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The irrigation landscape known today as Distrito de Riego 038 (southern Sonora's Mayo Valley) issues from historical struggles to construct an official order--set forth in maps, plans, and in a kaleidoscopic array of programs--out of a highly differentiated world of signs, symbols, places and peoples. This dissertation tracks and analyzes those struggles, beginning with nineteenth-century military efforts to map and colonize the valley, and ending with recent attempts to "devolve" control over the irrigated landscape to "water users." The lower Rio Mayo basin is the ancestral home of the Yoreme, or Mayos, an indigenous group for whom agricultural development--and colonization more broadly--has brought a loss of autonomy, of control over the Rio Mayo floodplain and its surroundings. Entwined with this process, particularly since the late nineteenth century, was the federalization of the river itself, and, over time, the entire hydrographic basin.In part because of the fluvial nature of water--or, rather, the implications of its unpredictability for the squest to tame it--even quintessentially modern complexes like Distrito 038 develop dependencies on and become deeply reworked in the engagement with a less-than-modern world. The district is, in many respects, quite obviously a space of capitalist-state hegemony. And yet, people have always done what they must to simply get by, to access resources any way they can for livelihood and production. Thus, while programs created to centralize/federalize hydraulic governance may have ensured a functional hegemony at certain critical moments and in particular places, the everyday micro-politics of access and allocation constantly chaffed against this process. Emergent around state-led irrigation, then, have always been counter-territorial projects, struggles to create autonomous spaces of resource access and use, and sites for alternative geographical and political imaginaries.

The societies of Mahan and Baekje occupied Korea’s southwestern region from approximately first through seventh centuries CE, but their origins, geographical extent, and internal cultural variations have been poorly understood from archaeological and historical data. Baekje is considered the first state to develop in the region, but Mahan has proven more difficult to categorize. This dissertation explores the social structures related to craft production in both societies through geochemical analysis of pottery remains from Mahan and Baekje sites. First, an overview of existing research on Mahan and Baekje is provided, followed by a discussion of the state concept in archaeology and more recent theories regarding heterarchy in complex societies. The methodologies deployed in this study include stylistic analysis, Instrumental Neutron Activation Analysis (INAA), and thin-section petrography on pottery fragments from Mahan and Baekje sites. The eight sites included in this study cover a wide range of the Mahan/Baekje region, including settlements in modern Seoul, Incheon, Wonju, Jincheon County, and Gwangju. Geochemical data from INAA which are subjected to multiple statistical analyses to detect patterns of chemistry related to clay sources and processing methods, revealing information on pottery manufacture and exchange. This dissertation finds that the production and consumption patterns of pottery in the Baekje kingdom bear a strong resemblance to those in Mahan, differing primarily in scale. Although Baekje is often studied in terms of its relationship with China, the findings presented here suggest a deep cultural relationship between Mahan and Baekje. Mahan’s role in the history of this region is currently undergoing reassessment, making this work part of mounting evidence of Mahan’s contribution to later Korean civilizations. Looking at Baekje as a complex society with the expectation of both hierarchical and heterarchical organization reveals a political economy with multiple nodes of power and control, resulting from local people making decisions in a locally situated cultural context. / 10000-01-01

This dissertation offers the first in depth examination of the government of garrisons in England between the 1560s and the 1630s, via the close examination of three case studies: the garrisons at Plymouth, Portsmouth and Berwick-upon-Tweed. The garrisons located at vulnerable locations along England’s frontier existed to help maintain the internal peace and safety of the realm. The central government, the crown and the privy council, and those who lived in these vulnerable areas agreed about the value and necessity of defence. They also agreed that defence served the larger goal of stable and orderly domestic government. They disagreed, however, over the government of garrisons. The central government and those upon whom it relied to govern in the localities thus entered into negotiations over the nature of garrison government. In these negotiations, the Elizabethan central government regularly and successfully asserted the queen’s right to appoint a garrison captain and successfully maintained him in his jurisdiction once appointed. The regime took specific, goal oriented action to maintain the stable and Protestant polity that was, in their view, established under Elizabeth I. The result was expansion of the state. This study questions, therefore, the extent to which the early modern English state expanded through an undirected process of state formation. While the garrisons under study here reveal that England underwent significant military development during this period, these garrisons still did not constitute a standing army. The Elizabethan central government still lacked the physical coercive power to implement their ambitions without recourse to negotiation. Domestic garrisons reveal, however, that state building occurred not in spite of the fact that power was negotiated, but rather because it was negotiated. The central government’s hand at the bargaining table was not as weak as is sometimes portrayed, particularly with regard to military matters. Defence of the realm was part of the royal prerogative and so actions taken concerning the government of garrisons carried considerable legitimacy. Moreover, as the font of all official authority within the state, the central government was the ultimate arbiter of jurisdictional dispute. Those who possessed official authority in early modern England feared the diminution of that authority, through actions perceived as illegitimate, in the eyes of those over whom they governed. Equally unpalatable, however, was the diminishing of one’s authority through the encroachment of the authority of another. Against this eventuality, one’s only recourse was the central government.

