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This dissertation investigates the impacts of constraints on optimal government policy. The first two chapters provide a general introduction and review of the literature. Chapters three and four analyze education spending and institutional structure in an economy with informational asymmetries and employment matching frictions. The fifth investigates the impact of politics on government decisions over taxation and spending programs more generally. Chapter three analyzes the situation where governments can target education funds to specific observable groups (referred to as low and high productivity neighbourhoods/regions). The results suggest that it may be optimal to employ educational transfers, rather than cash transfers amongst individuals, to achieve social welfare objectives. This is becasue the former can reduce distortions created by the tax system. However, the value of educational spending in mitigating these information frictions may not be that large, and may in fact exacerbate such distortions. This suggests that an optimal education policy may be more regressive when there is a distortionary tax system in place. Further, we showt that even if ``equalizing opportunities'' is deemed optimal in the static problem, it may not be a reasonable policy goal when we extend the analysis to include dynamics. Chapter four is joint work with Afrasiab Mirza. We analyze an economy where heterogeneous individuals are uncertain about their endowments. The education system trades off the desire to capitalize on talent through specific skills training with the need to provide individuals with opportunities to learn about their career preferences through a broader education. The results consider the implications of various educational institutions for the income distribution and consequently welfare. Chapter five analyzes the dynamics of public spending, taxation and debt in a political agency model. Choices are made by short-lived politicians who can be only partially controlled through the electoral process. The main focus is to consider the impacts of binding limits on the public budget. The value of imposing this additional friction depends both on the extent to which politicians' goals deviate from their constituencies and how effectively the electoral process disciplines them when they misbehave. The results also suggest that the value of such a restriction depends on the fiscal position at the time in which it is imposed. / Thesis (Ph.D, Economics) -- Queen's University, 2009-11-25 20:25:29.12

This thesis examines the effectiveness of the competition regime in Hong Kong (HK), which is one of the few remaining developed economies to yet implement a competition law. In its search for the optimal dynamics of the regime, the thesis offers a tripartite examination on its objectives, institutions and scope of application, and how these three distinct internal dimensions individually and jointly influence the effectiveness of the regime. Furthermore, a critical review is offered on two significant external factors, land hegemony and the political regime, both of which exert a strong force on the competition regime. This interdisciplinary research project encompasses legal, political, economic, and market-contextualized analysis. Given that HK has a new competition regime, and is an international financial, communication, and transportation centre, it is appropriate and apposite to evaluate it by international standards. The thesis begins with an examination of three internal dimensions. As a preliminary, it considers the extent to which HK benefits from a free economy with a sound competitive environment. It then moves on to investigate the first dimension, which is that of the objectives of the competition law in terms of its clarity, prioritization and consistency. Following this, the thesis investigates the second dimension, the institutions of the Competition Commission and the Competition Tribunal, by asking how the structure shapes the substance of enforcement. It explores the limitations and virtues of major institutional models and which model is the most appropriate for HK. In its third dimension, the thesis questions the adequacy of the scope of competition law, with a focus on the near blanket exclusion of public entities. Commentary is offered on how to achieve a level playing field between private and public sectors. Following the evaluation of the three internal dimensions, the thesis focuses on their correlations. The discussion reviews the challenges and puts forward a wide range of measures to manage them. Finally, the thesis explores the significance of two external powers, land hegemony and political regime, and suggests several long-term solutions which the author believes would lead to the steady optimization of the competition regime.

