<p>This thesis comprises an investigation into a very well known and perennial philosophical debate over the interpretive status of our most well confirmed scientific theories, known as "scientific realism." I do not defend scientific realism; rather, I set out to determine what scientific realism is in the first place. My contention is that the thesis is not a single, unified view, but rather a conglomeration of loosely associated propositions that are highly conceptually interwoven, but rarely distinguished. These consist of several different metaphysical, epistemological, and semantic doctrines, which I examine in great detail. I then argue that the indeterminate nature of scientific realism muddles the issue (if there is any) and renders debates fruitless. I attempt to define a thesis with relatively more precise content, which I call the "Core Realist Commitment," CRC. I argue that the CRC prioritizes epistemology - with the thesis that we can and do have (some) theoretical knowledge. I then demonstrate the relatively minimal commitments of the CRC, namely, a minimalist and very undemanding metaphysics, and almost none of the semantic theses that have been traditionally associated with realism. I conclude that the CRC is a step forward in thinking about the debate, not just for its relative precision but also because it is consistent with, and even tolerant of, a wide array of disagreement over concerns that are, I argue, external to the debate and need to be decided on independent grounds.</p> / Dissertation

Kant scholarship has a long, rich history of disagreement and interpretive reservations regarding the <i>Critique of Pure Reason</i>. One disagreement is over whether the first <i>Critique</i> contains a sufficient proof of the doctrine of <i>transcendental idealism</i>. Another disagreement revolves around the question of whether Kants doctrine of transcendental idealism and its associated metaphysical/epistemological terms conflict with <i>direct realism</i> a view that Kant also appears to be committed to. This thesis evaluates what Henry Allison, in his work entitled: <i>Kants Transcendental Idealism: an Interpretation and Defense</I> (1983), sets forth as the direct proof for transcendental idealism given in the first <i>Critique</i>. The inter-theoretical relation between transcendental idealism and direct realism is also evaluated, and argument is given for considering the two doctrines as consistent with one another after all.

Kant scholarship has a long, rich history of disagreement and interpretive reservations regarding the <i>Critique of Pure Reason</i>. One disagreement is over whether the first <i>Critique</i> contains a sufficient proof of the doctrine of <i>transcendental idealism</i>. Another disagreement revolves around the question of whether Kants doctrine of transcendental idealism and its associated metaphysical/epistemological terms conflict with <i>direct realism</i> a view that Kant also appears to be committed to. This thesis evaluates what Henry Allison, in his work entitled: <i>Kants Transcendental Idealism: an Interpretation and Defense</I> (1983), sets forth as the direct proof for transcendental idealism given in the first <i>Critique</i>. The inter-theoretical relation between transcendental idealism and direct realism is also evaluated, and argument is given for considering the two doctrines as consistent with one another after all.

Thesis (M.A.)--Denver Seminary, 1995. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 196-202).

<p> When groups of people are represented in classification systems, potential exists for them to be structurally or linguistically subordinated, erased or otherwise misrepresented (Olson &amp; Schlegl, 2001). As Bowker &amp; Star (1999) have shown, the real-world application of classification to people can have legal, economic, medical, social, and educational consequences. The purpose of this research is to contribute to knowledge organization by showing how the epistemological stance underlying specific classificatory discourses interactively participates in the formation of concepts. The medical and legal discourses in three timeframes are examined using Foucauldian genealogical discourse analysis to investigate how their depictions of gender and epistemic foundations correspond and interplay with conceptualizations of similar concepts in four editions of the <i>Dewey Decimal Classification.</i> As knowledge organization research seeks solutions to manage the paradigm change from assumptions of universal knowledge to instability of knowledge, recognition of epistemological underpinnings of classification systems is necessary to understand the very real consequences of corresponding classifications of gender.</p>

Three of the major issues in information ethics—intellectual property, speech regulation, and privacy—concern the morality of restricting people’s access to certain information. Consequently, policies in these areas have a significant impact on the amount and types of knowledge that people acquire. As a result, epistemic considerations are critical to the ethics of information policy decisions (cf. Mill 1978 [1859]). The fact that information ethics is a part of the philosophy of information highlights this important connection with epistemology. In this paper, I illustrate how a value-theoretic approach to epistemology can help to clarify these major issues in information ethics. However, I also identify several open questions about epistemic values that need to be answered before we will be able to evaluate the epistemic consequences of many information policies.

<p> This thesis recontextualizes the politics of Charles Brockden Brown's gothic novels in terms of the literary development of Gothicism (Friedrich Schiller) and Romanticism (Friedrich Schlegel) in Germany. This recontextualization highlights the ways in which Brown's work is participating in a transatlantic conversation about the relation of epistemology and politics in art, while underscoring how Brown's use of the gothic addresses the vital issues of grounding democratic politics in the early republic. The argument is that between his earliest extant gothic novel and his later gothic novels Brown uses Schiller's model of the gothic tale and its appeal to methodologies of epistemological verification to support democratic politics. However, in the later novels, he disregards method and uses the state of uncertainty to articulate radical subjectivity as the basis of democratic politics&mdash;<i>pace</i> Schlegel's defense of democracy.</p>

