<p> Disagreements continue over the most basic epistemic questions. Which logic is correct? What makes an argument good? We need a theory that can both explain the prevalence of such disagreements and evaluate the conduct and characters of those who participate in them. I argue that formal theories cannot supply this need. Circular arguments demonstrate the failure of formal approaches. Circular arguments are often impeccable from a formal perspective, but circular argumentation is almost always criticizable. A skilled arguer does not dismiss other viewpoints out of hand. Instead, to reason with those who reject our most basic assumptions about the logic of argumentation itself or the norms we assume when evaluating arguments for cogency or coherence we must break out of the circle of our own opinions. We must exercise a capacity for cognitive empathy. </p><p> In chapter zero, I develop a virtue-theoretic account of argumentation centered around the virtue of open-mindedness. I analyze open-mindedness in Aristotelian fashion as the mean between skepticism and dogmatism. Open-mindedness consists in the skillful deployment of empathic ability, which is in turn understood as the capacity to simulate the perspective of another. I use this same framework to analyze two more specific applications of cognitive empathy: sincerity and creativity, which are both essential to responsible argumentation. Responsible argumentation requires sincerity in our forms of expression and creativity in our efforts to resolve those disagreements we must resolve for pragmatic reasons. When it is understood as a "master virtue," open-mindedness is a way of utilizing sincerity and creativity for appropriate ends, and it is the surest route to epistemic progress. </p><p> In chapter one, I apply my virtue-theoretic account of argumentation to a dispute over the fallacy of begging the question. According to Robinson (1971), question-begging is not fallacious because it&rsquo;s fine from a formal perspective. Sorensen (1996) replies that question-begging is fallacious because it compromises the rationality of whoever is begging the question. By advancing the dialectic between Sorensen and Robinson, I aim to show that our argumentative practices must take the perspectives of others seriously, whether or not those perspectives are rational. When you beg the question against someone you fail to empathize with her. A tendency towards circularity of various sorts might be inevitable, but it needn&rsquo;t compromise open-mindedness. </p><p> In chapter two, I examine the connection between dogmatism and disagreement to address ongoing debates over the proper response to peer disagreement. How should we respond when we find ourselves disagreeing with a colleague or epistemic peer? According to the &ldquo;equal weight view,&rdquo; we should suspend belief in this kind of case. I defend this ideal from two charges: (1) that it is self-undermining, and (2) that it renders its adherents &ldquo;spineless.&rdquo; Even widespread disagreement amongst peers wouldn't force those who endorse the equal weight view into persistent agnosticism. We needn&rsquo;t compromise conciliation and cooperation, even when we find ourselves arguing with dogmatists who reject these cognitive virtues.</p><p>

Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-11T19:33:36Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2006Bitstream added on 2014-06-13T19:04:44Z : No. of bitstreams: 1 ely_df_dr_prud.pdf: 902098 bytes, checksum: 6c3ecec249be504e708f65dcb2fdee1a (MD5) / O presente trabalho constitui um mapeamento e análise sobre os discursos e práticas empreendidos pela climatologia geográfica brasileira. O principal propósito para o seu desenvolvimento foi a verificação de como o conhecimento geográfico do clima encontra-se vinculado aos debates efetivados pelas diversas correntes filosóficas de pensamento e às diferentes concepções de natureza e de geografia. A verificação do processo de inserção e constituição dessa especialidade científica no Brasil demonstrou a existência de duas vertentes metodológicas principais: uma baseada em decomposições analítico-descritivas do fenômeno climático e outra subsidiada nas explicações da meteorologia dinâmica. O estudo geográfico do clima, a partir desse universo de análise, é desenvolvido a partir de cinco recortes temáticos principais: clima urbano, variabilidade pluvial, o clima na análise ambiental e da paisagem, modelagem estatística em climatologia e teoria e método da climatologia; pautados na concepção de natureza dinâmica-sistêmica. Foi verificado que as questões epistemológicas da Geografia não são refletidas enfaticamente pela climatologia geográfica brasileira, tornando a apreensão da espacialidade do clima na composição das novas territorialidades uma tarefa difícil de ser realizada. / The main purpose of this following thesis is to verify how the geographic knowledge of the climate relates to debates about diverse philosophical trends and the different conceptions of nature and geography, by mapping out and analyzing discourses and practices within the scope of the Brazilian geographic climatology. The climate geographic study, in this universe of analysis, is developed from five main themes: urban climate, pluvial variability, the climate in the environment and setting analysis, statistical modeling in climatology and climatology theory and method; all of them based on the conception of the dynamic-systemic nature. It was verified that epistemological problems in Geography are not emphatically concerned by Brazilian geographic climatology, what can make the understanding of the climate spatiality in the composition of new territorialities a difficult task.

