The economic prosperity of a nation is a complex function of many factors, including its culture, geography, history, legal origins, ethnolinguistic fractionalization, resource endowment, leadership and religious homogeneity. However, economic prosperity is most robustly related to the quality of a nation’s institutions under which its resources are put to productive use. Institutions are the humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interactions. Fundamental economic institutions, like property rights and the rule of law, structure the incentives that affect a nation’s productivity. Since at least the early 1990’s, economists have quantified economic institutions and policies by aggregating economic policy variables into economic indexes. Of these indexes, the most popular is the Economic Freedom of the World, which measures the consistency of a nation’s institutions with the principles of economic freedom. After decades of study, we know that economic freedom is positively related to income, gender equality, civil liberty and happiness among other desirable economic outcomes. Despite the benefits of simplifying institutions into a single number, the implicit assumptions required to do so are costly. By summarizing institutional quality as a single quantity, scholars assume that the underlying institutional structure of two economies are identical as long as their summary scores are identical. This assumption is often false, and this research examines the costs of this assumption for modeling economic growth. The common methodology for measuring institutional quality ignores both institutional volatility and institutional imbalance. This research shows that both measures are robustly and negatively related to economic growth rates. Therefore, models that simply a nation’s institutions to a single value at a single period of time are assuming away valuable information that helps explain a nation’s prosperity or lack thereof. In addition to examining the costs of these false assumptions, this research also examines the institutional trends among U.S. states since 1981. Despite declining economic freedom in the United States relative to other nations, state and local governments in the United States are liberalizing in recent decades. This phenomena is driven by increasing labor market freedom among states.

Ce travail s’intéresse aux relations entre l’économie, la société et l’État au travers de la comparaison de trois institutions économiques – les chambres de commerce de Gênes, Bruges et Cologne – dans le contexte de la construction de l’Empire napoléonien. En s’appuyant sur une documentation issue des archives des chambres de commerce dans les trois villes étudiées, de fonds préfectoraux et des archives du ministère de l’Intérieur à Paris, il s’agit d’étudier les modalités du transfert culturel opéré à partir de 1802 avec la création des premières chambres de commerce dans les départements annexés de l’Empire français. Cette perspective, inscrite dans un questionnement global portant sur la rationalité du modèle institutionnel des chambres de commerce napoléoniennes, permet d’analyser les formes d’appropriations locales des institutions et pose la question de la spécificité de ces constructions institutionnelles dans les départements annexés. Ce travail montre que les règles, les ressources et les compétences des chambres sont en grande partie déterminés par les acteurs locaux, plutôt que par l’État. Il souligne également l’enracinement du fonctionnement de ces institutions dans un ensemble de réseaux sociaux et institutionnels construits sur l’initiative des négociants membres des chambres, sur lesquels reposent également les pouvoirs qui leur sont conférés par l’État et son administration dans la régulation des économies locales. Enfin, la localisation des chambres étudiées dans les départements annexés constitue plutôt une ressource dans la mesure où leur position d’intermédiaire auprès de l’État et des négociants locaux est renforcée / Comparing three economic institutions – the chambers of commerce of Genoa, Bruges and Cologne – this research focuses on the relationships between the economy, society and the State at the time of the expansion of Napoleon's Empire.Based on documents from the archives of these three chambers of commerce, as well as on archives from the Prefecture and the Ministry of the Interior in Paris, this research aims to study the process of cultural transfer from 1802 onwards, starting with the creation of the first chambers of commerce in departments annexed by the French Empire. This perspective, which is part of a broader reflection on the rationality of the model of the Napoleonic chambers of commerce, allows us to analyze the degrees of local ownership of the institutions and raises the question of the specific institutional construction of the chambers of commerce in the new French departments.This research intends to show that the rules, resources and competence of the chambers depend mostly on local actors, rather than on the State. It also highlights the fact that the workings of these institutions are rooted in social and institutional networks, established by merchants who are also members of the chambers of commerce. The power to regulate the local economy, vested in the chamber by the State, relies heavily on these valuable networks. Finally, the distant location of the three chambers, in newly annexed departments, proves to be an asset, by strenghtening their position as an intermediary between the State and local merchants

