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<p>Bertrand Russell is one of the grandmasters of 20^th Century Analytic Philosophy. It is surprising, then, that his work fell out of fashion later in his career. As a result, very little has been discussed concerning Russell’s work from the period of 1927 – 59. This thesis provides an analysis of Russell’s philosophical work from this era. Our attention here is on Russell’s theory of perception and the underlying metaphysical structure that is developed as a result of his scientific outlook. Russell’s philosophy during this time focused almost exclusively on perception, knowledge, and the epistemic relationship humans have with the world according to science. It is these topics that are engaged with and explicated. We discover that, due to Russell's outright acceptance of that conclusion found in physics, metaphysically he defends a four-dimensional neutral monist event ontology; perceptually he defends a causal theory where one's perceptions must be understood as only being of one's brain; and epistemically he is a fallibilist, wherein justification can be found in a coherent set of beliefs founded on intrinsically credible individual propositions, but knowledge itself is ultimately a vexed and imprecise concept.</p> / Master of Arts (MA)

<p>The purpose of this dissertation is to argue that epistemic contextualism, which proposes that the word ‘know’ is a context-sensitive term, is seriously deficient and therefore indefensible. Since epistemic contextualists claim that their semantic theory of ‘know’ contributes not only to a linguistic model of knowledge ascription but also to a unified solution to some important puzzles in epistemology, I divide my thesis into two basic parts. In the first part (i.e., Chapters 2 and 3), I argue that the proponents of both binary and ternary accounts of the supposed context-sensitivity of ‘know’ fail to provide a reasonable linguistic model of knowledge ascription. My argument in Chapter 1 indicates that ‘know’ cannot be treated as a binary context-sensitive term that is similar to paradigmatic indexical terms or gradable adjectives. Chapter 2 takes contrastivism as a representation of the ternary account of the supposed context-sensitivity of ‘know’ and argues that this theory is in an even worse position because it even fails to capture the supposed phenomena of the context-sensitivity of knowledge ascription. The second part (i.e., Chapters 4, 5, and 6) argues that epistemic contextualism does not provide us with a really satisfactory solution to the puzzles of skepticism, the epistemic closure principle and fallibilism. On the contrary, its rival, invariantism, with some support from pragmatics, psychology of belief and experimental philosophy, is able to solve the above puzzles in a quite nice way. At the end of my thesis (i.e., Chapter 7), I systematize the observations, the evaluations and the critiques of epistemic contextualism from the previous chapters and indicate that epistemic contextualists even fail to establish their supposed phenomena of the context-sensitivity of ‘know.’</p> / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Recent literature in religious epistemology has overlooked a significant debate in mainstream epistemology. In short, theories in religious epistemology have failed to consider the value problem. This essay, then, hopes to rectify this omission by arguing that one of the most influential accounts of religious epistemology - reformed epistemology - fails to adequately account for the value of knowledge. I argue, however, that a reasonable way out for the reformed epistemologist comes by way of endorsing the achievement thesis. The achievement thesis, put simply, states that knowledge is valuable because it is a cognitive achievement - unlike, for example, mere true belief. The central question of this essay, then, is this: Is Knowledge of God a Cognitive Achievement? In order to better answer this question I highlight two different ways in which one can understand the nature of cognitive achievements. First, a cognitive achievement can be understood as success from ability that is always primarily creditable to the agent. Or, second, a cognitive achievement can be understood as success from ability that is jointly creditable to the agent. Both, I argue, are compatible with knowledge and the achievement thesis. Whether knowledge of God is primarily or jointly creditable, however, will depend on the way in which one understands the role the agent plays in the belief forming process. Given the nature of reformed epistemology, I argue that knowledge of God is the kind of achievement that is jointly creditable. Further, and central to the argument, I argue that the reformed epistemologist is in a good position to meet the requirements for the strong achievement thesis. The strong achievement thesis argues that an achievement should be understood in terms of overcoming some obstacle whereby the agent's belief is the result of some ability that can be credited to the agent. The account I propose not only meets the requirements of the strong achievement thesis, but also retains a distinctive feature of reformed epistemology - namely, that the belief in God can be said to overcome the obstacle of cognitive malfunction that, as the reformed epistemologist argues, is brought about by sin. It's an achievement becasue it overcomes an excessively hostile environment (what I call the maxi-environment) that is not conducive to belief in God given the cognitive consequence of sin. In the end, it is possible to provide an account of reformed epistemology where the value of knowledge (over and above mere true belief) is adequately demonstrated.

