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<p>A majority of formal theoretic research in political science treats political parties as unitary actors, and endows them with decision-making powers not unlike those of strategic individuals. This is true both of most research in the spatial-theoretic tradition, as well as most game theoretic research in the field of comparative political-economy. In contrast, my dissertation examines strategic equilibria which arise when competition takes place simultaneously within parties over organizational control and between parties over political office. I first distinguish between three intra-organizational elements: a party's parliamentary group, its activist cadre, and its executive leaders. Chapters 2-4 develop a set of foundational game theoretic models which identify the equilibrium balance of power among these 3 organizational elements as a function of a country's electoral institutions and voters' relative responsiveness to marginal policy changes. In turn, this more complete understanding of intra-party competition sheds light on a number of important questions in comparative politics and comparative political-economy. For example, it helps to identify conditions under which Downsian vote-maximization is in fact a viable assumption in spatial theoretic models; conditions under which Duverger's argument that proportional representation (PR) should tend to generate multi-party competition may not apply; and, in contrast to Lijphart's famous argument, conditions under which PR may instigate rather than mediate social conflict. Ten months of intensive field research conducted in Turkey provide both the quantitative and the qualitative data which constitute the dissertation's most basic empirical material. This data includes primary and secondary source material on the history of intra-organizational competition in Turkey; observational and informant-based information on contemporary Turkish politics and the events of 2006-2008; and a data set of over 4,000 observations on party-switching in the Turkish Parliament (1987-2007).</p> / Dissertation

In developed democracies, incumbents are consistently found to have an electoral advantage over their challengers. The normative implications of this phenomenon depend on its sources. Despite a large existing literature, there is little consensus on what the sources are. In this three-paper dissertation, I find that both electoral institutions and the parties behind the incumbents appear to have a larger role than the literature has given them credit for, and that in the U.S. context, between 30 and 40 percent of the incumbents' advantage is driven by their "scaring off" serious opposition. / Government

A proposta dessa dissertação é analisar a criação da Justiça Eleitoral em 1932 e avaliar seu impacto nas eleições para a Assembleia Nacional Constituinte de 1934. Na primeira parte destacamos a importância das instituições eleitorais para a competição política, buscando enquadrar o tema, na literatura sobre a governança eleitoral. Em um segundo momento, passamos para a análise contextual dos antecedentes da criação da Justiça Eleitoral no Brasil e as mudanças empreendidas com o Código de 1932. Já na terceira parte, o objetivo é olhar para o funcionamento da Justiça Eleitoral, através dos Boletins Eleitorais, durante as eleições que elegeram a Constituinte de 1934 incluindo o desempenho do TSE, como última instância decisória. Neste trabalho mostramos que a Justiça Eleitoral funcionou através de um desenho institucional centralizado no TSE e sua criação não evitou a influência do governo no processo eleitoral. / The propose of this dissertation is to analyze the creation of the Electoral Justice in 1932 and evaluate its impact on the election for the Constituency Assembly of 1934. In the first part we turn our attention to the importance of the electoral institutions for political competition, aiming to link the theme with the literature about electoral governance. In second place, we analyze the contextual antecedents of the Electoral Justice and the changes inserted at the Electoral Code of 1932. In the third part, the goal is to look at the running of the Electoral Court, through the Electoral Bulletins, during elections to the Constituent Assembly elected in 1933 - including the performance of the TSE, as the final decision-maker. In this text we show that the Electoral Justice ran through a centralized institutional design in the TSE and its creation has not prevented the government\'s influence in the electoral process.

A proposta dessa dissertação é analisar a criação da Justiça Eleitoral em 1932 e avaliar seu impacto nas eleições para a Assembleia Nacional Constituinte de 1934. Na primeira parte destacamos a importância das instituições eleitorais para a competição política, buscando enquadrar o tema, na literatura sobre a governança eleitoral. Em um segundo momento, passamos para a análise contextual dos antecedentes da criação da Justiça Eleitoral no Brasil e as mudanças empreendidas com o Código de 1932. Já na terceira parte, o objetivo é olhar para o funcionamento da Justiça Eleitoral, através dos Boletins Eleitorais, durante as eleições que elegeram a Constituinte de 1934 incluindo o desempenho do TSE, como última instância decisória. Neste trabalho mostramos que a Justiça Eleitoral funcionou através de um desenho institucional centralizado no TSE e sua criação não evitou a influência do governo no processo eleitoral. / The propose of this dissertation is to analyze the creation of the Electoral Justice in 1932 and evaluate its impact on the election for the Constituency Assembly of 1934. In the first part we turn our attention to the importance of the electoral institutions for political competition, aiming to link the theme with the literature about electoral governance. In second place, we analyze the contextual antecedents of the Electoral Justice and the changes inserted at the Electoral Code of 1932. In the third part, the goal is to look at the running of the Electoral Court, through the Electoral Bulletins, during elections to the Constituent Assembly elected in 1933 - including the performance of the TSE, as the final decision-maker. In this text we show that the Electoral Justice ran through a centralized institutional design in the TSE and its creation has not prevented the government\'s influence in the electoral process.