This thesis examines the use of the right to health as a legal tool for ensuring access to better health care in Africa and as a means of dealing with threats to human health on the continent. The thesis critically assesses some of the key ways in which the right to health has been used at the local, regional and global levels as part of efforts to improve health on the continent. The aim of the thesis is to assess the utility of the right to health in Africa particularly in light of challenges posed by the power of international economic actors, local and international structural constraints and the paradoxical position of the state as both a potential violator and protector of the right. / As this thesis shows, human rights are a powerful and inspirational language for people struggling against degradation, domination and deprivation for the reason that they give expression to the notion that human dignity, equality and freedom ought to be respected and protected. They are also a tool for resisting oppressive power, in addition to providing legitimacy for the redistribution of material resources necessary to meet basic human needs and to alleviate human suffering. The thesis further shows that these benefits of human rights have been enhanced through legalisation, a process through which human rights have been translated from moral or natural rights into legal rights capable of being enforced through judicial and quasi-judicial processes. But legalisation has its drawbacks, as the thesis demonstrates. / The thesis argues that despite the significant advances that have been made, particularly in the last fifteen years, in the elaboration and clarification of the content and justiciability of the right to health, its limitations as a legal right are particularly evident in light of a number of factors. These include the power of international economic actors, local and international structural constraints and the problematic potential of the state as both a protector and violator of the right to health. By examining concrete instances in which efforts have been made to use the right to health in the context of some or of all these factors, the thesis demonstrates the limits and potential of the right as a legal right. The thesis thus argues that a proper account of the utility of the right to health should not overemphasise the legalisation of the right but must include an analysis of the power relations and structural constraints at play at both the international and local levels, which jeopardise good health in Africa in the first place. It is further argued that such an account offers a better understanding of how the moral, legal and political forms of the right to health might be strategically and productively combined in the struggle for better health in Africa.

The focus of the present research is to explore several dimensions and their interconnections: migration, election results and implemented policies. It will analyse how emigration is affecting the elections results and voting patterns, of both, migrants and non-migrants, thus influencing the undertaken policies and institution development in the home country. This thesis is based on evidence from Republic of Moldova, an Eastern European country with a Soviet Union heritage. The study covers the years 1998-2010 using data for 6 election results in Moldova and data about emigration during the corresponding years. The key assumption, confirmed in this thesis is that with increase of number of emigrants to the West countries, especially countries of European Union, the percentage of votes offered to Communist Party decreases, while there is a positive connection between the number of emigrants to eastern countries, namely Russia, and the number of votes given to Communist Party. Therefore, the migrants have different voting patterns from non-migrants, which with time are passed to their families and connections in the home country, using the spillover effect and hence being able to change the political and economic institutions in the home country. Data is modelled using OLS and GMM. Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)

Neste trabalho, explora-se a relação das instituições econômicas com o crescimento e desenvolvimento econômico. As instituições influenciam a estrutura de incentivos econômicos em uma sociedade, determinando como e o quão eficiente será a alocação de recursos, portanto determinam a performance econômica. A literatura empírica parece corroborar essa tese. Neste trabalho se busca contribuir para a literatura empírica no assunto. Foram construídas uma série de painéis autoregressivos com o objetivo de investigar a relação dinâmica entre a produtividade do trabalho, qualidade das instituições econômicas, capital humano e capital físico por trabalhador. Usando a base de dados criada por Kunˇciˇc (2014) como uma proxy para instituições e dados da Penn World Table 9.0 que medem a produtividade do trabalho, capital humano e capital físico por trabalhador, os resultados mostram que um choque estrutural nas instituições, em média, tem um efeito positivo e estatisticamente significante na produtividade do trabalho. Outro resultado obtido foi que um choque no capital humano gera, em média, um efeito positivo na produtividade do trabalho, enquanto que um choque ao capital físico por trabalhador não tem efeito sobre essa variável. Kunˇciˇc (2014) divide sua amostra em clusters de qualidade institucional que ranqueiam os países de melhores a piores instituições. Usando esses clusters, a amostra é dividida em dois, metade