This study is designed to examine how much of an impact crisis or the perception of a crisis might have on Congressional policy making for private electric utilities and how the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) reacts to Congressional action or inaction in such cases. Also, where appropriate the influence and impact of other actors in the different crises are mentioned. The first set of findings came from the era running from 1977 to 1986 as FERC was created by Congress in 1977 to address in part the stagflationary crisis of the 1970s of which electric utilities played an important role. Next, the Congressional response to the Gulf War and FERC's reaction to it is analyzed as in that case legislators were reacting to the perception that another energy driven economic crisis in the U.S. might occur as happened after the OPEC oil embargo of 1973. Finally, the study examines the Congressional response and FERC's reaction to the Midwest price spike, the California electricity crisis, the Northeast blackout of 2003, and the financial decline of electric utilities nationally due to the failures of wholesale electricity market restructuring. Modern technology driven societies like the U.S. need access to vast supplies of cheap reliable electricity to run everything from computer systems to public sanitation systems. Most of that electricity in the U.S. is provided by private electric utilities. As a result, this study focuses primarily on federal public policies, created by Congress and implemented by FERC, related to private utilities. Yet, despite the importance of electricity to contemporary societies, public affairs scholarship has generally not addressed this issue. In order to probe the impact of Congress and FERC, I examine interconnected events and actions that take place at different points in time to determine what influence, if any, these organizations have had. Crisis seems to be the primary causal mechanism pushing Congress to act in this area of public policy. Indicators of Congressional action include hearings, proposed federal legislation, and statutes, while indicators of a response from FERC include the issuance of orders, opinions, and formal docketed decisions. / Ph. D.

abstract: Today's energy market is facing large-scale changes that will affect all market players. Near the top of that list is the rapid deployment of residential solar photovoltaic (PV) systems. Yet that growing trend will be influenced multiple competing interests between various stakeholders, namely the utility, consumers and technology provides. This study provides a series of analyses--utility-side, consumer-side, and combined analyses--to understand and evaluate the effect of increases in residential solar PV market penetration. Three urban regions have been selected as study locations--Chicago, Phoenix, Seattle--with simulated load data and solar insolation data at each locality. Various time-of-use pricing schedules are investigated, and the effect of net metering is evaluated to determine the optimal capacity of solar PV and battery storage in a typical residential home. The net residential load profile is scaled to assess system-wide technical and economic figures of merit for the utility with an emphasis on intraday load profiles, ramp rates and electricity sales with increasing solar PV penetration. The combined analysis evaluates the least-cost solar PV system for the consumer and models the associated system-wide effects on the electric grid. Utility revenue was found to drop by 1.2% for every percent PV penetration increase, net metering on a monthly or annual basis improved the cost-effectiveness of solar PV but not battery storage, the removal of net metering policy and usage of an improved the cost-effectiveness of battery storage and increases in solar PV penetration reduced the system load factor. As expected, Phoenix had the most favorable economic scenario for residential solar PV, primarily due to high solar insolation. The study location--solar insolation and load profile--was also found to affect the time of year at which the largest net negative system load was realized. / Dissertation/Thesis / Masters Thesis Engineering 2014

Through the Smart Metering Initiative in the Canadian province of Ontario, all residential electricity customers will be converted from a tiered rate regime to a time-of-use (TOU) rate regime by the year 2010. Although TOU rates are designed to be cost-neutral for the average consumer, research suggests that TOU rates may affect consumers differently depending on their socioeconomic characteristics. In an effort to better understand the effects of TOU rates on lower-income and senior-headed households, a case-study in Milton was conducted between June and December of 2007. The overarching thesis question is: What are the behavioural responses to, and financial impacts of, TOU electricity rates on lower-income and senior-headed households? Nine expert interviews were conducted with Ontario professionals working in government, environmental non-profit groups, citizen advocacy organizations and affordable housing associations in order to provide context for the study. Time-differentiated electricity consumption data were then collected from 199 households from two senior housing complexes and two affordable housing complexes in Milton, Ontario between June and December 2007. A questionnaire