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This thesis analyzes investment incentives of strategic firms in industries where either demand is uncertain, or the good produced is economically non-storable and demand fluctuates. In those industries, investment is a long run decision, whereas production has to be adjusted short-run. Prominent examples are recently liberalized utilities such as the electricity sector. Regulated monopolies have been replaced by a small number of competing firms, which often are considered to behave strategically in order to exercise market power. Whereas the regulatory regimes prior to liberalization induced generous (over-)investment choices, we observe increasing unease of experts and policy makers regarding investment incentives in liberalized electricity markets. The first three chapters of this thesis (part one) analyze total capacity choice of strategic firms prior to producing for the spot market. We first determine the equilibrium of the market game. In the remainder of the first part we analyze the interdependency of enhanced spot market competition and firms overall capacity choice. We first analyze the impact of complete elimination of market power at the spot market giving rise to marginal cost pricing. We then consider the impact of price caps at the spot market. And finally we study the impact of reduced market power at the spot markets due to forward contracting. In the second part of the thesis firms can invest into several technologies. This allows them to determine not only their total capacity but also it's precise composition. In the absence of strategic interaction, for a single regulated firm, this has already been thoroughly analyzed in the so called peak load pricing literature, which has been widely applied for electricity markets prior to liberalization. In order to accommodate for the completely changed situation after liberalization, however, we extend this framework to the case of strategically interacting firms. Based on data of the German electricity market, we then illustrate and empirically quantify our theoretical results. We determine firms’ investment choices for different market structures and quantify the impact of spot market interventions on investment decisions and welfare. This allows us to quantify the potential for the exercise of market power, in the long run, when firms’ investment decisions are taken into account.

In 1991, the Federal Communications Commission began regulating the tariffed rates of the nation's largest local exchange carriers under a new regulatory scheme: price-cap regulation. Price caps were intended to "remedy" the ills of traditional rate-of-return regulation. They were to provide incentive for the telephone companies to adopt innovative technology, cost-cutting measures and provide telephone services more efficiently. To test the effectiveness of this incentive, this study examined productivity of the regional Bell operating companies (RBOCs) under both rate-of-return regulation and price-cap regulation. A total factor productivity model was developed and productivity gains were calculated under both regulatory regimes. The assumption of total factor productivity was then relaxed and value-added productivity and labor productivity measures were also examined. The point estimates of productivity gains indicate that price caps have led to greater productivity gains. Although productivity gains varied greatly across individual RBOCs, use of total RBOC data indicated that average productivity gains improved 1.3 percent under price caps using the TFP model. Similar improvements under price caps were estimated using the value-added (1.1 percent) and labor productivity measurements (1.3 percent). However, because of the variability of the annual estimates, none of the productivity improvements are statistically significant. In conclusion, calculations of RBOC productivity gains suggest that price caps have led to more efficient use of inputs--labor; materials, rents and services; and capital--in the production of telephone company output. Yet, the statistical evidence is not strong enough to unequivocally support the assertion that price cap regulation has led to great productivity gains. / Master of Arts

This note analyzes a simple Cournot model where firms choose outputs and capacities facing varying demand and price-cap regulation. We find that binding price caps set above long-run marginal cost increase (rather than decrease) aggregate capacity investment. (author's abstract) / Series: Working Papers / Research Institute for Regulatory Economics

This cumulative doctoral thesis comprises three essays in which "Data Envelopment Analysis"(DEA), an instructive and flexible analytic tool with origins in operations research, is utilized to help clarify three crucial issues that arise when subjecting network industries to price-cap regulation. These issues are: First, the relationship of price-cap regulation with investment, second, the relationship of price-cap regulation with quality and third, the correct cost of capital within price-cap regulation. Without loss of generality, the investigation is focused on the case of electricity. (author's abstract)

This thesis examines the potential effects of a price cap sanction on semi-finished steel products against the Russian steel industry. The research question is: "What are the effects on the Russian economy of a price cap on semi-finished steel products?”. By constructing a theoretical model and applying empirically-based parameters, estimation of the sanction's effects on Russia and the world is possible. The findings suggest that a severe price cap, such as capping Russian steel prices at 72 $/tonne (90 % of original price), only results in a 2,7 % decrease in supplied quantity but causes a significant loss of profit (approximately 10 billion dollars annually). In the long-run, market rebalancing somewhat diminishes these losses. An alternative model however indicates that Russian exporters would cease exports at a minimum price of 502,5 $/tonne, leading to a dramatic increase in global prices. Therefore, a recommended price cap of 30 % or less of the current market price is advised – leading to 3,4 billion dollars in annual Russian losses. This study contributes to the understanding of sanctions as an economic tool and informs the ongoing debate on the efficacy of price cap sanctions against a sizable economy like Russia's and on inelastic products such as semi-steel.