contendo os países com boas instituições, isto é, desenvolvidos, e metade contendo os países com instituições ruins, isto é, subdesenvolvidos. Os resultados diferem entre as duas amostras. Países com boas instituições não apresentam nenhum efeito sobre a produtividade do trabalho proveniente de um choque na qualidade institucional, enquanto que os países da amostra dos subdesenvolvidos mostram uma resposta maior que aquela da amostra completa. A produtividade do trabalho mostra uma resposta muito maior ao capital humano em países com boas instituições. Choques ao capital físico por trabalhador somente produzem resultados positivos para produtividade do trabalho na amostra dos países subdesenvolvidos. Estes resultados sugerem que existem retornos decrescentes para aumentos na qualidade institucional, o que está alinhado com a hipótese de convergência no nível de vida dos países. Isso está de acordo com o encontrado em Góes (2016). Os resultados sugerem também que o capital humano é melhor alocado quando as instituições são melhores e vice versa, gerando ganhos de produtividade de acordo com a qualidade institucional. Isso está de acordo com o encontrado em Hall, Sobel e Crowley (2010), Acemoglu, Gallego e Robinson (2014) e Niquito (2015). / I explore the relations between economic institutions and economic growth and development. Institutions influence the structure of incentives in a society determining how the resources will be allocated and how efficiently hence they determine economic performance. The empirical literature seems to agree with this line of thought. A series of panel autoregressions was built with the goal of investigating the dynamic relation between labor productivity, institutional quality, human capital and physical capital per worker. Using the database created by Kunˇciˇc (2014) as a proxy for institutions and data from the Penn World Table 9.0 of labor productivity, human capital and physical capital per worker I find that a structural shock to institutions has on average a positive and significant effect on labor productivity. I also find that a shock to human capital has on average a positive and significant effect on labor productivity while a shock to physical capital per worker does not. Kunˇciˇc (2014) divides his sample into clusters of institutional quality wich rank the countries from better to worst institutions. Using this clusters I divide the sample in two, one-half containing countries with good institutions i.e developed, and another containing the countries with worst institutions i.e underdeveloped. The results are strikingly different between the two samples. Countries with good institutions have no effect on labor productivity from a shock in institutional quality, while the underdeveloped countries sample show a bigger response than that of the full sample. Labor productivity shows a much greater response to human capital in countries with good institutions. Physical capital shocks only produce positive responses in labor productivity in the sample of countries with worst institutions. These results suggest that there are diminishing returns to increases in institutional quality and that human capital may be misallocated in countries with bad institutions, suggesting that economic institutions greatly affect the allocation of resources in a society.

O presente estudo procura analisar as transformações ocorridas nas instituições econômicas e na arrecadação tributária ao longo das primeiras décadas do século XIX, sobretudo entre 1808 e 1836. Primeiramente, tem-se em perspectiva as mudanças ocorridas nas principais instituições econômicas do período, a saber: o Banco do Brasil e o Tesouro Nacional. Procura-se, por meio da análise do funcionamento de ambas as instituições, verificar de que forma as principais questões financeiras do período financiamento do Estado, dívida pública, meio circulante, etc. estavam relacionadas com a formação da economia nacional bem como com a política econômica da época. Posteriormente, procura-se verificar o mesmo processo no tocante à arrecadação tributária, identificando de que forma a fiscalidade foi alterada no âmbito do Estado independente, bem como a introdução de novas formas de arrecadação tributária como no caso da Mesa das Diversas Rendas. Questões como a reforma das alfândegas, arrecadação dos impostos internos, definição da competência e dos espaços de tributação e da própria natureza da taxação são levantadas de forma a identificar a gênese do sistema tributário imperial, bem como quais interesses essas reformas representavam. Ainda sobre o sistema tributário, as transformações também são levadas em conta do ponto de vista das ideias e dos debates parlamentares com vias de identificar a forma pelas quais esses interesses fiscais manifestavam-se no Parlamento. Entre as principais conclusões alcançadas pelo estudo, destaca-se o caráter conflitivo e complexo de formação das instituições econômicas e do sistema tributário, bem como as diferentes opções que se apresentavam nos primeiros momentos de formação do Estado brasileiro. Assim, longe da formação econômica brasileira estar dada e seguir caminho inalterável e inevitável, as principais características sociais do sistema econômico, especialmente no que dizia respeito à fiscalidade regressividade e privilégios fiscais para as classes mais ricas foram opções conscientes dentre outras existentes na primeira metade do século XIX. / This study aims to analyze the economic institutions and tax system changes during the first decades in the Brazilians 19th