Party membership levels in the new democracies of central and east European were predicted to remain universally low, stymied by post-communist legacies, the availability of state funding and the prevalence of mass media communications (van Biezen, 2003; Kopeck&yacute;, 2007). However, more than two decades after the fall of the Berlin Wall, membership levels vary considerably between countries, and also between individual parties within party systems. Using freshly gathered party membership data, elite surveys and interviews, this thesis explores a number of institutional hypotheses to test whether, as in western democracies, electoral institutions influence how parties organise and campaign. This thesis finds that national electoral systems, municipal electoral rules and business funding regulations have an observable impact on how parties use their members. In particular, 'decentralised' electoral systems encourage greater involvement of members in voter contacting and other small campaign tasks. This thesis concludes that, contrary to the dominant literature, the availability of state funding has little impact on party membership recruitment. Instead, central and east European parties' attitudes to members are shaped by a complex interaction of institutional, cultural, ideological and strategic factors.

This thesis examines the conditions under which democratically elected policymakers are more likely to provide policies that compensate individuals that lose from international trade. It develops and empirically tests a theoretical framework of compensation in open economies that accounts for differences in the degree to which governments benefit losers from trade. It first develops a theory of preference formation based on economic geography, and then argues that electoral and legislative institutions jointly condition the supply of compensation. The theoretical analysis provides three sets of observable implications evaluated using micro- and macro-level data in Europe and Latin America. First, exposure to international competition increases demand for policy that compensates for the costs of trade, but this effect is more pronounced among those individuals in economically specialised and uncompetitive contexts where reemployment in the event of a shock is difficult. Second, policymakers in proportional electoral systems face weak incentives to target trade losers in geographically concentrated and uncompetitive regions. In contrast, majoritarian institutions generate incentives to increase compensation when trade losers are geographically concentrated. Another implication is that under some conditions, the presence of a strong upper house that represents regional interests dampens the provision of compensation, and the relative effect of electoral rules. The empirical implications of the argument are tested using a multi-method research strategy that combines cross-national and case study analyses and draws on quantitative and qualitative techniques. Chapter 3 tests the micro-level implications of the model using survey data for European regions over 2002-2006. The findings indicate that regional economic specialization and regional competitiveness jointly condition the impact of trade on preferences for compensation. Chapter 4 systematically tests the extent to which the geographical concentration of trade losers conditions the effect of electoral institutions on levels of compensation. It uses panel data from 14 European countries from 1980 to 2010. The findings indicate that where trade losers are concentrated, lower district magnitude leads to more compensation. Chapters 5 and 6 conduct case studies of compensation in Spain and Argentina, both countries that underwent deep liberalisation and offer significant variation at the regional and institutional level. Chapter 5 explores preferences over compensation in selected regions in Spain and Argentina, and shows that regional specialisation and competitiveness were important in shaping levels of support for compensation. Chapter 6 examines the role of electoral institutions and legislative veto bargaining in shaping the politics of compensation in Spain and Argentina.

Souvent prônée au regard de l’abondant discours politique et juridique dont elle fait l’objet, mais en même temps fréquemment et subtilement « torpillée », « combattue », la transparence des élections est l’une de ces notions-méridien des temps modernes.La présente thèse lève ainsi le voile sur ce que, quelle qu’en soit la forme, cette notion est tout logiquement reprise − et tant bien que mal consolidée ou en voie de consolidation − dans l’ordre juridique interne des différents États, notamment africains et tente de faire prendre conscience que, à l’analyse, une telle consécration, ou le cas échéant une telle consolidation, apparait bien plus embarrassée. En sus de cela, d’un point de vue de théorie et de pratique juridiques, naissent des incertitudes, au double regard de sa nature et de sa portée juridiques, instaurant ainsi un climat d’insécurité juridique dont il devient donc impérieux de sortir. Sans doute est-ce parce que, assez récente dans un domaine lui-même en quête d’autonomie : le droit électoral, cette notion se révèle très redoutable à cerner. Cette modeste contribution tente-t-elle justement de répondre à l’ensemble de ces préoccupations. Dans cette perspective, le travail pionnier de la Cour constitutionnelle du Bénin qui a érigé la transparence électorale en un principe à valeur constitutionnelle mérite d’être poursuivi. Elle est donc davantage un « construit » qu’un « donné ». En tout état de cause, un tel approfondissement assurerait une cohérence au droit public et renforcerait la sécurité juridique. Cette exigence est donc un terreau fertile à l’éclosion et au triomphe de la démocratie libérale. À y voir de près, elle est à même de réaliser la révolution juridique chère à Montesquieu et que n’a pu, malheureusement, pérenniser le principe de séparation des pouvoirs : la modération du pouvoir politique dans l’État. / Often advocated in view of the abundant political and legal discourse of which it is the object, but at the same time and often subtly "torpedoed", “fought”, transparent elections are one of these meridian notions of modern times.Whatever form it may take, this Thesis is lifting the veil on this notion which is logically repeated, and somehow not well consolidated or being consolidated - in the internal legal order of the various States, particularly African States and which tries to make people aware that, in the analysis, such a consecration, or if any such consolidation, appears more embarrassed. In addition to this, a point of view of legal theory and practice, uncertainties arise, the double view of its nature and scope of legal, thus creating a climate of legal insecurity that it becomes imperative to quit Without any doubt, this recently field is seeking itself autonomy, and this concept , electoral law proves to be very formidable to understand. This modest contribution, consequently tries to answer all these concerns. In this perspective, the pioneering work of the Constitutional Court of Benin which erected electoral transparency principle to a value worth pursuing. Therefore, it is more of “a constructed” than a "given”. In any event, such a deepening should ensure coherence to public law and enhance legal certainty. This requirement is a fertile ground for the emergence and triumph of liberal democracy. A close look at it, it is able to perform the legal revolution dear to Montesquieu who could not, unfortunately, perpetuate the principle of separation of powers: the moderation of political power in the state.