was also sent to each household to determine some socio-economic and structural characteristics of the households. The electricity consumption data collected from the four sites suggest that the households would not benefit financially from TOU rates given electricity consumption behaviour during the period prior to the implementation of TOU rates in June 2007. Thus, they would have to change their behaviour in order to benefit financially from TOU rates. During this pre-TOU period, Site A, Site B and Site C would have paid more, on average, for their electricity under TOU rates than on tiered rates ($0.34, $0.61 and $0.15 per week, respectively). While Site D, on average, would have seen no change under TOU rates. A conservation effect was detected by comparing the electricity consumption from billing periods in 2006 to corresponding billing periods in 2007 after the implementation of TOU rates. Site A saw a conservation effect during the first corresponding billing period (35%); while Site B saw a conservation effect for three corresponding billing periods (21%, 24% and 9%). Site C saw a conservation effect for the first five corresponding billing periods (ranging from 8% to 21%), while Site D saw a conservation effect for all corresponding billing periods (ranging from 10% to 34%). The presence of a conservation effect at Site D was unexpected, particularly because households at Site D are not responsible for paying their own electricity bills. Although a conservation effect was observed after the implementation of TOU rates, the extent to which it could be attributed to the implementation of TOU rates is unclear, and should be investigated further. There was no considerable shift in the proportion of electricity consumed during each of the peak periods during the summer TOU period for Site A and Site D after the introduction of TOU rates. There was, however, a slight reduction in the portion of electricity consumed during the summer TOU period for Site B and Site C (0.2% and 0.1% per week, respectively). Due to the change in the on-, mid- and off-peak schedule from the summer TOU period to the winter TOU period, the households consume more electricity during the off-peak periods in the winter than they do during the off-peak periods in the summer (even though their patterns of consumption do not change). Similar to the pre-TOU period, during the summer post-TOU period, Site A and Site B, and Site C, on average, paid more for electricity (commodity) under TOU rates than they would have paid if they had continued on tiered rates ($0.38, $0.51 and $0.16 more per week, respectively), while Site D would have seen no change in their electricity costs. In contrast, during the winter post-TOU period several sites paid less for electricity on TOU rates than they would have if they had continued on tiered rates. Site B, Site C and Site D paid, on average, $0.78, $0.16 and $1.76 less per week, respectively. Although Site A paid more under on TOU rates during the winter post-TOU (on average $0.18 more per week), the cost was less than during the summer post-TOU period. The change in costs expressed here does not reflect any reduced costs that may have resulted from conservation. For example, if the households were shown to have a conservation effect, they might have lower electricity costs. Additionally, the changes in costs do not reflect any additional fees or charges that might be attributed to the smart meter installation and the Smart Metering Initiative (e.g., additional fees from Milton Hydro). In conclusion, TOU rates appear to be ineffective at motivating these lower-income and senior-headed households in Milton, Ontario to shift electricity from on-peak periods to off-peak periods, however, a reduction in electricity usage may be attributed to TOU rates. Further research is required to confirm these effects. It is important to note that some of the lower-income and senior-headed households in this study appeared to see an increase in their electricity bill, particularly during the summer TOU period. Lower-income and senior-headed households are thought to be less able to shift electricity consumption, therefore it is important to develop mechanisms to identify households that are at risk of bill increases.

Through the Smart Metering Initiative in the Canadian province of Ontario, all residential electricity customers will be converted from a tiered rate regime to a time-of-use (TOU) rate regime by the year 2010. Although TOU rates are designed to be cost-neutral for the average consumer, research suggests that TOU rates may affect consumers differently depending on their socioeconomic characteristics. In an effort to better understand the effects of TOU rates on lower-income and senior-headed households, a case-study in Milton was conducted between June and December of 2007. The overarching thesis question is: What are the behavioural responses to, and financial impacts of, TOU electricity rates on lower-income and senior-headed households? Nine expert interviews were conducted with Ontario professionals working in government, environmental non-profit groups, citizen advocacy organizations and affordable housing associations in order to provide context for the study. Time-differentiated electricity consumption data were then collected from 199 households from two senior housing complexes and two affordable housing complexes in