century, especially between 1808 and 1836. Firstly, we have in perspective the transformation of the major economic institutions at that moment: the Brazilian Bank and the National Treasure. Our goal is to verify, through the operation of both institutions, how economic matters as the state financing, public debt and money supply , were related with the national economic formation and the imperial economic policy. After that, we try to verify the same process in the tax revenue system, identifying in what way the independent State changed the taxation, as well the introduction of new means to levy taxes the case of Mesa das Diversas Rendas. Issues as the custom and domestic tax reform, jurisdiction and tax spaces definition and the taxation essence itself was pointed in order to determine the genesis of the Brazilian imperial tax system, as well as which interests these reforms represented. Still, over the tax revenue system, the transformation are also analyzes together with the ideas and parliamentary discussions, seeking to describe how this fiscal interest was present in the congress. As the main conclusions achieved with this study, we can point out the conflicting and complex formation process of the economic institutions and Brazilian taxation system, as well the distinct options that materialized in the first moments of the Brazilian state formation. Thus, the Brazilian economic formation and main economic system social aspects, especially in the taxation (regressivity and fiscal privileges to the richer classes), were predetermined consciously during the first half of the 19th century.

Neste trabalho, explora-se a relação das instituições econômicas com o crescimento e desenvolvimento econômico. As instituições influenciam a estrutura de incentivos econômicos em uma sociedade, determinando como e o quão eficiente será a alocação de recursos, portanto determinam a performance econômica. A literatura empírica parece corroborar essa tese. Neste trabalho se busca contribuir para a literatura empírica no assunto. Foram construídas uma série de painéis autoregressivos com o objetivo de investigar a relação dinâmica entre a produtividade do trabalho, qualidade das instituições econômicas, capital humano e capital físico por trabalhador. Usando a base de dados criada por Kunˇciˇc (2014) como uma proxy para instituições e dados da Penn World Table 9.0 que medem a produtividade do trabalho, capital humano e capital físico por trabalhador, os resultados mostram que um choque estrutural nas instituições, em média, tem um efeito positivo e estatisticamente significante na produtividade do trabalho. Outro resultado obtido foi que um choque no capital humano gera, em média, um efeito positivo na produtividade do trabalho, enquanto que um choque ao capital físico por trabalhador não tem efeito sobre essa variável. Kunˇciˇc (2014) divide sua amostra em clusters de qualidade institucional que ranqueiam os países de melhores a piores instituições. Usando esses clusters, a amostra é dividida em dois, metade contendo os países com boas instituições, isto é, desenvolvidos, e metade contendo os países com instituições ruins, isto é, subdesenvolvidos. Os resultados diferem entre as duas amostras. Países com boas instituições não apresentam nenhum efeito sobre a produtividade do trabalho proveniente de um choque na qualidade institucional, enquanto que os países da amostra dos subdesenvolvidos mostram uma resposta maior que aquela da amostra completa. A produtividade do trabalho mostra uma resposta muito maior ao capital humano em países com boas instituições. Choques ao capital físico por trabalhador somente produzem resultados positivos para produtividade do trabalho na amostra dos países subdesenvolvidos. Estes resultados sugerem que existem retornos decrescentes para aumentos na qualidade institucional, o que está alinhado com a hipótese de convergência no nível de vida dos países. Isso está de acordo com o encontrado em Góes (2016). Os resultados sugerem também que o capital humano é melhor alocado quando as instituições são melhores e vice versa, gerando ganhos de produtividade de acordo com a qualidade institucional. Isso está de acordo com o encontrado em Hall, Sobel e Crowley (2010), Acemoglu, Gallego e Robinson (2014) e Niquito (2015). / I explore the relations between economic institutions and economic growth and development. Institutions influence the structure of incentives in a society determining how the resources will be allocated and how efficiently hence they determine economic performance. The empirical literature seems to agree with this line of thought. A series of panel autoregressions was built with the goal of investigating the dynamic relation between labor productivity, institutional quality, human capital and physical capital per worker. Using the database created by Kunˇciˇc (2014) as a proxy for institutions and data from the Penn World Table 9.0 of labor productivity, human capital and physical capital per worker I find that a structural shock to institutions has on average a positive and significant effect on labor productivity. I also find that a shock to human capital has on average a positive and significant effect on labor productivity while a shock to physical capital per worker does not. Kunˇciˇc (2014) divides his sample into clusters of institutional quality wich rank the countries from better to worst institutions. Using this clusters I divide the sample in two, one-half containing countries with good institutions i.e developed, and another containing the countries with worst institutions i.e underdeveloped. The results are strikingly different between the two samples. Countries with good institutions have no effect on labor productivity from a shock in institutional quality, while the underdeveloped countries sample show a bigger response than that of the full sample. Labor productivity shows a much greater response to human capital in countries with good institutions. Physical capital shocks only produce positive responses in labor productivity in the sample of countries with worst institutions. These results suggest that there are diminishing returns to increases in institutional quality and that human capital may be misallocated in countries with bad institutions, suggesting that economic institutions greatly affect the allocation of resources in a society.

