In this dissertation, I present three essays which examine questions in the field of public economics using a game theoretic approach, and I derive hopeful results and helpful rules for international negotiation. In my first chapter, I examine minimum participation constraints. In the presence of heterogeneity, a minimum participation (MP) clause in a public goods arrangement can serve as a device to create a more homogeneous group. When coalitions are restricted in what they can bargain over, exclusion of some agents from the bargaining process can be Pareto improving. This paper gives a general set of sufficient conditions for such an exclusion result to hold, and presents examples of when exclusion does, and does not, improve upon unanimity. In the second chapter, I discuss the problem of determining which externality situations merit international cooperation. I create a general framework of linearized parameters to examine a general externality problem, and then I provide the sufficient conditions for a parameter to move non-cooperative and cooperative solutions in opposite directions under certain circumstances. I argue that situations which behave in this manner and which have a higher parameter value have more benefit to cooperation through the increased range in actions to bargain over. The third chapter extends upon the second chapter and applies the framework developed to an externality problem. I present a particular story of correlation in fish growth and a corresponding model which gives an example of an increasing action gap. I describe the method of use of the framework, and using the linearized parameters developed in the second chapter, I attempt to show the divergence of non-cooperative and cooperative actions in this setting, demonstrating the need for negotiation among sovereign entities. / text

Despite worldwide policy efforts such as the Kyoto Protocol, the emission of greenhouse gases (GHG) remains a negative externality. Economic equilibrium paths in the presence of such an uncorrected externality are inefficient; as a consequence there is no real economic opportunity cost to correcting this externality by mitigating global warming. Mitigation investment using resources diverted from conventional investments can raise the economic well-being of both current and future generations. The economic literature on GHG emissions misleadingly focuses attention on the intergenerational equity aspects of mitigation by using a hybrid constrained optimal path as the "business-as-usual" benchmark. We calibrate a simple Keynes-Ramsey growth model to illustrate the significant potential Pareto-improvement from mitigation investment, and to explain the equilibrium concept appropriate to modeling an uncorrected negative externality.

L'innovation engendre la croissance économique et permet d'accroître le niveau de vie des populations. Cette proposition de Joseph Alois Schumpeter (1912) a été plutôt confortée que contestée par les faits empiriques. De nombreux travaux ont en effet montré que le lien entre innovation, croissance et niveau de vie existe. Ainsi, il existe un assez large consensus sur l'idée qu'encourager l'innovation devrait constituer l'un des objectifs prioritaires de la politique économique. Cependant, de nombreuses innovations peuvent affecter la richesse, la santé ou même la liberté de l'ensemble de la société ou de certains de ses membres. Par exemple, les semences OGM peuvent permettre d'accroître la production agricole, mais peuvent également avoir un impact négatif sur la santé humaine et l'environnement. C'est également le cas de nombreuses innovations à caractère médical, les nanotechnologies, certains logiciels, certains produits financiers, etc. Partant de l’hypothèse que l’innovation peut être génératrice d’effets négatifs, cette thèse propose un cadre théorique pour guider le décideur public dans la mise en œuvre d’une politique avisée. Dans un premier temps, nous évaluons tour à tour la performance de plusieurs instruments permettant de réglementer une innovation potentiellement nuisible. Nous examinons deux règles de responsabilité distinctes et nous caractérisons les conditions sous lesquelles chaque réponse réglementaire devrait être mise en oeuvre par les pouvoirs publics. Contrairement à des travaux antérieurs, nous montrons notamment que même si l’innovateur a une responsabilité illimitée, les autorisations peuvent être optimales. D’autre part, en cas de responsabilité limitée, nous établissons que les pénalités ne devraient jamais être privilégiées. Dans un second temps, nous déterminons la politique de brevet optimale lorsque l’innovation est à l’origine d’une externalité négative. Dans ce cas, la largeur du brevet influence non seulement la perte sèche induite par la propriété industrielle mais également la taille de l’effet externe. Nous proposons plusieurs interprétations du concept de largeur et nous caractérisons la structure optimale du brevet. Par ailleurs, nous nous penchons sur la question de savoir quelle récompense attribuer aux innovateurs et nous montrons notamment qu’une politique de brevet modulée gratifiant celles et ceux ayant mis en œuvre une stratégie de Recherche & Développement (R&D) précautionneuse d’une protection industrielle plus forte pourrait être un instrument à même de contenir l’émergence d’innovations génératrices de nuisances. Enfin, nous considérons que plusieurs entreprises sont engagées dans une course à l’innovation et nous caractérisons les conditions sous lesquelles une augmentation de la rivalité conduit ces dernières à précipiter le processus de R&D au risque d’introduire une innovation nuisible. Nous proposons plusieurs méthodes de mesure du degré de rivalité et nous montrons notamment que, dès lors qu’il existe un certain équilibre entre les coûts et les bénéfices engendrés par la précaution, la rivalité rend les entreprises plus enclines à négliger les actions préventives/correctives et à briser la séquentialité du processus de R&D. / Innovation drives economic growth and it increases the standard of living of populations. This proposition of Joseph Alois Schumpeter (1912) has been rather confirmed than challenged by empirical evidence. Indeed, much research has shown that the link between innovation, economic growth and standard of living does exist. Hence, there is a fairly broad consensus on the idea that fostering innovation should constitute one of the main objectives of the economic policy. However, many innovations can affect the wealth, the health, or even the freedom of the society as a whole or of some of its members. For instance, genetically-modified seeds enable farmers to increase agricultural production but they may also have a negative effect on public health and the environment. This is also the case of nanotechnologies, certain software, some financial products, etc. On the assumption that innovations may induce social harm, this thesis provides a theoretical framework in order to guide the regulator in implementing a sound policy. First, we successively evaluate the performance of several instruments available for regulating potentially harmful innovations. We examine two distinct liability rules and we characterize the conditions under which each regulatory response should be implemented. Unlike previous work, we show that even though the innovator has unlimited liability, authorizations may be optimal. Furthermore, in case of limited liability, we establish that penalties should never be favored. Second, we determine the optimal patent policy when the innovation generates a negative externality. In that case, the patent breadth not only influences the deadweight loss induced by the industrial property, but also the size of the external effect. We provide several interpretations of the concept of breadth and we compute the optimal patent structure. Besides, we address the question of how much to reward innovators and we show that a modulated patent policy giving stronger protection to those who have implemented safe Research & Development (R&D) strategies might be an instrument with the potential to prevent the emergence of harmful innovations. Last, we consider several firms engaged in an innovation race and we determine the conditions under which an increase in rivalry leads them to hasten the R&D process at the risk of introducing a harmful innovation. We provide several methods of measurement for the degree of competition and we show that whenever there is some balance between the cost and the benefit induced by safety, then rivalry makes firms more inclined to overlook preventive/corrective actions and to break the sequentiality of R&D.

