting a set questionnaire and neuroimaging results which contribute to debates in the field and raises questions for future research. This work, its implications, and contributions to the wider literature are reviewed in the DISCUSSION chapter.

The extent to which motivational mechanisms contribute to reward seeking processes is crucial to our understanding of certain abnormal behaviours, including addiction. Pavlovian conditioning endows reward-associated stimuli with the ability to modulate goal-directed actions for that same reward (Pavlovian-to-Instrumental transfer; PIT). Learning and motivational theories attempt to describe the processes by which stimuli in the environment acquire incentive properties, attract attention and drive reward-seeking behaviours and bear many resemblances, but there are also important differences. This thesis uses a general PIT model in humans to further our understanding of these discrepancies and investigates the effect mood has on these processes. Firstly, altering the value of the reward affected the rigor of instrumental performance, but the same changes in outcome value did not affect the expectancy of, attention to, or emotional reactivity to the cues suggesting that in Pavlovian learning, apart from the nature of outcomes, the value of outcomes is encoded such that changes in outcome value prevent transfer of a Pavlovian cue's incentive properties to alter goal-directed action. Secondly, the further papers assess the extent to which mood modulates this same action. When under negative mood a general reduction in motivation, driven by an attenuated sensitivity to the reward was observed, as well as a dissociation between aversive and appetitive outcomes. The remaining study explored whether mood altered Pavlovian learning and revealed that those under state negative mood take longer to express their knowledge explicitly and that those under positive mood showed altered attention and emotional responses towards the same stimuli. The approach used in this thesis shows the merits of both motivational and learning theories, and further demonstrates the link between mood and motivation. Additionally, a dissociation between punishment and reward prediction when under negative mood was demonstrated and builds upon this important distinction.

Research suggests that infants progress from discrimination to recognition of emotions in faces during the first half year of life. It is whether the perception of emotions from bodies develops in a similar manner. In the current study, when presented with happy and angry body videos and voices, 5-month-olds looked longer at the matching video when they were presented upright but not when they were inverted. In contrast, 3.5-month-olds failed to match even with upright videos. Thus, 5-month-olds but not 3.5-month-olds exhibited evidence of recognition of emotions from bodies by demonstrating intermodal matching. In a subsequent experiment, younger infants did discriminate between body emotion videos but failed to exhibit an inversion effect, suggesting that discrimination may be based on low-level stimulus features. These results document a developmental change from discrimination based on non-emotional information at 3.5 months to recognition of body emotions at 5 months. This pattern of development is similar to face emotion knowledge development and suggests that both the face and body emotion perception systems develop rapidly during the first half year of life.