Milton, Ontario between June and December 2007. A questionnaire was also sent to each household to determine some socio-economic and structural characteristics of the households. The electricity consumption data collected from the four sites suggest that the households would not benefit financially from TOU rates given electricity consumption behaviour during the period prior to the implementation of TOU rates in June 2007. Thus, they would have to change their behaviour in order to benefit financially from TOU rates. During this pre-TOU period, Site A, Site B and Site C would have paid more, on average, for their electricity under TOU rates than on tiered rates ($0.34, $0.61 and $0.15 per week, respectively). While Site D, on average, would have seen no change under TOU rates. A conservation effect was detected by comparing the electricity consumption from billing periods in 2006 to corresponding billing periods in 2007 after the implementation of TOU rates. Site A saw a conservation effect during the first corresponding billing period (35%); while Site B saw a conservation effect for three corresponding billing periods (21%, 24% and 9%). Site C saw a conservation effect for the first five corresponding billing periods (ranging from 8% to 21%), while Site D saw a conservation effect for all corresponding billing periods (ranging from 10% to 34%). The presence of a conservation effect at Site D was unexpected, particularly because households at Site D are not responsible for paying their own electricity bills. Although a conservation effect was observed after the implementation of TOU rates, the extent to which it could be attributed to the implementation of TOU rates is unclear, and should be investigated further. There was no considerable shift in the proportion of electricity consumed during each of the peak periods during the summer TOU period for Site A and Site D after the introduction of TOU rates. There was, however, a slight reduction in the portion of electricity consumed during the summer TOU period for Site B and Site C (0.2% and 0.1% per week, respectively). Due to the change in the on-, mid- and off-peak schedule from the summer TOU period to the winter TOU period, the households consume more electricity during the off-peak periods in the winter than they do during the off-peak periods in the summer (even though their patterns of consumption do not change). Similar to the pre-TOU period, during the summer post-TOU period, Site A and Site B, and Site C, on average, paid more for electricity (commodity) under TOU rates than they would have paid if they had continued on tiered rates ($0.38, $0.51 and $0.16 more per week, respectively), while Site D would have seen no change in their electricity costs. In contrast, during the winter post-TOU period several sites paid less for electricity on TOU rates than they would have if they had continued on tiered rates. Site B, Site C and Site D paid, on average, $0.78, $0.16 and $1.76 less per week, respectively. Although Site A paid more under on TOU rates during the winter post-TOU (on average $0.18 more per week), the cost was less than during the summer post-TOU period. The change in costs expressed here does not reflect any reduced costs that may have resulted from conservation. For example, if the households were shown to have a conservation effect, they might have lower electricity costs. Additionally, the changes in costs do not reflect any additional fees or charges that might be attributed to the smart meter installation and the Smart Metering Initiative (e.g., additional fees from Milton Hydro). In conclusion, TOU rates appear to be ineffective at motivating these lower-income and senior-headed households in Milton, Ontario to shift electricity from on-peak periods to off-peak periods, however, a reduction in electricity usage may be attributed to TOU rates. Further research is required to confirm these effects. It is important to note that some of the lower-income and senior-headed households in this study appeared to see an increase in their electricity bill, particularly during the summer TOU period. Lower-income and senior-headed households are thought to be less able to shift electricity consumption, therefore it is important to develop mechanisms to identify households that are at risk of bill increases.

A partir de revisão do histórico da regulação do segmento de distribuição de energia elétrica no Brasil, da revisão de conceitos de Teoria da Regulação, Distribuição de Energia Elétrica, Estrutura Tarifária, Regulação de Monopólios Naturais, Qualidade do Serviço Prestado, e Sustentabilidade Econômico-Financeira, assim como definições de Direito Administrativo, Teoria Geral de Concessões de Serviços Públicos e política de preço aplicada a monopólios naturais, aprende-se que o regime tarifário chamado de serviço pelo preço (price cap) foi adotado a partir da edição da Lei de Concessões, sendo abandonado o regime do custo do serviço (rate of return), praticado desde a década de 1950. Contudo, a distinção entre os dois regimes de regulação tarifária fica prejudicada devido às práticas do regulador, fato que ocorre não apenas no Brasil. Conforme estabelecem os contratos de concessão, as tarifas deveriam ser preservadas pela equação de equilíbrio inicial \'RPI +/- X\', sendo previstas revisões tarifárias periódicas, observadas as alterações na estrutura de custos e de