The Genevan scholar, Jean Piaget, made a highly significant contribution to epistemology that has not generally been adequately recognized by philosophers. His purpose was to remove epistemology from philosophy and make it a strictly scientific endeavour separate from philosophy. Yet an examination of main themes in his theory of knowledge shows the clear outline of a philosophical framework - using his own definition of philosophy. An examination of a number. of criticisms, shows that, underlying philosophical differences constantly emerge as the major factor separating Piaget and his critics.. That Piaget failed in his purpose of establishing a scientific epistemology independently of philosophy is corroborated by a comparison with the psychologist, Rudolph Arnheim. 'The Piagetian philosophy - which though within the mainstream of twentieth century philosophy, has its own quite distinctive features leans to a shaping of the. experimental data in terms of a constructivist, monolithic hierarchy of knowledge, not as a static structure but as a continually structuring activity. In this structuring activity knowledge develops in a continual interaction of subject and object in which the object feeds the cognitive structure of the subject and the subject by its logico-mathematical structure, gives order to the object world- There is a conflation of the logical and mathematical and a blurring of the distinction between the logical function,. as a primary functional mode, and the formalization by which we extend knowledge of the logical function with the aid of symbols. Cognitive normativity is seen as provided by a formalization of logic, rooted ultimately in the universal biological structure of the organism. As an alternative., and more satisfactory, empirical philosophical framework the outline is given for a multi-dimensional theory of knowledge within a lawfully ordered, dynamic, relational field. Within this context, it becomes apparent that the Piagetian experiments do not trace the development of thought or the growth of knowledge or of logic as such, but have the more limited scope of tracing the development• of one mode of knowledge; a mode of knowledge which is nevertheless important because of its role in science. The evaluation of Piaget and the proposed alternative make constant appeal to empirical data. At the same time, it is acknowledged that: an. explicit Christian commitment also plays a part just as Piaget's commitment played a part in shaping his theory. / MA, PU vir CHO, 1983

The Genevan scholar, Jean Piaget, made a highly significant contribution to epistemology that has not generally been adequately recognized by philosophers. His purpose was to remove epistemology from philosophy and make it a strictly scientific endeavour separate from philosophy. Yet an examination of main themes in his theory of knowledge shows the clear outline of a philosophical framework - using his own definition of philosophy. An examination of a number. of criticisms, shows that, underlying philosophical differences constantly emerge as the major factor separating Piaget and his critics.. That Piaget failed in his purpose of establishing a scientific epistemology independently of philosophy is corroborated by a comparison with the psychologist, Rudolph Arnheim. 'The Piagetian philosophy - which though within the mainstream of twentieth century philosophy, has its own quite distinctive features leans to a shaping of the. experimental data in terms of a constructivist, monolithic hierarchy of knowledge, not as a static structure but as a continually structuring activity. In this structuring activity knowledge develops in a continual interaction of subject and object in which the object feeds the cognitive structure of the subject and the subject by its logico-mathematical structure, gives order to the object world- There is a conflation of the logical and mathematical and a blurring of the distinction between the logical function,. as a primary functional mode, and the formalization by which we extend knowledge of the logical function with the aid of symbols. Cognitive normativity is seen as provided by a formalization of logic, rooted ultimately in the universal biological structure of the organism. As an alternative., and more satisfactory, empirical philosophical framework the outline is given for a multi-dimensional theory of knowledge within a lawfully ordered, dynamic, relational field. Within this context, it becomes apparent that the Piagetian experiments do not trace the development of thought or the growth of knowledge or of logic as such, but have the more limited scope of tracing the development• of one mode of knowledge; a mode of knowledge which is nevertheless important because of its role in science. The evaluation of Piaget and the proposed alternative make constant appeal to empirical data. At the same time, it is acknowledged that: an. explicit Christian commitment also plays a part just as Piaget's commitment played a part in shaping his theory. / MA, PU vir CHO, 1983

<p> This case study explores the dynamics of a small long-term leaderless group of five, Jungian-oriented, women therapists. The group, meeting from 1992 to 2005, was originally convened to explore how women's initiatory journey is distinctive from men's. Refusing to adopt a leader, its non-hierarchical structure merited further exploration. The research questions were as follows: What are the individual and collective meanings given to a successful, long-term leaderless women's group? What aspects of the group contribute to its meaningfulness, vitality and longevity? </p><p> The dissertation adopts the metaphor and meta-framework of the Father's House and Mother's House, referring to two distinct ways women's consciousness develops. The Father's and Mother's House form a continuum that ranges from women's adaptation to conventional values and structures to women's ways of knowing and being. Extensive literature reviews describe consciousness in The Father's House, The Mother's House and Women in Groups. </p><p> Case study data illuminate both individual and group perspectives on the group's life. They include audio-taped individual interviews and group sessions, including typical and crisis sessions, along with researcher observations and reflections. The researcher conducted the study as a participant member. </p><p> Narrative analysis reveals three phases in the group's life: an initial phase exploring the dreams and visions of Christiana Morgan and Jung's <i> Visions Seminars;</i> a second phase of moving into a void with an unfolding emergent process; and a third phase following 9/11 in which the group attended to psychological trends manifesting in collective consciousness. </p><p> The Weaving chapter relates the group's experiences to the literature on women's groups, noting a key challenge faced by the group and by women generally&mdash;the dynamic of connection, disconnection, and re-connection. </p><p> The final chapter presents major conclusions drawn from the research: Women's groups serve a developmental function for women and can impact the collective in transformative ways. The Visions group found that the prevalent archetypal drama of saviour, victim, and persecutor must give way to new ways of relating. This study adds to our understanding of groups that learn organically and shows how a group functions when it lives in the Mother's House.</p>