This dissertation examines the role of education in the formation of the Singapore developmental state, through a historical study of education for citizenship in Singapore (1955-2004), in which I explore the interconnections between changes in history, civics and social studies curricula, and the politics of nation-building. Building on existing scholarship on education and state formation, the dissertation goes beyond the conventional notion of seeing education as providing the skilled workforce for the economy, to mapping out cultural and ideological dimensions of the role of education in the developmental state. The story of state formation through citizenship education in Singapore is essentially the history of how Singapore’s developmental state managed crises (imagined, real or engineered), and how changes in history, civics and social studies curricula, served to legitimize the state, through educating and moulding the desired “good citizen” in the interest of nation building. Underpinning these changes has been the state’s use of cultural constructs such as Confucianism and Asian values to shore up its legitimacy. State formation in Singapore has been very successful, as evidenced by its economic prosperity and education has played a key role in this success. However, the “economic growth at all costs” ethos comes, arguably, at a price – the potential loss of zeitgeist, or the loss of the “World-Soul”. Nation building in the sense of fostering a sense of rootedness and belonging to the country in its citizenry – the “World-Soul” – had to be relegated to the backburner in the relentless pursuit of economic development, in order to sustain and legitimize the developmental state. By harnessing the educational sphere for its economic growth objectives through the discourse of crisis, the developmental state gained political legitimacy in the eyes of a citizenry increasingly accustomed to educational mobility and material wealth, even if at the expense of political freedoms.

This dissertation examines the role of education in the formation of the Singapore developmental state, through a historical study of education for citizenship in Singapore (1955-2004), in which I explore the interconnections between changes in history, civics and social studies curricula, and the politics of nation-building. Building on existing scholarship on education and state formation, the dissertation goes beyond the conventional notion of seeing education as providing the skilled workforce for the economy, to mapping out cultural and ideological dimensions of the role of education in the developmental state. The story of state formation through citizenship education in Singapore is essentially the history of how Singapore’s developmental state managed crises (imagined, real or engineered), and how changes in history, civics and social studies curricula, served to legitimize the state, through educating and moulding the desired “good citizen” in the interest of nation building. Underpinning these changes has been the state’s use of cultural constructs such as Confucianism and Asian values to shore up its legitimacy. State formation in Singapore has been very successful, as evidenced by its economic prosperity and education has played a key role in this success. However, the “economic growth at all costs” ethos comes, arguably, at a price – the potential loss of zeitgeist, or the loss of the “World-Soul”. Nation building in the sense of fostering a sense of rootedness and belonging to the country in its citizenry – the “World-Soul” – had to be relegated to the backburner in the relentless pursuit of economic development, in order to sustain and legitimize the developmental state. By harnessing the educational sphere for its economic growth objectives through the discourse of crisis, the developmental state gained political legitimacy in the eyes of a citizenry increasingly accustomed to educational mobility and material wealth, even if at the expense of political freedoms.

This thesis explores the relationship between proto-democracy, multiculturalism, and state formation. In the introduction, I express the desire to ascertain how legal multiculturalism on the Isle of Man could be viewed as a product of the shared proto-democratic character of the Irish and the Norse legal traditions. Further, I wish to explore how this multiculturalism influenced the development of the state on the island and, coming full circle, what multiculturalism and state formation meant for the future of proto-democracy on the island. In this thesis, I conclude that many of the institutions that played a role in fostering state formation on Man, such as the keys, coroners, and parishes, were themselves a product of legal multiculturalism. Further, I argue that this legal multiculturalism and state formation in turn results in a loss of institutions on Man that characterized the separate legal traditions as proto-democracies. / Master of Arts

This article analyses efforts by the state of Oaxaca to mark its border from 1856 to 1912. State officials hoped to demarcate a permanent border along the frontier as a way to delineate a peaceful ending to on-going boundary disputes, some of which allegedly dated to pre-Columbian times. The activity of marking Oaxaca's boundary effectively represented a literal process of Mexican state formation. Oaxaca officials attempted to negotiate the state's jurisdictional limits in cooperation with other federations as well as with their own citizens as they located the parameters of the state and the limits of its authority during the era.

Yes

Two key themes of this special issue are: how violence challenges democracy and how democratic politics might, over time, diminish violence. This paper explores how violence(s) embedded in Latin America's state formation process are multiplied rather than diminished through democratization, generating a securitizing logic which fundamentally distorts democratic principles. Known for its high levels of historic violence(s), Latin America today is second only to Southern Africa in levels of homicide in the world. Some see contemporary violence in the region as a rupture from the past: ‘new violence’ characterized by its urban and social nature in contrast to the rural and political nature of the past. Violence, however, has a reproductive quality, by which it is transmitted through space as well as time. This article argues that rather than reflecting a rupture with the past, violence in Latin America has merely accelerated its complex reproduction in many forms across (gendered) spaces of socialization. The paradox is that the proliferation of this violence has occurred alongside democratic transitions. Although the state is not directly responsible for all the violence which is taking place, this article argues that in many countries it is the very trajectory of the state-formation process which has facilitated this rapid reproduction of violence. I call this process ‘perverse’. Democracy is increasingly subject to the fears and insecurities of the population, enabling the state to build its authority not on the protection of citizens' rights, but on its armed encounters and insidious collusions with violent actors in the name of ‘security provision’. Categories of people become non-citizens, subjected to abuse by state, para-state and non-state violent actors. If this process continues, democracy will ultimately be securitized.