企業名稱是企業重要的無形資產，但是在1925年至2000年間名列美國證券市場資料庫的企業中，卻有超過三成的比率在公開上市後曾經更改過企業的名稱，因此本研究基於管理者及投資者的門檻心理，使用實證模型，探討企業更名後，管理者為了吸引投資者的注意，是否較可能去迎合各個盈餘門檻。 本研究以1994~2006年在美國三大證券交易所交易之具更名事件的企業為觀察樣本（實驗組），並依企業規模大小、產業及年度配對出非更名企業（對照組），比較更名企業與非更名企業在門檻心理之下的盈餘管理程度差異，探討企業更名後擊敗或達到盈餘門檻的機率是否大於更名前，研究方法兼採獨立樣本t檢定、綜和橫斷面分配法、分群樣本之羅吉斯多變量迴歸及差異中之差異法。實證結果發現獨立樣本t檢定下，企業更名後會迎合前期盈餘門檻；在綜和橫斷面分配法下則沒有發現迎合盈餘門檻的跡象；多變量迴歸及差異中之差異法則發現企業更名後會迎合前期盈餘門檻及分析師預測盈餘門檻。 / The name is an important intangible asset of the corporate. But over the 1924~2000 period, on the CRSP tapes, over 30% corporates had changed corporate names. Based on the earning thresholds behavior, I examine whether executives would try to meet or beat different earning thresholds in order to attract investors’ attention. In order to investigate the effects of name change, I use the corporates which had changed names over the 1994~2006 period to be the target groups, and then pair comparison groups by the same firm size, industry, and name-changed year. The results indicate that corporates would try to sustain recent performance when using t test. On the other hand, there is no evidence for executives to exceed thresholds under pooled cross-sectional distribution approach. Finally, corporates would sustain recent performance and meet analyst’s expectations when using multivavariate logit regression and difference - in - difference methods.

現今，世界經濟脈動迅速，科技發展日新月異，如何在瞬息萬變的趨勢洪流中掠取先機，端賴自身競爭力強弱而定。然而管理當局短視行為的發生，卻易損及企業的競爭優勢，甚至對企業未來有不利影響。造成管理當局短視之因源於多方面，來自資本市場投資人的影響即為其一。而資本市場中，機構投資人往往是大家注目的焦點，因此本研究乃對機構投資人持股比例與管理當局短視行為的關係進行探討，並期望能對公司治理制度的擬定上有所助益。 本研究以民國八十四年至民國九十年為研究期間，針對我國上市公司研究其管理當局短視行為與機構投資人持股比例間的關係，並探究在電子與非電子產業間兩者關係是否相同。此外，本研究亦比較機構投資人與個人投資者，各自持股比例與管理當局短視行為的相關情形，進以探尋真正能發揮監理機制的投資人類別。 實證結果顯示：(1)管理當局短視行為與機構投資人持股比例高低有顯著之負向關係，而與個人投資者持股比例間則有顯著的正向關係。(2)在非電子產業中，機構投資人持股與管理當局短視行為呈顯著負向關係，而電子產業中兩者則無顯著關係。(3)管理當局短視行為與機構投資人持股比例變動的幅度有顯著之負向關係，而與個人投資者持股比例變動則有顯著的正向關係。(4)在非電子股產業方面，機構投資人持股比例變動幅度與管理短視行為間無顯著關係；但在電子產業中，則兩者間呈現顯著之負向關係。 / Nowadays, the economy situation is changing so fast and the development of new technology has altered with each passing day. To be ahead of their competitors, firms must sharpen their competitive edge. However, management myopia often damage their competitive advantages and would do harm to the firms in the future. The phenomenon of management myopia is derived from many reason, one of them is the effect of the investors in the capital market. Furthermore, participants in the capital market always pay attention to the behavior of institution investors. Thus, this research explores the relationships between the ownership of institution investors and management myopic. We hope it would be beneficial to the enactment of the system of corporate governance. This research focuses on the relationship between the myopic behavior of management and the ownership of institution investors of the listed companies in Taiwan Stock Exchange from 1995 to 2001. It also explores if the relationship is the same in both electronic industry and non-electronic industries. Besides, the study also compares the effect of the ownership of individual or institution investors on the management myopia in order to point out the type of investors that can provide monitory function clearly. The empirical study indicates that (1) there is a significant negative relationship between the myopic behavior of management and the ownership of institution investors. Conversely, there is a significant positive relationship between the myopic behavior of management and the ownership of individual investors. (2) In the electronic industry, the relationship between the ownership of institution investors and the myopic behavior of management is not significant. However, it is significant negative in other industries. (3) The change of percentage of ownership of institution investors has significant negative relationship with the management myopia. However, it is opposite to the individual investors. (4) No significant relationship between the institution investors and the management myopic in non-electronic industries. But in the electronic industry, it is significant negative.