A legislação brasileira estabelece que o Estado tem a obrigação de preservar o equilíbrio econômico financeiro das concessões de serviços públicos. Assim o Estado deve garantir que as tarifas dessas concessões sejam capazes de cobrir os seus custos operacionais e ainda ofereçam um retorno justo para os agentes privados que nelas investiram. Nas concessões de distribuição de gás natural canalizado e de energia elétrica os reguladores brasileiros optaram por aplicar uma regulação baseada em incentivos, que se inspira no modelo inglês de regulação por preço teto. Esta opção regulatória fez com que a Agência Nacional de Energia Elétrica adicionasse à remuneração dos acionistas das concessionárias um prêmio de risco regulatório refletindo a diferença entre o risco das distribuidoras inglesas e o risco das norte americanas, pois as inglesas praticam uma forma de determinação de tarifas considerada mais arriscada que as norte americanas. Tal adição de retorno encontra amparo na teoria econômica, mas é questionada por estudos empíricos que mostram que a diferença entre os graus de risco do regime inglês e norte americano não é estatisticamente significativa. Nesta dissertação é testada a hipótese de que o grau de risco de mercado da regulação por preço teto é maior do que o da regulação por custo de serviço. Para tanto são usados dados de distribuidoras de gás natural e energia elétrica da Argentina, Brasil, Chile e Estados Unidos, sendo que apenas neste último país se pratica regulação por custo de serviço e nos demais é adotada a regulação por preço teto de inspiração inglesa. Os testes aqui realizados indicam que não há evidências de que o risco de mercado seja maior em países com regulação por preço-teto do que em países com regulação por custo de serviço. Mais do que isso, esta dissertação conclui que o principal determinante do diferencial entre o risco de mercado das concessionárias brasileiras e o risco de mercado das empresas norte americanas comparáveis de distribuição de energia elétrica e de gás natural é a volatilidade do índice IBOVESPA e não o modelo tarifário adotado pelos reguladores. / Brazilian Law establishes that preservation of the economic balance of utilities is an obligation of the Brazilian State. Thus the State must set tariffs that not only cover utilities operational costs but also cover its capital cost, giving a fair return for utilities investors. In tariff setting, Brazilian regulators estimate a weight average cost of capital, of which market risk is one of the components. Brazilian regulators of natural gas and electricity distribution utilities choose an incentive based model of regulation, inspired in the English regulatory model of price cap, or RPI X. This regulatory model is considered riskier than the American model of cost of service, or (fixed) rate of return regulation. Thus, the choice for a price cap model made Brazilian electricity regulator (ANEEL) add a regulatory risk premium in the equity component of WACC to incorporate the risk differential between the English and the American regulatory models. Such regulatory risk premium is validated by economic theory, but is questioned by empiric studies that show that, across many countries, the difference between the risk of English and American models are not statistically significative. This dissertation tests the hypothesis that the market risk of price cap regulation is greater than cost of service regulation. In order to test such hypothesis data from natural gas and electric energy distributors from Argentia, Brazil, Chile and United States is used. Only the latter practices cost of service regulation and all other countries adopt the english inspired price cap regualation. The tests performed indicate that there is no evidence that the market risk is greater in countries adopting price cap regulation than in countries using cost of service regulation. Moreover, this dissertation concludes that the main aspect determining the difference between market.risk of Brazilian utilities providers and American comparable natural gas end electric energy distributors is the volatility of the IBOVESPA índex in spite of the tariff model adopted by the regulators.