Neste trabalho, explora-se a relação das instituições econômicas com o crescimento e desenvolvimento econômico. As instituições influenciam a estrutura de incentivos econômicos em uma sociedade, determinando como e o quão eficiente será a alocação de recursos, portanto determinam a performance econômica. A literatura empírica parece corroborar essa tese. Neste trabalho se busca contribuir para a literatura empírica no assunto. Foram construídas uma série de painéis autoregressivos com o objetivo de investigar a relação dinâmica entre a produtividade do trabalho, qualidade das instituições econômicas, capital humano e capital físico por trabalhador. Usando a base de dados criada por Kunˇciˇc (2014) como uma proxy para instituições e dados da Penn World Table 9.0 que medem a produtividade do trabalho, capital humano e capital físico por trabalhador, os resultados mostram que um choque estrutural nas instituições, em média, tem um efeito positivo e estatisticamente significante na produtividade do trabalho. Outro resultado obtido foi que um choque no capital humano gera, em média, um efeito positivo na produtividade do trabalho, enquanto que um choque ao capital físico por trabalhador não tem efeito sobre essa variável. Kunˇciˇc (2014) divide sua amostra em clusters de qualidade institucional que ranqueiam os países de melhores a piores instituições. Usando esses clusters, a amostra é dividida em dois, metade contendo os países com boas instituições, isto é, desenvolvidos, e metade contendo os países com instituições ruins, isto é, subdesenvolvidos. Os resultados diferem entre as duas amostras. Países com boas instituições não apresentam nenhum efeito sobre a produtividade do trabalho proveniente de um choque na qualidade institucional, enquanto que os países da amostra dos subdesenvolvidos mostram uma resposta maior que aquela da amostra completa. A produtividade do trabalho mostra uma resposta muito maior ao capital humano em países com boas instituições. Choques ao capital físico por trabalhador somente produzem resultados positivos para produtividade do trabalho na amostra dos países subdesenvolvidos. Estes resultados sugerem que existem retornos decrescentes para aumentos na qualidade institucional, o que está alinhado com a hipótese de convergência no nível de vida dos países. Isso está de acordo com o encontrado em Góes (2016). Os resultados sugerem também que o capital humano é melhor alocado quando as instituições são melhores e vice versa, gerando ganhos de produtividade de acordo com a qualidade institucional. Isso está de acordo com o encontrado em Hall, Sobel e Crowley (2010), Acemoglu, Gallego e Robinson (2014) e Niquito (2015). / I explore the relations between economic institutions and economic growth and development. Institutions influence the structure of incentives in a society determining how the resources will be allocated and how efficiently hence they determine economic performance. The empirical literature seems to agree with this line of thought. A series of panel autoregressions was built with the goal of investigating the dynamic relation between labor productivity, institutional quality, human capital and physical capital per worker. Using the database created by Kunˇciˇc (2014) as a proxy for institutions and data from the Penn World Table 9.0 of labor productivity, human capital and physical capital per worker I find that a structural shock to institutions has on average a positive and significant effect on labor productivity. I also find that a shock to human capital has on average a positive and significant effect on labor productivity while a shock to physical capital per worker does not. Kunˇciˇc (2014) divides his sample into clusters of institutional quality wich rank the countries from better to worst institutions. Using this clusters I divide the sample in two, one-half containing countries with good institutions i.e developed, and another containing the countries with worst institutions i.e underdeveloped. The results are strikingly different between the two samples. Countries with good institutions have no effect on labor productivity from a shock in institutional quality, while the underdeveloped countries sample show a bigger response than that of the full sample. Labor productivity shows a much greater response to human capital in countries with good institutions. Physical capital shocks only produce positive responses in labor productivity in the sample of countries with worst institutions. These results suggest that there are diminishing returns to increases in institutional quality and that human capital may be misallocated in countries with bad institutions, suggesting that economic institutions greatly affect the allocation of resources in a society.