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Submitted by Renata Lopes (renatasil82@gmail.com) on 2017-07-11T18:10:57Z No. of bitstreams: 1 sandrodefreitasferreira.pdf: 4885587 bytes, checksum: 00f43590d0a4fdd642bfeae221602a02 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Adriana Oliveira (adriana.oliveira@ufjf.edu.br) on 2017-08-08T15:32:55Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 sandrodefreitasferreira.pdf: 4885587 bytes, checksum: 00f43590d0a4fdd642bfeae221602a02 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-08-08T15:32:55Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 sandrodefreitasferreira.pdf: 4885587 bytes, checksum: 00f43590d0a4fdd642bfeae221602a02 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-06-01 / CAPES - Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / As medidas de crimes no Brasil, particularmente violentos e fatais, têm se mantido e crescido, desde os anos de 1980, acima de dez homicídios por cem mil habitantes; limite mínimo recomendado pela Organização Mundial da Saúde. A essa “poluição” social, costuma-se responder com aumento do esforço de combate e controle do aparato policial-judicial. Todavia, as autoridades estatais não conseguem monitorar ubiquamente as atividades ilegítimas sob sua jurisdição. Portanto, não podem prescindir de outros controladores. Embora sejam menos eficazes quanto aos crimes, porém mais difusos territorialmente, os controladores sociais podem atuar, como efeito dissuasório primário, mediante a socialização de crenças positivas de adesão a normas sociais e leis, de crenças negativas para sua violação e a administração de sanções. As políticas criminais, especialmente aquelas que envolvem mudanças legislativas penais não podem ignorar os efeitos que outras mudanças legislativas têm sobre as estruturas de incentivos que regem as atividades desses controladores primários. Pressupondo-se que os processos decisórios criminal e transgressivo têm natureza comum (envolvendo punição penal e social, respectivamente); que a decisão individual de entrada na atividade criminal requer informação útil e que, na ausência de mercados ilícitos organizados, recorre-se a outros canais de informação, tal como as experiências transgressivas e criminais pessoais e alheias; a densidade transgressivo-criminal poderia carregar informação sobre o custo moral dessa entrada na “indústria” proscrita. O objetivo desta Tese é avaliar o efeito qualitativo da dissuasão social como barreira primária às escolhas ilegítimas individuais. Uma vez que os níveis de transgressões podem indiretamente sinalizar o nível dessa dissuasão primária, desenvolveu-se uma estratégia metodológica que pudesse mensura-la. Além de uma avaliação preliminar da distribuição territorial e da evolução temporal de algumas transgressões, nas áreas mínimas comparáveis (AMCs) brasileiras nos anos de 1991 a 2010, executam-se Análises de Agrupamentos e Discriminante para identificar grupos de AMCs em níveis de transgressividade-criminalidade; extraem-se os fatores transgressivos comuns (definidos como “transgressividade por incapacitação”, “transgressividade familiar-religiosa” e “transgressividade educativa adulta”) da amostra do grupos de AMCs com maiores níveis de transgressões e crimes e com maiores populações, por Análise Fatorial; e averiguam-se, via Análise Comparativa Qualitativa, as relações entre esses fatores e as taxas de homicídio, como medida mais robusta do nível de criminalidade. Além da identificação de grupos de níveis alto, intermediário e baixo de transgressões e crimes, e desses três fatores, as evidências sugerem que alta transgressividade familiar-religiosa (equivalentemente, baixa coatividade familiar-religiosa) associa-se consistentemente alta taxa de homicídio; inclusive, quando combinada com alta dissuasão estatal. / Measures of crimes in Brazil, particularly violent and fatal, have been maintained and increased, since the 1980s, over ten homicides per hundred thousand inhabitants; minimum threshold recommended by the World Health Organization. To this social "pollution", it is usually answered with increased effort to combat and control the police-judicial apparatus. However, state authorities are unable to monitor illegitimate activities under their jurisdiction. Therefore, they cannot do without other controllers. Although they are less effective in crimes, but more territorially diffused, social controllers can act as a primary deterrent by socializing positive beliefs of adherence to social norms and laws, from negative beliefs to their violation and the administration of sanctions. Criminal policies, especially those involving criminal law changes, cannot ignore the effects of other legislative changes on the incentive structures governing the activities of these primary controllers. Assuming that criminal and transgressive decision-making processes have a common nature (involving criminal and social punishment, respectively); that individual decision to enter criminal activity requires useful information and that, in the absence of organized illicit markets, other information channels are used, such as personal and extraneous criminal and transgressive experiences; Transgressive-criminal density could carry information about the moral cost of such entry into proscribed industry. The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate the qualitative effect of social deterrence as a primary barrier to individual illegitimate choices. Since the levels of transgression can indirectly signal the level of this primary deterrence, a methodological strategy was developed that could measure it. In addition to a preliminary evaluation of the territorial distribution and the temporal evolution of some transgressions, in the brazilian comparable minimum areas (AMCs) from 1991 to 2010, Clusters and Discriminant Analysis are carried out to identify groups of AMCs at levels of transgressivitycriminality; the common transgressive factors (defined as "transgressivity by incapacitation", "family-religious transgressiveness" and "adult educational transgressiveness") are extracted from the sample of AMC groups with higher levels of transgressions and crimes and with larger populations by Factor Analysis; and, through Qualitative Comparative Analysis, the relationships between these factors and homicide rates are ascertained as a more robust measure of the level of crime. In addition to the identification of groups of high, intermediate and low levels of transgressions and crimes, and of these three factors, the evidence suggests that high family-religious transgressiveness (equivalently, low family-religious deterrence) is consistently associated with a high homicide rate; even when combined with high state deterrence.

