This dissertation is an exploration of the role of Euro-North American Philosophy of Education discourse in the genealogy of race struggle. I examine how the reliable narration of Philosophy of Education functions as a project of racial rule premised on moral/temporal/spatial notions of (White) civility and respectability. Tracing the history of race war from the 17th century to present day, I look at how racism has shifted from sovereign power to disciplinary power to biopower as a mode of population management, operating not only through race but through gender and class distinctions as well. I analyze the racialized narrative conventions of liberal modern Enlightenment philosophy and the role these conventions continue to play in the creation and maintenance of a violent racial state. Drawing upon Critical Race Theory, feminist epistemologies, narrative theory, and the work of Michel Foucault, I look at what reliable narration does for philosophers, educators, and students, examining what we/they might have invested in maintaining a distinction between ‘reliability’ and ‘unreliability.’ I ask: How is reliable narration used as a tool by philosophers, educators, and ultimately, the state to distinguish between the civil and uncivil, between those worthy and unworthy of moral consideration, political engagement, and basic human rights? How do the impartiality, univocality, universality, and dispassion of reliable narratives become tied to race and the management of racialized bodies? My aim is to examine the ways in which race as a method of governance acts on a text, its author(s), and its audience. “How are racialized subjectivities constituted through and constitutive of language and knowledge,” I ask, “and to what effect?” I want to trace the social and civil relations mapped out by particular narrative conventions and examine the consequences of failing to adhere to such conventions. I suggest that by questioning the function of reliable narration in philosophical and pedagogical practice, educators, scholars, and students can intervene in the operation of race as a mode of discipline, creating the possibility of a more equitable society in which all have the opportunity to flourish.

In modernity, probably more than ever, “knowledge” has become the object of an intense desire. The tensions underwriting this modern desire for knowledge are inscribed in the very term, curiosity, which is at the centre of this dissertation. A venerable motif, curiosity anchors the specifically modern desire to know within a longstanding philosophical, theological and literary tradition. By the 19th century, “curiosity” is certainly an anachronistic paradigm. Yet, inscribed in curiosity, there are two conflicting dialectics which can be found at the heart of modernity’s unquenchable thirst for knowledge: one the one hand, the dialectic between curiosity as a disenchanting desire to see through into the innermost secrets of things, and curiosity as a “thing”, the product of a fetishist desire arrested on the glittering surface of things. On the other hand, curiosity is beset by the dialectic between the desire for a “totalizing”, meaningful vision and the compulsive drive of an increasingly specialized, meaningless pursuit of knowledge. This dissertation examines a series of Modernist narratives which expose this double dialectic. The protagonists of Gustave Flaubert’s Bouvard et Pécuchet, Elias Canetti’s Die Blendung and Jorge Luis Borges’ El Aleph are all caricatural, anachronistic, curieux ultimately seeking an “absolute knowledge” that cannot be embodied. The moment it seems to have been attained, it is reified, “objectified” into a fetish, a “curiosity”. Yet, these narratives are not only about curiosity; they are in fact true vortexes of curiosity: that of the protagonists of the narratives as well as that of the authors and the readers themselves. As a result, these narratives also speak to the paradoxical location of literature within culture: literature appears simultaneously as the privileged site of all – ultimately phantasmic – totalizing, meaningful visions of the world, as well as a marginal locus, a monstrous cultural residue.

The purpose of this thesis is to trace Marx&rsquo / s critique of Hegel from the beginning to the end and to draw attention to his continuous dialogue with Hegel, which results in Marx&rsquo / s appropriation of Hegel&rsquo / s dialectic in all its aspects. To this aim, we will focus on the texts in which Marx criticizes Hegel and try to understand how he develops his position against Hegel&rsquo / s philosophy. Marx has always become in a critical relationship with Hegel&rsquo / s philosophy and considered it as a philosophy which must be transcended since it, for Marx, amounts to justify the present reality which, in Marx&rsquo / s eyes, constitutes a great barrier for human freedom. However, Marx also regards Hegel&rsquo / s philosophy, in which dialectic occupies a central place, as one which includes the most developed conception of science and the true scientific method, and attempts to use Hegel&rsquo / s dialectic in his critique of political economy. In this thesis, by following Marx&rsquo / s critique of Hegel, we will try to show that Marx comes closer to Hegel&rsquo / s dialectic even when he criticizes Hegel&rsquo / s philosophy.

