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Chapter 1 develops a model of parallel trading of corporate securities (shares, bonds) and derivatives in which a large trader can sometimes profitably acquire securities and the corporate control rights inherent therein for the sole purpose of reducing the corporation's value and gaining on a net short position in the corporation created through off-setting derivatives. At other times, the large trader profitably takes a net long position in the corporation and exercises its control rights to maximize the corporation's value. This strategy is profitable if and because other market participants cannot observe the large trader's orders and hence cannot predict how the control rights will be exercised. In effect, the large trader is benefitting from trading on private information about payoff uncertainty that the large trader itself creates. This problem is most likely to manifest in transactions that give blocking powers to small minorities, particularly out-of-bankruptcy restructurings and freezeouts, and is bound to become more severe when derivatives trade on an exchange rather than over-the-counter. Chapter 2 investigates in parallel the cross-country determinants of crime and punishment in the largest possible sample of countries with data on homicides, victimization by common crimes (ICVS), incarceration rates, and the death penalty. While models with a small number of plausible covariates predict much of the variation of homicide and incarceration rates between major developed countries, they predict only one seventh of the actual US incarceration rate. Chapter 3 probes into the pervasive correlations between legal origins, modern regulation, and economic outcomes around the world. Where legal origin is exogenous, it is almost perfectly correlated with another set of potentially relevant background variables: the colonial policies of the European powers that spread the "origin" legal systems through the world. The chapter attempts to disentangle these factors by exploiting the imperfect overlap of colonizer and legal origin, and looking at possible channels, such as the structure of the legal system, through which these factors might influence contemporary economic outcomes. It find strong evidence in favor of non-legal colonial explanations for economic growth. For other dependent variables, the results are mixed. / Economics

La tesi mette a confronto l'universo delle riorganizzazioni nel Chapter 11 con i nuovi modelli di ristrutturazione concessi dalla riforma del diritto fallimentare. In modo particolare la tesi si sofferma sul mercato del controllo nella crisi di impresa. Negli Stati Uniti c'e' da tempo un mercato dei crediti sofferenti, mentre in Italia scontiamo ancora i ritardi del sistema economico. Il primo capitolo racconta i temi collegati al mercato del controllo nel Chapter 11: gli acquisti dei crediti nelle diverse classi creditorie, la nuova finanza concessa al debtor in possession, il controllo da covenant, la remunerazione degli amministratori con il debito, i derivati sul credito e il voto connesso. Il secondo capitolo si sofferma sull'interpretazione degli artt. 124 e 127 della legge fallimentare letti nell'ottica di un potenziale mercato del controllo nella crisi di impresa come nel caso del concordato con assunzione e si interroga infine sull'esenzione o meno da opa obbligatoria di tali operazioni alla luce dell'art. 106 TUF. / The thesis compares the world of Chapter 11 reorganizations with the new types of reorganizations introduced in Italy by the recent reform of bankruptcy law. In particular the thesis deals with the market for corporate control in the insolvency arena in both countries. In the States bankruptcy claims are traded on a regular basis whereas Italy still hasn't fully experienced transfers of control within the frame of a corporate reorganization. The first chapter focuses on all issues connected to US M&A in bankruptcy: acquisition of claims in the different classes, control rights in covenants, debtor-in-possession financing, pay for performance in bankruptcy, credit default swaps and empty voting. The second chapter focuses on the interpretation of articles 124 and 127 of the new Italian bankruptcy law which may lead to the creation of a market for corporate control within the frame of a composition with a third party buyer and discusses the potential applicability of mandatory bids pursuant to art. 106 TUF to such deals.

L’auteure traite des stratagèmes de propriété occulte et de vote vide orchestrés par l’entremise des instruments dérivés. Dans un premier temps, cette recherche expose les diverses perturbations occasionnées par ces stratagèmes sur le système d’alerte et de notification ainsi que sur le droit corporatif canadien. Pour illustrer ces propos, une revue de la jurisprudence est détaillée. De plus, de nombreuses solutions législatives sont proposées afin de pallier aux utilisations potentiellement abusives des instruments dérivés. La solution la mieux adaptée au contexte des marchés financiers canadiens est finalement sélectionnée. / The research paper herein deals with hidden morphable ownership schemes and empty voting strategies orchestrated through derivatives. Initially, the author exposes the various disturbances caused by these schemes on early warning systems and follows up with repercussions that reverberate through to the Canadian corporate laws framework. Detailed case reviews are also presented to highlight the practical implications of these aforementioned schemes. Legislative solutions to mitigate the potential misuse of derivatives are proposed and ultimately the preferred solution tailored to Canadian financial markets is selected.