A partir de revisão do histórico da regulação do segmento de distribuição de energia elétrica no Brasil, da revisão de conceitos de Teoria da Regulação, Distribuição de Energia Elétrica, Estrutura Tarifária, Regulação de Monopólios Naturais, Qualidade do Serviço Prestado, e Sustentabilidade Econômico-Financeira, assim como definições de Direito Administrativo, Teoria Geral de Concessões de Serviços Públicos e política de preço aplicada a monopólios naturais, aprende-se que o regime tarifário chamado de serviço pelo preço (price cap) foi adotado a partir da edição da Lei de Concessões, sendo abandonado o regime do custo do serviço (rate of return), praticado desde a década de 1950. Contudo, a distinção entre os dois regimes de regulação tarifária fica prejudicada devido às práticas do regulador, fato que ocorre não apenas no Brasil. Conforme estabelecem os contratos de concessão, as tarifas deveriam ser preservadas pela equação de equilíbrio inicial \'RPI +/- X\', sendo previstas revisões tarifárias periódicas, observadas as alterações na estrutura de custos e de mercado, os níveis de tarifas observados em empresas similares no contexto nacional e internacional, e estímulos ao ganho de eficiência e à modicidade tarifária. Passadas duas décadas da implantação do price cap, observa-se que o regulador incorporou práticas do rate of return, criando instrumentos de reposicionamento das tarifas de acordo com critérios e trajetórias de custos operacionais eficientes e componentes discricionários de cálculo do ganho de produtividade, dotando o processo de reajuste e revisão das tarifas de excessiva complexidade. Assim, buscando-se maior simplicidade e clareza nos processos tarifários, de modo a incentivar de forma mais adequada o investimento na melhoria da qualidade do serviço e na sustentabilidade da concessão, o presente trabalho propõe aperfeiçoamentos na metodologia tarifária com base em parâmetros de eficiência em relação à qualidade do serviço prestado, discutido no âmbito do Mecanismo de Incentivo à Melhoria da Qualidade (MIQ) por meio do componente \'Q\' do Fator X, e de eficiência em relação à gestão econômico-financeira (sustentabilidade), aferida por parâmetros utilizados amplamente no setor financeiro, tratados como elementos de uma política de incentivos para assegurar a trajetória de sustentabilidade da concessão. A partir do princípio contratual de que os processos tarifários consideram como receita da distribuidora a soma de uma parcela não gerenciável (VPA) e de parcela gerenciável (VPB), a busca por maior simplicidade e clareza diz respeito ao estrito cumprimento dos critérios contratuais, com retorno à prática da regulação de serviço pelo preço, como estabelecido pela Lei de Concessões. A aplicação dos aperfeiçoamentos propostos é realizada mediante estudos de caso de duas distribuidoras de energia elétrica em situações de qualidade e sustentabilidade distintas. O resultado ilustra que a qualidade e sustentabilidade do serviço podem ser parâmetros importantes para introdução de uma metodologia menos complexa e mais objetiva para reajuste e revisão das tarifas de fornecimento no Brasil. / The Tariff Regulation for public service distribution of electrical energy, called \"price cap\" was adopted in Brazil from the publication of Law 8.095/1995 (the Law of Concessions), therefore abandoning the \"return rate\" remuneration system practiced since the late 1950s. However, the distinction between price cap and return rate regulation was negatively affected due to practices of the regulatory agency (National Electric Energy Agency - ANEEL), which occurs not only in Brazil. As established in concession contracts, the tariffs should be preserved by the equation of initial balance \'RPI +/- X\', forecasting tariff reviews periodically by observing changes in the structure of the licensee\'s costs and market share, the levels of rates observed in similar businesses in the national and international context, as well as stimulating efficiency gains and controlling tariffs. After two decades of implementation of the system of price cap in Brazil, and after four cycles of periodic review of tariffs, it is observed that the regulator has incorporated practices of rate of return throughout the process, creating instruments of repositioning of tariffs in accordance with criteria of operational costs considered efficient and discretionary components of calculating the productivity gains (X Factor), giving the process of readjustment and revision of rates of excessive complexity. In search of greater simplicity and clarity in the tariff process in order to encourage more adequately the investment in improving the quality of service and sustainability, this Thesis presents proposals for the improvement of tariff methodology based on parameters efficiency in terms of quality of service, objectively measured by global indicators of continuity and efficiency in relation to the economic and financial management (sustainability), measured by parameters used widely in the financial sector. The improvement of the efficiency of quality is discussed under the Incentive to Quality Improvement Mechanism (MIQ) of the Brazilian tariff regulation through the \'Q\' component of Factor X. The improvements on the extent of economic and financial sustainability are treated as elements of an incentive policy to ensure a path of sustainability of the concession, given that the Brazilian regulator has not adopted explicit mechanisms of sustainability, except those specifically defined in the process of renewal of distribution concessions, pursuant to Presidential Decree n. 8.461/2015. From the contractual principle that tariff processes consider the distribution company Requested Revenue as the sum of an unmanageable portion (VPA) and manageable portion (VPB), the search for greater simplicity and clarity with respect the strict compliance with the contract criteria, returning to the practice of price cap regulation, as established by the Concessions Law. The implementation of improvements for the proposed tariff mechanisms is carried out through case studies relating to two electricity distribution companies in different quality and sustainability situations. The result of the study shows that the quality and sustainability of the service in the electricity distribution segment can be important parameters for introducing a less complex and more objective methodology for adjustment and review of electricity tariffs in Brazil.