mercado, os níveis de tarifas observados em empresas similares no contexto nacional e internacional, e estímulos ao ganho de eficiência e à modicidade tarifária. Passadas duas décadas da implantação do price cap, observa-se que o regulador incorporou práticas do rate of return, criando instrumentos de reposicionamento das tarifas de acordo com critérios e trajetórias de custos operacionais eficientes e componentes discricionários de cálculo do ganho de produtividade, dotando o processo de reajuste e revisão das tarifas de excessiva complexidade. Assim, buscando-se maior simplicidade e clareza nos processos tarifários, de modo a incentivar de forma mais adequada o investimento na melhoria da qualidade do serviço e na sustentabilidade da concessão, o presente trabalho propõe aperfeiçoamentos na metodologia tarifária com base em parâmetros de eficiência em relação à qualidade do serviço prestado, discutido no âmbito do Mecanismo de Incentivo à Melhoria da Qualidade (MIQ) por meio do componente \'Q\' do Fator X, e de eficiência em relação à gestão econômico-financeira (sustentabilidade), aferida por parâmetros utilizados amplamente no setor financeiro, tratados como elementos de uma política de incentivos para assegurar a trajetória de sustentabilidade da concessão. A partir do princípio contratual de que os processos tarifários consideram como receita da distribuidora a soma de uma parcela não gerenciável (VPA) e de parcela gerenciável (VPB), a busca por maior simplicidade e clareza diz respeito ao estrito cumprimento dos critérios contratuais, com retorno à prática da regulação de serviço pelo preço, como estabelecido pela Lei de Concessões. A aplicação dos aperfeiçoamentos propostos é realizada mediante estudos de caso de duas distribuidoras de energia elétrica em situações de qualidade e sustentabilidade distintas. O resultado ilustra que a qualidade e sustentabilidade do serviço podem ser parâmetros importantes para introdução de uma metodologia menos complexa e mais objetiva para reajuste e revisão das tarifas de fornecimento no Brasil. / The Tariff Regulation for public service distribution of electrical energy, called \"price cap\" was adopted in Brazil from the publication of Law 8.095/1995 (the Law of Concessions), therefore abandoning the \"return rate\" remuneration system practiced since the late 1950s. However, the distinction between price cap and return rate regulation was negatively affected due to practices of the regulatory agency (National Electric Energy Agency - ANEEL), which occurs not only in Brazil. As established in concession contracts, the tariffs should be preserved by the equation of initial balance \'RPI +/- X\', forecasting tariff reviews periodically by observing changes in the structure of the licensee\'s costs and market share, the levels of rates observed in similar businesses in the national and international context, as well as stimulating efficiency gains and controlling tariffs. After two decades of implementation of the system of price cap in Brazil, and after four cycles of periodic review of tariffs, it is observed that the regulator has incorporated practices of rate of return throughout the process, creating instruments of repositioning of tariffs in accordance with criteria of operational costs considered efficient and discretionary components of calculating the productivity gains (X Factor), giving the process of readjustment and revision of rates of excessive complexity. In search of greater simplicity and clarity in the tariff process in order to encourage more adequately the investment in improving the quality of service and sustainability, this Thesis presents proposals for the improvement of tariff methodology based on parameters efficiency in terms of quality of service, objectively measured by global indicators of continuity and efficiency in relation to the economic and financial management (sustainability), measured by parameters used widely in the financial sector. The improvement of the efficiency of quality is discussed under the Incentive to Quality Improvement Mechanism (MIQ) of the Brazilian tariff regulation through the \'Q\' component of Factor X. The improvements on the extent of economic and financial sustainability are treated as elements of an incentive policy to ensure a path of sustainability of the concession, given that the Brazilian regulator has not adopted explicit mechanisms of sustainability, except those specifically defined in the process of renewal of distribution concessions, pursuant to Presidential Decree n. 8.461/2015. From the contractual principle that tariff processes consider the distribution company Requested Revenue as the sum of an unmanageable portion (VPA) and manageable portion (VPB), the search for greater simplicity and clarity with respect the strict compliance with the contract criteria, returning to the practice of price cap regulation, as established by the Concessions Law. The implementation of improvements for the proposed tariff mechanisms is carried out through case studies relating to two electricity distribution companies in different quality and sustainability situations. The result of the study shows that the quality and sustainability of the service in the electricity distribution segment can be important parameters for introducing a less complex and more objective methodology for adjustment and review of electricity tariffs in Brazil.