Widespread cross-border securities trading have led to the internationalization of securities markets. No one seriously disputes that such securities dealings require regulation, but there is no academic consensus on the best normative approach to such regulation. The academic debate initially focused on whether regulatory competition or cooperation constitutes the better model. However, the debate seems to have evolved to adopt a hybrid model combining the virtues of these two approaches. ‘Harmonization’ constitutes the dominant hybrid model. Nevertheless, the implementation of the harmonization model has barely received any attention in the literature. The aim of this thesis is hence two-fold: first, justify why harmonization should be the preferred model for the regulation of international securities markets; and second, develop, applying an international trade regulation perspective, a regulatory framework to implement the harmonization model using the World Trade Organization and General Agreement on Trade in Services (WTO/GATS) framework.

Widespread cross-border securities trading have led to the internationalization of securities markets. No one seriously disputes that such securities dealings require regulation, but there is no academic consensus on the best normative approach to such regulation. The academic debate initially focused on whether regulatory competition or cooperation constitutes the better model. However, the debate seems to have evolved to adopt a hybrid model combining the virtues of these two approaches. ‘Harmonization’ constitutes the dominant hybrid model. Nevertheless, the implementation of the harmonization model has barely received any attention in the literature. The aim of this thesis is hence two-fold: first, justify why harmonization should be the preferred model for the regulation of international securities markets; and second, develop, applying an international trade regulation perspective, a regulatory framework to implement the harmonization model using the World Trade Organization and General Agreement on Trade in Services (WTO/GATS) framework.