本研究以實徵性會計理論為基礎，測試在現金增資此一會計數字被使用來評估公司績效的事件中，上市公司是否有動機美化申請增資所使用的會計報表，亦即採用增加盈餘的裁量性應計項目，或是控制營業外交易以增加盈餘的方式進行盈餘的操縱以順利通過證管會的審查。同時，本研究亦檢定上市公司是否在增資結束後，由於應計項目的自動迴轉，而使其裁量性應計項目的變動為負。同時本研究亦透過三個假說來檢定現金增資前的操縱行為受某些公司特徵或增資時的經濟狀況等因素之影響是否顯著。 　　本研究的分析過程分成三大部份：第一部分的檢驗在了解現金增資公司的營業收入變動狀況，以Wilcoxon signed rank統計檢定法確定樣本公司的營業收入是否有顯著的變動；第二部分為整體性的探討上市公司增資之前，是否採用增加盈餘之裁量性應計項目和營業外收益淨額，同時探討增資後上述會計項目變數變化的情形，本研究採用Wilcoxon signed rank檢定法，檢定增資前後裁量性應計項目和營業外收益變動的差異；第三部分乃將樣本分為二組，以Wilcoxon rank sum檢定法，分別檢定高、低內部人持股比率，股市景氣榮枯期增資，以及大、小規模等二組樣本公司在增資前，其盈餘操縱行為是否有顯著差異？ 　　本研究所得到的結論如下： 　　1.樣本公司在增資前後期間營業收入淨額均顯著地持續增加。 　　2.樣本公司在增資前一年的確採取增加盈餘的裁量性應計項目和營業外收益淨額，且增資後一年，裁量性應計項目因迴轉而有負向的變動，但此盈餘操縱行為未達統計顯著性。 　　3.樣本公司在增資當年裁量性應計項目和營業外收益淨額均呈顯著的正向變動，可能的解釋是：(1)來自樣本公司在年初或年中季報的操縱行為；(2)公司在增資後有較高的「政治敏感性」。進一步測試發現：公司的確在增資前一季、增資完成當季和後一季，均有盈餘操縱的行為。 　　4.在股市景氣繁榮期增資的樣本公司，的確較顯著地採用了提高盈餘的裁量性應計項目和營業外收益淨額。而代理成本較高和規模較小的公司，分別較代理成本低和規模大的公司，傾向在增資前進行盈餘管理行為，但此行為並未達統計顯著性。

La promulgation de la loi de la sécurité financière (LSF) en 2003 a modifié l’architecture institutionnelle et la pratique d’audit en France. Au travers l’adjonction de nouvelles règles imposées par cette loi aux spécificités persistantes depuis 1966 comme le co-commissariat aux comptes et la durée du mandat de six ans, le marché d’audit se montre unique. Cette recherche examine l’impact de cette fusion réglementaire sur la qualité et le coût de l’audit en France. En se basant sur un échantillon composé par 888 observations du SBF 250 sur la période 2005-2010, nous avons révélé l’apport de la rotation des équipes signataires dans la restriction de la discrétion managériale. Outre son avantage dans la promotion de la qualité de l’audit, ce dispositif favorise la négociation à la baisse des honoraires d’audit. Nous avons aussi souligné l’évolution sous forme parabolique de la composante discrétionnaire sur la durée de mandat. En effet, la qualité de l’audit est inférieure pendant la première et la dernière phase de l’engagement. Ce postulat renvoie au renforcement de la compétence dans le temps et l’érosion de l’esprit critique à la fin du mandat. Le décalage, issu de la fusion réglementaire, favorise le maintien du niveau de la qualité élevé sur le marché français. L’association des deux équipes avec des durées auditeur-audité différentes est une contrainte à la discrétion managériale. Toutefois, ce décalage ne doit pas être excessif pour limiter la domination du plus ancien. Cet inconvénient du régime du co-commissariat aux comptes s’est trouvé limité sur le marché français. Nos résultats confirment son efficacité, essentiellement dans le cas d’un collège composé par deux Big 4. / In 2003, the promulgation of the financial security act (LSF) has changed the institutional architecture and audit practice in France. Through the addition of new rules imposed by this act to the persistent specificities since 1966 as the joint audit and tenure of six years, the audit market shows unique. This research examines the impact of this regulatory merger on the quality and the cost of the audit in France. Based on a sample composed by 888 observations of the SBF 250 over the 2005-2010, we found the contribution of rotation audit partners in restricting managerial discretion. Besides its advantage in promoting audit quality, this device supports the negotiation of lower audit fees. We also emphasized the evolution in the parabolic form of the discretionary accruals over tenure. Indeed, the audit quality is lower during the first and last phase of the engagement. This assumption refers to strengthening the skills over time and erosion of critical appraisal at the end of audit tenure. The shift from regulatory fusion helps to maintain the level of high quality on the French market. The combination of the two teams with different listener-audited tenures is a constraint to managerial discretion. However, this shift should not be excessive to limit the oldest’ domination. This drawback of the system of joint audits is limited in the French market. Our results confirm its effectiveness, mainly in the case of two Big 4.