<p> The substance 3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine (a.k.a., MDMA, Ecstasy, Molly, Midomafetamine) is currently listed by the Food and Drug Administration as a breakthrough therapy for post traumatic stress disorder. The drug however remains a Schedule I controlled substance in the United States, and is listed in the top four most frequently used recreational drugs. Use by young people in social venues like all night dance parties (raves) and clubs around the world is widely documented, but evidence suggests that an increasing demographic of users is older adults (over age 27). Research is lacking about how this growing demographic uses MDMA and how assumptions of illegal/deviant models of drug use may or may not apply. Several decades of research on MDMA produced three primary models of use: the psycho-spiritual model, medical/psychotherapeutic model, and the illegal/deviant model. Each model of use is socially constructed along certain epistemological assumptions about users and the sought after outcome or effects of the drug. It is currently unclear which model of use older demographics of users fit within or if an entirely new model of use is needed to understand evolving trends. The current grounded theory investigation used snowball sampling methods to recruit adult participants who actively use MDMA in privacy with their committed partner. Semi-structured interviews were used to explore eight couples&rsquo; experiences using MDMA with their partner. Transcripts were analyzed with an iterative process of open and focused coding, followed by member checking. Major themes reported by couples include <i> a different reason to relate to each other, serving me in so many ways, added depth to relationship and practice returning to MDMA experience</i>. Together, themes from this study support a cognitive-relational model of recreational MDMA use, that is best described as a process that involves acquisition of knowledge, rational thinking, reasoning, and collaboration about ingesting MDMA together, all based on the expectation of durable change to their relationship together and other relationships in their lives. This investigation provides a critical lens for uncovering epistemological assumptions of other models, and provides a pathway for research into the use of medicines and drugs in the context of committed relationships.</p><p>

This thesis focuses on contemporary religious education within the state system of England and Wales. It explores the influence upon religious education of epistemology, theological and religious formulations, and educational philosophy in the context of the decline of modernism and concurrent emergence of programmes of post-modernism and critical realism. Within this developing context the question of the ability of religious education to make possible the emergence of authentic religious understanding is asked. In Part One, the provenance of religious education between 1944 and 1988 is identified as being that of the tradition of liberal modernism that grew out of the Enlightenment. The basic dualistic epistemological contours of modernism are identified, and it is shown how these give rise to a liberal experiential-expressive understanding of the nature of religion. In similar fashion, modernism engenders specifically modem forms of educational philosophy. Religious education has elected to work within this modernist provenance, making uncritical assumptions that are dependent upon modem philosophical, religious and educational debate, and as a result is unable to uphold the integrity of its subject matter. In Part Two, the nature of deconstructive post-modem responses to the limitations of modernism are outlined, together with the understanding of the nature of religion that such a reaction produces. It is suggested that the implementation of a programme of religious education within this alternative setting would also fail to do justice to the integrity of religion. In Part Three, the response of critical realism to modernism is set out, and the implications of this for an understanding of the nature of religion are explored. A philosophy of education within critical realism is proposed, together with a revised framework for religious education, one able to uphold the integrity of religion, both in terms of its intrinsic diversity and its intrinsically realistic self-understanding

<p> My dissertation aims to provide a virtue reliabilist account of the epistemic effects of social location. I use a reliabilist theory of virtue epistemology as a framework for understanding the epistemic effects of social marginalization and privilege. </p><p> To do so, I describe how marginalization and privilege affect social cognition. I argue that social cognition is underwritten by various social cognitive capacities, some of which can and do qualify as intellectual virtues. Understanding these capacities as virtues elucidates how epistemic benefits and harms accrue to agents as a result of identity and associated social status. </p><p> Additionally, I argue that drawing on an information economy framework illuminates the epistemic effects of social location on groups. Specifically, I use John Greco&rsquo;s distinction between transmission and generation, two functions of knowledge with distinct epistemic norms, to explain how structural marginalization and privilege work to influence the movement of knowledge into, within, and among marginalized and privileged epistemic communities. </p><p> Finally, I describe the relationship of the virtues to knowledge justification. In simplified terms, I argue that knowledge demands both reliability and responsibility. Responsibility involves those dispositions an agent manifests when sensitive to the reliability of the evidence for her beliefs. Such sensitivity takes environment into account, and for humans, that environment is generally social. So, I argue that responsibility involves sensitivity to the social nature of human knowledge. I explain what the relationship between types of virtues means for the epistemic effects of social location, and how that relationship suggests potential correctives to some epistemic harms.</p><p>

<p> Personal narrative and literature review was used to explore the historical and current contexts of embodied knowing, embodied inquiry, and embodied teaching. Methods of embodied inquiry from phenomenology, somatics, and transpersonal research are described and compared. Ten common elements of embodied inquiry practices are distilled, including a dialogue between witnessing and felt sense aspects of awareness, as a tool for facilitating embodied understanding and integration. The application of embodied inquiry to teaching is explored, and the proposal that teaching and learning as a participatory embodied inquiry practice facilitates embodied understanding and transformation. </p><p>