A partir de revisão do histórico da regulação do segmento de distribuição de energia elétrica no Brasil, da revisão de conceitos de Teoria da Regulação, Distribuição de Energia Elétrica, Estrutura Tarifária, Regulação de Monopólios Naturais, Qualidade do Serviço Prestado, e Sustentabilidade Econômico-Financeira, assim como definições de Direito Administrativo, Teoria Geral de Concessões de Serviços Públicos e política de preço aplicada a monopólios naturais, aprende-se que o regime tarifário chamado de serviço pelo preço (price cap) foi adotado a partir da edição da Lei de Concessões, sendo abandonado o regime do custo do serviço (rate of return), praticado desde a década de 1950. Contudo, a distinção entre os dois regimes de regulação tarifária fica prejudicada devido às práticas do regulador, fato que ocorre não apenas no Brasil. Conforme estabelecem os contratos de concessão, as tarifas deveriam ser preservadas pela equação de equilíbrio inicial \'RPI +/- X\', sendo previstas revisões tarifárias periódicas, observadas as alterações na estrutura de custos e de mercado, os níveis de tarifas observados em empresas similares no contexto nacional e internacional, e estímulos ao ganho de eficiência e à modicidade tarifária. Passadas duas décadas da implantação do price cap, observa-se que o regulador incorporou práticas do rate of return, criando instrumentos de reposicionamento das tarifas de acordo com critérios e trajetórias de custos operacionais eficientes e componentes discricionários de cálculo do ganho de produtividade, dotando o processo de reajuste e revisão das tarifas de excessiva complexidade. Assim, buscando-se maior simplicidade e clareza nos processos tarifários, de modo a incentivar de forma mais adequada o investimento na melhoria da qualidade do serviço e na sustentabilidade da concessão, o presente trabalho propõe aperfeiçoamentos na metodologia tarifária com base em parâmetros de eficiência em relação à qualidade do serviço prestado, discutido no âmbito do Mecanismo de Incentivo à Melhoria da Qualidade (MIQ) por meio do componente \'Q\' do Fator X, e de eficiência em relação à gestão econômico-financeira (sustentabilidade), aferida por parâmetros utilizados amplamente no setor financeiro, tratados como elementos de uma política de incentivos para assegurar a trajetória de sustentabilidade da concessão. A partir do princípio contratual de que os processos tarifários consideram como receita da distribuidora a soma de uma parcela não gerenciável (VPA) e de parcela gerenciável (VPB), a busca por maior simplicidade e clareza diz respeito ao estrito cumprimento dos critérios contratuais, com retorno à prática da regulação de serviço pelo preço, como estabelecido pela Lei de Concessões. A aplicação dos aperfeiçoamentos propostos é realizada mediante estudos de caso de duas distribuidoras de energia elétrica em situações de qualidade e sustentabilidade distintas. O resultado ilustra que a qualidade e sustentabilidade do serviço podem ser parâmetros importantes para introdução de uma metodologia menos complexa e mais objetiva para reajuste e revisão das tarifas de fornecimento no Brasil. / The Tariff Regulation for public service distribution of electrical energy, called \"price cap\" was adopted in Brazil from the publication of Law 8.095/1995 (the Law of Concessions), therefore abandoning the \"return rate\" remuneration system practiced since the late 1950s. However, the distinction between price cap and return rate regulation was negatively affected due to practices of the regulatory agency (National Electric Energy Agency - ANEEL), which occurs not only in Brazil. As established in concession contracts, the tariffs should be preserved by the equation of initial balance \'RPI +/- X\', forecasting tariff reviews periodically by observing changes in the structure of the licensee\'s costs and market share, the levels of rates observed in similar businesses in the national and international context, as well as stimulating efficiency gains and controlling tariffs. After two decades of implementation of the system of price cap in Brazil, and after four cycles of periodic review of tariffs, it is observed that the regulator has incorporated practices of rate of return throughout the process, creating instruments of repositioning of tariffs in accordance with criteria of operational costs considered efficient and discretionary components of calculating the productivity gains (X Factor), giving the process of readjustment and revision of rates of excessive complexity. In search of greater simplicity and clarity in the tariff process in order to encourage more adequately the investment in improving the quality of service and sustainability, this Thesis presents proposals for the improvement of tariff methodology based on parameters efficiency in terms of quality of service, objectively measured by global indicators of continuity and efficiency in relation to the economic and financial management (sustainability), measured by parameters used widely in the financial sector. The improvement of the efficiency of quality is discussed under the Incentive to Quality Improvement Mechanism (MIQ) of the Brazilian tariff regulation through the \'Q\' component of Factor X. The improvements on the extent of economic and financial sustainability are treated as elements of an incentive policy to ensure a path of sustainability of the concession, given that the Brazilian regulator has not adopted explicit mechanisms of sustainability, except those specifically defined in the process of renewal of distribution concessions, pursuant to Presidential Decree n. 8.461/2015. From the contractual principle that tariff processes consider the distribution company Requested Revenue as the sum of an unmanageable portion (VPA) and manageable portion (VPB), the search for greater simplicity and clarity with respect the strict compliance with the contract criteria, returning to the practice of price cap regulation, as established by the Concessions Law. The implementation of improvements for the proposed tariff mechanisms is carried out through case studies relating to two electricity distribution companies in different quality and sustainability situations. The result of the study shows that the quality and sustainability of the service in the electricity distribution segment can be important parameters for introducing a less complex and more objective methodology for adjustment and review of electricity tariffs in Brazil.