A partir de revisão do histórico da regulação do segmento de distribuição de energia elétrica no Brasil, da revisão de conceitos de Teoria da Regulação, Distribuição de Energia Elétrica, Estrutura Tarifária, Regulação de Monopólios Naturais, Qualidade do Serviço Prestado, e Sustentabilidade Econômico-Financeira, assim como definições de Direito Administrativo, Teoria Geral de Concessões de Serviços Públicos e política de preço aplicada a monopólios naturais, aprende-se que o regime tarifário chamado de serviço pelo preço (price cap) foi adotado a partir da edição da Lei de Concessões, sendo abandonado o regime do custo do serviço (rate of return), praticado desde a década de 1950. Contudo, a distinção entre os dois regimes de regulação tarifária fica prejudicada devido às práticas do regulador, fato que ocorre não apenas no Brasil. Conforme estabelecem os contratos de concessão, as tarifas deveriam ser preservadas pela equação de equilíbrio inicial \'RPI +/- X\', sendo previstas revisões tarifárias periódicas, observadas as alterações na estrutura de custos e de mercado, os níveis de tarifas observados em empresas similares no contexto nacional e internacional, e estímulos ao ganho de eficiência e à modicidade tarifária. Passadas duas décadas da implantação do price cap, observa-se que o regulador incorporou práticas do rate of return, criando instrumentos de reposicionamento das tarifas de acordo com critérios e trajetórias de custos operacionais eficientes e componentes discricionários de cálculo do ganho de produtividade, dotando o processo de reajuste e revisão das tarifas de excessiva complexidade. Assim, buscando-se maior simplicidade e clareza nos processos tarifários, de modo a incentivar de forma mais adequada o investimento na melhoria da qualidade do serviço e na sustentabilidade da concessão, o presente trabalho propõe aperfeiçoamentos na metodologia tarifária com base em parâmetros de eficiência em relação à qualidade do serviço prestado, discutido no âmbito do Mecanismo de Incentivo à Melhoria da Qualidade (MIQ) por meio do componente \'Q\' do Fator X, e de eficiência em relação à gestão econômico-financeira (sustentabilidade), aferida por parâmetros utilizados amplamente no setor financeiro, tratados como elementos de uma política de incentivos para assegurar a trajetória de sustentabilidade da concessão. A partir do princípio contratual de que os processos tarifários consideram como receita da distribuidora a soma de uma parcela não gerenciável (VPA) e de parcela gerenciável (VPB), a busca por maior simplicidade e clareza diz respeito ao estrito cumprimento dos critérios contratuais, com retorno à prática da regulação de serviço pelo preço, como estabelecido pela Lei de Concessões. A aplicação dos aperfeiçoamentos propostos é realizada mediante estudos de caso de duas distribuidoras de energia elétrica em situações de qualidade e sustentabilidade distintas. O resultado ilustra que a qualidade e sustentabilidade do serviço podem ser parâmetros importantes para introdução de uma metodologia menos complexa e mais objetiva para reajuste e revisão das tarifas de fornecimento no Brasil. / The Tariff Regulation for public service distribution of electrical energy, called \"price cap\" was adopted in Brazil from the publication of Law 8.095/1995 (the Law of Concessions), therefore abandoning the \"return rate\" remuneration system practiced since the late 1950s. However, the distinction between price cap and return rate regulation was negatively affected due to practices of the regulatory agency (National Electric Energy Agency - ANEEL), which occurs not only in Brazil. As established in concession contracts, the tariffs should be preserved by the equation of initial balance \'RPI +/- X\', forecasting tariff reviews periodically by observing changes in the structure of the licensee\'s costs and market share, the levels of rates observed in similar businesses in the national and international context, as well as stimulating efficiency gains and controlling tariffs. After two decades of implementation of the system of price cap in Brazil, and after four cycles of periodic review of tariffs, it is observed that the regulator has incorporated practices of rate of return throughout the process, creating instruments of repositioning of tariffs in accordance with criteria of operational costs considered efficient and discretionary components of calculating the productivity gains (X Factor), giving the process of readjustment and revision of rates of excessive complexity. In search of greater simplicity and clarity in the tariff process in order to encourage more adequately the investment in improving the quality of service and sustainability, this Thesis presents proposals for the improvement of tariff methodology based on parameters efficiency in terms of quality of service, objectively measured by global indicators of continuity and efficiency in relation to the economic and financial management (sustainability), measured by parameters used widely in the financial sector. The improvement of the efficiency of quality is discussed under the Incentive to Quality Improvement Mechanism (MIQ) of the Brazilian tariff regulation through the \'Q\' component of Factor X. The improvements on the extent of economic and financial sustainability are treated as elements of an incentive policy to ensure a path of sustainability of the concession, given that the Brazilian regulator has not adopted explicit mechanisms of sustainability, except those specifically defined in the process of renewal of distribution concessions, pursuant to Presidential Decree n. 8.461/2015. From the contractual principle that tariff processes consider the distribution company Requested Revenue as the sum of an unmanageable portion (VPA) and manageable portion (VPB), the search for greater simplicity and clarity with respect the strict compliance with the contract criteria, returning to the practice of price cap regulation, as established by the Concessions Law. The implementation of improvements for the proposed tariff mechanisms is carried out through case studies relating to two electricity distribution companies in different quality and sustainability situations. The result of the study shows that the quality and sustainability of the service in the electricity distribution segment can be important parameters for introducing a less complex and more objective methodology for adjustment and review of electricity tariffs in Brazil.