<p> As never before, nearly every aspect of our lives in modern Western society is influenced by a web of institutions. Whether driving to work, making a deposit at the bank, or shopping for groceries, our lives are inextricably linked to the institutional construct known as a corporation. Society has become fiercely aware of and opinionated about the deeds and values of corporate entities (The Harris Poll, 2016). Though it may seem so, corporations are not faceless establishments, but are made up of human persons guided by boards of directors whose leadership in the boardroom becomes an expression of a corporation interacting with this living planet. </p><p> Governance systems, defined as the process by which corporations are made responsive to the rights and wishes of stakeholders are at a critical juncture (Lorsch, 2012b). Corporate governance has been cited by many as fundamentally flawed (Turnbull, 2010), entrenched in old patterns of thinking (Scharmer &amp; Kaufer, 2013), and in need of new insights (Sonnenfeld, 2002). This theoretical study establishes the need for a paradigmatic shift in corporate governance&mdash;one that might embolden corporations to live into their fullest potential of shaping a regenerative society, one in which life creates conditions for life, one that serves the well-being of the whole (Senge, Smith, Kruschwitz, Laur &amp; Schley, 2008). </p><p> I imagine corporate governance realized through a participatory paradigm. I offer specific characteristics of this mindset: reflexive knowing, generative engagement, creative enactment, and mutual regard that, when practiced in the boardroom, are likely to foster needed new insights capable of reframing and repurposing the work of governing. A new model for corporate governance is not offered; rather, I suggest boardroom practices grounded in relationship and powered by integral knowing, which will benefit governance, no matter the model. What if corporations, guided by governing boards exercising a participatory perspective, used their significant influence toward shaping a society that fosters human flourishing?</p><p>

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Bayesian Epistemology is a general framework for thinking about agents who have beliefs that come in degrees. Theories in this framework give accounts of rational belief and rational belief change, which share two key features: (i) rational belief states are represented with probability functions, and (ii) rational belief change results from the acquisition of evidence. This dissertation focuses specifically on the second feature. I pose the Evidence Question: What is it to have evidence? Before addressing this question we must have an understanding of Bayesian Epistemology. The first chapter argues that we should understand Bayesian Epistemology as giving us theories that are evaluative and not action-guiding. I reach this verdict after considering the popular ‘ought’-implies-‘can’ objection to Bayesian Epistemology. The second chapter argues that it is important for theories in Bayesian Epistemology to answer the Evidence Question, and distinguishes between internalist and externalist answers. The third and fourth chapters present and defend a specific answer to the Evidence Question. The account is inspired by reliabilist accounts of justification, and attempts to understand what it is to have evidence by appealing solely to considerations of reliability. Chapter 3 explains how to understand reliability, and how the account fits with Bayesian Epistemology, in particular, the requirement that an agent’s evidence receive probability 1. Chapter 4 responds to objections, which maintain that the account gives the wrong verdict in a variety of situations including skeptical scenarios, lottery cases, scientific cases, and cases involving inference. After slight modifications, I argue that my account has the resources to answer the objections. The fifth chapter considers the possibility of losing evidence. I show how my account can model these cases. To do so, however, we require a modification to Conditionalization, the orthodox principle governing belief change. I present such a modification. The sixth and seventh chapters propose a new understanding of Dutch Book Arguments, historically important arguments for Bayesian principles. The proposal shows that the Dutch Book Arguments for implausible principles are defective, while the ones for plausible principles are not. The final chapter is a conclusion.