Il faut avec Levinas faire le constat d’un premier problème, premier parce qu’il y va du sens de la vie en commun et du respect de l’humain. Annonçons ce problème : « si la proximité ne m’ordonnait qu’autrui tout seul, il n’y aurait pas eu de problème ». Nous ne sommes pas deux au monde et notre rapport à l’autre, au tiers, au prochain comme au lointain, s’impose toujours déjà à nous, avant tout consentement. « Problème », car l’autre est aussi le plus préoccupant par excellence, imprévisible, nous nous trouverons toujours déjà en relation avec lui dans une infinité de rapports indéfectibles. Jetés que nous sommes dans le monde, notre préoccupation de et pour l’autre nous est imposée en héritage avec la même nécessité que notre présence à nous même. Dans notre existence, nous n’avons été et ne serons jamais vraiment seuls, c’est pourquoi notre rapport à l’autre, depuis les rapports de paix jusqu’à la guerre devient un problème fondamental, le premier comme le dernier des problèmes. Nous montrerons dans ce travail que le problème de la guerre et de la paix prend naissance par et pour l’être mais nous irons plus loin en identifiant précisément qu’à l’être et à l’ontologie s’ajoute une autre source de conflit, d’autant plus ambivalente qu’elle sera tout aussi nécessaire aux paix qu’aux guerres : la transcendance. Ce que nous proposerons de faire voir ici et de soutenir, c’est que l’être n’est pas la seule origine du mal et conséquemment de la guerre. La position de Levinas aura sur ce point peu à peu évolué depuis ses écrits de jeunesse et l’expérience des camps jusqu’à ses œuvres de la maturité discréditant la jouissance et le bonheur pour soi. C’est à ce déplacement que nous inviterons le lecteur ainsi qu’à la compréhension des implications touchant à la justice, à l’Etat, au bonheur et à la réalisation effective de la paix comme au surgissement toujours possible et menaçant de la guerre.Ce travail ne fera pas l’économie de la lucidité réclamée par Levinas sur le siècle passé et ses génocides et cherchera à concilier cette dernière avec l’espoir que l’ensemble de sa philosophie veut soutenir. / Along a first, major question, primordial as it involves living together and respecting human values. Let us present that problem: «it proximity concerned one person only there would not have been any difficulty». There are not only two of us in this world, and our relation to the other, the third one, the closest as well as the furtherest, is a reality we cannot deny before any consent. «A problem» because the other is equally, par excellence, the most worry some, and unpredictable with the other we shall always be in a relation that includes an infinity of indestructible links. Last as we are in the world our preoccupation “of” and “for” the other is imposed on us as an heritage with the same necessity as our presence to ourselves. In our existence we have never been and never shall be alone; that is why our relation to the other, from peace to war, becomes an essential question, the first as well as the last of the problems. We will show in these links that the problem of war and peace arises by and for the being, we shall to go further by identifying precisely that to being and to ontology is added another source of conflict, which is all the more ambivalent as it will be necessary to peace and war: transcendence. What we would like to let appear and to sustain is that the being is not the only origin of evil and consequently of war. Levinas’s position on that point has slowly but significantly evolved, as the thesis expressed in his early writing has been submitted to the harsh experience of the nazi concentration camps and have finally resulted in his maturity in a general discard for enjoyment and happiness for ourself. This is the voyage to which the reader is invited, as well as to approach of the implications it includes for justice, state, happiness and the effective realization of peace as well as for the always possible and sudden looming up treat of war.We shall accompagny Levinas in his striving for lucidity regarding the last century and its genocides and we shall endeavor to reconcile that lucidity with the hope his whole philosophy wants never theless to sustain.

vii, 50 p. A print copy of this thesis is available through the UO Libraries. Search the library catalog for the location and call number. / Emmanuel Levinas has recently been given much attention for the resources that his writing could provide for an ethics of the non-human. While some commentators dismiss the humanistic biases of Levinas' analyses in favor of expanded sites of application, others argue that Levinas' anthropocentrism is central to his philosophy. This debate is resolved by demonstrating that Levinas' analysis oflanguage and separation in Totality and Infinity is an analysis of the hW11an on!.v. For Levinas, ethics signifies the peculiar way ofbeing in the world that is found in the site of the human. This way of being in the world is the emergence of concems about justice, the emergence of reason and discourse, but it does not restrict moral consideration to hwnans. Despite Levinas' own tendency to align the non-human animal against the ethical, there is nothing in Levinas' analysis that prevents granting full moral consideration to the non-human. / Adviser: Ted Toadvine

No description available.

