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In the literature on doxastic evidence, the phenomenon is regarded as either internal (Plantinga 1993, Feldman and Conee 2001, Turri 2009) or external (Armstrong 1973, Collins 1997, BonJour 2008). Though the specifics of these views tend to vary, the two main categories are prominent. However, these views face various criticisms. Internalists claim that external evidence ignores relevant mental processes. Externalists claim that internal evidence is weak given its subjective nature. I will propose a remedy for both of these criticisms. I will argue that evidence is internal, external, and social. That is to say, that there are three types of evidence: mental states, states of affairs, and that which has been produced by a rigorous social process. I will extract Helen Longino’s method for establishing social knowledge (2002) and apply it to evidence; I will argue that her method produces social evidence as well. The social component of evidence is aimed towards strengthening internal and external theories of evidence by responding to the worries raised by the internalists and externalists. First, I will argue that a theory that accommodates both internal and external evidence can absolves the worries raised to either theory alone. Moreover, a theory that can accommodate social evidence will be stronger insofar as a rigorous social process will add a further qualification which can only strengthen our evidence. Second, I will argue that social evidence is not reducible to either external or internal evidence. The external view cannot account for the mental processes that are evidently a part of the justification process and is therefore weak. Finally, though the internal view is compelling, it does not account for evidence which supports our usage of automatic, non-conscious mental processes (Bargh and Chartrand 1999; Aarts and Dijksterhuis 2000).

There has been a general reluctance in epistemology to classify memory and testimony as basic epistemic sources (along with perception, reason, and introspection): some epistemologists have attempted to establish that testimonial justification is reducible; and while considerations of epistemic circularity suggest that reductionism about memorial justification is untenable, epistemologists have typically held that memory merely preserves beliefs and (therefore) their justification. Approaching memory and testimony from a naturalist and reliabilist perspective, this dissertation develops new accounts of these epistemic sources, concluding that neither preservationism about memory nor reductionism about testimony is tenable.

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Thesis (Ph.D.) -- University of Western Sydney, Hawkesbury, 1999. / Thesis submitted for the degree of doctor of philosophy. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 297-318).

<p> This thesis explores Herman Melville's struggling relationship between belief and unbelief in <i>Moby-Dick</i>, &ldquo;Benito Cereno&rdquo; and <i>Clarel</i>. Melville&rsquo;s travel to the Marquesas gave him a sense of cultural relativity which prompted questions about his faith that continually remerged even as he found answers. In spite of overwhelming skepticism, Melville was unwilling to fully relinquish his faith because belief also offered comfort. Being trapped in a space where he could not fully believe but was equally unable to detach himself from faith, Melville discovered Ralph Waldo Emerson&rsquo;s concept of double consciousness which served as a theoretical framework for his feelings of internal liminality. Melville drew on Emerson&rsquo;s ideas to propose a wrestling form of belief. The Melvillean believer discovers questions which produce doubt and then seeks answers. These answered questions produce a brief sense of peace before further questions assert themselves and the struggling believer must begin his journey once again.</p><p>

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Boston University / The problem of knowledge in contemporary thought is unusually complex. This dissertation seeks to isolate but one of the fundamental questions of epistemology and investigate it in the literature of Britain and America since 1920. The problem is: the nature of the given in the knowledge situation. After nothing certain historical roots of the theory, four contemporary theories of the given are examined. Their implications are brought out, and critical evaluations are made. The literature on the problem as a whole is relatively meager. One book by R.D. Mack deals with the given in Bradley, Whitehead, and Dewey. Many thinkers consider the problem seriously in developing their epistemologies and several important articles about it have appeared in the journals. Some have denied the uniqueness of the question by saying that everything is given. [TRUNCATED]