The purpose of this thesis is to trace Marx&rsquo / s critique of Hegel from the beginning to the end and to draw attention to his continuous dialogue with Hegel, which results in Marx&rsquo / s appropriation of Hegel&rsquo / s dialectic in all its aspects. To this aim, we will focus on the texts in which Marx criticizes Hegel and try to understand how he develops his position against Hegel&rsquo / s philosophy. Marx has always become in a critical relationship with Hegel&rsquo / s philosophy and considered it as a philosophy which must be transcended since it, for Marx, amounts to justify the present reality which, in Marx&rsquo / s eyes, constitutes a great barrier for human freedom. However, Marx also regards Hegel&rsquo / s philosophy, in which dialectic occupies a central place, as one which includes the most developed conception of science and the true scientific method, and attempts to use Hegel&rsquo / s dialectic in his critique of political economy. In this thesis, by following Marx&rsquo / s critique of Hegel, we will try to show that Marx comes closer to Hegel&rsquo / s dialectic even when he criticizes Hegel&rsquo / s philosophy.

Medical decisions should be based on good evidence. But this does not mean that health care professionals should practice evidence-based medicine. This dissertation explores how these two positions come apart, why they come apart, and what we should do about it. I begin by answering the descriptive question, what are current standards of evidence in medicine? I then provide a detailed critique of these standards. Finally, I address the more difficult normative question, how should we determine standards of evidence in medicine? In medicine, standards of evidence have been established by the pervasive evidence-based medicine (EBM) movement. Until now, these standards have not been subjected to comprehensive philosophical scrutiny. I outline and defend a theory of knowledge – a version of Helen Longino’s Critical Contextual Empiricism (CCE) – which enables me to critically evaluate EBM. My version of CCE emphasizes the critical evaluation of background assumptions. In accordance with this, I identify and critically evaluate the three substantive assumptions underlying EBM. First, I argue that medicine should not be held to the restrictive definition of science assumed by proponents of EBM. Second, I argue that epidemiological evidence should not be the only “base” of medical decisions. Third, I argue that not only is the particular hierarchy of evidence assumed by EBM unjustified, but that any attempt to hierarchically rank research methods is incoherent and unjustifiably restricts medical knowledge. Current standards of evidence divert attention from many legitimate sources of evidence. This distorts medical research and practice. In the remainder of the dissertation I propose means for improving not only current standards of medical evidence but also the process of producing and defending future standards. On the basis of four CCE norms, I argue that we have reason to protect and promote those features of the medical community that facilitate diversity, transparency, and critical interaction. Only then can we ensure that the medical community retains its ability to produce evidence that is both rigorous and relevant to practice.

This dissertation is an exploration of the role of Euro-North American Philosophy of Education discourse in the genealogy of race struggle. I examine how the reliable narration of Philosophy of Education functions as a project of racial rule premised on moral/temporal/spatial notions of (White) civility and respectability. Tracing the history of race war from the 17th century to present day, I look at how racism has shifted from sovereign power to disciplinary power to biopower as a mode of population management, operating not only through race but through gender and class distinctions as well. I analyze the racialized narrative conventions of liberal modern Enlightenment philosophy and the role these conventions continue to play in the creation and maintenance of a violent racial state. Drawing upon Critical Race Theory, feminist epistemologies, narrative theory, and the work of Michel Foucault, I look at what reliable narration does for philosophers, educators, and students, examining what we/they might have invested in maintaining a distinction between ‘reliability’ and ‘unreliability.’ I ask: How is reliable narration used as a tool by philosophers, educators, and ultimately, the state to distinguish between the civil and uncivil, between those worthy and unworthy of moral consideration, political engagement, and basic human rights? How do the impartiality, univocality, universality, and dispassion of reliable narratives become tied to race and the management of racialized bodies? My aim is to examine the ways in which race as a method of governance acts on a text, its author(s), and its audience. “How are racialized subjectivities constituted through and constitutive of language and knowledge,” I ask, “and to what effect?” I want to trace the social and civil relations mapped out by particular narrative conventions and examine the consequences of failing to adhere to such conventions. I suggest that by questioning the function of reliable narration in philosophical and pedagogical practice, educators, scholars, and students can intervene in the operation of race as a mode of discipline, creating the possibility of a more equitable society in which all have the opportunity to flourish.

