Since 1945 a number of historical controversies have arisen over the German leadership in the Second World War. Hitler has been described both as an astute opportunist and as a fanatic relentlessly following a preconceived plan. Thus his decision to turn east in 1941 has been regarded as the result of frustration in the West and also as the ultimate step in a great plan for eastern conquest which he followed throughput his career. Most of the German military leaders have supported the idea that Hitler had no "war plan." They have depicted themselves as subordinates hopelessly attempting to avert the worst effects of Hitler's irresponsible opportunism and amateurish interference in military strategy. Thus they have attributed most of the blame for the failure of the Blitzkrieg in the East to Hitler’s errors. This study re-examines these controversies in the light of the planning for the invasion of Russia. It shows that Hitler consistently followed a broad plan for the conquest of Lebensraum. Thus in 1940 his decision to attack Russia even if the war was still unfinished in the West was the result of his determination to fulfill his plan while Germany still held the initiative in Europe. Most of Hitler's military leaders shared his anti-Bolshevism and favoured a policy which would revive the situation created by the Treaty of Brest Litovsk in 1918. These attitudes made them willing to attack Russia. However, the optimism fostered by their defeat of France and their serious underestimation of Russia's strength caused them to omit careful consideration of the logistic and operational difficulties in the East. While accepting Hitler's more cautious plan they neglected to make the necessary preparations to implement it and instead attempted to adhere to their own simpler plan for a battle of destruction near the frontier followed by a thrust on Moscow. By the time it had become clear that the initial battles had failed to yield a decisive victory it was too late to revive Hitler's plan and the campaign deteriorated into a series of improvised operations. These served only to show that the Wehrmacht lacked the range and striking power to defeat the Soviet Union by military force alone. Hitler might have compensated for this deficiency by developing a coalition grand strategy capable of exerting further pressure on Russia from the Far East or the South. But instead, he failed to win the trust and cooperation of the Japanese by concealing his intention of attacking Russia and by directing them and the Italians towards the war against Britain. Furthermore, the Nazi terror and exploitation in Russia precluded the development of a positive policy which might have caused an internal collapse of Stalin's regime. The basic flaws of Hitler's Lebensraumpolitik as presented in Mein Kampf, his misjudgement of the British and his contempt for the Russians, were major political and grand strategic causes of his ultimate defeat. But on the military strategic level the German generals bear a far greater share of the responsibility for the failure of the Blitzkrieg in the East than has previously been recognised. / Arts, Faculty of / History, Department of / Graduate

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In spite of the crucial importance of the Russian front in the outcome of the Second World War, this aspect of the conflict has been studied relatively little in the West since 1945. This omission can be attributed to several factors including linguistic complexity, the difficulty of access to Soviet archives, and the political constraints caused by the ideological climate of the Cold War. Since the time of glasnost' and the collapse of the Soviet block, however, a new era has begun for historians thanks to the release of many documents which had been secret and to the improved ideological climate. / The present work aims to summarise the current situation of the debate in this rapidly expanding field of historiography. Some of the most controversial military, political, and strategic questions are examined, most frequently from a Soviet perspective. These include the Soviet preparations for war and their shortcomings; the German campaign of 1941 and the reasons for its failure; the turning of the tide in 1942-1943, especially the battles of Kursk and Stalingrad; the Yalta conference and the "division of the world"; the role of Stalin and his regime in the "Great Patriotic War"; the human and material losses of the Soviet Union during the conflict; and finally the importance of the Soviet contribution to the victory of the Allies.

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On 16 December 1941, Adolf Hitler issued his controversial Haltbefehl (halt order). As Germany’s Army Group Center reeled under the Soviet counterattack during the battle for Moscow, the Haltbefehl forbade the army to retreat. Scholars have argued that this order ended the Prussian-German method of command called Auftragstaktik. Under this concept, German field commanders enjoyed wide command discretion within the intent of their superiors. This thesis argues that Auftragstaktik did survive at and below the German Army’s divisional level during its defensive struggles in the battle for Moscow. The case studies illustrate that field commanders kept their command independence and withdrew their units against Hitler’s halt order. / History

An essential and critical component of the orders German front-line formations received in the ideological war against the Soviet Union was the Commissar Order of 6 June 1941. This order, issued by the High Command of the Armed Forces prior to the German invasion of the Soviet Union, required that front-line military formations, as well as SS and police units attached to the Army, immediately execute Soviet political commissars among prisoners of war. Soviet political commissars were attached to the Red Army at virtually every operational level, and were viewed by both Hitler and the High Command as the foremost leaders of the resistance against the Nazis because of their commitment to Bolshevik ideology. According to the Commissar Order, "Commissars will not be treated as soldiers. The protection afforded by international law to prisoners of war will not apply in their case. After they have been segregated they will be liquidated." / While there is no paucity of information on the existence and intent of the Commissar Order, this directive has only been investigated by scholars as a portion of a much greater ideological portrait, or subsumed in the larger context of overall Nazi criminal activities during "Operation Barbarossa." / Examining the extent to which front-line divisions carried out the charge to shoot all grades of political commissars is necessary if we are to understand the role and depth of involvement by front-line troops of the Wehrmacht in a murderous program of extermination during the German attack and occupation of the Soviet Union. Such an examination has simply not taken place to-date. My dissertation seeks to address this issue. The result is both a narrative on the genesis of the Commissar Order and its attendant decrees and agreements between the Army leadership and the SS ( SD) and Security Police, and a quantitative analysis of how many commissars were reported captured and shot by the front-line forces of the 17th Army over a seven month period.

The aim of this work is to analyse the development of relationships of German elite generals towards Adolf Hitler during Soviet Union Campaign in 1941-1945. It's necessary to follow these relationships from 1933, because they changed dramatically. In brief, Führer's behaviour to generals and his interventions to army issues will be describe. The main field of this work is the analysis of war operations during fights with Soviet Union from the point of view of Nazi generals and Führer. The basics of the work come from the ideas of generals and other important personalities close to Hitler written in their memoirs that are confronted with the historical literature.

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