A legislação brasileira estabelece que o Estado tem a obrigação de preservar o equilíbrio econômico financeiro das concessões de serviços públicos. Assim o Estado deve garantir que as tarifas dessas concessões sejam capazes de cobrir os seus custos operacionais e ainda ofereçam um retorno justo para os agentes privados que nelas investiram. Nas concessões de distribuição de gás natural canalizado e de energia elétrica os reguladores brasileiros optaram por aplicar uma regulação baseada em incentivos, que se inspira no modelo inglês de regulação por preço teto. Esta opção regulatória fez com que a Agência Nacional de Energia Elétrica adicionasse à remuneração dos acionistas das concessionárias um prêmio de risco regulatório refletindo a diferença entre o risco das distribuidoras inglesas e o risco das norte americanas, pois as inglesas praticam uma forma de determinação de tarifas considerada mais arriscada que as norte americanas. Tal adição de retorno encontra amparo na teoria econômica, mas é questionada por estudos empíricos que mostram que a diferença entre os graus de risco do regime inglês e norte americano não é estatisticamente significativa. Nesta dissertação é testada a hipótese de que o grau de risco de mercado da regulação por preço teto é maior do que o da regulação por custo de serviço. Para tanto são usados dados de distribuidoras de gás natural e energia elétrica da Argentina, Brasil, Chile e Estados Unidos, sendo que apenas neste último país se pratica regulação por custo de serviço e nos demais é adotada a regulação por preço teto de inspiração inglesa. Os testes aqui realizados indicam que não há evidências de que o risco de mercado seja maior em países com regulação por preço-teto do que em países com regulação por custo de serviço. Mais do que isso, esta dissertação conclui que o principal determinante do diferencial entre o risco de mercado das concessionárias brasileiras e o risco de mercado das empresas norte americanas comparáveis de distribuição de energia elétrica e de gás natural é a volatilidade do índice IBOVESPA e não o modelo tarifário adotado pelos reguladores. / Brazilian Law establishes that preservation of the economic balance of utilities is an obligation of the Brazilian State. Thus the State must set tariffs that not only cover utilities operational costs but also cover its capital cost, giving a fair return for utilities investors. In tariff setting, Brazilian regulators estimate a weight average cost of capital, of which market risk is one of the components. Brazilian regulators of natural gas and electricity distribution utilities choose an incentive based model of regulation, inspired in the English regulatory model of price cap, or RPI X. This regulatory model is considered riskier than the American model of cost of service, or (fixed) rate of return regulation. Thus, the choice for a price cap model made Brazilian electricity regulator (ANEEL) add a regulatory risk premium in the equity component of WACC to incorporate the risk differential between the English and the American regulatory models. Such regulatory risk premium is validated by economic theory, but is questioned by empiric studies that show that, across many countries, the difference between the risk of English and American models are not statistically significative. This dissertation tests the hypothesis that the market risk of price cap regulation is greater than cost of service regulation. In order to test such hypothesis data from natural gas and electric energy distributors from Argentia, Brazil, Chile and United States is used. Only the latter practices cost of service regulation and all other countries adopt the english inspired price cap regualation. The tests performed indicate that there is no evidence that the market risk is greater in countries adopting price cap regulation than in countries using cost of service regulation. Moreover, this dissertation concludes that the main aspect determining the difference between market.risk of Brazilian utilities providers and American comparable natural gas end electric energy distributors is the volatility of the IBOVESPA índex in spite of the tariff model adopted by the regulators.