In modernity, probably more than ever, “knowledge” has become the object of an intense desire. The tensions underwriting this modern desire for knowledge are inscribed in the very term, curiosity, which is at the centre of this dissertation. A venerable motif, curiosity anchors the specifically modern desire to know within a longstanding philosophical, theological and literary tradition. By the 19th century, “curiosity” is certainly an anachronistic paradigm. Yet, inscribed in curiosity, there are two conflicting dialectics which can be found at the heart of modernity’s unquenchable thirst for knowledge: one the one hand, the dialectic between curiosity as a disenchanting desire to see through into the innermost secrets of things, and curiosity as a “thing”, the product of a fetishist desire arrested on the glittering surface of things. On the other hand, curiosity is beset by the dialectic between the desire for a “totalizing”, meaningful vision and the compulsive drive of an increasingly specialized, meaningless pursuit of knowledge. This dissertation examines a series of Modernist narratives which expose this double dialectic. The protagonists of Gustave Flaubert’s Bouvard et Pécuchet, Elias Canetti’s Die Blendung and Jorge Luis Borges’ El Aleph are all caricatural, anachronistic, curieux ultimately seeking an “absolute knowledge” that cannot be embodied. The moment it seems to have been attained, it is reified, “objectified” into a fetish, a “curiosity”. Yet, these narratives are not only about curiosity; they are in fact true vortexes of curiosity: that of the protagonists of the narratives as well as that of the authors and the readers themselves. As a result, these narratives also speak to the paradoxical location of literature within culture: literature appears simultaneously as the privileged site of all – ultimately phantasmic – totalizing, meaningful visions of the world, as well as a marginal locus, a monstrous cultural residue.

Socrates teaches in the Meno that in order for a belief to be justified, an appropriate relation must ‘tie down’ the belief to its (apparent) truth. Alvin Goldman’s position of externalism holds that for a belief to be justified, an appropriately reliable process must have obtained. One need not be aware of this reliable process. Conversely, Laurence BonJour’s brand of internalism holds that this relation between a belief and its (apparent) truth is just what the cognizer needs to be aware of in order for that belief to be justified. This work examines their debate, with particular interest paid to BonJour’s case of Norman: a clairvoyant who forms a belief via this ability but has no evidence for or against the belief or his own clairvoyance. Using this case, I propose an ‘epistemological spectrum’ wherein the insight of externalism is appreciated – what Robert Brandom deems the Founding Insight of Reliabilism – that a reliably produced belief bears some epistemic legitimacy, while retaining the insight of internalism: that objective reliability cannot offset subjective irrationality. This is done by classifying cases wherein only the obtainment of a reliable process occurs as epistemically rational, though not justified. Ultimately I reconcile the virtues of both positions, and propose that Goldman’s brand of full blooded externalism was generated by following an intuitional illusion by way of affirming the consequent.

Against moral intuitionism, which holds that moral intuitions can be non-inferentially justified, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong argues that moral intuitions are unreliable and must be confirmed to be justified (i.e. must be justified inferentially) because they are subject to cognitive biases. However, I suggest this is merely a renewed version of the argument from disagreement against intuitionism. As such, I attempt to show that the renewed argument is subject to an analogous objection as the old one; many cognitive biases of moral intuitions result from biases of non-moral judgments. Thus, the unreliability of moral intuitions due to biases (and the reason inferential justification was required) can be removed by clearing up the non-moral biases. Accordingly, biases of moral intuitions do not threaten a slightly qualified version intuitionism which posits non-inferential justification of intuitions when non-moral biases are not present. I also present an empirical study that lends initial support to my argument.

This dissertation theorizes the ramifications of new media forms of narrative on subjectivization by tracing the evolution of the observer through its permutations as second-order observer, witness, director, and narrative agent and demonstrating the various interacting processes involved in the recursive feedback loops between and among, self, world, and story. In this project, I ex-plore novels by contemporary U.S. authors John Barth, Richard Powers, Don DeLillo, and David Foster Wallace, as well as two televisual texts, Battlestar Galactica and Dollhouse. Drawing from several seemingly disparate theories, I situate my argument in the interstices of systems theory (Luhmann, Clarke), psychoanalysis (Lacan, Butler), media theory (Ellis, Fiske, Buonanno), and posthuman theory (Hayles, Badmington), putting forth a theoretical lens I call posthuman narrative onto-epistemology. The study thus fits into overlapping critical conversations. The extended treatment of five contemporary American novels situates Storied Subjects in conversations surrounding postmodernism and posthumanism as well as conversations surrounding these particular authors. For example, in the first chapter, I argue that the John Barth’s Giles Goat-Boy and Richard Powers’s Galatea 2.2 incorporate the observer from systems theory into the narrative frame, catalyzing an ontological and epistemological shift. In the second chapter, I show the ways in which Don DeLillo’s novels White Noise and Underworld demonstrate what John Ellis calls the “witness” ontology as well as the evolution of that ontology into what I call the “direc-tor” in David Foster Wallace’s Infinite Jest. In addition, the chapter devoted to televisual texts intervenes in an important, though often marginalized, conversation surrounding the importance of situating televisual narratives in dialogue with print fiction, arguing that we must attend to TV texts if we are to understand the texture of contemporary print fiction, which is saturated with the language of TV. In the final chapter, I explore the development of the “narrative agent” ontology, examining both form and content of the televisual texts Battlestar Galactica and Dollhouse in order to argue that, once second-order observation reaches a prolonged critical awareness, the observer’s observation runs alongside her or his ability to intervene in the narrative, which allows for changing the story itself.