Submitted by Renata Lopes (renatasil82@gmail.com) on 2017-07-11T18:10:57Z No. of bitstreams: 1 sandrodefreitasferreira.pdf: 4885587 bytes, checksum: 00f43590d0a4fdd642bfeae221602a02 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Adriana Oliveira (adriana.oliveira@ufjf.edu.br) on 2017-08-08T15:32:55Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 sandrodefreitasferreira.pdf: 4885587 bytes, checksum: 00f43590d0a4fdd642bfeae221602a02 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-08-08T15:32:55Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 sandrodefreitasferreira.pdf: 4885587 bytes, checksum: 00f43590d0a4fdd642bfeae221602a02 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-06-01 / CAPES - Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / As medidas de crimes no Brasil, particularmente violentos e fatais, têm se mantido e crescido, desde os anos de 1980, acima de dez homicídios por cem mil habitantes; limite mínimo recomendado pela Organização Mundial da Saúde. A essa “poluição” social, costuma-se responder com aumento do esforço de combate e controle do aparato policial-judicial. Todavia, as autoridades estatais não conseguem monitorar ubiquamente as atividades ilegítimas sob sua jurisdição. Portanto, não podem prescindir de outros controladores. Embora sejam menos eficazes quanto aos crimes, porém mais difusos territorialmente, os controladores sociais podem atuar, como efeito dissuasório primário, mediante a socialização de crenças positivas de adesão a normas sociais e leis, de crenças negativas para sua violação e a administração de sanções. As políticas criminais, especialmente aquelas que envolvem mudanças legislativas penais não podem ignorar os efeitos que outras mudanças legislativas têm sobre as estruturas de incentivos que regem as atividades desses controladores primários. Pressupondo-se que os processos decisórios criminal e transgressivo têm natureza comum (envolvendo punição penal e social, respectivamente); que a decisão individual de entrada na atividade criminal requer informação útil e que, na ausência de mercados ilícitos organizados, recorre-se a outros canais de informação, tal como as experiências transgressivas e criminais pessoais e alheias; a densidade transgressivo-criminal poderia carregar informação sobre o custo moral dessa entrada na “indústria” proscrita. O objetivo desta Tese é avaliar o efeito qualitativo da dissuasão social como barreira primária às escolhas ilegítimas individuais. Uma vez que os níveis de transgressões podem indiretamente sinalizar o nível dessa dissuasão primária, desenvolveu-se uma estratégia metodológica que pudesse mensura-la. Além de uma avaliação preliminar da distribuição territorial e da evolução temporal de algumas transgressões, nas áreas mínimas comparáveis (AMCs) brasileiras nos anos de 1991 a 2010, executam-se Análises de Agrupamentos e Discriminante para identificar grupos de AMCs em níveis de transgressividade-criminalidade; extraem-se os fatores transgressivos comuns (definidos como “transgressividade por incapacitação”, “transgressividade familiar-religiosa” e “transgressividade educativa adulta”) da amostra do grupos de AMCs com maiores níveis de transgressões e crimes e com maiores populações, por Análise Fatorial; e averiguam-se, via Análise Comparativa Qualitativa, as relações entre esses fatores e as taxas de homicídio, como medida mais robusta do nível de criminalidade. Além da identificação de grupos de níveis alto, intermediário e baixo de transgressões e crimes, e desses três fatores, as evidências sugerem que alta transgressividade familiar-religiosa (equivalentemente, baixa coatividade familiar-religiosa) associa-se consistentemente alta taxa de homicídio; inclusive, quando combinada com alta dissuasão estatal. / Measures of crimes in Brazil, particularly violent and fatal, have been maintained and increased, since the 1980s, over ten homicides per hundred thousand inhabitants; minimum threshold recommended by the World Health Organization. To this social "pollution", it is usually answered with increased effort to combat and control the police-judicial apparatus. However, state authorities are unable to monitor illegitimate activities under their jurisdiction. Therefore, they cannot do without other controllers. Although they are less effective in crimes, but more territorially diffused, social controllers can act as a primary deterrent by socializing positive beliefs of adherence to social norms and laws, from negative beliefs to their violation and the administration of sanctions. Criminal policies, especially those involving criminal law changes, cannot ignore the effects of other legislative changes on the incentive structures governing the activities of these primary controllers. Assuming that criminal and transgressive decision-making processes have a common nature (involving criminal and social punishment, respectively); that individual decision to enter criminal activity requires useful information and that, in the absence of organized illicit markets, other information channels are used, such as personal and extraneous criminal and transgressive experiences; Transgressive-criminal density could carry information about the moral cost of such entry into proscribed industry. The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate the qualitative effect of social deterrence as a primary barrier to individual illegitimate choices. Since the levels of transgression can indirectly signal the level of this primary deterrence, a methodological strategy was developed that could measure it. In addition to a preliminary evaluation of the territorial distribution and the temporal evolution of some transgressions, in the brazilian comparable minimum areas (AMCs) from 1991 to 2010, Clusters and Discriminant Analysis are carried out to identify groups of AMCs at levels of transgressivitycriminality; the common transgressive factors (defined as "transgressivity by incapacitation", "family-religious transgressiveness" and "adult educational transgressiveness") are extracted from the sample of AMC groups with higher levels of transgressions and crimes and with larger populations by Factor Analysis; and, through Qualitative Comparative Analysis, the relationships between these factors and homicide rates are ascertained as a more robust measure of the level of crime. In addition to the identification of groups of high, intermediate and low levels of transgressions and crimes, and of these three factors, the evidence suggests that high family-religious transgressiveness (equivalently, low family-religious deterrence) is consistently associated with a high homicide rate; even when combined with high state deterrence.