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Il faut avec Levinas faire le constat d’un premier problème, premier parce qu’il y va du sens de la vie en commun et du respect de l’humain. Annonçons ce problème : « si la proximité ne m’ordonnait qu’autrui tout seul, il n’y aurait pas eu de problème ». Nous ne sommes pas deux au monde et notre rapport à l’autre, au tiers, au prochain comme au lointain, s’impose toujours déjà à nous, avant tout consentement. « Problème », car l’autre est aussi le plus préoccupant par excellence, imprévisible, nous nous trouverons toujours déjà en relation avec lui dans une infinité de rapports indéfectibles. Jetés que nous sommes dans le monde, notre préoccupation de et pour l’autre nous est imposée en héritage avec la même nécessité que notre présence à nous même. Dans notre existence, nous n’avons été et ne serons jamais vraiment seuls, c’est pourquoi notre rapport à l’autre, depuis les rapports de paix jusqu’à la guerre devient un problème fondamental, le premier comme le dernier des problèmes. Nous montrerons dans ce travail que le problème de la guerre et de la paix prend naissance par et pour l’être mais nous irons plus loin en identifiant précisément qu’à l’être et à l’ontologie s’ajoute une autre source de conflit, d’autant plus ambivalente qu’elle sera tout aussi nécessaire aux paix qu’aux guerres : la transcendance. Ce que nous proposerons de faire voir ici et de soutenir, c’est que l’être n’est pas la seule origine du mal et conséquemment de la guerre. La position de Levinas aura sur ce point peu à peu évolué depuis ses écrits de jeunesse et l’expérience des camps jusqu’à ses œuvres de la maturité discréditant la jouissance et le bonheur pour soi. C’est à ce déplacement que nous inviterons le lecteur ainsi qu’à la compréhension des implications touchant à la justice, à l’Etat, au bonheur et à la réalisation effective de la paix comme au surgissement toujours possible et menaçant de la guerre.Ce travail ne fera pas l’économie de la lucidité réclamée par Levinas sur le siècle passé et ses génocides et cherchera à concilier cette dernière avec l’espoir que l’ensemble de sa philosophie veut soutenir. / Along a first, major question, primordial as it involves living together and respecting human values. Let us present that problem: «it proximity concerned one person only there would not have been any difficulty». There are not only two of us in this world, and our relation to the other, the third one, the closest as well as the furtherest, is a reality we cannot deny before any consent. «A problem» because the other is equally, par excellence, the most worry some, and unpredictable with the other we shall always be in a relation that includes an infinity of indestructible links. Last as we are in the world our preoccupation “of” and “for” the other is imposed on us as an heritage with the same necessity as our presence to ourselves. In our existence we have never been and never shall be alone; that is why our relation to the other, from peace to war, becomes an essential question, the first as well as the last of the problems. We will show in these links that the problem of war and peace arises by and for the being, we shall to go further by identifying precisely that to being and to ontology is added another source of conflict, which is all the more ambivalent as it will be necessary to peace and war: transcendence. What we would like to let appear and to sustain is that the being is not the only origin of evil and consequently of war. Levinas’s position on that point has slowly but significantly evolved, as the thesis expressed in his early writing has been submitted to the harsh experience of the nazi concentration camps and have finally resulted in his maturity in a general discard for enjoyment and happiness for ourself. This is the voyage to which the reader is invited, as well as to approach of the implications it includes for justice, state, happiness and the effective realization of peace as well as for the always possible and sudden looming up treat of war.We shall accompagny Levinas in his striving for lucidity regarding the last century and its genocides and we shall endeavor to reconcile that lucidity with the hope his whole philosophy wants never theless to sustain.

Zugl.: Berlin, Freie Univ., Diss.

Informe de Seminario para optar al grado de Licenciado en Filosofía. / Para llevar a cabo esta pequeña investigación expondré principalmente los textos iniciales de Emmanuel Lévinas dedicados al arte, cuales son “El exotismo”, que se encuentra, como mencionamos, en “De la existencia al existente” y “La realidad y su sombra”. Sin embargo, también recurriré a aquellos textos que, podríamos decir, son más bien éticos, entendiendo por esta palabra el análisis filosófico de la relación con el otro y no un sistema normativo, esto porque, como planteé, muchas de las ideas de Lévinas pueden ser entendidas a partir de su obra. Y, además, porque, ciertamente, los textos sobre arte, en Lévinas, son muy escasos, aunque ricos en su contenido. Para culminar este escrito utilizaré el breve ensayo “Del ser al otro” escrito por Lévinas en 1976 a propósito de un discurso de Paul Celan llamado “El meridiano”. Estos dos últimos textos, de Lévinas y Celan, los empleo precisamente para abordar la relación entre arte y ética; allí me propongo exponer una dimensión del arte que no es aquella de la evasión, sino del encuentro con la epifanía del rostro.