Texte remanié de: Th. doct.--Philosophie, 2002. / Notes bibliogr., bibliogr. p. 177-183.

Proefschrift--Philosophie--Nimègue, 2005. / Bibliogr. p. 254-262.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oregon, 2001. / Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 222-228). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users.

Thesis. / Emmanuel Lévinas (1906- 1995). Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (MA)--University of Stellenbosch, 2006. / Bibliography. Also available via the Internet.

Thesis advisor: Richard Kearney / This dissertation asks what it means to be faithful to the friend. From Aristotle onward friendship has often been taken as the foundation of political life, but as it is a private relation that excludes many fellow citizens, fidelity to the friend may conflict with the duties of citizenship and endanger the political realm. What is more, one can never be perfectly faithful to one’s friend, so is true friendship impossible? I argue that friendship, though always a risk, directs us toward a justice that is higher than the political. Moreover, friendship is a great good that is suited to our finitude. While our finitude renders perfect fidelity impossible, it is also the horizon within which alone friendship can take place. Friendship is possible for those who admit its impossibility, who love precisely that the other – whether the other person or a language – escapes them.Chapter 1 considers selected ancient and medieval examinations of friendship in order to clarify friendship’s unstable place in the borderlands of hostility and hospitality. Only the dispossession of the self opens it to alterity. Thus if friendship is possible, it is possible only between strangers, not citizens secure in their ipseity. To bind people into a community, it must also shatter open any community in which they believe themselves to be comfortably at home. Chapter 2 further explores, in light of Emmanuel Levinas’ ethics, the conflict between friendship and one’s obligation to others. Levinas posits a self who is absolutely responsible for every other according to an asymmetrical ethical relation; how then can one prefer the friend to others? I reply that friendship serves as a forceful reminder of the singularity of the other and of the inadequacy of the comparisons among people that politics must employ to determine whose interests will win out. Friendship is not, however, only a signpost that points to ethics: it is a good that needs no justification to be worthwhile. Chapter 3 proposes that friendship arises from our finitude. Drawing on Emmanuel Falque’s work, I maintain that finitude is a positive good that is suited to humans. Friends translate the world for each other – but what of the fact that translation is always unfaithful? It is impossible, as Jacques Derrida has emphasized, to maintain infinite fidelity to the friend, but this impossibility is constitutive of friendship. Stepping beyond this horizon would not lead to better friendships but would destroy the possibility of friendship by taking us outside the limits that constitute humanity, when it is as humans that we love each other in friendship. Chapter 4 further investigates the possibility of friendship by taking up the suggestion, raised in Marcel Proust’s In Search of Lost Time, that friendship is an illusion because it pretends to offer knowledge of another even though such knowledge is impossible. I argue that a careful reading of the Search reveals that writing itself functions as an act of friendship: the narrator discovers that through writing his world can encounter the worlds of others. True friendship is a relation across absence. Finally, chapter 5 shows how the promise of fidelity to the friend constitutes the self: the promise creates the very world that the self is called to translate for the friend. I conclude that although one can never achieve perfect fidelity to the friend, this is no reason to despair of fidelity: the very infidelity of the self’s witness to the friend may still bear witness to the friend’s irreplaceability. Bearing witness to the friend is a task to be undertaken in fear and trembling but also in gratitude and joy, for friendship is a great good of our existence within finitude. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2020. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.

The Emmanuel Movement is frequently cited by scholars of the history of religion and psychology in the United States. While the story of the movement has been told many times, scholars have missed key ideas about the movement that become clear when we compare the various historical approaches to the movement. I review the Emmanuel Movement’s ideas, taking note of its intellectual influences, its relationship to other liberal Protestant traditions, and its place in turn-of-the-century culture. By reviewing the ideas of the movement, I observe that the Emmanuel Movement brings into focus previously obscure intellectual figures in the history of the movement, foreshadows late-twentieth century cooperation between medicine and religion through mindfulness movements, and highlights a strand of liberal Protestantism that originates in a Jamesian psychology of the healing subconscious. This new look at the Emmanuel Movement thus provides new avenues of inquiry for students of religion and psychology. / text