A fundamental question to both historians and development economists is why countries today are able to reach and maintain such starkly different economic outcomes. Popular explanations include geographic and climatological features, short-term policy decisions, and economic institutions. This paper looks at the importance of violence and social pressure in the transformation and conservation of political and economic institutions in Russia. It finds that several major historical legacies including serfdom, Mongol dominance, Orthodoxy, and authoritarianism significantly influence both the past a present institutional setting. Furthermore, such legacies have proven to be major obstructions to the emergence of economic liberalism.

Manufacturing Revolutions - Industrial Policy and Networks in South Korea. This chapter uses a historic big push intervention and newly digitized data from South Korea to study the effects of industrial policy on industrial development. In 1973 South Korea transitioned to a military dictatorship and drastically changed their development strategy. I find industries targeted by the regime's big push grew significantly more than non-targeted industries along several key dimensions of industrial development. These developmental effects persisted after industrial policies were retrenched, following the 1979 assassination of the president. Furthermore, I estimate the spillovers of the industrial policies using exogenous variation in the exposure to the policy across the input-output network. I find evidence of persistent pecuniary externalities like those posited by big push development theorists, such as Albert Hirschman. In other words, I find that South Korea's controversial industrial policy was successful in producing industrial development, the benefits of which persisted through time and in industries not directly targeted by the policies. Waiting for the Great Leap Forward - The Green Revolution and Structural Change in the Philippines. This study explores the short- and long-run impacts of the green revolution on structural transformation. The setting is the revolution’s home country: the Philippines. In 1966, the Philippine’s experienced the widespread introduction of so-called “miracle rice” varieties, invented at the International Rice Research Institute in Los Banos, Laguna. The island republic experienced large gains to agricultural productivity as a result. Using a newly constructed panel of Philippine municipalities, I show that growth in agricultural productivity led to unexpected patterns of structural transformation. In the short-run, the green revolution translated into labor-absorbing technological change, reallocating labor into HYV-intensive rice economies. However, in the long-run, the rising relative cost of labor, meant that rice farms mechanized and displaced the Philippine peasantry into the service sector. The Historical State, Local Collective Action, and Economic Development in Vietnam. This study examines how the historical state conditions long-run development, using Vietnam as a laboratory. Northern Vietnam (Dai Viet) was ruled by a strong centralized state in which the village was the fundamental administrative unit. Southern Vietnam was a peripheral tributary of the Khmer (Cambodian) Empire, which followed a patron-client model with weaker, more personalized power relations and no village intermediation. Using a regression discontinuity design across the Dai Viet-Khmer boundary, the study shows that areas historically under a strong state have higher living standards today and better economic outcomes over the past 150 years. Rich historical data document that in villages with a strong historical state, citizens have been better able to organize for public goods and redistribution through civil society and local government. This suggests that the strong historical state crowded in village-level collective action and that these norms persisted long after the original state disappeared.