Made available in DSpace on 2015-03-04T21:01:05Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 1 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / Esta dissertação tem como tema a constituição da subjetividade e ação ética no pensamento de Emmanuel Levinas. Seu objetivo é investigar a constituição da identidade do eu segundo a obra de Levinas. A hipótese que defendemos é que, segundo Levinas, a identidade do sujeito não se anula na acolhida responsável do outro, mas se constrói sempre como referência necessária na relação com o outro, relação que se torna sempre uma interpelação ética. A alteridade é um convite-demanda para sair de si, para se transcender na responsabilidade pelo outro. O primeiro capítulo mostra que o eu se constitui como uma identidade fechada quando considerado meramente na sua relação com o mundo. O eu, na sua relação com o mundo, não tem um ponto fixo, nem um lugar definido para onde retornar; é um ser peregrino no mundo. O segundo capítulo aborda de forma especial o tema do tempo. Em Lévinas o tempo é diacrônico, isso indica que ele não é uma mera sucessão de acontecimentos pontuais. Essa experiência inédita de uma temporalidade

This research project participates in the genre of Performance art. It explores performativity in relation to Emmanuel Levinas' formulation of two interlacing modes of language, the ethical saying and the ontological, political said. The saying is of my originary, ethical relation to the other person that constitutes me, whereas the said is the mode of 'content', knowledge, and ontology. The project suggests that at least two registers of performativity pertain to the saying. One is in Simon Critchley's description of the saying as performative, prior to any decision to perform. In regard to another meaning of performativity, I propose that a political signification of art may be what Levinas calls a "reduction" of the said that 'performs' a showing of the saying. To perform a showing of the saying, would, in a Levinasian engagement, be to make apparent the ultimate interruption by ethics of ontology and politics, thus pointing to a constitutive non-closure of the political like that theorized by Jacques Derrida and by Critchley. Such a non-closure of the political is tentatively linked with critiques of Nicolas Bourriaud's Relational Aesthetics such as Claire Bishop's which draw on Jacques Lacan's notion of the subject. Performances explore the notion of the "reduction" of ontology resourced by Derrida's formulation of Levinas' later writing style as involving a sériature; serial and heterogeneous interruptions of the said1. The project has unfolded in a series of performance pieces, and will conclude with a final performance in March 2007. This exegesis articulates the major provocations for the project, contextualises the project with regard to selected art practices, and documents and discusses the major performance pieces.

This study used a qualitative research design incorporating principles of social constructionism, hermeneutic dialectic method, Neo-Socratic dialogue and philosophy for reporting the tacit and social knowledge constructions underlying particular ways of knowing that inform the experiential reality of love in the practice of nursing and midwifery. The philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas, that culminated in his magnum opus of the ‘metaphysics of otherness’, provided the theoretical underpinning for the interpretation of the experiences nurses and midwives believed were examples of love in their clinical practice in Australia, Singapore and Bhutan. What is love in nursing and midwifery? The answer is moral responsibility. The relational context has a nurse and midwife constantly exposed to patient situations that give rise to expressions of love as moral responsibility. It is a form of love that centres on the ability of our being, or at least the possibility of our being, to transcend its everyday form to a metaphysical state of being moral. It enables a nurse and midwife to transcend the isolation associated with their personal being as a self-project, to be ‘for’ the patient as a first priority. But while the ‘Goodness’ of the ‘Good’ assigns the nurse and midwife responsible and is expressed to their personal being in the form of the ‘urge to do’, ‘what to do’ in caring for the patient is a matter of living out the command to be responsible and will be different for each nurse and midwife. However, no matter the outcome, love as moral responsibility will always leave a nurse and midwife feeling there is still more to be done in being responsible.

This research project participates in the genre of Performance art. It explores performativity in relation to Emmanuel Levinas' formulation of two interlacing modes of language, the ethical saying and the ontological, political said. The saying is of my originary, ethical relation to the other person that constitutes me, whereas the said is the mode of 'content', knowledge, and ontology. The project suggests that at least two registers of performativity pertain to the saying. One is in Simon Critchley's description of the saying as performative, prior to any decision to perform. In regard to another meaning of performativity, I propose that a political signification of art may be what Levinas calls a "reduction" of the said that 'performs' a showing of the saying. To perform a showing of the saying, would, in a Levinasian engagement, be to make apparent the ultimate interruption by ethics of ontology and politics, thus pointing to a constitutive non-closure of the political like that theorized by Jacques Derrida and by Critchley. Such a non-closure of the political is tentatively linked with critiques of Nicolas Bourriaud's Relational Aesthetics such as Claire Bishop's which draw on Jacques Lacan's notion of the subject. Performances explore the notion of the "reduction" of ontology resourced by Derrida's formulation of Levinas' later writing style as involving a sériature; serial and heterogeneous interruptions of the said1. The project has unfolded in a series of performance pieces, and will conclude with a final performance in March 2007. This exegesis articulates the major provocations for the project, contextualises the project with regard to selected art practices, and documents and discusses the major performance pieces.

Thesis (Ph.D.) - University of Queensland, 2005. / Includes bibliography.

Diss.--Grund- und Integrativwissenschaftliche Fakultät--Universität Wien, 1999. / Bibligr. p. 359-374.