Doctor of Philosophy / Curriculum and Instruction Programs / Thomas Vontz / Today, more than ever, educators throughout the United States need to know more about the challenges, opportunities, and value diversity brings to their schools. In one decade, 2003 to 2013, the population of K-12 public school students who identified as white decreased by 9%, or by 3.2 million. During this same time, the number of Hispanic students in the K-12 public school system increased from 19% to 25%, or by 3.5 million (NCES, 2016). Projections for K-12 student enrollment in public schools indicate a continued decline in the number of White students and increases in students from diverse racial and ethnic backgrounds within another decade (NCES, 2016). We must consider the ways in which we socialize, communicate, and act within these unfamiliar and new spaces – especially those spaces where our beliefs intersect with observable actions in the classroom. The literature is replete with research on teacher epistemologies and culturally responsive teaching, yet research on the dynamic interaction between the two does not exist. Research in this area is needed to better understand how a teacher’s individual epistemology interacts with culturally responsive teaching practices. The purpose of this study was to examine whether individual teacher’s epistemologies, as measured by the Epistemic Belief Inventory (EBI) can predict their level of effective practice with culturally and linguistically diverse (CLD) students, as measured by the Biography-Driven Practices (BDP) rubric. Further, five subscales of the EBI – Simple Knowledge, Certain Knowledge, Innate Ability, Omniscient Authority, and Quick Learning – were examined individually to test for potential correlations. Results show that, overall, a teacher’s epistemic beliefs do not predict their level of effective practice at a statistically significant level; however two subscales, Simple and Certain Knowledge significantly predicted effective practice with CLD students.

<p> Research surrounding the prevalence and impact of adversity during childhood has surfaced as a possible key to addressing the impact of chronic stress on children during their early years and well into adulthood. The research has suggested that when resilience is present, due to protective factors being in place, there may be neutralization of the negative impact and outcomes due to the physiological effects of chronic stressors. Identifying which protective factors have the greatest neutralizing impact may provide educators, physicians, and parents better aid in the prevention and healing of children who have been exposed to chronic adversity. This research provides insight into the negative impact of adversity and the neutralizing impact of resilience on physical, psychological, and emotional well-being</p><p>

<p> This decolonizing interpretive analysis serves to provide bicultural researchers the opportunity to engage and challenge the dominant literature on pedagogy, curriculum, methodology, and schooling. Bicultural researchers have been forced to navigate the dialectical social terrain of dominant/subordinate tensions and contradictions, as part of their process of survival, as subaltern or subordinate cultural citizens and critical scholars. This study seeks to deconstruct Eurocentric epistemicides that compartmentalize knowledge, particularly within the fields of theology and education. Western Christianity tends to separate God from humanity. This is an epistemological problem. The nature of this study necessitates a process by which critical theory, critical pedagogy, and liberation theology serve to reconstruct traditional Westernized notions of the interrelatedness of theology and education. This study seeks to determine what can be learned from a critical pedagogy of Jesus Christ by examining His integration of theology and pedagogy as presented in His praxis detailed in the New Testament. Jesus is positioned as the literal embodiment of both theology and pedagogy, where both are procured through praxis for liberation, resulting in an emancipatory pedagogy that reconciles humanity back to God and God to humanity.</p><p>

Concerning religious matters there are a wide variety of views held that are often contradictory. This observation creates a problem when it comes to thinking about the rationality of religious belief. Can religious belief be rational for those who are aware of this widespread disagreement? This is a problem for a view in religious epistemology known as reformed epistemology. Alvin Plantinga, one of the leading defenders of this view, has argued that there is no successful argument to show that religious belief is irrational or in any other way epistemically unacceptable – he calls these arguments de jure arguments. I respond to this claim by seeking to develop two new versions of de jure argument that Plantinga has not dealt with. The first of these I call the return of the Great Pumpkin; and the second, the problem of religious disagreement. The return of the Great Pumpkin is an objection that develops an earlier objection that Plantinga has considered called, simply, the Great Pumpkin objection. This objection is that Plantinga’s methodology for defending the rationality of religious belief could be adopted by anyone, no matter how strange their beliefs – even someone who believed in the Great Pumpkin could use it. I develop this objection further by showing that it would be possible for a person with clearly absurd beliefs to find themselves in the same situation as the hypothetical Christian whom Plantinga is seeking to defend. There is, however, a response available to Plantinga, which involves showing how the historical and sociological context in which the person finds themselves makes a difference to the rationality of some of the beliefs that they hold. This discussion naturally leads into the second version of the de jure argument which asks whether knowledge of several religious communities who hold incompatible beliefs undermines the rationality of religious belief. This discussion engages with work in religious epistemology, but also more widely with the literature on the epistemology of disagreement. I consider whether, and in what circumstances, finding out that others disagree with you could ever rationally require you to give up one or more of your beliefs. This issue involves discussion of epistemic peers and defeaters. One of the arguments I consider is that if a religious believer continues to hold on to her religious beliefs in the face of disagreement then that will give her a reason to think that she is epistemically superior, which will lead to dogmatism, and a sort of epistemic arrogance. I respond to such an argument by showing that there is a problem with the inference involved in this argument.