The aim of the present thesis is to reconcile two opposing intuitions; one originating from mainstream individualistic epistemology and the other one from social epistemology. In particular, conceiving of knowledge as a cognitive phenomenon, mainstream epistemologists focus on the individual as the proper epistemic subject. Yet, clearly, knowledge-acquisition many times appears to be a social process and, sometimes, to such an extent—as in the case of scientific knowledge—that it has been argued there might be knowledge that is not possessed by any individual alone. In order to make sense of such contradictory claims, I combine virtue reliabilism in mainstream epistemology with two hypotheses from externalist philosophy of mind, viz., the extended and distributed cognition hypotheses. Reading virtue reliabilism along the lines suggested by the hypothesis of extended cognition allows for a weak anti-individualistic understanding of knowledge, which has already been suggested on the basis of considerations about testimonial knowledge: knowledge, many times, has a dual nature; it is both social and individual. Provided, however, the possibility of distributed cognition and group agency, we can go even further by making a case for a robust version of antiindividualism in mainstream epistemology. This is because knowledge may not always be the product of any individual’s cognitive ability and, thereby, not creditable to any individual alone. Knowledge, instead, might be the product of an epistemic group agent’s collective cognitive ability and, thus, attributable only to the group as a whole. Still, however, being able—on the basis of the hypothesis of distributed cognition—to recognize a group as a cognitive subject in itself allows for proponents of virtue reliabilism to legitimately apply their individualistic theory of knowledge to such extreme cases as well. Put another way, mainstream individualistic epistemologists now have the means to make sense of the claim that p is known by S, even though it is not known by any individual alone.

Conspiracy theories have been present within American culture for hundreds of years. In the hyper-visibility provided by online spaces within the past few years, however, it now feels as if conspiracy theories are everywhere. This proliferation means that, more than ever, it’s imperative that we are equipped to evaluate which conspiracy theories are worth believing in. This paper will explore the qualities of conspiracy theories that should affect how we perceive their credibility. I’ll highlight some similarities shared between conspiracy theories and gossip, and then subsequently apply epistemic concerns relating to gossip to our understanding of conspiracy theories. Two of these concerns – irrelevant influences and the composite hypothesis – will be explored in depth. Although the effects of irrelevant influences and the composite hypothesis are not necessarily defeating for belief in all conspiracy theories, I will highlight the specific ways in which these two features may operate to reduce the credibility. Despite conspiracy theories’ tendency to have these epistemically concerning factors, I am not in favor of an approach that assumes all conspiracy theories are bunkum. Instead, I will argue for an approach in favor of analyzing conspiracy theories on an individual basis and following the evidence in order to assess credibility.

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<p> The notion of service has enjoyed historical longevity&mdash;rooted deeply within our institutions (i.e., churches, schools, government, military, etc.), reminiscent of indentured servitude, and rarely questioned as a colonizing practice that upholds oppression. Given the relentless insertion of service learning programs into working class communities, the sacrosanctity awarded and commonsensically given to service is challenged and understood within its colonial, historical, philosophical, economic, and ideological machinations. This political confrontation of service learning practices serves to: (a) critique the dominant epistemologies that reproduce social inequalities within the context of service learning theory and practice; and (b) move toward the formulation of a critical bicultural service learning theory and critical principles, in line with the humanizing and emancipatory intent of a critical decolonizing pedagogical practice. </p><p> This dissertation is deeply influenced by the writings of Brazilian educational philosopher Paulo Freire and critical activist scholar Antonia Darder, among others, and incisively examines and critiques service learning through critical bicultural pedagogy and critical decolonizing interpretive methodology. As a radical political project, Darder&rsquo;s decolonizing interpretive theoretical framework provides an opportunity to rupture the abyssal divide that epistemologically privileges the Eurocentric service learning discourse in an effort to place bicultural voices, scholarship, and communities at the forefront of this educational movement. In seeking to move toward equality and liberatory practices, both politically and pedagogically, it is imperative that critical consciousness be the guide to ensure that society does not stand by and accept the displacement and dehumanization of the oppressed by culturally invasive practices of service. </p>

The general topic of this research is scientific success and the form it might take in sociology. The recent resurgence of evolutionary thinking across the social sciences has potentially positive implications for sociology and its understanding of social change. To evaluate this evolutionary turn in relation to sociology, I focus on David Hull's evolutionary analysis of scientific change and success, which claims that a social mechanism lies at the heart of the selection processes that occur in science. What is good for the individual is what is good for science as a whole, he argues, and it is descent that matters more in analyzing this process than conceptual similarity. Hull believes such an evolutionary account makes sense of both success and failure, though he doubts that sociology can be considered a science. My contention is that by applying his evolutionary analysis to evolutionary sociology, not only can his claims be tested and modified, but also that insights into the sociology of knowledge will be generated. To achieve this, I examine a large range of texts and commentary on evolutionary theory and sociology from the early nineteenth century until the recent present. All of these theories of evolution exhibit a pattern of problematic conceptualization, which includes special categories of human action, developmentalism, and inadequate methods. Despite each generation of evolutionary sociology recognizing the pattern as producing invalid theory, these flaws are consistently replicated. I conclude that such findings suggest, first of all, that sociology is not organized collectively but is an individualistic discipline; secondly, that Hull's evolutionary framework needs major reconstruction around the areas of fitness (mere reproductive success, as in evolutionary sociology's case) and fit (of theory to evidence, accompanied by the reconstruction of concepts that do not fit the empirical findings -a process that tends not to happen in evolutionary sociology); and thirdly, that the evolutionary turn in the social sciences offers an opportunity for a reorganization of approach in sociology and its interdisciplinary engagements.

This thesis discusses the idea of certainty in Wittgenstein's On Certainty and various interpretations of this text. Many deny a relativist reading of Wittgenstein because they think such reading fails to achieve Wittgenstein's goal, which is refuting skepticism. This thesis suggests the possibility of maintaining the certainty of our notion of truth while at the same time being open to the metaphysical possibility of relativism.