過去有許多實證研究探討了公司治理特性對於公司經營績效的影響，特別是關於股權結構及管理階層薪酬方面，而在董事會特性對經營績效的影響上卻未獲致一致性的結論。近年來開始有研究探討董事會特性對於企業的經營策略，乃至於經營績效的關係。本研究參考Baysinger and Robert（1990）及He and Joseph（2006）等人提出之理論架構，針對國內上市公司的公司治理特性、經營策略選擇以及績效表現之關連性進行實證上之研究，研究之主要目的係在瞭解台灣上市公司的公司治理特性對於企業策略選擇之影響，並延伸過往研究，對公司治理特性、企業績效表現，以及不同的策略選擇三者間的關連性，提出實證研究上之證據。 本研究除印證過去文獻所指出董事會特性與股權結構對公司績效具有顯著影響及企業績效顯著受到策略行為影響外，並發現企業的差異化策略強度顯著受到公司治理特性影響。而將差異化策略強度依強弱程度作組別劃分時，差異化策略強度亦與公司治理特性同為影響企業績效的因素；另外，在不同差異化策略強度下，差異化策略強度為董事長雙元性、董事會持股、經理人持股影響企業績效的中介因子。本研究的結果支持Baysinger and Robert（1990）及He and Joseph（2006）等人所提出的理論架構，在探討公司治理特性影響企業績效時，或應將企業的策略行為納入考量。 / Formerly, there were many researchs discussed how corporation governance, equity structure and managerial remuneration especially, effects business performance. But, there were not consistent conclution in how the board attributes effects performance. Recently, there were some researchs discussed the relationship among corporation governance, business strategies and performance. This research dicussed the relationship among corporation governance, business strategies and performance in listed company in Taiwan, and referred to the theoretical frameworks advanced by Baysinger and Robert（1990）and He and Joseph（2006）. This research not only proved the performance effected by the board attributes equity structure and strategic behavior observably, but also discovered that the strength of difference strategy effected by corporation governance noteworthily. In the different degree of strength of difference strategy, the strength of difference strategy was the mediator to corporation governance and performance. This research argued that the strategic behavior should be considered when research how corporation governance effect performance.

董監事會為公司治理之核心，本研究以民國87年至民國91年為研究期間，針對我國上市公司探討董監事會特性與權益資金成本之關聯性，而不同於以往國內有關估計權益資金成本的方法，本研究以Ohlson模型來設算權益資金成本。實證結果顯示： 1.董監事會成員持股比率與企業權益資金成本率之關係並不顯著，若觀測兩者間是否存有非線性關係，本研究亦未發現兩者間的不顯著關係是由非線性因素所造成。 2.複迴歸分析顯示，董監事會持股質押比與權益資金成本之關係並不顯著，若進一步區分全體樣本為正、負盈餘樣本，則發現在負盈餘樣本中，董監事會持股質押比與企業權益資金成本呈現顯著正向關係；另外，若以Panel Data分析，本研究則發現在電子業中董監事持股質押比與權益資金成本始呈現正相關。 3.公司是否聘任獨立董監與權益資金成本之關係並不顯著，且不論是在有聘任或無聘任獨立董監之樣本間，或是在自願性聘任與強制性聘任獨立董監之樣本間，其權益資金成本並無明顯的差異。 / This study examines the relations between characteristic of board of directors and supervisors and cost of equity capital. It is unlike previous research to use capital assets pricing model（CAPM）, this research adopts an alternative technique for estimating the cost of equity capital. Specifically, we use Ohlson (1995) model to generate a market implied cost of capital. Our samples consist of all public companies listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporate over 5 years period 1998-2002. The empirical results are as follows: 1.There is no significant negative relation between the ratio of the stock held by the board and supervisors and the cost of equity capital. Moreover, we don’t find this relation caused by nonlinear specification. 2.There is no significant positive relation between the pledged share ratio of the board and supervisors and the cost of equity capital. When the entire samples are divided into the sub-samples of firms experiencing losses and others, the existence of the positive relationship is found only in the firms experiencing losses. In addition, the relation is further proved in the electronic industry when adopting panel data analysis. 3.There is no significant reverse relation between the independent directors and supervisors and the cost of equity capital. And there is also no significant difference in the cost of equity capital between companies with implementing the independent directors and supervisors and those without implementing the regulation.

現今，世界經濟脈動迅速，科技發展日新月異，如何在瞬息萬變的趨勢洪流中掠取先機，端賴自身競爭力強弱而定。然而管理當局短視行為的發生，卻易損及企業的競爭優勢，甚至對企業未來有不利影響。造成管理當局短視之因源於多方面，來自資本市場投資人的影響即為其一。而資本市場中，機構投資人往往是大家注目的焦點，因此本研究乃對機構投資人持股比例與管理當局短視行為的關係進行探討，並期望能對公司治理制度的擬定上有所助益。 本研究以民國八十四年至民國九十年為研究期間，針對我國上市公司研究其管理當局短視行為與機構投資人持股比例間的關係，並探究在電子與非電子產業間兩者關係是否相同。此外，本研究亦比較機構投資人與個人投資者，各自持股比例與管理當局短視行為的相關情形，進以探尋真正能發揮監理機制的投資人類別。 實證結果顯示：(1)管理當局短視行為與機構投資人持股比例高低有顯著之負向關係，而與個人投資者持股比例間則有顯著的正向關係。(2)在非電子產業中，機構投資人持股與管理當局短視行為呈顯著負向關係，而電子產業中兩者則無顯著關係。(3)管理當局短視行為與機構投資人持股比例變動的幅度有顯著之負向關係，而與個人投資者持股比例變動則有顯著的正向關係。(4)在非電子股產業方面，機構投資人持股比例變動幅度與管理短視行為間無顯著關係；但在電子產業中，則兩者間呈現顯著之負向關係。 / Nowadays, the economy situation is changing so fast and the development of new technology has altered with each passing day. To be ahead of their competitors, firms must sharpen their competitive edge. However, management myopia often damage their competitive advantages and would do harm to the firms in the future. The phenomenon of management myopia is derived from many reason, one of them is the effect of the investors in the capital market. Furthermore, participants in the capital market always pay attention to the behavior of institution investors. Thus, this research explores the relationships between the ownership of institution investors and management myopic. We hope it would be beneficial to the enactment of the system of corporate governance. This research focuses on the relationship between the myopic behavior of management and the ownership of institution investors of the listed companies in Taiwan Stock Exchange from 1995 to 2001. It also explores if the relationship is the same in both electronic industry and non-electronic industries. Besides, the study also compares the effect of the ownership of individual or institution investors on the management myopia in order to point out the type of investors that can provide monitory function clearly. The empirical study indicates that (1) there is a significant negative relationship between the myopic behavior of management and the ownership of institution investors. Conversely, there is a significant positive relationship between the myopic behavior of management and the ownership of individual investors. (2) In the electronic industry, the relationship between the ownership of institution investors and the myopic behavior of management is not significant. However, it is significant negative in other industries. (3) The change of percentage of ownership of institution investors has significant negative relationship with the management myopia. However, it is opposite to the individual investors. (4) No significant relationship between the institution investors and the management myopic in non-electronic industries. But in the electronic industry, it is significant negative.